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WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division

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PART A VOLUME 49

SEPTEMBER 1943

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WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
(Operations Division)

PART A

September 1943

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|--|-----------------------|
| Chief, Naval Staff: | Grand Admiral Doenitz |
| Chief of Staff, Naval Staff: | Vice Admiral Meisel |
| Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff: | Rear Admiral Wagner |

Volume 49

| | |
|---------|---------------|
| begun: | 1 Sept. 1943 |
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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 49 is the fourteenth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, and the Fuehrer Directives, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the micro-film library of Naval Records and Library.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

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Items of Political Importance.

Mr. Churchill did not deal with any new or important problems in the broadcast he made from Quebec on 31 Aug. He hoped that the conference desired with Stalin would be held in the near future. He said that the "gigantic operation" of a so-called Second Front in Western France, was very desirable. But the major blow could only be dealt after first ascertaining whether there really was a good chance of achieving continuous success, because soldiers' lives were not going to be sacrificed to political moves of any kind whatsoever but only in support of sound strategy.

Despite the seriousness of the situation, the beginning of the fifth year of war has been noted in the German press with unshakeable belief in victory. No public speeches by the Fuehrer or other eminent personalities have marked this event.

The Pope's appeal to all nations for peace has been turned down in the British press.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

I. Report of Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quarter-master Division about preparations regarding new instructions from Armed Forces High Command for operation "Achse" (see War Diary 3 Aug.). The occupation of Trieste, Fiume and Pola is a new development. It is proposed to let the commands advance with Army Group B in the same way as planned for the La Spezia, Leghorn and Genoa commands.

Naval Commands have not been prepared for the Dodecanese. Armed Forces High Command must be notified that there is no personnel available for them.

The "Pilot Commandos" left and some reached their destinations. German Naval Command, Italy is to report its plans by courier. It is suggested that Naval Shore Commanders should leave the North and East Adriatic immediately.

No harbor organizations are planned for Corsica.
The coastal defenses of Northern Italy are unprepared.

A full report to Armed Forces High Command is being prepared by Operations Division.

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Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division has ordered Naval Shore Commands, Fiume, La Spezia, Trieste and Pola to assemble and equip themselves ready for departure at short notice.

II. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

In connection with the above instructions from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence, reported that:

The units of the Sabotage Section, Intelligence Division stationed in Italy would be quite inadequate both as regards strength and equipment or supplies of sabotage material to prevent the Italian Fleet from deserting to the enemy. We have no underground connections either with members of the Italian Fleet or with the dockyard personnel in the naval ports in question, and owing to the lack of Italian speaking intelligence officers or other trustworthy collaborators, we cannot hope to make any successful contacts now.

The employment of insufficiently screened collaborators or confidential agents would constitute too great a danger to our security. It would in any case be impossible under present transport conditions to obtain sufficient quantities of sabotage materials together with the necessary personnel.

German Naval Command, Italy received a copy of this report from Naval Staff.

Special Items.

I. The Naval Attaché in Rome reported through Ambassador Rahn that the Chargé d' Affaires for Rome, Prince Bismarck, had been relieved, and in connection with this requested an immediate ruling from Armed Forces High Command on reporting procedure for the Attaché. For the present, the Naval Attaché will forward information of a political nature through the Naval Attaché's Department exclusively.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has decided that the Naval Attaché is to forward all reports here, whilst at the same time informing the Ambassador of them, except for those on strictly military matters, as laid down in the order received from Commander in Chief, Navy.

Incidentally, the former Military and Air Force Attachés in Rome were obviously relieved of their duties for the same reasons as in the case of the Chargé d' Affaires.

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II. Chief, Naval Communications Division submitted for the information of all higher front-line commands copies of his orders of 17, 21 and 26 Aug. on the experiences of submarines with the self-radiation of the Metox receivers.

Copy as per 1/Skl 23784/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Naval Staff is of the opinion that the obviously fatal part which the uncontrolled re-radiation of the Metox receiver in all probability played in the sudden breakdown of submarine warfare since May must be thoroughly investigated, primarily to prevent technical disasters of this nature from ever happening again. The elimination of the submarine arm must, just at the time it happened, have been of great assistance to enemy operations, a fact, which cannot be overemphasized. Therefore not only will thorough scientific and practical research be carried out on all radar equipment, but also all naval armament research problems connected with organization, testing and recording of operational reactions will have to be thoroughly examined.

III. The intelligence report given on 31 Aug. about "Ostrow" in connection with the enemy's planning of operations for 14 Aug. was, according to investigations made by Naval Intelligence Division, received by Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Secret Intelligence Section, Army Liaison, West on 19 Aug., by Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Secret Intelligence Section, Naval Liaison, on 26 Aug., and by Naval Staff on 30 Aug. In view of the importance which this report might have this channel seems to be far too slow. With regard to the question of the value of the "Ostrow" organization, Naval Intelligence Division remarked that its reports are thought of very highly by the Army and the Air Force, whereas Naval Intelligence Division does not have as high an opinion of their reports on the naval war situation. The "Ostrow" reports are often so comprehensive and detailed that it is difficult to understand how a private agent can continuously obtain first hand information of this nature.

It must, however, be pointed out that the data supplied by "Ostrow" explaining his sources and channels of communication usually appear to be absolutely reliable. Probably most of the opinions in the report arrived at by speculations and co-ordinations must be ascribed to agents in enemy or neutral territory, for these are characteristic features of these types of intelligence organizations.

Comments of Naval Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 26526/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

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Situation 1 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff informed the Naval Attaché in Tokyo by Telegram 0415 that the FLIEDER put into Brest in the forenoon of 31 Aug. There was nothing special to report.

The following reply is to be made to the Naval Attaché's inquiry in connection with the radar gear (see War Diary 31 Aug.):

"Aquila boats are provided with radar gear; the Italians have been told when it is not to be used. Nevertheless, appropriate orders must be issued to them. Submarine U "178" is informed."

An enemy situation report has been dispatched to all ships in foreign waters by Telegram 1907.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifty-seven planes were spotted over the Bay of Biscay; the greatest air activity took place between 1500 and 1700. One British vessel was located between 1043 and 2325 in each of the following squares: CF 8141, BF 1880, BF 1850, CG 9770 and GG 9486.

In the Channel radio intelligence detected continuous heavy radio traffic in the eastern part and in the straits during the night of 31 Aug. A number of vessels were located by radar between 2300 and 0515 in the Boulogne area. During the forenoon, minesweepers accompanied either by torpedo boats or old destroyers, were sighted or detected by long-range camera Blanc Nez and by radar location operating under cover of smoke screens in BF 3328, (west-southwest of Boulogne). Nineteen vessels were identified, ten of which were of the large type with the tactical markings "J" and "Yota" (minesweepers). Furthermore a convoy of 16 vessels was sighted off Dover.

At 0854 the Batteries "Todt" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" shelled seven vessels, which appeared to be large minesweepers, off Folkestone. One vessel of this group, returning alone, was shelled by the Battery "Friedrich August".

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At 1615 and at 1711, nine large vessels, amongst which there appeared to be some of the ATHERSTONE class, were shelled west-southwest of Boulogne; at 1836 the Battery "Sangatte" shelled three motor gunboats approaching the coast northwest of Calais and at 1924 the Battery "Wissant" shelled two motor gunboats north of Cape Gris Nez. At 1625, our air reconnaissance reported nine vessels on a south-westerly course 13 miles southeast of Hastings, which put up a smoke-screen, and were taken to be patrol vessels.

The exceptional activity of naval units in the Boulogne area, ostensibly on large-scale minesweeping operations which seem to have started on 31 Aug., may be an indication that preparations for a landing operation are being made in this area. In view of the increased attacks on our airfields and traffic installations in northern France and the numerous agents' reports from the south of England on the preparations being made there, the present situation in the Channel is of very great interest.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Five ELM/J mines were swept off Brest and La Pallice.

Three submarines departed from bases in western France.

On 31 Aug. 199 fishing vessels were at sea in the northern, 132 in the southern area.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "19", T "25", the MOEWE and KONDOR put into Cherbourg from Brest at 0635 and departed for Le Havre in the evening; the torpedo boats T "26" and T "27" also left Boulogne for Le Havre during the night of 1 Sept.

During the night of 1 Sept. the motor boat RHENANIA followed in the wake of a harbor patrol boat sailing from Le Havre; it seems to have escaped to England. The boat was moored in a berth. The codes and papers were stolen from the Harbor Master's Office.

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III. Situation North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

The convoy escort 457 Helder - Hook has been completed. The hospital ship STRASSBURG ran aground in AN 8537 in the course of efforts to tow her in (1.5 miles north of Ijmuiden). Salvage operations will only be possible with the assistance of a large pump ship. Anti-aircraft defense was provided by 7 minesweepers, 6 motor minesweepers and 9 patrol vessels.

Six ELM/J mines were swept near Scheveningen, Terschelling and Borkum.

The patrol line off the west coast of Denmark is unoccupied.

In connection with Danish fishing in Heligoland Bight, Naval Command North reported:

"1. Owing to measures taken in connection with the seizure of executive power, Danish fishing in the North Sea area from Danish west coast ports, including Skagen, has been stopped since 29 Aug. 1943. Of the total 814 fishing cutters concerned, it has until now been impossible to gain contact with, and therefore control of, about 100 of them still out at sea. Air reconnaissance definitely proved that the Danes are mainly fishing in the Dogger Bank; moreover 50 % of them are in the German declared area.

2. In order to safeguard our strategic interests, the new developments in Danish internal political affairs make it imperative for stricter control to be exercised before fishing is permitted again. It is therefore planned that fishing by Danish vessels in the designated fishing areas and, if possible, also west of the declared area, should be controlled by the German Navy. The preparation and organization of control measures will probably take two weeks; during that time Danish fishing vessels will be unable to leave their home ports. This will cause a corresponding reduction in the catch which, in view of the circumstances, will have to be faced.

3. The measures taken will be reported."

Naval Staff has first of all requested the Reich Ministry of Food to make a statement, so as to know what effect these measures will have on the German fish supply.

2. Norway, Northern Waters.

Enemy Situation:

Ten planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

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At 1247 a submarine sighted two single mast heads, presumably belonging to patrol vessels 59 miles west of Bear Island. According to radio intelligence on board submarine U "354", several vessels, including one in tow, were located on 31 Aug. at 2942 in 74° 00' N, 160° 00' E on an unknown course.

According to an intelligence report via Portugal, the new aircraft carrier RABAUL arrived in Newcastle at the end of Aug.; she is to escort the PQ convoy which is to sail at the beginning of Sept.

Own Situation:

The enemy battery on the Fisher peninsula fired ten rounds at an outward bound picket boat on 30 Aug. at 0740 and at two homeward bound motor minesweepers on 31 Aug. at 1435.

Two men were killed and four wounded on the motor minesweeper R "122". At 1253 on 1 Sept., the steamer RUEDESHEIM (2,036 BRT) in convoy near Havningsberg, was hit by a torpedo from a long-range double shot which was seen being fired from an enemy submarine. The ship remained afloat.

Twenty-four ships were escorted north, 21 south. In the arctic coastal area eleven ships remained lying in harbor owing to a shortage of escorts. Group North/Fleet transmitted and approved the proposal of Admiral, Arctic Ocean to use four destroyers for the mining of the Kanin Noss area and the White Sea entrance with 150 EMF mines each (time setting 60 to 80 days) during the nights of the end of Sept. and the beginning of Oct. and to carry out at the end of Sept. with one minelaying submarine, three minelaying operations off the Kola coast where destroyers cannot be used owing to the proximity of the shore.

Naval Staff approves the Kanin Noss minefield plan and draws attention to the old "Anton" minefield there, which is without contact setting. The proposed minefield for the White Sea outlet requires careful study, for according to the information available here, enemy traffic is mostly passing along Kanin Noss or the Kola coast, whereas in open waters enemy activity has so far only been observed by our Air Force reconnaissance on 25 and 26 Sept. It would therefore seem more advantageous also to carry out the second operation closer inshore, particularly as minesweeping submarines are not available because they are badly needed for supply operations in the Atlantic. Request of Group North/Fleet and order of 1/Skl IE 2573/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in file 1/Skl IE.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During the day gun carriers and five guard boats were located south of the Kronstadt Channel; they put up a smoke-screen when shelled and steamed off to the north. During the night there was only slight gunfire.

Air activity in the Gulf of Finland has increased perceptibly. During the week prior to 18 Aug. 93 planes were counted and from 18 Aug. to 25 Aug. 465 planes.

2. Own Situation:

The sweeping operations in the Smaal and its fairway as well as in the area south of Fyen produced no results.

The situation in Denmark is unchanged. All dockyards are working full time. The state of emergency has been further relaxed. The Coastal Sector Commanders of North and South Jutland have set up court martials.

Naval Command, Baltic submitted a report on the damage sustained by the NIELS JUEL. According to a diver's report, the damage was probably the result of bomb-detonation; the ship sustained minor leaks and small dents. Naval Command, Baltic considers the Danish commander's theory correct that after being deliberately grounded at a speed of about 16 knots, the ship was flooded by opening the bottom valves and bulk-heads. No explosions were attempted. It is thought that salvage operations can be completed within 20 to 25 days. (See Teletype 1123.)

Naval Command, Baltic reported in detail on the important operations carried out by the Danish Navy. The patrol of the Sound was one of them, but it will never under any circumstances be entrusted with it again as it would now be impossible to use vessels with Danish crews there. (See Teletype 1148).

Furthermore Naval Command, Baltic submitted the following report from Admiral, Denmark:

"1. Until now the Danish Navy had worked in our interest with absolute loyalty. It therefore feels that its pride has been very deeply wounded. At present I consider it quite hopeless to try and persuade them to reform a limited Navy. A refusal is definitely to be anticipated. This deduction is emphasized by the fact that, whenever this subject was touched upon in the presence of Admiral Vedel, he absolutely refused to discuss it.

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2. It will probably only be possible to carry out the Danish minesweeping operations, as up to now, on a semi-military (river police) or civilian basis. Investigations in connection with this are being made.

3. Light-house and seamarks service will continue unchanged for the time being. A change to a civilian basis could probably be effected without difficulty."

The Naval Attaché in Stockholm has been confidentially informed by the Chief of the Swedish Admiralty Staff of a report from Naval District, West Coast, that all German freighters now in Goeteborg had received orders to discontinue loading and to return at once to a German port. The alleged report greatly astonished the Swedish Navy. Naval Staff informed the Naval Attaché in Stockholm that no such orders were given either by Naval Staff or by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

The Naval Attaché in Stockholm has been ordered to investigate matters through the Consulate General in Goeteborg or through the Shipping Office and to make a report. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic reported that the minelayer KAISER is at present not available for operation "Lithium" because of boiler damage and he requested the dispatch of the minelayers ROLAND and ELSASS to carry out this operation. To lay this minefield with only one minelayer is impossible. One week's delay must be considered inevitable.

Group North/Fleet recommended the ROLAND as a substitute; she is at present attached to Naval Command, Norway. The ELSASS is indispensable, as she is needed in Pillau for a special training course for planes.

In accordance with this proposal, Naval Staff ordered that the minelayer ROLAND be handed over to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic as a substitute for the KAISER as soon as possible. Details are to be arranged by Group North/Fleet.

Otherwise nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

Convoy traffic was carried out without incident throughout the Baltic.

According to Commander, Minesweepers Baltic, as from 29 Aug. our patrol vessels will not be stationed in daytime outside the islands behind the "Seeigel" minefield, owing to the heavy losses sustained from enemy air activity.

The patrol positions will only be taken up during the hours of darkness. Otherwise there is nothing special to report from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers Baltic and Admiral, Baltic Countries.

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V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 74 planes operating over the western area and 15 over the Mediterranean.

During the day traffic installations in Holland were attacked by minor forces and considerable damage was caused. Isolated bomber attacks were also made on patrol vessels off the Dutch coast.

Single reconnaissance planes were reported over the Potsdam, Brandenburg, Goslar, Brunswick and Wuerzburg areas. Only eleven enemy flights over the Belgian coast and six courier planes between England and Sweden were detected during the night of 1 Sept.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out air reconnaissance over the Tunisian coast and over the east coast of Sicily.

In the afternoon, the enemy attacked the station and town of Cosenca and during the night of 1 Sept. carried out a raid on Naples with 20 planes, as well as harassing raids without attacking in Northern Italy.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty-six enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 30 Aug.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The REVENGE and the RESOLUTION put out from Gibraltar again at 1330 westbound. These two ships are ostensibly on their return passage from the Indian Ocean and only entered Gibraltar to get supplies. Furthermore, seven transports carrying troops and two loaded freighters with ten escort vessels put out from Gibraltar for the

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Atlantic and two auxiliary aircraft carriers with two destroyers for the Mediterranean.

The third auxiliary aircraft carrier located in Gibraltar docked during the night of 31 Aug. A CARDIFF-class cruiser put in from the Mediterranean in the afternoon of 1 Sept.

At 1800 Punta Carnero reported a convoy passing from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and consisting of 15 U.S. transports with troops, 6 U.S. freighters and 2 U.S. tankers under escort of 13 U.S. destroyers.

One U.S. battleship of the TEXAS class with one tanker and two British destroyers put into the port from the Atlantic at 1815.

Our air reconnaissance spotted no traffic in the sea area between Sardinia and the Balearic Islands until 1415. The battleships reported on 31 Aug. in the Strait of Messina were, according to photographic reconnaissance, the RODNEY and the NELSON accompanied by one light cruiser. At 1010 on 1 Sept. one cruiser and two destroyers were sighted 25 miles southeast of Augusta on a northerly course; at the same time two further destroyers were sighted 79 miles east of Augusta on a southerly course. These vessels are probably the patrol against the Taranto Group. At 1050 there were 3 destroyers 25 miles east of Catania on an easterly course and at 1100 2 destroyers and 48 small vessels 30 miles northeast of Catania on a northeasterly course. This indicates the increasing danger of enemy landings being launched from ports in eastern Sicily or southern Calabria. In the afternoon air reconnaissance of the ports of Catania and Augusta was hampered by heavy anti-aircraft defense. The NELSON and RODNEY were located in Augusta. Photographic reconnaissance of 31 Aug. showed an increase of 18 large, 11 small landing craft, 3 monitors and 15 small naval vessels and a decrease of 2 destroyers in Augusta. In Palermo, Augusta and Syracuse an increase of a few freighters and tankers was reported.

According to photographic second phase interpretation, the ships in Catania in the afternoon included 2 transports, 4 freighters, 7 LST's, 10 LCT's and 16 LCI's.

At 1540 our air reconnaissance spotted 1 destroyer, course 90°, 2 freighters with 4 escort vessels, course 90°, and a group of 13 LCM's, course 210°, in the Oran area.

On the afternoon of 31 Aug. a submarine position was reported six miles west of Cattaro and two miles east of Bari. A submarine was located southwest of Toulon at 0740 on 1 Sept.

No sighting reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

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The German General in Vichy submitted the assertion made by the Italian General, Avarna that according to the latest information, an enemy landing on the Balearic Islands is imminent. This report is considered rather unlikely at the present time by Foreign Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command. According to an intelligence report made on 27 Aug., large formations of American troops with war material have arrived in Oran.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Sea Transport Situation:

The 3rd German PT Boat Flotilla did not carry out an operation from Cagliari because there were no targets. No reports of heavy damage resulting from the air raid on Leghorn and southern Calabria have been received.

The Italian tanker FLEGETONTE was sunk two miles east of Bari by a submarine on 31 Aug. Two of our PT boats proceeding from Taranto to Pola arrived in Pola with 23 survivors.

In the convoy traffic, 10 steamers, 2 tankers, KT "31", KT "8" and KT "6" were escorted by 3 Italian torpedo boats, 1 submarine chaser, 2 auxiliary minesweepers, 2 motor minesweepers and 2 naval landing craft without special incidents.

Naval Staff has ordered German Naval Command, Italy to ask the Italian Admiralty for immediate information on the course followed by the groups of Italian repatriation ships operating between Gibraltar and our home ports, of the instructions given them by the enemy as regards the voyage through the Mediterranean, especially through the Sicilian Channel, and of ships and naval vessels sighted between Gibraltar and our home ports, stating their positions and time. Group West reported that according to information from the Deputy of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the barge (péniche) operation for the French south coast has been cancelled owing to the change in the war situation; sufficient barges are available in Marseilles for the requirements of the Italian coast and the inter-island traffic. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping intends, with the assistance requested of Group West, to route all barges still remaining north of Chalons by overland transportation (Elbe-Danubè) through Germany to the southeastern area. Furthermore, all barges in process of conversion in dockyards of northern France will be sent to Germany for the same purpose. Group West requested the approval of Naval High Command for the carrying out of these measures. The matter will be further dealt with by Quartermaster Division. (See Teletype 1340).

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

A surfaced submarine was sighted near Samos in the afternoon

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of 31 Aug. Enemy planes dropped a few bombs on Kos. No damage was reported. The DRACHE and the BULGARIA took on mines in Dede Agach, in preparation for the third minelaying operation off the Thracian coast starting at Kavala during the night of 1 Sept. Convoy operations were carried out according to plan and without incident.

4. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, 1 torpedo boat was located in the Kerch area, 1 destroyer in the southeastern Black Sea, another torpedo boat and 2 motor gunboats probably off the coast of southern Caucasia in the evening of 31 Aug.

Own Situation:

During the night of 31 Aug. the 11th PT Boat Flotilla with three boats was stationed off Utrich Point without achieving any results; the 1st PT Boat Flotilla with four boats and a naval artillery lighter group stationed off Yeisk and east of Mariupol, did not sight the enemy either. The enemy air raid on Temryuk in the evening of 31 Aug. caused no damage. Two of the attacking planes were probably shot down.

During the night of 31 Aug. mines were probably layed by enemy planes in front of the southern entrance of the Strait of Kerch. Sweeping operations are in progress. The 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla cleared another seven mines near Sevastopol. The enemy declared area south of Mariupol was swept without any results. In this operation one motor minesweeper was slightly damaged by an enemy air attack and four men were injured.

On 31 Aug. one of our planes dropped bombs on the Primorsko harbor and observed the effect of incendiaries.

Otherwise, nothing special to report.

At the request of Operations Division, Group South reported that the Hungarians are using three minelaying battalions with vessels in the Danube area between the Tisza and the frontier near Bratislava. The area of the German Danube Flotilla has been extended by Group South from Belgrade upstream to the Tisza river; therefore the assistance of Hungarians in non-Hungarian territory is not required. Group South considers it necessary to stipulate that the Hungarians' responsibility only extend as far as the Tisza.

Operations Division handed the matter of mine defense on the Danube over to Quartermaster Division for further action and laid down the following basic principles:

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"With regard to inland waterways (streams, rivers, canals) the Army (Deputy General Command/Engineering Section) is responsible for mine defense. This also applies to the German part of the Danube.

From the German-Hungarian border at Bratislava to the Tisza, mine defense on the Danube is to be carried out by the Hungarians with three mine battalions and a corresponding number of boats.

From the Tisza downstream, Group South considers itself to be responsible to Naval Staff; therefore the operational area of the Danube Flotilla, which so far ended at Belgrade, will be extended upstream to the Tisza.

This arrangement, which, however, diverges from the principles laid down whereby the Army was to be responsible for inland waterways, seems useful and important in the case of the Danube since:

a. the Rumanians as well as the Bulgarians, both bordering on the Danube, have ordered their Navies to keep the Danube free of mines and

b. there is a corresponding unit of our Navy available in the Danube Flotilla.

The responsibility of each of the Armed Forces for all problems related to the mine defense of inland waterways must be determined, and the Danube will require special regulations.

Furthermore, it must be decided how far the German Navy is to assist the mine defense operations of the Army on rivers, streams and canals by supplying material and personnel and by passing on experience gained in the handling and destruction of ground mines fitted with various firing units etc."

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Group West submitted the following comments on the enemy minesweeping operations off Boulogne:

"In view of the increase in the number of vessels in use, which has risen to 30, and of the systematical large-scale sweeping operations now in their third day, the enemy's tactics demand attention. The area of enemy sweeping operations has been extended further south to point Bassurelle Bank and further inshore to the French coast. An operation on this scale cannot be simply aiming at giving small enemy vessels a safer approach and better operational possibilities. More important aims must now be considered certain. Because of the increased use of smoke-screens by small boats and planes, there has been no exchange of gun fire. Fighter escorts have been continuously over the group, so that our Air Force has been unable to operate. There was lively enemy traffic off the English coast at the same time. An air photograph also revealed three LCP's with the group of minesweepers.

A minelaying operation with the last 97 UMB mines with snaglines at present available is planned for the night of 2 Sept. by two torpedo boats only near the fairway southwest of Boulogne; a float-cutting operation in the same area by motor minesweepers and PT boats is to sweep into the area of enemy operations in two groups. There are three torpedo boats at half an hour's notice in Le Havre.

A minelaying operation with ground mines is planned by the 9th Air Corps in the area southwest of Le Colbart Bank for the night of 3 Sept. The minelaying operation N 1 is also planned for the night of 3 Sept. with EMC mines with their snagline on the fairway off Dieppe."

Operations Division briefly informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, as per 1/Skl 2642/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Group West's assumption corresponds with Naval Staff's opinion and further justifies the decision not to withdraw forces from the area of Group West in favor of "Achse".

II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division submitted a revised report on enemy shipping losses for August 1943. Because of the anticipated lull in submarine warfare, of the total of 106 ships equalling 442,590 BRT sunk, only 22 equalling 115,413 BRT were the result of submarine activity.

Copy as per 1/Skl 26444/43 geh. in War Diary File "Enemy Shipping Losses 1943".

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

III. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Group West reported on the present situation of the forces in the naval fortress of Toulon:

1. Not only does Admiral Matteucci still refuse to hand over the batteries in the fortress area of Toulon but on 30 Aug. he also withdrew his former promise to hand over the coastal batteries east and west of Toulon to the Navy. He has only agreed to permit advance detachments, each consisting of one officer and eight to ten specialists, to enter the batteries. These detachments have in the meantime moved into the three batteries concerned.

2. This shows that although the coastal area is occupied by the enemy, the Italians must be intending to continue occupying Toulon for a long time. The motive behind this decision seems to be that they still attach great importance to the former French warships as booty. In addition they are afraid of losing some of their prestige with the French.

3. Commander in Chief, West first tried to get the Navy to approach Matteucci in order to obtain further concessions from him by making various demands. Group West declined this because:

a. of the indefinite state of the negotiations between Italian High Command and Armed Forces High Command and because Matteucci probably has orders to make no further concessions. Therefore, further discussions would not appear to be very promising, and

b. Group West has no authority to give Matteucci orders of any kind.

4. Now that 19th Army Command has taken command of the coastal area, Commander in Chief, West intends to put Matteucci under his command, if necessary by a unilateral act on our part, and then to order him to hand the batteries over to the German Navy. Armed Forces High Command has informed us that the Fuehrer concurred with this decision of Commander in Chief, West. Armed Forces High Command will inform Italian High Command of the planned subordination.

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The occupation of the coastal area and the consequent subordination of Matteucci will take place on 10 Sept. Unless there should be a drastic change in the situation no further steps or measures will therefore be taken in connection with the occupation of the batteries until then.

5. Previous transfers into the Italian area and Italian collaboration with 19th Army Command have always been effected in a most cordial atmosphere. General Vercellino and especially his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Frabucchi, seem quite sincerely willing to continue putting all their energy into the prosecution of the Axis war for as long as may be necessary."

b. The supply ship BRAKE left as scheduled on 26 Aug. on a supply operation to the Monsum submarines. (See War Diary 28 Aug.)

IV. Chief, Quartermaster Division:

a. The degree of secrecy is increased by "Special Instructions No. 1" from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff with reference to operation "Achse". Quartermaster Division plans to issue the order for the measures to be taken in three separate orders which are to be worded as simply as possible.

b. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division informed Group South and German Naval Command, Italy that the change in the command boundary of Army Groups B and F requested by Group South is impossible to effect at present and ordered the planning to be organized as follows:

1. The boundary between Admiral, Adriatic Sea and German Naval Command, Italy will be the Croatian - Italian border. The off-shore islands are to remain under the command of Admiral, Adriatic Sea, irrespective of which nation they belong to.

2. The area of Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia will be extended further north to the Croatian - Italian border including the off-shore islands.

3. The area of Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic from the Italian - Croatian border to the old Austrian - Italian border will be put under the command of German Naval Command, Italy.

c. The barge (péniche) operation has been stopped. It is recommended to agree to the plans of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. (See War Diary 1 Sept.)

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

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Special Items.

I. The Foreign Office informed Naval Staff of the basic directions given to German Diplomatic Missions abroad on 24 Aug. Amongst other things it was stated that:

"Although the present raids of terror on German cities would at present appear to be an indication of Anglo-American air superiority, this air superiority is only of a transitory nature and will change as soon as the countermeasures now being prepared are completed. The extraordinary importance which the rapid technical development of various weapons has had in this war, makes it easy to understand that there are bound to be phases of the war during which, because of certain technical advances, the enemy will have the upper hand. But our experience of all technical matters connected with war is superior to the enemy's so that we shall in the near future be able to match the enemy's technical advances with new German weapons, which will soon reverse the present obvious Anglo-American advantage. What has been said about the Air Force, also applies to the submarine arm. The present interruption in our great submarine warfare successes will in all probability be over very shortly."

Naval Staff considers it most undesirable to make predictions of this kind about the future.

Evaluations of enemy messages intercepted by radio deciphering and radio intelligence between 23 and 29 Aug. are contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 23/43.

Reference: to page seven in connection with the successes reported by the enemy anti-submarine defense and to the positions of our submarines which have been located:

"The number of German submarines sighted in the Bay of Biscay still remained very small. Attack reports were not intercepted. It was still noticed that in the Bay of Biscay at night the message "attack given up" was wirelessly again and again, always a few minutes after ASV location had been made.

This observation, already mentioned in Radio Monitoring Report No. 34/43, seems to indicate that the "Hagenuk" equipment was effectively able to warn our submarines in time to dive after ASV location. We must now wait and see how the enemy will respond to this experience. Not only are more reconnaissance operations to be expected, but also the use of gear which can operate effectively outside the range of the "Hagenuk" equipment.

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Situation 2 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff informed the raider, Ship "28" by Radiogram 2312 of the arrival of the FLIEDER (Japanese transport submarine), U "178", the AQUILA VI and the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN. The Naval Attaché in Tokio reported the arrival of the ERITREA with the AQUILA II in Singapore on 9 Aug.

The Naval Attaché furthermore reported that the AQUILA II will be ready to put out on 10 Sept. Therefore the time of departure for the AQUILA boats again presents an acute problem. The old pretexts are out of date, and the new ones are unconvincing. The Naval Attaché is now trying to get the Japanese to postpone the departure until the situation is more clearly defined, for the Japanese will have less ill feeling about it than the Germans, so that the Naval Attaché asked for support in his discussions with the Japanese Navy in connection with this.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventy planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay as far as 13° W. One British vessel was located at 2242 in BF 1930 and another one at 2344 in BF 2771.

About 30 vessels were located in the Channel west of Boulogne. The smoke screening was heavier than on 1 Sept. and the operational area was extended to the south and east. Owing to bad visibility it was impossible to use our guns. At 1700 photographic reconnaissance located nine vessels, including three minesweepers, two PT boats, three landing craft and one coastal freighter in the sea area west of Boulogne.

Seven ships were located close to the English coast. Four destroyers were sighted in Folkestone harbor which put up a smoke-screen when our planes approached.

At 1318 two PT boats or minesweepers were fired on at 175 hectometer range from the Wissant Battery; the boats withdrew.

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Group West submitted a detailed review of the minesweeping operations in the Channel on 31 Aug. and 1 Sept. which stated that:

"1. Sighting and radio monitoring reports of enemy activity revealed that a large-scale minesweeping operation was undoubtedly in progress, mostly within our declared area in the minefields laid with UMA/K mines. They are at distances from 20 kilometers upwards as far as the English coast (not 10 kilometers as stated in a message to the 3rd Air Force.) Many of these mines have been thinned out by the weather. Enemy activity has been continuously observed in this area during the last few months. This systematic sweeping operation suggests that large and valuable ships are to be convoyed through this area. The fact that the sweeping operation is being carried out in daytime, is not only because clearing is risky at night, but because the enemy is well aware of his superiority and does not consider daytime operations dangerous. Our only means of defense are long-range coastal guns, the effects of which are obviously not feared by the enemy owing to the slow rate of fire and the possibility of being able to put up a smoke-screen very quickly.

2. During the last two months Group West noticed several times that the enemy carried out sweeping operations in our declared area moving from Cherbourg eastwards. These operations could not be completely observed by air reconnaissance or sightings. Explosions, radar and radio locations were however so frequently observed that they made the facts quite obvious. The sweeping operation now being observed off Boulogne may simply be the final stage of this lengthy operation in the Channel, without there being any definite reason behind it.

3. The conclusion drawn in paragraph 2 is, however, not a final one, for the following facts have also been observed and may well be connected with plans for a landing operation:

a. There has been enemy minelaying on our routes east of the center of the Channel, obviously to prevent further forces from being brought up from the east.

b. Air raids have increased on the coastal airfields of the eastern part of the Channel.

c. The existence of troop concentrations in southeastern England has been confirmed.

d. It is reported that new long-range batteries are being set up in the Dover area. The information required in order to be able to form an accurate picture of the landing craft concentrations in the Channel ports can only be partially provided by air reconnaissance. The observations made revealed no increase in the number of

landing craft. Group West agrees with Commander in Chief, West that quite apart from the various intelligence reports on plans for a landing operation in this area, it has now been strategically established that the enemy may well be planning an enemy landing operation in the Channel. It is possible that the enemy may be planning limited operations aiming at the destruction of the special Organization Todt construction sites which he has learned about and which, in his opinion, could only be inadequately attacked from the air.

4. As regards dates, enemy landings must be anticipated in September because later on weather conditions will be unsuitable. There would be no point in carrying out sweeping operations long before the landings because of the danger of fresh German minelaying operations."

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines were swept off Lorient. Three submarines on a war cruise, were escorted out of Brest and St. Nazaire. One of the submarines which put out on 1 Sept. returned.

Group West, reporting on the searches of Spanish fishing vessels which have been carried out by vessels of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and by our torpedo boats in the Bay of Biscay, stated that the searches were all carried out without result, because thorough searches are absolutely impossible at sea and only possible in port after the vessels have been completely unloaded. No suspicious circumstances were found which might have justified bringing in vessels searched at sea for a thorough examination or detaining vessels ready to put out. Group West considers that further searches under present methods hold out little promise of success.

Naval Staff sees no reason for cancelling the present order providing for the occasional examination of the fishing vessels, for it is good for the fishermen to know that they are being watched.

Channel Coast:

At 0113 four of our patrol vessels moving from Dunkirk to Calais had an encounter with five enemy PT boats 4.5 miles north of Dunkirk. Hits on enemy vessels were definitely observed. We suffered neither damage nor casualties.

While leaving Boulogne the torpedo boat T "26" ran temporarily aground in the net barrage and was slightly damaged. The boat will be moved to Le Havre for docking.

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The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with three boats at Le Havre was ordered on half-hour readiness at 2200.

The transfer of the nine PT boats belonging to the 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas from Cherbourg to Peter Port which is to be the base port for the torpedo attack planned on an east or westbound convoy in Plymouth or Lyme Bay during the night of 1 Sept. and 5 Sept. has been carried out. The flotillas put out at 2100 for the torpedo attack in the western Channel.

To counter the British sweeping operations off Boulogne, Group West ordered a float-cutting operation in the left half of grid square 3553 for the night of 2 Sept. by motor minesweepers on the laying-course parallel to route "Herz" and in addition a minelaying operation by torpedo boats T "26" and T "27" with 97 UMB mines. Furthermore a PT boat thrust is planned into the area swept by the enemy up to 2 Sept., using all available PT boats in one group from Ostend and a second group from Boulogne.

Naval Staff informed Groups North, South and West, Naval Commands, Norway, Baltic and North and German Naval Command, Italy that during the last few days large-scale enemy minesweeping operations were observed off Calais and Boulogne, which may be an indication that a landing operation is being prepared. In connection with this Naval Staff pointed out that other facts, especially reports on heavy troop concentrations in southeastern England, lead to the same conclusion and it must, therefore, be anticipated that if the enemy carries out a landing on the northwest coast of France, he will simultaneously launch operations prepared against other coast lines. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; the Naval Liaison Officer to the General Staff of High Command, Army and the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Navy were likewise informed. The comments on the enemy sweeping operations of 31 Aug. and 1 Sept. submitted by Group West, were passed on by Naval Staff to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters; Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Navy and the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff with the following remarks:

"1. In the last few days we have closed the gaps between the German minefields which are always being used by British PT boats. The enemy sweeping operations, which are being partly carried out in these minefields, are taken to be a reaction against our measures.

2. As a defense against possible enemy landings in this area, it is planned to lay further minefields near our routes, so that the mines are within effective range of our radar and location stations. The mines will have time setting (up to 80 days, later 200) and snag-lines, which will make the mines effective against shallow draught vessels. The first minefields will be laid off Dieppe during

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the present new-moon period with the minelaying material available. Further minelaying material is to be taken from material, earmarked for other operations, because it is in short supply. These mines are being continuously shipped to Group West.

3. In order to be able to carry out in the Mediterranean the measures necessary for operation "Achse", it was planned to reduce the present strength of our coastal defenses by 20 % in the areas of Norway, Holland and France. The position was also reported to Armed Forces High Command who approved of the measures planned. But independently of the orders cited above, Commander in Chief, Navy ordered quite a few days ago that the withdrawal of forces from the naval coastal defenses of northwestern France should be avoided for the time being, because it would endanger this coast. Instead a request to withdraw the Army coastal batteries in Italy is under consideration."

Group West has been informed of Naval Staff's point of view.

Group West submitted a new inshore minefield system, because experience has shown that the uncoordinated minefield system used in the Channel is useless because it is outside the range of our radar and medium guns, so that sweeping operations are not very difficult for the enemy; it also pointed out the advantages of the proposed system in detail. Group West came to the conclusion that the advantages heavily outweigh the disadvantages and that this is the only possible measure by which to ensure the effective defense of the convoy routes and of the inshore coastal waters against possible enemy landing operations. The minefields in the eastern part of the Channel, off Dieppe, Le Havre and Cherbourg are considered to be the most important ones because it is there that most of the PT boat attacks are occurring and also where an enemy landing operation is most likely. It is planned to use EMC and UMB mines with snag-lines and detonators set at 200 days. About 2,500 mines are required, 1,500 of which are in the area of Group West.

Naval Staff concurred in principle with the opinion of Group West. Naval Staff, however, anticipates that the freedom of action of the PT boat commanders will be limited, not so much by navigational difficulties, as by the possibility of returning PT boats being intercepted by superior enemy PT boat formations at the minefield entrances.

Naval Staff approved in principle the change from the uncoordinated minefield system to the corresponding inshore minefield system, with detonator settings within the range of our own patrol and defense system, and released the entire supply of EMC mines available in Group West's area for this operation. 1,000 more EMC mines with snag-

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lines and detonator settings are for the present being set aside at home. Their shipment will only be possible after supplies stored in the western area have been exhausted, for these 1,000 mines also represent the emergency supply for the Adriatic. Group West has been ordered to submit as soon as possible full details of the mine-field system which must also take the interests of our PT boats fully into account. For relevant order 1/Skl IE 2626/43 Gkdos. Chefs. see File 1/Skl IE.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Eight sabotage agents were arrested in Esbjerg which is under martial law, three including their leader are still fugitives.

In the forenoon 20 Typhoons attacked the Hansweerd canal locks at the southern exit of the South Beveland canal with rocket bombs. Each plane released five 15 cm calibre rockets which were attached under the wings. The trail of white smoke behind the rockets formed a flat trajectory. No lights appeared during their flight, neither were smoke or flames observed after the detonation. One undamaged and two slightly damaged rockets were recovered. The locks were very slightly damaged. One boat of the Rhein Flotilla was sunk in the harbor.

Furthermore six British fighters fired on harbor defense boats in Flushing. Two of the ten Mosquitoes which attacked the minesweeper M "3401" on the Antwerp-Flushing passage, were shot down without any damage being sustained on our side.

At 2035 on 1 Sept. twelve planes attacked boats of the Rhein Flotilla at Shouven: one boat was heavily damaged, two slightly, and two of the planes were shot down.

On 1 Sept. seven ELM/J mines were swept at Schiermonikoog, Terschelling and Borkum, and one on 2 Sept. at Terschelling. The salvage operations and patrolling of the hospital ship STRASSBURG continued.

According to information from the Reich Ministry of Food, the Danish fishing fleet supplies Germany with about 100,000 tons of fish amounting to 1/4 - 1/3 of the total German annual imports, approximately 70 % of which are caught in the North Sea.

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Operations Division passed this information on to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters; Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; Army General Staff, Operations Division; the Naval Liaison Officer attached to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, and, also to Naval Commands, Baltic, North and Norway, and to Group North/Fleet.

Furthermore the following order has been dispatched to Naval Command, Baltic, with copy to Group North/Fleet, Naval Commands North, Norway and Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy:

"Naval Command, Baltic will decide on the date of release and put the Danish merchant and fishing fleets into operation again. An understanding is to be reached with the Reich Plenipotentiary through Admiral, Denmark, also as regards release of the fishery with Naval Command, North. In the interests of the war economy, an early reopening would be indicated."

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Six planes were detected on operations over the North Sea in the forenoon and four in the afternoon.

Air reconnaissance of the flight route Banak - Bear Island - South Cape - Ice Fiord (on Spitsbergen) - 75° N, 5° E - Banak was carried out according to plan without achieving any tactical results.

According to a report from submarine U "302" the southern route of Vilkitski Strait is full of drift ice, but it can still be used by ships and boats. Another of our submarines was chased by naval vessels in XA 7292 on an easterly course. From the patrol line in the Bear Island narrows one of our submarines sighted a smoke cloud for a short time in AB 3519. A periscope was sighted at 2124 in AB 3519; it probably belonged to an enemy submarine.

Own Situation:

The steamer RUEDESHEIMER, which was damaged in an aerial torpedo attack on 1 Sept. was beached in Per Fiord. At 1730 on 2 Sept. eight Russian bombers and fighters attacked one of our convoys with bombs in the Kirkenes entrance. One plane was shot down. The convoy sustained no damage. The rest of the convoy traffic was able to operate according to plan. Seventeen ships were escorted north and 31 south. Six ships were delayed by a shortage of escorts in the Arctic coast area.

Group North/Fleet considered that the situation in the Barents Sea was at present unchanged. We must wait for a confirmation of the

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assumption made by one of our submarines that the naval vessel sighted in XA 7292 was waiting for an eastbound convoy.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

There was slight gun fire in Kronstadt Bay. Three gun carriers and 25 patrol vessels put into Kronstadt from the west in the forenoon.

At 0230 an attempt was made to attack the Stansdaal ordnance depot. On Bornholm one of our infantry assault detachments was dispatched from Copenhagen to reinforce the island's occupation force. Furthermore an armed special unit was sent to Roenne on two PT boats.

At 2200 ten armed men forced Danish custom officers in Nyord near Gjedser to hand over the revenue cutter, and sailed off with it. Our patrol vessels were ordered to search for the fugitives.

2. Own Situation:

One British ELM/J mine was detonated off Korsoer. At 0815 the patrol boat IK "32" off Copenhagen was almost completely burned out. The cause is still unknown. Sabotage is out of question.

Torpedo boat "7", which was rammed on 28 Aug. on the Swine by the Swedish steamer ROSA SCHMIDT reported that sabotage is suspected.

The Swedish steamer SVEA REUTER was heavily damaged in an enemy air raid near Domesnes and is being towed in. The ship has no anti-aircraft guns on board. Orders have been given that ships bound for the Gulf of Riga are to be equipped with anti-aircraft guns.

Otherwise there are no special reports available from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, and Admiral, Baltic Countries.

In accordance with the request of Naval Command, Baltic for a stronger fighter escort in the Gulf of Finland (see War Diary 29 Aug.), Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff requested the 1st Air Force to supply Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic with fighter escort within the limits of available forces. According to information from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Navy, the 1st Air Force has only one fighter group of 38 planes at its disposal, of which 14 were operationally ready on 1 Sept.

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This group has to defend the whole area of Army Group, North. All other eastern front fighter groups have been concentrated in the 6th and 4th Air Forces. Owing to the extraordinarily tense strategic situation prevailing at Central Army Group and Army Group South, reinforcements from the 1st Air Force Fighter Group cannot be expected, even though Chief, Air Force General Staff is well aware of the precarious nature of the naval situation in the Gulf of Finland.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The enemy air raid on the Hansweerden canal locks was not carried out by 20 Typhoons, as reported, but by a formation of 20 Hurricanes with rocket bombs. The two planes reported shot down were accounted for by naval anti-aircraft guns.

During the day enemy penetrations into the western area were insignificant.

In the evening seven bomber groups with strong fighter escort penetrated the whole coastal area and raided traffic and industrial installations in the Belgian area. Two fighters were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns.

In the forenoon, four single reconnaissance planes were reported to be over Reich territory in the areas of Hannover, Mannheim, Nuernberg and Munich. During the night of 2 Sept. ten enemy planes penetrated into the Rhineland. During the same night a few bombs were dropped on an airfield in the area of Belgium and northern France. Heavy formations probably mined the coastal area of Brest and Lorient and the Gironde estuary. One Hampden was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out reconnaissance.

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The enemy carried out repeated operations against traffic installations in southern Italy. Near Cancellò (Naples) the railroad installations were so heavily damaged that traffic will have to be interrupted for two weeks. Small enemy formations raided Bologna at 1045. 50 - 60 planes flew over the Spezia - Taranto - Bolzano area in several waves.

Our bombers carried out an attack on ships in Augusta and Catania, and scored several near hits. Further results could not be observed because of heavy anti-aircraft guns and fighter defense. In the raid on Cancellò our fighters shot down 18 enemy fighters with only minor losses to themselves. During the night of 2 Sept. our bomber and torpedo planes carried out an operation against an enemy eastbound convoy off Cape Tenes.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South concludes from the concentrated enemy air raids on traffic routes in and leading to Calabria that an attack against this peninsula is highly probable.

3. Eastern Front:

Forty-eight planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 31 Aug.

The 5th Air Force reported that a coastal freighter of 300 tons and a patrol vessel had been sunk in Eina Bay.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The CARDIFF-class cruiser, which put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean on 1 Sept., left for the Atlantic. During the day one of the DIDO-class cruisers was at sea east of Gibraltar.

At 1230 Tangiers reported a convoy of 54 vessels making for the Mediterranean. Six LST's, one transport, and six escort vessels were sighted with this convoy. It crossed the Ceuta - Gibraltar line at 1400 with eleven large tankers, 26 freighters, eight LST's, and six escort vessels.

On the evening of 1 Sept. our air reconnaissance reported nine ships on an easterly course northwest of Bone and 13 destroyers and one cruiser - course not given - off Oran. According to our air reconnaissance, on 2 Sept. at 1254 there were 13 freighters with six escort vessels on a northwesterly course 10 miles north-northwest of Oran, and at the same time 22 freighters and eight escort vessels on an easterly course,

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at 1305 50 miles west-southwest of Cape Tenes, 20 freighters, and eight escort vessels on a westerly course,

at 1929 35 miles west of Cape Tenes, nine freighters with three destroyers and three escort vessels on course 60°,

at 1710 30 miles northeast of Philippeville, 32 large freighters, one cruiser, and six torpedo boats were reported,

at 1650 55 miles west of Bizerta, three large freighters, two landing craft (apparently converted) and two escort vessels, and 20 miles behind this convoy one large freighter on an easterly course.

At 0936 five miles south of Messina two battleships and nine destroyers were reported on a northerly course. This unit, probably the WARSPITE and the VALIANT, shelled the Calabrian coast north of Reggio.

According to a report from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, landing craft sufficient for approximately half a division moved from Augusta to Catania on the forenoon of 2 Sept. At 1800 ten miles northeast of Catania small vessels on a northerly course were continuously observed. These observations again go to confirm the belief of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South that an attack on Calabria is very imminent. Two monitors were in port in Augusta in the forenoon.

Reconnaissance of Malta on 1 Sept. was incomplete because of heavy defense so that new evaluations could not be obtained.

There are no sighting reports from the eastern Mediterranean.

According to an intelligence report, a convoy of 37 freighters is said to have put out from Port Said for Catania at 1900, on 30 Sept. It is said that it is planned to unload material and fuel east of Melito, north of Bianco, and in Locri as soon as the operation against southern Italy has been launched.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Sea Transport Situation:

There are no special reports from the Italian area.

Group West reported that Admiral, French South Coast (Aix) took over his duties on 1 Sept. Admiral, French South Coast, who was in Montpellier until now, will again be officially known as Naval Shore Commander, Languedoc.

The German Armistice Commission reports that, according to information received from a French deputation on 31 Aug., the Italians secretly put out from Toulon for Italy with the destroyer LANSQUENET during the night of 30 Aug. The French are very upset about this incident

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because negotiations are at present being conducted with Italy for a token Navy. French workers in Toulon arsenal have been instructed by Vichy not to carry out any work whatsoever for the Italians, except on destroyed coastal batteries. The Italians intend to tow away some more destroyers during the night of 1 Sept.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that Commanding General, Armed Forces, South ordered in accordance with the instructions of Armed Forces High Command for operation "Achse", that the eastern entrance of the Strait of Bonifacio be effectively mined and requested the immediate shipment to Toulon of 410 EMC mines with chains or else, if this is not possible, 200 EMC mines with chains and 210 EMF mines.

Naval Staff, Operations Division approved the required supply.

3. Area Naval Group South:

At 1815 on 1 Sept. an enemy submarine was reported off Samos. The steamer VERSILIA (590 BRT) which belonged to one of our convoys was sunk by an enemy submarine at 0600 on 2 Sept. This submarine was attacked by our bombers at 1218 20 miles west of Leros.

The Italian steamer PALERMO (1,461 BRT) was attacked at 1025 off Prevesa by four enemy planes and slightly damaged. The rest of the convoy traffic met with no incidents.

The 3rd DRACHE/BULGARIA minelaying operation was postponed for 24 hours owing to the weather.

One coastal patrol vessel on passage from Chios to Mudros has been overdue since 25 Aug.

4. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, none of the larger formations were at sea. Five submarines were located on operations. According to a sighting report from Novorossisk, four motor minesweepers were steaming up from the southeast, in T-formation off the coast. More than 50 detonations were observed behind the boats. The boats entered Gelendzhik at 1545.

Own Situation:

At 0600 the Anapa convoy was attacked by ten enemy planes and two fighters with bombs and gun fire. One plane was shot down. Neither damage nor casualties were sustained.

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During the night of 1 Sept. a weather buoy was laid by three boats belonging to the 1st PT Boat Flotilla 72 miles south of the Strait of Kerch. There is nothing special to report from the patrol line in the Gulf of Taganrog and off Temryuk.

The submarine U "23" put into Feodosiya for a short time to take on supplies. Owing to the weather, transport and convoy traffic along the Crimean coast was delayed by 24 hours. Minesweeping operations on the Mariupol - Berdyansk route, off Sevastopol and on the Danube continued according to plan, but without result.

During the night of 2 Sept. three naval artillery lighters and three boats of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will carry out a special operation in the Gulf of Taganrog.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

On 1 Sept. enemy air and naval forces attacked Marcus Island. In connection with this the Under-Secretary of the U.S. War Department stated that it would not be very long now before Tokyo itself will be bombed. Marcus Island is only 2,000 km from the Japanese mainland. The recovery of the Aleutian Islands has also helped to bring Tokyo within striking distance of heavy bombers.

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Items of Political Importance.

In a secret session of the Finnish Diet the Prime Minister made a statement on foreign policy, which was followed by a discussion. Press comments reveal that the war no longer has the unanimous support of the nation behind it. It appears, however, that steps in the direction of a separate peace treaty are not yet being seriously contemplated in leading circles. It would, however, be advisable to regard the situation in Finland as one which is beginning to lose its stability.

According to Reuter the discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill in Washington on 2 Sept. dealt mainly with their relations with Russia.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

A. Report of Chief, German Naval Command, Italy about the measures to be taken in connection with operation "Achse" in accordance with the new instructions from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. For memorandum see 1/Skl 2653/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

In addition to this memorandum Chief, Naval Command, Italy reported the following:

"1. My own personal impressions are that, to all outward appearances, the Government is conducting itself properly. It is trying to enforce its authority everywhere and to nip peace demonstrations and similar activities in the bud. For example a peace demonstration in Rome announced by leaflet and calling for all work to cease between 1000 and 1015 on 1 Sept. was prohibited by Government proclamation. Furthermore small Army detachments were stationed at all important traffic points in Rome and they obviously had instructions to disperse any gatherings.

2. At every conference, Italian Naval High Command has emphasized that, in the event of a large-scale enemy landing, it is willing to put into operation all the naval forces which that situation may demand. The Italian Navy has stressed that there will be no repetitions of Scapa Flow or Toulon.

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3. The naval commands in Taranto and La Spezia reported that the efficiency of the battleships, fleet cruisers, and destroyers has been distinctly improved by exercises carried out at sea and rigid disciplining whilst in port. It is reported that the naval coastal batteries are well trained. The Commanders and Operations Staffs are conscientious and energetic, the discipline of the men is said to be excellent, a fact which has been particularly noticeable in public. We are convinced that the Navy will offer spirited resistance to all attacks, from whatever quarter they may come. In the case of operation "Achse" it will, therefore, be very important to relieve the flag officers and operations staffs of their command as quickly as possible, for it can be assumed that in the event of such an operation they would have the effect of considerably diminishing the morale of the men.

In conclusion it must be emphasized that in the case of operation "Achse" sufficient Army units must be kept in readiness for the operation not only in Taranto and La Spezia, but also in the other ports, if complete success is to be achieved. Furthermore I am of the opinion that it is desirable in our own interest to delay operation "Achse" as long as possible, because our operations can at present be carried out much better in collaboration with the Italian Navy."

Chief, Naval Staff concurred in principle with the report and recommendations made by Chief, Naval Command, Italy. The above additional situation report is to be brought to the Fuehrer's attention.

B. Conference on the Situation:

I. The anticipated landing on the Calabrian coast started at 0600 near Reggio. According to present reports, one British and one Canadian division are participating. About 100 tanks had been landed by noon. According to radio intelligence, the enemy reported at 1227: "600 prisoners of war - including two colonels -, no mines, no Germans, slight gunfire along the coast, steady advance, civilians friendly."

Our own reports are not yet available for further details.

At the moment Naval Staff considers that this operation has been solely undertaken to gain a bridgehead and to complete the defense of the Strait of Messina. This will probably be followed by the occupation of Calabria and Appulia with a view to crossing the Adriatic to the Balkans. A campaign on the Apennine peninsula towards northern Italy seems less likely, nor would it fit in with the British temperament. Further details reported under: "Mediterranean Warfare".

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II. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported that the Air Force has asked for the concrete block on the coast of the Heligoland Bight, which was intended for use as a naval beacon station, in order to build a radio beacon for night fighters.

Commander in Chief, Navy has refused because it will be needed for reconnaissance now that submarine warfare has started up again. The request for a communications labor unit which was also made will, however, be granted.

III. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported that of the total of 343 submarines afloat, 108 have so far been equipped with quadruple anti-aircraft guns as planned.

IV. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division has reported on the request from the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions for permission to reduce the Navy's raw material allocation for weapon production in favor of warship construction.

Commander in Chief, Navy will immediately inform Minister Speer that this is impossible and will see to it that the request is withdrawn.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the confidential information which Chandra Bose gave in Singapore to the Chief of the German Commands in the southern area (The area of Malaya, Dutch East Indies and Burma is meant: Tr. N.) about his own intentions in Burma. See 1/Skl 26401/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

VI. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported that Armed Forces High Command offered four 21 cm guns belonging to the Army. The Navy intends to place them in the Dalmatian area.

Commander in Chief, Navy concurred.

Special Items.

I. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy has received the following order:

"To be submitted to the Fuehrer:

1. Commander in Chief, Navy intends to make a surprise attack on the enemy base at Ice Fiord (Spitsbergen) with a task force and

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with the support of the Army. Permission has been granted for this operation; the sailing order will be given by Admiral, Task Force when the weather permits.

2. The enemy has established his own bases on Spitsbergen after putting the German meteorological station in northwest Spitsbergen out of action; it also seems that coal is being mined again on Spitsbergen. The destruction of the enemy base would not harm the enemy irreparably, but the destruction of the enemy meteorological stations would. It might also result in disturbing the enemy's plans for a landing in Norway. Furthermore, Commander in Chief, Navy considers that the task force needs to undertake this operation in order to gain further experience in preparation for the anticipated main task of resisting an enemy landing in Norway.

3. Participating units will be the task force under the command of Admiral Task Force on the TIRPITZ, the SCHARNHORST and probably nine destroyers; units of the 349th Infantry Division will be embarked on the destroyers as landing forces."

II. Naval Staff issued the following order in connection with the construction of the East Wall (see War Diary 13 and 15 Aug.):

a. to: Naval Command, Baltic, Admiral, Baltic Countries, with copy to the Naval Liaison Officer attached to High Command, Army.

"1. The Fuehrer has ordered the construction of the East Wall: In the north along the line Lake Peipus - Narva. As yet, a retreat to this new position has not been contemplated.

2. In order to safeguard naval interests, Admiral, Baltic Countries is to participate in the search for, and the selection and preparation of, the East Wall positions in areas near the coast (coastal batteries).

3. Admiral, Baltic Countries is to investigate and report on such measures as may be necessary for the further fortification of the islands.

b. to: Group South, Admiral, Black Sea, with copy to the Naval Liaison Officer attached to High Command, Army:

"1. The Fuehrer ordered the construction of the East Wall; in the south along the line: east of Berdyansk - Dnieper bend at Zaporozhye; rear interception position: the Molotzhnaya sector.

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2. Thus, Berdyansk as well as Genichesk still remains as a naval base.

3. In order to safeguard naval interests, Admiral, Black Sea is to participate in the search for and the selection and preparation of the East Wall positions in areas near the coast.

4. Should it prove necessary to retreat to the Molotzhnaya sector and therefore to abandon Berdiansk, as a precautionary measure, the necessary preparations are to be made at Genichesk.

c. to: Quartermaster Division:

"1. The Fuehrer ordered the construction of the East Wall as a rear interception position. In the north along the line: Lake Peipus - Narva; in the south: east of Berdyansk - Dnieper bend as far as Zaporozhye, and rear positions behind this line in the Molotzhnaya sector. The position known as the "Gotenkopf" will be given up.

As yet, a retreat to the Lake Peipus position has not been contemplated.

2. In order to safeguard naval interests Admiral, Baltic Countries and Admiral, Black Sea received orders to participate in the search for and the selection and preparation of the East Wall positions in areas near the coast (coastal batteries).

Furthermore Admiral, Baltic Countries has orders to investigate and report on such measures as may be necessary for the further fortification of the islands.

Should it prove necessary to retreat to the Molotzhnaya sector and therefore to abandon Berdyansk, as a precautionary measure, Admiral, Black Sea has been ordered to make the necessary preparations at Berdyansk.

3. A Lake Peipus Flotilla is to be formed for next spring consisting of: 24 naval artillery lighters (three groups of eight each) and six coastal defense vessels. The 24 naval artillery lighters are to be set aside from this winter's building output, the six coastal defense vessels from those earmarked for Commander, Minesweepers Baltic. Group North, Naval Command, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic Countries have been given preliminary information of the plan to form a Lake Peipus Flotilla. Furthermore Admiral, Baltic Countries received orders to investigate into suitable bases and to submit proposals for their preparation."

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III. The Naval Attaché in Rome submitted further information in connection with the "Duke of Aosta" case. The Embassy and Armed Forces High Command received copies of this report. Details as per 1/Skl 2654/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII. In this connection, the Naval Attaché reported on the development of the situation in Italy as follows:

"In higher naval circles the opinion prevails that ever since he assumed office Badoglio has been trying to bring the Italian war to as favorable a conclusion as possible, but only with Germany's consent, for Badoglio takes Italy's honor as an Axis partner very seriously.

In senior officers' circles throughout all branches of the Army there is mounting criticism of Badoglio's method **as being** aimless and as having committed grave errors. Badoglio is considered to be an old man who is worn out, a good general but no statesman. I was for example very confidentially told that War Minister Sorice does not agree with Badoglio's method **because his** policy does not sufficiently consider Germany's strategic position. The same criticism has been voiced in a very intimate circle of officers by Urbanie, the Secretary General of the Air Ministry.

During the last few days higher naval circles have advised me of their fear that internal political events may well lead very quickly to a swing to the extreme left.

IV. On 18 Aug. High Command, Naval (Ship) Construction Division issued the following order:

"In order to carry out the naval construction program and all the assignments connected with it, the following, in accordance with the joint order of Commander in Chief, Navy and Minister Speer, will be technically subordinated to the Chief, Shiptbuilding Commission:

The dockyard control staffs,
the chief naval engineering offices,
the assembly and repair works of the naval dockyards and arsenals as regards all constructional problems (new constructions, alterations, repairs).

Otherwise, subordination of supplies and departments within the Navy remains as hitherto.

Of the technical work, for which the Navy remains responsible, the most important is that of

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1. The shipyard control staffs

who have to deal with and follow up the strategic requirements of repairs, of acceptances and of trials including partial acceptances and partial trials.

2. The naval shipyard of Wilhelmshaven and the naval arsenals in Kiel, Hamburg and Gdynia

which have to deal with and follow up the preparations for overall repairs and shipyard periods.

3. The chief naval engineering offices

which have to report in time any interruptions in the schedule drawn up for the work ordered by Chief, Shipbuilding Commission and also acceptances and trials including partial acceptances and partial trials.

4. Furthermore equipment and supply, the granting of contracts and management of funds come under 1. and 2.

V. Intelligence Service submitted the following remarkable information:

a. Agent's report based on a statement personally made by Colonel Malaise, Giraud's representative in Madrid, during the second half of August:

"1. A concentric large-scale attack on the Continent of Europe is not to be anticipated this year unless Germany is able to withstand the Russian offensives on the eastern front. The concentrations of ships and troops in and near ports in England, Ireland and North Africa are at present only to be regarded as being in waiting positions, in case Germany should be forced to withdraw large numbers of forces from the occupied areas for the east.

2. An isolated landing operation on the southern tip of Italy and Taranto is to be anticipated within the next few weeks. According to statements made by General Eisenhower, the next strategic objective will be the blockading of the Strait of Otranto. After the ports of Brindisi and Otranto have been occupied, the second stage of the landing operations is to be an attack on the Albanian coast, which is planned for this fall. It is said that the frequently mentioned plans for a landing operation at Naples or Genoa have been shelved because of the length of the approach route, the shortage of transports and the unprotected flank of Sardinia and Corsica. The occupation of Sardinia is also planned for the next few weeks; it is, however, considered to be a secondary operation, because the main

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defenses are in Italian hands so that after a few heavy bombardments from the air and from the sea, they will most probably give up the fight, just as they did in Sicily.

3. The first wave of the attack on the coastal area of Taranto and Otranto will be carried out by the British Army, for fairly strong enemy resistance is anticipated there, particularly from the German rear-guard. The U.S. 7th Army under General Patton, which has been mostly replaced by fresh units, will be used for landing operations on the southern tip of Italy and on Sardinia, because much less resistance is expected there.

4. Allied Supreme Command is said to have agreed to launch a large-scale offensive against numerous points on the Continent of Europe only when the success of such an offensive can be guaranteed by the further weakening of German defense forces."

b. From enemy diplomatic sources in Lisbon:

"1. The start of the offensive in Norway, as well as in France and the Mediterranean, has been set for 10 - 12 Sept. 1943 subject to weather conditions.

2. A convoy of 45 ships will leave Halifax on 8 Sept. with course Cape Farwell, then south of Reykjavik, then north of Bear Island to Murmansk.

3. About 20 Sept. a convoy sailing from Iceland with supplies for West Fiord is to join the above convoy for part of the route.

4. On 10 Sept. convoys will leave Oran, Bizerta and Tunis for the simultaneous offensive against Sardinia and the Lecce area so as to blockade the Adriatic Sea from there. Crete is to be attacked from Africa and Cyprus by airborne forces."

Situation 3 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report. For message on enemy situation see Radiogram 1723.

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2. Own Situation:

No reports received from our vessels.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 61 planes were located as far as 15° W. One British unit was located at 2232 in BF 7255 and one at 2258 in BF 4190. No units were sighted in the Channel in the forenoon because of misty weather. Between 1539 and 1628 13 vessels - apparently minesweepers - were sighted from time to time by numerous observation posts through the haze for short periods only, east of Boulogne. Very few locations were made. It is assumed that operations are being carried out in the same area and in the same numbers.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off Lorient. Five submarines put out from their bases on a war cruise.

The JAGUAR moved from Nantes to St. Nazaire and then proceeded from there to Brest.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 2 Sept. a minelaying operation was carried out by the torpedo boats T "26" and T "27" as planned. The boats were detected by the enemy. This operation was probably discovered by the enemy. From 1900 onwards, minesweeping operations were detected near the mined area.

The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla's sweep into the Channel area was cancelled owing to a lack of enemy position reports. The operations of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla were carried out with six boats according to plan. The enemy was not sighted. One boat, which lost contact with the group, was attacked on her return trip off Boulogne by enemy fighter-bombers without result.

The 2nd and 10th Motor Minesweeper Flotillas carried out operations according to plan.

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The 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas which were on a torpedo operation in the western part of the Channel did not meet the enemy convoy. On its return passage, this group was chased for a short time by two enemy destroyers without result off Guernsey.

At 2247 in BF 3331, enemy guns fired 35 rounds at three vessels of the 18th Patrol Boat Flotilla and one minesweeper proceeding from Calais to Boulogne. The vessels were undamaged.

The war economy sustained no damage in the enemy air raid on Paris in the forenoon. The Naval Base Company was hit by a bomb.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

In an enemy air raid at 0700 the ferry ZIERIKSEE was sunk and at 0712 one boat of the Rhine Flotilla was damaged at Fere (Walcheren). One plane was probably shot down.

On 2 Sept. six ELM/J mines and on 3 Sept. four ELM/J and two ELM/A mines were reported to have been swept in the area of the Frisian Islands.

Salvage operations on the hospital ship STRASSBURG were continued, so far without result.

Naval Command, North received the following order from Naval Staff:

If, as proposed by Naval Command, North, the Danish fisheries are only reopened in about a fortnights' time, the catch will be heavily reduced and will seriously affect the German food situation. This is, however, intolerable in view of the strained food situation. Naval Staff therefore ordered the speedy re-opening of the Danish fisheries. The disadvantages arising from the incompleting execution of a more rigid military control will have to be borne for the time being."

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Eighteen planes were located on operations over the North Sea.

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Submarines were confirmed off Kongs Fiord and near Nordkyn. Single reconnaissance planes were reported over the Vardoe and Trondheim area. At 1730 on 2 Sept. our patrol vessels and one steamer were attacked by eight bombers and eight fighters in the arctic coast area. No damage was sustained. One plane was shot down.

Own Situation:

The submarine chaser UJ "1202" was sunk by a submarine off Kongs Fiord at 0437. Twenty-one men are missing. Two torpedoes were unsuccessfully fired at a submarine chaser group off Nordkyn at 1025.

Twenty-three ships were escorted north and 21 south. Owing to a shortage of escorts, nine ships were delayed in the arctic coast area.

Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff of instructions in connection with moving the LUETZOW to home waters from Alta, planned for 22 Sept. approximately. There is to be an escort of four destroyers, including the JACOBI and IHN, which are due for docking. The other two are to be named by Commanding Admiral, Task Force and are to be relieved at Kristiansand South by two home-based destroyers. The journey is to be broken at Narvik for degaussing equipment tests of the LUETZOW, JACOBI and IHN and for refuelling the destroyers. Code word for the transfer in the area of Admiral, Northern Waters is "Hansa"; in the area of Group North/Fleet it is "Hermelin". Release by teletype from Group North/Fleet as per 1/Skl 2631/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

The stop at Narvik is indeed most undesirable, but unavoidable.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to photographic reconnaissance, two 65 meter long and conspicuously wide special service vessels, which were in Leningrad, were located in Kronstadt for the first time. The Peter Port - Leningrad route was subjected to gunfire.

2. Own Situation:

Danish shipping has been released on condition that affidavits of loyalty are signed by the Danish captains before sailing.

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There is nothing special to report from the western and central Baltic.

Ever since the fighter protection of a temporarily provided squadron has been available, all patrol positions have been occupied again in the Gulf of Finland.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Enemy penetrations over the occupied western areas have been particularly lively during the day. Twenty-two passengers were killed in the attack on the ferry ZIERIKSEE. Both heavy and very heavy air raids took place on airfields in northern France, especially in the outlying districts of Paris. Plane factories in the area were also attacked. Another target was the building site at Watten. Seven enemy planes were shot down at the cost of five of our fighters. For details see today's situation report. During the night of 3 Sept. a heavy air raid was again carried out on Berlin. The attack was concentrated on the western, northwestern and northern parts of the city. Full details of the strategic and industrial damage suffered are still unknown. A tanker was set on fire and a steamer sunk. The damage is heavy on the whole. For details see today's situation report.

Minor air raids were also carried out over the Duisburg area as well as over Belgium and northern France. Mining operations were apparently carried out in the coastal area between La Rochelle and the Gironde. Reports on the number of planes shot down have not yet been completed.

During the same night, 72 of our bombers were out on operations over England, probably minelaying. The report from the 3rd Air Force has not yet been received.

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2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out air reconnaissance. During the night of 2 Sept. 34 of our torpedo-carrying planes were sent out on an operation against an enemy convoy west of Tenes. Eight planes reached the target and damaged three steamers. During the same night a transport was damaged and close hits were registered amongst ships and landing craft by a fighter-bomber operation in the Strait of Messina. Twelve four-engined enemy bombers were shot down on 3 Sept. During the day the enemy carried out raids on Pula in the Gulf of Cagliari, on Crotonne, Cosenca and Sulmona east of Rome. During the night the areas of Capua and Naples were raided. For damage sustained see today's situation report.

3. Eastern Front:

Sixty-three enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 1 Sept.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation:

Nine freighters put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean in the afternoon of 2 Sept. and one ILLUSTRIOUS-class aircraft carrier put out with three destroyers in the forenoon of 3 Sept. The following vessels were in port at 1400: one battleship of the TEXAS class, two cruisers of the DIDO class, one auxiliary aircraft carrier, which had left dock on 2 Sept., one transport, 69 freighters, eleven tankers and others.

The two auxiliary aircraft carriers, which put out from Gibraltar for the east on 1 Sept., were sighted north of Mostaganem at 1945 on 2 Sept. Lively shipping traffic was observed in the Oran area. The eastbound convoy of 39 ships, reported on the afternoon of 2 Sept. off Philippeville, was again located at 1100 17 miles east of Bizerta. At 1730 our air reconnaissance sighted five or six freighters off Bizerta, and eight freighters, all with escorts, on an easterly course north of Tunis.

The RODNEY and NELSON are presumably in Malta.

The anticipated landing on Calabria began at 0600 north of Reggio at the narrowest point of the Strait of Messina. The first news of this operation reached Naval Staff at 0800 through a special bulletin from Allied Headquarters in North Africa via Reuter, stating that British

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and Canadian 8th Army troops supported by Allied naval and air forces attacked across the Strait of Messina and landed on the Italian mainland. The 15th Armored Infantry Division confirmed this large-scale landing operation carried out with the support of cruisers and destroyers. During the day continuous landings were observed in a wide sector 8 km to the north and south of Reggio.

According to an Italian report, 100 tanks were counted in the Reggio area at noon. Lively ferry traffic across the Strait of Messina was protected by very strong fighter escort, which badly hampered our air reconnaissance. A further large landing fleet was reported to be on the way. Its destination is probably the Melito area. There are no reports available on our resistance. At 1600 stationary transports (seven medium-sized and two large) were sighted near Reggio, and four destroyers were sighted near Taormina.

It has so far not been ascertained whether landing forces are being moved up from other areas besides the east coast of Sicily.

On 2 Sept. submarines were reported 55 miles west of Ajaccio, 47 miles east of Maddalena, 45 miles southwest of Toulon and ten miles southeast of La Spezia; on 3 Sept. eleven miles southeast of Bastia, 40 miles southwest of Genoa and 44 miles east of Rezzuto.

At noon our air reconnaissance sighted three freighters on a westerly course 28 miles northwest of Tobruk, nine freighters in the outer harbor of Tobruk, and five freighters and one patrol vessel, also on a westerly course, ten miles northwest of Alexandria.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Sea Transport Situation:

One of our submarines is stationed at the southern entrance of the Strait of Messina. The 7th PT Boat Flotilla is moving to Salerno. Two vessels of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla are transferring to Maddalena.

Four large and two small Italian submarines are lying off the east coast of Calabria, four large submarines are in waiting positions northwest and southwest of Naples. Four other large submarines are being prepared for operations in this area. Four naval ferry barges are transferring from Sapri to Vibo Valentia escorted by two motor minesweepers. The operation of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla with four vessels during the night of 2nd Sept. from Cagliari against a large eastbound convoy, reported northeast of Philippeville, was unsuccessful. Only southwest of Cape Spartivento and south of Cape Teulada were sighted groups of three destroyers each. The flotilla returned to Cagliari at 0850.

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In an enemy torpedo-plane attack with guns and 15 torpedoes, three planes were shot down by two of our naval landing craft north of Elba. Prisoners were brought in. Convoy traffic in the Tyrrhenian Sea and in the Adriatic Sea proceeded according to plan. Two steamers ran temporarily aground on **the east coast of Corsica**, but sustained no serious damage.

Naval Staff informed German Naval Command, Italy that the transfer of the remaining two **vessels of the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla** as well as the transfer of the foreign motor minesweepers has been stopped for the time being, until the possibilities of a transfer to the Adriatic Sea have been investigated.

General Hube, in command of the tank forces, wrote the following letter to the Sea Traffic Commander for the Strait of Messina, Baron von Liebenstein:

"Today, upon the successful completion of our evacuation from Sicily, I extend my sincerest appreciation and thanks to the units under your command who have testified to their devotion to duty through weeks of most exacting trials, which, in the last few days, were intensified into an uninterrupted operation, subject to constant enemy air attacks. Their finest reward should be the proud knowledge that, as a result of their devotion, not one German soldier, not one weapon or vehicle, has been lost to the enemy."

German Naval Command, Italy submitted a complete survey of the operations of transport units in the Sicilian and Sardinia - Corsica traffic for the period between the close of the African campaign and the occupation of Sicily. Copy as per 1/Skl Im 24554/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV. This report contains the number of vessels lost and the **transport operations as well as the achievements** of the German escort vessels.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that the Italian Admiralty has approved the formation of Sea Transport Station, Venice. The appointment of a German Liaison Officer to each Italian naval command has been agreed to for the ports of Ragusa, Durazzo, Valona, Corfu and Prevesa. As all the traffic in the Adriatic Sea is directed by Maricotraf (Probably Italian Naval Sea Transport Headquarters: Tr.N.) Rome, Italian High Command, Navy requests that these officers be put under the command of German Naval Command, Italy. German Naval Command, Italy recommends that this request be granted for the time being. Patras will be approved after a German Chief of Staff has been appointed to Marimorea.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In addition, the sinking of the motor sailing vessel COLOMBE by an enemy submarine on the Calino-Santorini route on 31 Aug. is reported.

The DRACHE and the BULGARIA with one submarine chaser and three motor minesweepers put into Salonika, after having completed their third minelaying operation. Convoy traffic proceeded according to plan and without incident.

The railroad between Salonika and Athens has been reopened now that the bridge at Lamia has been completed.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

A minelaying operation was carried out according to plan during the night of 2 Sept. by three naval artillery lighters and three motor minesweepers in the Gulf of Taganrog. On its return voyage the minelaying group was reinforced by four naval landing craft and was attacked several times by enemy planes. No damage was reported. Their arrival at Mariupol was delayed by weather conditions. The naval artillery lighter MAL "2" was damaged by heavy seas and had to be beached off Mariupol. Salvage operations are being prepared.

Further mining of Naples harbor was started. Six mines were laid during the night of 2 Sept. On the afternoon of 3 Sept. two minelaying naval landing craft put out from Constanta under escort of motor minesweepers and four fighters for a special operation off the Bosphorus. During the night of 3 Sept. five more motor minesweepers will follow on a similar operation.

The sweeping operations in the Strait of Kerch and off Sevastopol were interrupted by stormy weather. Owing to shortage of cargoes and weather conditions, neither supply traffic nor convoys ran along the Crimean coast. The Kerch-Anapa and Feodosiya-Taman traffic was postponed for 24 hours owing to the weather.

Operations Division most urgently requests Quartermaster Division immediately to investigate the possibilities of converting and rebuilding the war freighters in the Black Sea area.

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VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

According to press reports, the Finnish Prime Minister declared in a secret session of the Diet that the significance of the sacrifices made so far depended on the ability to reach a carefully considered and sober decision at the critical moment. Above all, unity was imperative. The Government's declaration was unanimously adopted.

According to the London Times, the U.S. Democrats have opened the election campaign with the slogan: "No presidential change for the duration".

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

I. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Group North/Fleet requested that all destroyers, becoming due for service from home bases, be transferred to the northern area, in order to carry out all necessary operations.

Naval Staff first of all proposes to assign the destroyers Z "38", the BEITZEN and ZH "1" and to reserve decision for further assignments in view of requirements in the west.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

Relevant order to Group North/Fleet and request submitted by Group North as per 1/Skl I op. 2574/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. IX, 2, Vol. 1.

b. In the withdrawal which is now imminent, Army General Staff has asked the Navy to carry out the demolition of the harbor of Novorossisk.

II. Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:

The request of Admiral, Task Force for permission to commence operation "Zitronella" has been submitted by Group North/Fleet with its commendation. It is advisable only to carry this operation out whilst weather conditions continue to remain fairly good and on condition that the meteorological operations planned are not interfered with.

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The fuel situation is still strained, but it will just permit carrying out this operation which will require about 7,000 cbm. The fuel reserve, at present available in the area north of Stadlandet, will thus fall from 25,500 to 18,500 cbm. A further 4,000 cbm are on their way off the west coast of Norway. Naval Staff is of the opinion that, apart from the prospects of success held out and the knowledge that the operation will at least harass the enemy, the decisive factor should after all be the effect it will have on the morale of the crews.

Having given due thought to the matter, Naval Staff therefore recommends allowing this operation to take place.

Should an enemy landing occur while this operation is in progress, the task forces would be able to start offering resistance within two days at the most. This short delay would not be a decisive factor in combatting the enemy and his supply lines.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred and ordered the information to be sent to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters so that a brief report on the planned operation can be submitted to the Fuehrer.

Group North/Fleet, Admiral Northern Waters, Admiral Task Force received the following order:

" "Zitronella" approved. Keep two destroyers in reserve for "Husar". "

The plan for operation "Zitronella" submitted by Admiral, Task Force needs no further comments from Naval Staff. Copy as per 1/Skl 2669/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. "Spitsbergen". The tour of inspection of Norway planned by Chief, Naval Staff for the week commencing 6 Sept. has been postponed.

III. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division about minelaying plans for the Gorlo Straits and the White Sea as per War Diary 1 Sept.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred with Naval Staff's decision.

During further discussions with Commander in Chief, Navy, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff stated the reasons which would make it expedient for Naval Staff - as an operations staff - to be, to a certain extent, disassociated from the ministerial activities and administrative duties of High Command, Navy. Armed Forces High Command, the Army and the Air Force followed the right course, whereas owing to self-imposed, but misplaced, limitations the Navy did not establish a very useful and broadly planned Operations Headquarters, for the conduct of naval warfare, so that technically speaking, it has

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remained attached to the Naval High Command. Consequently the Naval Staff is incapable of handling this organization. It has to suffer the consequences of such an unwieldy arrangement without being able to remedy the situation. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff suggests accelerating construction at Lanke (a small town east of Berlin where emergency headquarters were being built for the Naval Staff, Tr. N.) with the assistance of Minister Speer, so that the Commander in Chief, Navy, the Operations Division, and the Submarine Division, as well as parts of the Quartermaster and Naval Intelligence Divisions, can be transferred there as soon as possible. These measures should in every respect have a favorable effect on naval efficiency, especially if they result in more favorable and congenial working conditions than are possible under the present circumstances.

The fact that Lanke is so favorably located by being near Berlin as well as Eberswalde (Eberswalde, a town northeast of Berlin, where part of the Naval High Command was housed, Tr.N.) will make it very easy for the Naval Staff and the Naval High Command to keep in contact with each other. Furthermore, in view of the danger to all telegraphic lines of communication from enemy air raids, the Bernau area would also be suitable because of the naval radio transmitter there.

The Commander in Chief, Navy agrees with the views expressed by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

A detailed proposal made by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and the Quartermaster Division suggests, similar to the "ideal plan for the organization of the Navy" drawn up by the Organization and Mobilization Branch, putting all departments outside of the Naval Staff under the command of a Chief of Naval Affairs in order to relieve the Commander in Chief, Navy of some of his responsibilities, since he is almost constantly absent from his headquarters in order to be either at the Fuehrer Headquarters or at the Naval Staff command post.

The Commander in Chief, Navy entertained similar ideas when he first came to Berlin, but he did not put them into effect because, after the very first few months, it was clear to him that the Commander in Chief, Navy actually cannot be relieved of any of his responsibilities by a Chief of Naval Affairs, because the Divisional Chiefs of the Naval High Command consult him on matters which only he can decide after consultation with the Fuehrer or other leading personalities. Other disadvantages of such decentralization should also not be overlooked. The confusion which arose concerning the development of new types of planes for the Air Force should be remembered as a deterring example. The effective leadership exercised by the Navy is the result of deliberately cen-

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tralized organization. The plan proposed for the organization by Naval Staff is undoubtedly an attractive one. Commander in Chief, Navy, however, really doubts whether a difference will be felt. He ordered that the transfer of Submarine Division be accelerated as much as possible and that it is to be followed by Operations Division which is to begin making preparations. The completion of Lanke is to be pushed forward with the assistance of Minister Speer.

Special Items.

I. Preparations for Operation "Achse".

1. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters has been instructed to submit to the Fuehrer the general survey of the situation in Italy made on 2 Sept. by Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy (see War Diary 2 Sept.) with the following comment by Naval Staff:

"This report confirms the opinion, which Commander in Chief, Navy already expressed to the Fuehrer, that it is desirable to postpone operation "Achse" as long as possible."

As per 1/Skl I op. 2662/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. II, 17.

2. In connection with instructions of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff for execution of operation "Achse" (see War Diary 30 Aug.).

Naval Staff reported its intentions in teletype 1/Skl I op. 2666/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Amongst other things, this report shows that it will be impossible for the German Navy, single handed and with its limited forces, to carry out the order to take over the Italian warships.

3. In connection with the decision of Quartermaster Division on the reorganization of the Adriatic coastal commands (see War Diary 2 Sept.) Group South requested the appointment of a third naval shore commander in the Adriatic area as soon as the manpower situation allows such a step. Teletype as per 1/Skl 2661/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. II, 17, Vol. 1.

The matter will be further dealt with by Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division.

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II. Denmark.

As regards the proposals of Naval Staff concerning the Danish Navy (see War Diary 31 Aug.), Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff made the following decisions:

"1. In agreement with the German Foreign Office, Naval Staff's recommendations are approved. Danish naval vessels are to remain Danish property, but will be taken over by the German Navy with the right of ownership reserved.

2. The re-establishment of the Danish Navy under the Danish Ensign is out of question. There are no objections against continuing the Danish Minesweeping Service on a civilian basis or of employing it as a river police force.

These measures must be carried out in co-operation with the Reich Commissioner."

III. In accordance with the proposals of Naval Command, Baltic, Quartermaster Division ordered that in order to guarantee requirements in personnel the following commands should be created:

A. In the area of Admiral, Denmark:

1. Coastal Sector Commander, North Jutland,
2. Coastal Sector Commander, South Jutland,
3. Coastal Sector Commander, Danish Islands.

B. 1. The command area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic will be extended further east, up to and inclusive of Memel. The duties of Admiral, Denmark and of the Naval Shore Commanders, Western Baltic, Pomerania and Eastern Baltic in connection with the coastal inshore waters and the mine defense of the harbors and harbor entrances are transferred to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. The coastal defense flotillas and the harbor defense flotillas are transferred to the command of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

The Skagen Harbor Defense Flotilla is to be excepted and to remain as before under the command of Admiral, Denmark. Furthermore all boom defense craft remain under the command of the sector commanders.

2. The Senior Officer's ship, the REIHER, remains under Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

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3. The Staff of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic will be augmented by a staff officer and one communications officer.

C. 1. The commands of Naval Shore Commanders, Western Baltic, Pomerania and Eastern Baltic are abolished and instead the command of

"Naval Shore Commander, Southern Baltic"

will be created. The duties of Naval Shore Commander, Southern Baltic are limited solely to coastal and anti-aircraft gun defense measures, and to duties of a similar nature which may be ordered for the home front. Naval Command, Baltic will decide where Naval Shore Commander, Southern Baltic is to be stationed. In the opinion of High Command, Navy, Gdynia would be the most suitable place.

D. In the area of Admiral, Baltic Countries, one naval shore command is to be abolished, for the sake of economy. The Reval area must, however, remain within the area of a naval shore commander.

Copy as per 1/Skl 24669/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Situation 4 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported:

"1. The Japanese Navy has for the time being (about 2 weeks) ordered Singapore to stop the AQUILA boats from sailing for strategic reasons and in the meantime requests them to come to a clear-cut decision with Rome on the AQUILA question because it is impossible to continue postponing the date of sailing by making excuses.

2. Admiral Kojuma was today officially appointed Attaché in Berlin. Leaving end of October on TANNE from Singapore. Admiral Yokoi will return on FLIEDER."

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The Naval Attaché in Tokyo, copy to Ship "28", has received the following instructions by Radiogram 2147:

"1. Blockade-runners are to be instructed in their sailing orders that everything possible must be done and the radio operators remain at their posts to the end in order to send signals to the home base or to Tokyo right until the ship sinks or the radio station is demolished. Information on the ship's fate is vital to Naval Staff for the planning of future operations.

2. As we are connected with Norddeich, area-station Tokyo or Choshi Radio, perhaps our only course is to transmit messages in the same form as the distress signals of enemy merchant shipping. In areas where enemy merchant shipping is likely, this method should be tried before sending messages to German or Japanese stations. It is unlikely that the pursuing enemy will be deceived. It is, therefore, only to be used in cases of great danger, in order to make enemy shore stations repeat the message.

3. At the moment the enemy is no longer using international but secret call signs in groups of five letters, using four letters and at present, always the numeral four in the middle. Give each ship an arbitrarily chosen call sign of a similar kind in her sailing orders (it must also be known by the wireless operators) and advise Naval Staff. Secret call signs for these enemy distress signals are, therefore, now given independently of those assigned to the cover ships.

4. Form of distress signals to German and Japanese stations as up to now. In the Far East they are, if necessary, to be dispatched to Choshi and Norddeich alternately. "Himati" radio instructions to be corrected correspondingly."

Furthermore, the Naval Attaché in Tokyo will receive the following instructions by Telegram 0555:

"Because of fuel difficulties Italian submarine I "28" (CAGNI), at present in South African operational area, is proceeding on direct course to AQUILA rendezvous position. Arrival there to be expected by 22 Sept. Putting in instructions to be reported. Submarine is to replenish and take on rubber for return passage.

Enemy situation report to all in foreign waters as per Radiogram 1343.

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventy-seven planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. A British unit was located at 2034 in BF 7420 and another at 2151 in BE 6980. In the Boulogne area there was fair visibility, but only normal patrol activity was observed off the English coast. At the moment, Group West does not draw any new conclusion from the fact that the enemy has broken off minesweeping operations, but still considers the situation to be tense.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

During the night of 3 Sept. a small British commando raid was carried out on Ouessant. After an exchange of fire with German guards, the raid was apparently given up. No actual damage has been ascertained on the island. The British left some equipment and weapons behind. Two mines were cleared six miles northwest of Bayonne. The route was closed. Group West draws attention to the renewed activity of enemy submarines in the south of the Bay of Biscay. Two ELM/J mines were swept south of Brest and one off La Pallice.

The JAGUAR moved from Nantes to Brest to commence her dockyard period.

Channel Coast:

In connection with the operation of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 2 Sept., it is supplementary reported that on their return trip our boats had a brief engagement with an enemy destroyer subdivision, but did not have a chance to attack with torpedoes. The boats also reported a heavy air attack with bombs, flare bombs, and flare floats, from which they sustained no damage. Furthermore on the same day four enemy minesweepers were bombarded by the Army battery at Hardenot. The enemy put up a smoke-screen. At 2350 a few batteries each fired a salvo at enemy vessels by radar location in BF 3351.

At 0116 on 4 Sept. the convoy LOTHRINGEN on passage from Boulogne to Flushing was bombarded by British batteries.

Our batteries returned fire. The convoy put into Flushing at 0615 according to plan and undamaged. At 0740 20 Spitfires fired on a tug off Fécamp which was scuttled off the harbor entrance with the loss of some of the crew.

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At 1520 48 light enemy bombers raided Boulogne without inflicting any strategic damage. The raid was repeated at 1936 by heavier forces . Once again no serious damage was sustained.

Seven mines with snag-lines were swept between Dunkirk and Ostend.

At 2100 the 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas were put at immediate readiness for a torpedo operation in Plymouth Sound.

The enemy showed lively PT boat activity on the coastal route Boulogne - Le Tréport during the night of 4 Sept. At 2240 and shortly after midnight thereafter, the 10th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla had an engagement with enemy PT boats, two of which were sunk. Our own boats suffered minor losses.

Furthermore, the laying of mine barrage "Nanni I" was carried out.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Three ground mines were swept off the East Frisian Islands. The salvage operations on the hospital ship STRASSEBURG were continued so far without any success. During the night of 3 Sept. presumably another enemy aerial minelaying operation took place at the mouth of the Elbe and off the coast of Heligoland Bight. Anti-aircraft guns fired ineffectively against the enemy planes.

Admiral, Netherlands assumes that the enemy air raids on canal locks and traffic installations on 1, 2 and 3 Sept. were aimed at our supply lines in the area of Belgium - northern France and that further raids on canal locks and railway installations in the Zeeland area are to be expected. Additional canal lock protection has been ordered involving erecting masts against low flying planes, employing the river flotilla for harbor defense and reinforcing the anti-aircraft gun defenses at the canal locks. Naval Command, North draws special attention to these enemy activities, in view of anticipated enemy plans in the western area.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

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Over the North Sea eleven planes were detected on operations. At noon on 3 Sept. enemy planes carried out reconnaissance of the ships' mooring berths at Alta Fiord and Narvik. At 2348 on 3 Sept. three enemy PT boats on an easterly course were sighted from Sandoe and at 0225 on 4 Sept. one was sighted on a westerly course. Between 0240 - 0325 16 planes were reported over the Kristiansand South area; three bomb explosions were heard southeast of Arendal.

At 0645 in the area of the Faroes our air reconnaissance reported two cruisers and four destroyers in AE 9828, and at 0800 two destroyers on a northwesterly course in AM 1286. Otherwise, the reconnaissance produced no tactical results.

Own Situation:

On 3 Sept. three anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut off Nordkyn. On resweeping, three mines in good condition were cleared.

Shipping between Bergen and Aalesund was stopped because of PT boat danger. Our search operations and air reconnaissance have been so far without result.

Fifteen ships were escorted north, 19 south. In the arctic coastal area eight ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escorts.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Slight gunfire and little shipping traffic was reported in Kronstadt Bay. Numerous small vessels were observed in the Lavansaari area. In the Tyters area our boats were attacked by planes of which four were shot down. A group of 28 vessels, presumably motor minesweepers, were shelled by the Tyters Battery in the afternoon. One boat was sunk, another hit. The boats returned with the assistance of PT boats which came out from Lavansaari.

Under escort of Swedish destroyers, the LIONEL changed her anchorage in the coastal islands.

2. Own Situation:

Patrol measures against the Norwegian ships which are blockade-running out of Goetsborg are to be intensified. The 5th Air Force promised armed air reconnaissance.

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It is suspected that an enemy minelaying operation was carried out at the northern entrance to the sound during the night of 3 Sept.

It is also presumed that the areas of Skagen, Laesoe Channel, Aalborg Bay and Aarhus Bay were mined. Temporarily barred routes in the Baltic Sea entrances are being swept.

One British ELM mine was detonated in AO 7514.

Convoy traffic was carried out without incident throughout the Baltic.

No special reports are available from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers Baltic and Admiral, Baltic Countries.

Naval Command, Baltic together with the 5th Air Force, Group North/Fleet and Naval Command, Norway investigated the possibilities of resuming the North Sea reconnaissance. With the strength of the 5th Air Force as it is, this measure cannot at present be carried out, for the few available planes are indispensable to the escort operations along the southwest coasts of Norway. For copy of relevant report see Teletype 1347.

At the request of High Command, Army, on 25 Aug. Naval Command, Baltic openly prohibited all shipping to enter an area north of Stolp. An announcement of this kind makes it quite obvious that the declared area is being used as a firing range for the Penemuende research factory. Naval Staff informed the Naval Liaison Officer attached to Army General Staff, High Command, Army of the inexpediency of this measure.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 298 planes out on operations in the west and ten in the Mediterranean. The minelaying operation we carried out during the night of 3 Sept. took place east of the Isle

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of Wight where 64 BM 1000 and 57 LMB mines were laid. During the day very lively enemy air activity was reported over the whole of the western area with raids by numerous formations of two- and four-engined planes with heavy fighter escort, concentrating on railway installations in northern France. The trains transporting the 25th Tank Division were hit at St. Pol railroad station. Damage is only slight. In connection with the raids on Boulogne see: "Situation West Area!" Our fighters shot down four Spitfires. During the night of 4 Sept. the mouth of the Elbe was probably again mined by about ten enemy planes.

In the evening eight to ten enemy planes penetrated the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area and dropped two bombs on open country. In the Texel area and the coastal area of Lorient minelaying operations on a larger scale were probably carried out.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out air reconnaissance in the Sicily - Calabria area, and also photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria. At Palmi an enemy cruiser was damaged in an attack by our fighter-bombers. In the afternoon the enemy raided airfields in the Naples and Capua area. Three enemy planes were attacked. In the evening 15 enemy planes attacked the Island of Ventotone, where slight damage was done. Harassing raids were carried out over the Naples area.

3. Eastern Front:

On 2 Sept. 62 planes were shot down over the Army frontlines.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Two DIDO-class cruisers with one auxiliary aircraft carrier and four destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. A convoy of 18 steamers with six escort vessels left the port for the Atlantic. Twelve freighters with five escort vessels put in from an unknown direction.

The ILLUSTRIOUS-class aircraft carrier which put out from Gibraltar on 3 Sept. was sighted on the same day at 1530 near Alboran on an easterly course.

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No further reports are available on the large convoy of 39 ships, against which our PT boats carried out an unsuccessful operation during the night of 3 Sept.

The following reports are available on the enemy situation in southern Calabria. Cannitello, at the northern entrance to the Strait of Messina was in enemy hands in the afternoon of 3 Sept. Air-borne infantry landed one mile southeast of Cape Del Armi. The landing fleet which was reported to be approaching carried out landing operations in the afternoon of 3 Sept. two miles east of Melito. In the afternoon of 3 Sept. and in the morning of 4 Sept. lively shipping traffic was sighted between Catania and Reggio. In the afternoon of 3 Sept. one cruiser and four destroyers as well as numerous patrol vessels were lying at the southern entrance to the Strait of Messina. Furthermore both monitors were at sea in the early morning of 4 Sept.

A large landing force left Messina, possibly for a landing operation behind our lines at Palmi. It is estimated that the enemy has so far landed three British divisions, including one tank division. Palmi and Reggio are the centers of the transport traffic. The bringing up of additional landing craft into the Sicilian ports has not been noticed. No important changes have been noticed in the occupation of the ports of Syracuse and Augusta.

No sighting reports are available from the eastern Mediterranean. Photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria at noon on 3 Sept. revealed about 300,000 BRT of merchant tonnage, two cruisers and one submarine in dock.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Sea Transport Situation:

During the night of 2 Sept. Italian PT boats carried out a special operation off the north coast of Tunisia. Another group pushed forward to the coast of southern Calabria, without sighting the enemy.

Of the five PT boats we had in Cagliari three moved to Salerno, two to Maddalena. Four of our motor minesweepers put into Maddalena after carrying out minesweeping operations. In connection with the operation of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 2 Sept. against the large convoy, the Commander of the 1st PT Boat Force reported that 15 miles west of La Galite the group was forced away by two destroyers and probably passed right behind the convoy. On the return trip the group was again detected by three destroyers, but their tactical position and the visibility gave them no opportunity to attack.

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The removal of Army equipment from Vibo Valentia is being continued.

Eight Italian torpedo boats, one anti-aircraft corvette and three motor minesweepers were on escort duty. Eight steamers, two tankers and the war freighter KT "8" and KT "31" were escorted. Convoys were also carried out without incident in the Adriatic Sea. In connection with this, German Naval Command, Italy reported that enemy submarine activity in the Strait of Otranto has increased so that unescorted passages are now impossible. Calling at Brindisi is especially dangerous. The Italian Admiralty, realizing the importance of keeping the Strait of Otranto open, is using six corvettes and two submarine chaser groups there. Our patrol vessels and planes are not available. German Naval Command, Italy therefore proposed that Group South should use boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and induce Air Force Command, Southeast and Air Force Staff, Greece to carry out submarine chase. Owing to the dangers Adriatic traffic is subjected to and the consequent delays, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping ordered the coaling ships to Varna.

The German Minister in Croatia submitted the request to Armed Forces High Command that in the event of operation "Achse", the Croatian Naval Detachment employed in the Black Sea be released for operations off the Dalmatian coast.

Naval Staff considers the Minister's request justified and in such an event will try to employ the Croatians in their home territory.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff requested the Army General Staff to place the four 4.21 cm guns, type 39, meanwhile completed, at the disposal of High Command, Navy.

These are the guns which Quartermaster Division plans to mount along the Dalmatian coast.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

According to Italian reports, submarine locations were reported at 2300 on 3 Sept. south of Kos and at 0600 on 4 Sept. 40 miles west-northwest of Rhodes. Slight air activity was reported over the central Aegean and over Prevesa.

After taking on mines, the DRACHE and the BULGARIA put out from Salonika for Piraeus with one submarine chaser, three motor minesweepers and four steamers.

Convoy operations were carried out according to plan.

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In view of the difficulties, the duration and unsuitability of transporting the remaining ships of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla from Italy to the Aegean Sea overland, Admiral, Aegean Sea instead recommended reinforcing the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla by transferring other motor minesweepers from home waters via the Elbe-Danube route to the Black Sea. The vessels should be camouflaged as tugs for the passage through the straits. Group South gives its utmost support to this request. (See Teletype 1140).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence detected minor patrol activity in the east coast area and sighted five submarines at sea, of which three are probably in the northwestern and two in the southwestern part of the Black Sea.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla was unable to carry out operations because of weather conditions.

A minelaying naval landing craft group with four submarine chasers and five motor minesweepers is en route from Constanta to the Bosphorus.

Convoys in the Sea of Azov were carried out according to plan. Shipping and convoys along the Crimean coast were further postponed owing to a shortage of cargo and because of the weather.

The column of the 1st Naval Motor Transport Battalion which had been surrounded at Taganrog, arrived at Mariupol with a few casualties.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

The situation in the southern sector of the eastern front is developing very rapidly and in an alarming manner. The withdrawals of our own forces from the southern and western fronts are being very keenly felt. The Russian offensive has shown no signs of abating. The Army General Staff assumes that the enemy is putting all its forces into operation against the industrial areas on the Donetz and the Dnieper and against the Ukraine. Should this operation succeed, it would have serious consequences for Army Groups Manstein and Kleist. The commencement of the mud-season in this area varies and is normally not expected before the beginning of October. The main areas of concentration are in the area west of Kharkov and at the "Schildkroete" positions. The enemy has been successful in completely cutting off the Southern Army Group from the Central Army Group.

II. Chief, Operations Division reported on the Japanese request to settle the question of the detention of the "Aquila" boats with Rome. (see War Diary 4 Sept.) This request shows a complete misunderstanding of the facts. The **two-weeks** detention period, ordered by the Japanese, can be made use of for the time being. A decision cannot, however, be delayed much longer. Because of the uncertainty of the Italian situation and in view of the "Aquilas" ten week passage it is difficult to make a decision of this kind. Chief, Naval Staff decided to postpone the decision for **two weeks**.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo has received the following interim instructions:

Naval Staff intends to make use of the **two-weeks** detention period announced by the Japanese. Extension would be welcome. In view of the impossibility of further pretexts, please report the latest date by which Naval Staff's decision on the sailing must reach you. Was cable from Japanese Naval Attaché, Berlin in the hands of the Admiralty there when you dispatched your inquiry of 4 Sept.? Japanese request to settle "Aquila" question with Rome shows complete misunderstanding of the whole matter.

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III. In accordance with the decision of Armed Forces High Command in connection with the Danish Navy (see War Diary 4 Sept.), Naval Command, Baltic has been ordered to submit proposals. The plan to arm Danish merchantmen must be abandoned.

IV. It is anticipated that operation "Zitronella" will commence on the evening of 10 Sept. If the operation proceeds according to plan, the task force should return in the evening of 9 Sept. The Chief, Naval Staff intends to proceed to Fuehrer Headquarters on 10 Sept., in order to show the Fuehrer by means of charts the operational areas chosen for mines with a new kind of firing unit.

Special Items.

I. Furthermore, German Naval Command, Italy reported in addition to the plans already specified that the Italian Admiralty had also granted permission (see War Diary 4 Sept.), for the appointment of naval liaison officers in Spalato and Sebenico, if required, and requested a decision on the suggestion that the appointment of Liaison Officers for the Dalmatian Coast should be made by Group South, under German Naval Command, Italy. (See Teletype 2210).

This matter is dealt with by Quartermaster Division.

II. Group North/Fleet submitted a survey of the situation in view of the heavy enemy landings anticipated in Norway on 20 Aug. (See War Diary 20 Aug.).

In connection with this, Naval Staff had decided on 26 Aug. as follows:

1. Survey of the Situation:

Naval Staff is also of the opinion that a large-scale operation in Norway is at the moment still very unlikely. Nevertheless, the development of the situation in general makes it imperative to realize that the enemy is planning a large-scale operation for the recapture of Norway with the aim of striking a decisive blow against the northern flank of Europe. In this event the south of Norway must be regarded as especially vulnerable, as all landings, other than those made there, can only be of limited scope; and if German resistance is heavy they will probably be only partially successful. Therefore, an enemy thrust into the Skagerrak and a landing in southern Norway must be the deciding factor in all our considerations and preparations (for instance: in the selection of bases).

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2. Possibilities of Intervention by our Naval Forces:

Concur fully with your survey of the situation. Improvements in the strength of the Air Force are not to be expected in the near future; from now on, therefore, air reconnaissance of enemy ports and inshore waters will be incomplete because of the shortage of planes. It is at present impossible to estimate to what extent we should be able to have reinforcements of planes sent up in the event of a large-scale enemy operation.

3. Preparatory measures:

Plans of Group North/Fleet are approved in principle. Keyword orders are to be dispatched as proposed. The taking over of the over-all command by Group North/Fleet after the release of the keyword is to be decided on in the preliminary discussions with the three naval commands. In connection with this it is to be particularly noted that:

- a. the demand to make vessels available at any given time ready for action within 24 hours, can only be met when it will not interfere with training.
- b. the transfer of the PT boat training flotillas to Oslo is out of question. On the other hand, the transfer of one or several PT boat flotillas can be counted on from the western area.
- c. a varying number of operational submarines can be counted on in Norwegian ports.
- d. in our opinion the taking over of control of shipping traffic by Group North/Fleet after release of keyword is unnecessary. Group North/Fleet has the means of influencing the operations of the escort and defense forces as required, by issuing instructions to the naval commands and by ordering re-dispositions of forces whenever necessary.

4. Naval Staff is to be kept constantly informed of the measures decided on and of future plans.

Situation 5 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The BRAKE has received the following instructions by Teletype 1601:

1. Contrary to Radiogram 2115/30, cipher 4, after supplying the five outward-bound submarines, return to Djakarta, remain there for about four weeks, and then put out to supply same boats for a second time.

2. One of rendezvous submarines has orders to hand BRAKE a 1944 nautical yearbook. BRAKE to have photostatic copies of this yearbook made in Djakarta for blockade-runners. Naval Attaché, Tokyo responsible for distribution of photostatic copies. Original copy of yearbook and three copies to be taken on second supply operation for delivery to boats.

In reply to the inquiry made by the Naval Attaché in Tokyo into the sinking of the steamer TILAWA in November 1942 in the Indian Ocean, Naval Staff replied that she was not sunk by German vessels. (See Telegrams 1941/2 and 1615/9).

Enemy situation report dispatched to all in foreign waters by Teletype 1346.

II. Situation West Area.1. Enemy Situation:

Over the outer part of the Bay of Biscay as far as 13° W 45 planes were detected. In the evening one British unit was located in BF 1820, one in BF 4953 and one in A1 5870.

At 1720 our air reconnaissance reported one light cruiser with course 340° in BE 6699.

One mine was swept off Brest and one off La Pallice.

In the area west of Boulogne 6 - 7 vessels were sighted from 2020 onwards. The same targets were located from 2125 onwards on a northerly course. During the late hours of the night targets, presumably destroyers or minelayers, were located at point "Herz" between Ile de Bas and Les sept Iles.

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2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

See Teletype 1715 for a brief report by Admiral, Atlantic Coast on the commando raid on Ouessant during the night of 6 Sept.

Two submarines put out from St. Nazaire and two from La Pallice on war cruises.

Channel Coast:

The 10th Minesweeper Flotilla put into Le Havre at 0600 after having had a successful encounter with enemy PT boats. For brief report see Teletype 1115. Our vessels only sustained light damage and suffered but small losses in personnel.

From 0045 onwards three boats of the 2nd Gun-Carrier Flotilla had an encounter with six enemy PT boats off Le Tréport. Two PT boats were sunk, a third one set on fire. Our boats put into Le Tréport with a few casualties. For brief report see Teletype 1400.

During the night of 3 Sept. the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla carried out an operation in two groups in the coastal waters of the areas between Calais and Berk-sur-mer. The ships put into Boulogne again on 4 Sept. at 0600.

On 2 Sept. west of Ostend a mine detonated in a fishing net, then four ELM/A mines detonated a mile to the west of it.

Because of the menace of enemy landings, Group West ordered the following disposition for the torpedo boats which were ready for action: three at Le Havre, two at Cherbourg, three at Brest. Furthermore the torpedo boats FALKE and T "14" were stationed at Bayonne. From 2000 till sunrise the 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas were on half-hour readiness with five ships. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla carried out with four ships a patrol of inshore waters the focal point of which was south of Cape Griz Nez.

The aerial minelaying operation scheduled for the night of 4 Sept. was not carried out.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

From 0700 onwards, several vessels belonging to the Maas Flotilla, together with their base of Zijpe were attacked with bombs and guns by numerous enemy fighters and bombers. Three of our ships were damaged. One of the attacking planes was definitely shot down and probably a second one also. At 0818 the escort vessels of the hospital ship STRASSBURG were unsuccessfully attacked by two low-flying planes.

Five ELM/I mines were swept off the Dutch Coast.

Escort and patrol operations were carried out without special occurrences in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Five planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

There was lively reconnaissance activity in the Vardoe area. One air penetration was reported in the Banak area.

On 4 Sept. drifting mine chains were found south of Stadlandet off Olaska.

Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 35 ships were escorted north and six south. Eleven ships were delayed by a shortage of escorts in the area of Admiral, Arctic Coast.

Group North/Fleet reported no change in the evaluation made of the situation in the Arctic Ocean.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

In Kronstadt Bay our batteries were subjected to harassing bombardment from guns whilst engaged in a defensive action against air raids on the coastal area and rear-positions.

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Twenty-eight patrol vessels and three naval artillery lighters were stationed north and south of the sea canal. An unsuccessful air attack was carried out against the Lippowa Battery in Luga Bay.

A half-submerged submarine on a southwesterly course was sighted by our naval landing craft south of Kalbada Ground. The Finns presumably reported the same boat at 1020 west of Kalbada Ground. Twelve planes raided Tallin and dropped 18 high explosive bombs, two of them on the town.

Two PT boats were shelled off Little Tyters by the minesweeper M "16"; the results were not observed.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Although 77 enemy planes were on operations on 4 Sept., radio intelligence in the Bay of Biscay intercepted only one periscope sighting report, which confirms our assumption that since the introduction of the Hagenuk-sets the enemy has been considerably handicapped in locating the numerous submarines we have at present in the Bay of Biscay.

Otherwise nothing to report.

After the conclusion of the submarine operations in mid-Atlantic, Submarine Division drew up a comprehensive survey of the situation in the different operational areas of the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean in War Diary of 15 - 31 Aug., to which special attention is drawn.

The southeast coast of Africa and the area off Madagascar proved to be the most successful areas, where the six boats operating there, sank 36 ships with a total tonnage of 212,000 BRT, while only one submarine was lost. All the boats from this operational area are at present on their return passage from this operational area. The breakdown of three submarine tankers greatly handicapped the supplying of southbound submarines and proved extremely unfavorable to the actual operational periods, and thus to the operational results of the boats.

Taken as a whole, the operations in the southern area did not have the expected results, but instead led to unexpectedly severe losses. In planning these operations, Operations Staff was forced to include this area. The events in May proved that further operations in the North Atlantic were impossible because the losses were too heavy. If the submarine warfare was to be at all continued whilst awaiting the

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installation of new weapons and equipment, all outward-bound VII C and IX C submarines would only be able to operate in the areas stated. Operations in these areas had to be abandoned again sooner than had been anticipated. Although in comparison with the losses the results obtained must be considered very modest, it must be pointed out that these submarine operations kept the enemy's defense forces completely tied down throughout the mid-Atlantic and heavily taxed his air force. Thus in view of the present balance between submarine and defense forces, the desired result was achieved even though at great cost.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day there was lively enemy air activity over the western area with raids on airfields and traffic installations.

During the night of 5 Sept. the RAF carried out a heavy raid on Mannheim and Ludwigshafen. Several industrial plants were damaged. It is reported that isolated bombs were dropped in the areas of Ulm, Augsburg, Munich and Nuremberg. Three hundred and thirty of our night fighters were put into operation. The number of planes shot down has not yet been reported.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out reconnaissance over the Calabrian landing area, as well as over the African coast in the sectors of Oran, Arzen, Djidjelli and Benghazi.

The enemy attacked the radar stations in Pula and in the area of San Antioco, as well as Viterbo and the airfields of Grazzanisa in Calabria.

It is reported that ten enemy planes penetrated into the Balkans as far as Nis for the purpose of supplying the partisans.

3. Eastern Front:

On 3 Sept. there was very little air activity owing to weather conditions.

There are no special reports available on the number of planes shot down.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean Theater:

A convoy of seven freighters and a damaged auxiliary cruiser in tow put out from Gibraltar for the west. One TEXAS-class battleship, 1 transport, 53 freighters, 11 tankers were observed in port at 1400. On 4 Sept. 3 light cruisers, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 12 destroyers, 149,000 BRT of merchant tonnage and 15 landing craft were observed in Mers el Kebir and 6 merchant ships and 35 landing craft in Arzeu. At 0800 on 5 Sept. there were according to air reconnaissance, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers and 5 destroyers on an easterly course 30 miles northwest of Oran. In addition six convoys were located by radio interception in the Oran area, which were partly confirmed by air reconnaissance at 1740. Furthermore, at 1820 air reconnaissance reported 24 freighters with 4 destroyers and 11 further escort vessels on a westerly course 40 miles north of Djidelli, at 1815 60 ships (up to 20,000 BRT) and 8 warships on an easterly course 30 miles north of Bone, and at 1725 ostensibly 2 transports, 23 freighters, 1 tanker and 7 escort vessels 80 miles northwest of Benghazi on course 130°.

In the forenoon there were 50 - 60 ships lying in Bizerta roads and 80 ships in port. By noon these numbers had dropped to 20 and 50 respectively, so that the departure of a large group or convoy is to be assumed.

During the night of 4 Sept. in the Sicilian area, 20 - 30 ships were located 40 miles north-northwest of Trapani and 5 ships north of Cape San Vito.

In connection with the Calabrian landing a morning reconnaissance of the Messina area revealed about 90 ships as well as 2 battleships 23 miles south of the port on a northerly course. A large number of landing craft were sighted off Reggio. Twelve large and 30 small landing craft were located at noon near Palmi. Probably new landings took place there with the assistance of warships. At 1515 on 4 Sept. five destroyers (presumably British) were sighted off the east coast of Calabria; they were probably reconnoitering our gun positions. No shipping traffic was sighted in the Apulian area.

A convoy of 22 freighters, 4 tankers and 1 submarine, probably coming from Malta, was sighted at 1125 about 200 miles northwest of Benghazi on a southeasterly course. This is possibly the large convoy reported at 1725 80 miles northwest of Benghazi.

Submarine positions were reported west of Durazzo and 40 miles east of Toulon.

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Two hundred and ninety-eight thousand BRT of merchant tonnage and only a few landing craft were observed in Port Said on 4 Sept. An aircraft carrier appeared to be in the outer harbor, which, according to intelligence reports, has been stationed in the eastern Mediterranean for some time. Two heavy cruisers put into Port Said via the canal in the afternoon.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Shipping and Transport Situation:

No damage was sustained by naval installations in the air raids on the Naples area during the night of 3 Sept.

Because of weather conditions and the enemy situation the removal of our army supplies from Vibo Valentia was abandoned. The last group of ships will sail north during the night of 5 Sept. Transportation on to Naples and Leghorn is being prepared. The enemy minefields discovered on 26 Aug. 40 miles southwest of Genoa were swept on 3 Sept. and it was discovered that there were no mines but instead tubelike containers filled with sabotage material together with directions for use. They were probably laid by a submarine.

At 0800 two naval landing craft, loaded with parts of the 21 cm guns and sailing from Naples to Corsica, sank off Ialta. A more detailed report is not yet available.

Escort operations in the Tyrrhenian Sea and in the Adriatic Sea were carried out without incident.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a moderate amount of convoy traffic was running along the Turkish coast.

According to the photographic reconnaissance carried out on 4 Sept., 20 minesweepers, 20 PT boats and 64 landing craft were lying in Gelendzhik.

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Own Situation:

Submarine U "9" is returning to Sevastopol because both the compasses and periscopes have broken down. No operations were carried out by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla owing to weather conditions. For the same reason the bombardment of the coast east of Mariupol by three naval artillery lighters was not carried out during the night of 5 Sept. The mine-barrage of Novorossisk harbor was reinforced by 32 LMB mines.

Six more mines were cut near Sevastopol.

Three of the 14 enemy planes attacking the 105th Anapa convoy were shot down; we sustained minor damage and light losses. An enemy bomber attack on the Berdyansk-Mariupol convoy was unsuccessful, as was also the attack on the BURGAS by torpedo planes whilst proceeding between Constanta and Sevastopol.

There was once again ferry traffic in the Strait of Kerch together with supply transports and convoys of barges in tow.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, a conference between the Russian, British and U.S. Foreign Ministers is said to have been agreed on. Furthermore, efforts to bring about a tripartite conference between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill are being continued.

According to an announcement from the U.S. State Department, a director has been appointed for the U.S. Economic Relief Organization to Italy who will go to Italy as soon as possible.

The report gives the impression that the collapse of Italy is already considered to be quite certain and imminent.

According to a report from the Military Attaché in Lisbon in the middle of June the British Government demanded of the Portuguese Government, on behalf of the United States, the Union of South Africa, and itself, either the cession of the Portuguese Atlantic Islands to the Allies or else entry into the war. For the time being an evasive answer is said to have been given. Salazar will not, however, be unable to ignore the Allied demands indefinitely, as the Portuguese colonies are at the mercy of the big naval powers. According to a remark made by the British Air Attaché, Portugal will have to enter into the war against Germany by the beginning of September if she wishes to avoid an armed seizure by the United States.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

In order to make forces available for other operations, the Fuehrer ordered the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead and the transfer of the 17th Army across the Strait of Kerch to the Crimea. The directive includes instructions on the course the evacuation is to follow, on the demolitions to be carried out and on the defense of the Crimea. Three or four German divisions will have to be released for other sectors of the eastern front. Copy of this directive as per 1/Skl 2686/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

Naval Staff transmitted a copy of this directive to Group South and ordered Admiral, Black Sea to go at once to Army Group A to acquaint himself with the Fuehrer directive there. Admiral, Black Sea has been commissioned to carry out the measures ordered whilst also forming a special staff to represent the Navy. Plans to be reported by 10 Sept.

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II. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported that the preliminary report of Communications Equipment Experimental Command on the investigations made into the Metox self-radiation have been received. Chief, Naval Communications Division has ordered Communications Equipment Testing Command to participate in the investigations subsequently to be made.

Chief, Naval Staff again stressed the magnitude of the mistake made in this case through human failure. The dire consequences must be frankly discussed so that something can be learned from them for the future. During August, 18 submarines were lost up to 13 Aug., and five after 13 Aug. It is, therefore, quite clear that the situation in the Bay of Biscay was fundamentally changed after the installation of the Hagenuk sets on board ship. Practical experience has shown that the self-radiation of this equipment is insignificant. This problem, however, must not be lost sight of either, especially as the enemy will counter our defense with new methods.

III. Chief, Quartermaster Division: Armed Forces High Command refused the request for Air Force reinforcements for defending Sevastopol from air attacks in view of the prevailing shortage of forces.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. According to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, Ambassador Ritter transmitted the Foreign Office's request that further incidents with Sweden should be avoided. Written confirmation of this request has been promised. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division: Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported that according to the latest operational order from Commander in Chief, South, German forces in Apulia only consist of parts of the 1st Airborne Infantry Division and that the transfer of another division from the Naples area is to be prepared according to schedule. Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy draws attention to the great importance of Apulia for operations. The loss of this peninsula would mean that the Strait of Otranto would be closed to our sea traffic and that the entire supply traffic between the Adriatic Sea and Greece would be brought to a standstill. The enemy attack on Apulia is expected any day.

Furthermore, Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy advised that Commander in Chief, Army Group B should concur with the opinion of Chief, Naval Staff and Naval Staff that, if possible, the execution of operation "Achse" should be avoided.

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Chief, Naval Staff repeatedly explained to the Fuehrer his opinion on the importance of Sicily, Calabria and Apulia as forming a bridgehead for enemy operations against the Balkans and intends to touch on the subject again in his next report to the Fuehrer.

VI. Chief, Quartermaster Division has been informed by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy that, as a result of the re-organization of the commands in Italy, the 2nd Air Force is being transferred from the command of Commander in Chief, South and is being placed directly under the command of Commander in Chief, Air Force. Quartermaster Division is of the opinion that German Naval Command, Italy should remain under the command of Commander in Chief, South until further notice. It would not, at present, be very practical to place it under the command of Army Group B, and the suggestion to place it both under Commander in Chief, South and Army Group B must be definitely turned down. Naval Staff does not consider the withdrawal of German Naval Command, Italy from the command of Commander in Chief, South to be opportune, as this will make unified command in the operational area more difficult. Operations Division and Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy agreed with Quartermaster Division's opinion.

Chief, Naval Staff was of the same opinion.

Soocial Items.

I. The operation against Spitsbergen.

The proposals made by the task force and by Group North/Fleet prior to the release of this operation by Naval Staff (see War Diary 4 Sept.) as per l/Skl 2639 and 2649 Gkdos. Chdfs. are filed under 3 Sept. in File l/Skl I ops. VIII, 2 "Spitsbergen". The senior officer in charge of the task force regarded the possible overlapping of "Zitronella" with operation "Luetzow" in the Kara Sea ("Husar") as unimportant, whereas Group North/Fleet felt it advisable not to restrict the free movement of the task force during "Husar" and to allow eleven destroyers to participate in operation "Zitronella". As reported, the decision of Naval Staff, envisaged the retention of two destroyers for "Husar". Therefore, nine destroyers will be available for "Zitronella". At 1850 on 5 Sept. Group North/Fleet ordered the release of the keyword for 6 Sept.

At 1238 on 6 Sept., Admiral, Northern Waters reported that "Zitronella" is starting according to plan. The force will assemble at 2230 and leave the islands at about 0130 on 7 Sept.

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At 1514 Commander, Submarines, Norway informed the submarines at sea of the start of this operation.

With regard to the co-operation of the Air Force it is to be noted that the 5th Air Force plans to confine reconnaissance over the operational area to probing observations in favor of a more thorough reconnaissance of the western area, namely of Iceland and the east coast of Scotland. Group North/Fleet is rightly of the opinion that reconnaissance of the outer fringes such as between Norway and Iceland and Norway and Scapa is more important during "Zitronella" than reconnaissance of the operational area itself, for if the weather conditions are favorable it will be able to detect enemy counter-measures and above all maintain contact with them. In the afternoon of 6 Sept. the 5th Air Force reported the following plans:

"Since reconnaissance of the entire sea area between Stadlandet and Iceland as far as 32° E has already been carried out once, reconnaissance operations for the days after 7 Sept. are, in view of the fuel situation, to be limited to:

1. probing reconnaissance east of the line North Cape - southern point of Spitsbergen with two planes by Air Commander, North (East).

2. occasional reconnaissance over the sea area of the approach route, west of the line North Cape - southern point of Spitsbergen, with four planes by Air Commander Lofoten.

3. reconnaissance of the outer fringes Trondheim - Jan Mayen - Iceland - Stadlandet with three FW 200's (FM) and two BV 138's or two Ju 88's by Air Commander, North (West). Air reconnaissance of the anchorages in Scotland is to be continued independently of the above."

During air reconnaissances on 6 Sept. the enemy was not sighted until 2130.

Plans for 7 Sept.:

"1. Thorough reconnaissance of the sea area between the north coast of Iceland and Jan Mayen westwards up to the ice boundary.

2. Reconnaissance of the sea area west of the Norwegian west coast between 65° and 66° N as far as 13° W.

3. Fanning-out reconnaissance off the Norwegian west coast between 5° and 13° E.

4. Reconnaissance of the anchorages in Scapa."

II. Operation "Achse".

1. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division decided on the request of Group South with regard to the area of Naval Shore Commander, Adriatic Sea (see War Diary 4 Sept.) as follows:

"Although it is recognized that the requests of Group South represent a basic minimum and that the Naval Shore Commander's area is a very extensive one, the present personnel situation will not allow for the establishment of another Naval Shore Commander.

It will be recalled that the area boundary was fixed in conformity with Army organization. Should the boundary of the Army Groups change in the course of operations, it is intended to make them conform to them. Until then Group South and the Commanding Admiral are given the right to issue orders after the release of the keyword to the Northern Adriatic Shipping and Transport Organization as regards the execution of transport operations to the Aegean Sea or to the east coast of the Adriatic Sea.

As soon after the release of the keyword as the quantity and nature of the tonnage seized can be assessed, the distribution of forces will be settled by Naval Staff.

2. On 1 Sept., Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Propaganda Branch issued instructions on the line of propaganda to be followed in the Italian area in the event of operation "Achse".

Copy as per 1/Skl 2671/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. II, 16.

III. Group West transmitted the following report from Commanding Admiral, French South Coast:

"A new French protest was dispatched to the Italians in connection with the transfer of the submarine POINCARE. Hereafter the French will not give the Italians any assistance at all, nor will they help them to repair their coastal batteries as promised. After further lengthy explanations justifying the Italian point of view, Matteucci expressed the conviction that the French would alter their point of view as soon as German personnel occupied the coastal batteries. This Italian opinion has on further inquiry been again confirmed."

IV. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff of the orders given to the 3rd Air Force with regard to using LM mines with new firing units in operations against England.

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Particulars as per 1/Skl 2681/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI. A monthly minimum of 1,500 mines is provided for Air Force operations. The operations will be concentrated on the ports of the east coast and on shipping routes (Thames, Humber, Tyne). In addition the ports and shipping lanes around Scotland are to be mined. For the latter operations the 3rd Air Force will have Stavanger put at its disposal as an operations base. This order tallies generally with the decisions reached.

V. The following points taken from intelligence reports on invasion preparations from England are noteworthy:

About 120 large and 150 - 180 smaller assault boats put into Falmouth on 28 Aug. and probably proceeded east on 29 Aug. No further tonnage arrived in Plymouth. In Falmouth, Weymouth, Exmouth and Poole-Portsmouth there are numerous light naval vessels, including two anti-aircraft cruisers, four destroyers and about 30 corvettes, sloops etc. On 25 Aug. a convoy of about 70 vessels, including 17 tankers, put into Bristol, Newport and Swansea from Canada.

It was reported from Canada through reliable diplomatic sources on 27 Aug. that three U.S. battleships and about 70 laden transports were lying in readiness on the east coast of Iceland during the second half of August; furthermore, there were 2,500 U.S. planes of all types.

An agent commented as follows on reports from England on 4 Sept. about the preparations along the south coast, for which tonnage is being continuously drawn from the northwestern ports and from northern Ireland:

"A decisive large-scale operation in the area of northern France and Belgium must be expected in the spring of 1944. Basic plans were made in Quebec. The present main operation is aimed at Italy. All the other plans are for operations of secondary importance. Heavy pressure was exerted by the Russians at the beginning of the Quebec Conference. It is alleged that Russia presented an ultimatum demanding the immediate opening of a second front in western Europe. The Anglo-Americans are trying to come to an agreement with the Russians at all costs. This political attitude will undoubtedly mean that circumstances permitting, something may be attempted now after all. Very important political discussions are, therefore, at present taking place in London between the British, Americans and Russians, which will have an important bearing on future events in western Europe. Furthermore, military circles here state that a secondary operation in northern France might tie the German forces down: a factor of the utmost importance in the event of difficulties in the Italian operations. In conclusion it may be said that from 15 Sept. 1943 onward an operation in northern France may be anticipated. All preparations must be completed by then. This will, however, only be an operation for the gaining of a bridgehead, the undertaking of which will to a large extent depend on the political aspects and the developments in Italy."

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VI. Naval Intelligence Division reported on the new information on British and U.S. landing craft; namely on tank landing craft (LCT mark V) small type, U.S. vehicle landing craft (LCV) and vehicle and personnel landing craft. (LCVP).

Particulars as per 1/Skl 27002/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, File "Intelligence Evaluation of Foreign Navies".

Situation 6 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Sixty-six planes were detected over the outer part of the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located in each of the following places:

At 1000 in BE 5370, at 1238 in BF 1460,
at 1256 in AM 7220, and at 2227 in BF 1140.

At 0900 12 - 15 vessels (minelayers, patrol vessels and minesweepers) were sighted in the sector 14 miles southwest and northwest of Gris Nez, which on being bombarded by our batteries put up a smoke-screen and withdrew at 1029. Between 1025 and 1120 targets were being continuously located southwest of Boulogne. At 1157 our batteries bombarded targets west of Cape Gris Nez; no results were observed.

According to a report from Group West, the minesweeping activity sighted and located by radar between 31 Aug. and 3 Sept. subsided on 4 and 5 Sept. Only in the evening of 5 Sept. were vessels located in the area of Boulogne; it is, however, doubtful whether they were minesweepers.

Operations Division will inform Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy accordingly.

Group West concludes from the fact that the enemy has either discontinued or broken off minesweeping operations in those minefields undoubtedly known to him, that the danger of a large-scale landing in the area concerned has lessened. The gaps in our barrage would, how-

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ever, permit minor landing operations to take place. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and Commander, PT Boats have therefore been instructed to leave the ordered defense measures more or less unchanged.

From observations made today, Group West reported that the enemy has fully resumed his activity in the Channel area off Boulogne and obviously closer in to our shores than before. The enemy is not deterred by occasional gunfire: he puts up a smoke-screen and bypasses our barrage "Schnellschluss" in the south. Operations Division informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, High Command, Army, the Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff and Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Navy accordingly. Teletype 1/Skl 24998/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Area:

Eight moored mines were swept off Brest, one ELM/J mine off Lorient, and one off Bayonne.

Channel Area:

The motor minesweeper R "94" sank in AN 8784 after hitting a mine. The boat was first underslung, but nevertheless capsized later on.

During the night of 5 Sept. the 6th PT Boat Flotilla out on a patrol of inshore coastal waters was recalled because of weather conditions. During the night of 6 Sept. the 5th PT Boat Flotilla with five ships will transfer from Peter Port to Cherbourg, the 4th PT Boat Flotilla with four ships from Peter Port to Le Havre, and torpedo boats MOEWE, T "19" and T "25" from Le Havre to Cherbourg.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy planes probably mined the convoy route from Wangeroog to Borkum during the night of 5 Sept. For brief action report of the Maas Flotilla on the air raid and anti-aircraft defense of 5 Sept. see Teletype 0822.

One ELM/S mine was swept off Terschelling, one off Ameland, and one off Borkum.

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Convoy "458" Elbe-Hook sailed at 1300, convoy "1771" Hook-Elbe at 2300.

Salvage operations on the hospital ship STRASSBURG were abandoned as hopeless.

Convoy and escort operations in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North were carried out according to plan.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twelve planes were located on operations over the North Sea. Slight artillery activity was reported from the Petsamo area, slight air reconnaissance activity was reported from the Vardoe area.

According to radio intelligence from one of our submarines, the departure of the vessels STALIN and DUDINKA for Dickson is imminent. Whether they are icebreakers or tankers, is conjectural.

One of our submarines reported the sighting of two houses and wireless masts on Heiberg (Vilkitski Strait) Island.

Own Situation:

A minelaying operation was carried out in Sylta Fiord by the ROLAND group of minelayers. A report of its execution has not yet been received. After running aground off Holmengras, the patrol vessel VP "5502" was sunk after unsuccessful salvage efforts had been made. Twenty-seven ships were escorted north, 17 south. Fourteen ships were delayed in the arctic coastal area owing to a shortage of escort vessels.

With regard to the start of operation "Zitronella" make special reference to paragraph I.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The special duty vessels observed in Kronstadt are landing craft of a British type. Shipping movements in Kronstadt Bay were concealed by a smoke-screen at noon. At 0600 13 vessels, mostly minesweepers and motor minesweepers were observed on a southwesterly course west-southwest of Lavansaari. This group returned to Lavansaari at 0900. One ship sank after hitting a mine.

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At 0110 and at 0230 landing craft vainly tried to enter the harbor of Rutshi. Two boats were damaged. The attacker put up a smoke-screen and returned to Lavansaari.

Minesweeping activity is showing more initiative.

A large-scale operation against the Esthonian coast in the rear of our Army front lines would be quite possible.

Our battery "Korgulovo" was subjected to a continuous attack from enemy planes with bombs and guns. Damage and losses were light.

According to intelligence reports, DICTO and LIONEL were no longer in their former berths at 1600 on 3 Sept. According to the pilot both ships left port.

The Norwegian tanker REALF II, anchored off Lodeese, is ready to put out.

2. Own Situation:

Ten transports, one submarine, one tanker and one steamer were escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defense, Baltic.

An unidentified single-engined plane flew over the hospital ship BERLIN east of Grenaa and was fired on when it failed to respond to the recognition signal.

One ELM/J mine was swept northwest of Falsterbo.

The Esthonian sailing vessel REDU was seized at the southern end of the west net in the Gulf of Finland and brought into Reval.

Minesweeping operations continued in Irben Strait.

During the night of 5 Sept. in an encounter between the "Seeigel" patrol vessels and three enemy PT boats one of the latter was sunk.

Extension of Seeigel VIa was carried out. In the course of a minelaying operation the motor minesweeper R "72" was heavily damaged by a mine explosion and towed back to Reval with heavy losses in personnel.

V. Submarine Warfare.

At 0620 on 2 Sept. in BE 9668, an outward-bound submarine was accurately spotted by a search light from an enemy plane and attacked,

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the Hagenuk apparatus having given no location. This is the first known incident where the Hagenuk set did not work.

In an attack on a convoy east of the Azores one submarine was heavily damaged by depth charges. Successes have not been reported.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The enemy carried out fairly heavy raids on Boulogne, and also on the airfields of Dieppe, Orleans and Conche during the day. Furthermore, railway installations in the Amiens area were the targets of heavy and successful attacks mostly by twin-engined bomber formations.

Two to three hundred Fortresses penetrated the Metz - Karlsruhe - Ulm - Epinal area between 0650 and 1400. Center of attack was Stuttgart. Strasbourg was also raided. The 440 fighters we put into operation definitely shot down 16 of the attacking planes and probably another 23. During the night of 6 Sept. Munich was raided by 200 - 300 planes. Damage to industries was moderate. One hundred and ninety-four of our night fighters were sent up. Reports of successes have not yet been received.

The 3rd Air Force sent 71 bombers out on an operation against Cambridge and ten fighter-bombers against Cambridge airfield during the night. Some of these fighter-bombers attacked the alternate targets Colchester, Southend and Canterbury.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Air activity over Calabria was very slight owing to weather conditions. The enemy carried out a few fighter-bomber attacks. Our fighters scattered enemy formations which penetrated the Naples area with 400 bombers, escorted by 200 fighters. Damage was therefore slight. No air activity was reported over Sardinia. Two planes were shot down over Naples, four over Calabria.

Our planes were out on operations against ship targets off Bizerta during the night of 6 Sept.

3. Eastern Front:

Forty-two planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 4 Sept. and 72 on 5 Sept.

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Special Items.

The Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy informed Naval Staff that the Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff planned to discontinue the production of large flying boats in favor of the production of fighter models, and that he planned to re-equip the flying boat formations of the 3rd Air Force with Ju 290's, of the 6th Air Force with Ju 88's, and of the 5th Air Force with Ju 88's and Ju 290's. On about 1 Nov. 1943 it is planned to withdraw the BV 138's and the BV 222's from the Atlantic area after the arrival of the 5th Long-Range Reconnaissance Group (Ju 290's).

Operations Division considers this an inadvisable measure and asks the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy to put forward their point of view as follows:

"As the request made for further production of planes of the BV 222 type shows, Naval Staff attaches great importance to the operations of these flying boats in the western area, and indeed wishes them to start as early as possible and to continue as long as the tactical suitability of the BV 222 type permits. Naval Staff considers it inadvisable to withdraw the BV 222's from the western area after the arrival of the 5th Long-Range Reconnaissance Group. Every additional long-range reconnaissance plane available there will be an asset to the tasks to be carried out. Even if no operations need to be carried out for the Submarine Division at present, the reconnaissance requirements for Naval Staff's measures in general are so numerous - especially when the dispatch of blockade-runners is being planned - that planes of the BV 222 type will be a welcome addition to reconnaissance facilities. It should be recalled that last year not even with the 40 available FW 200's was it possible fully to satisfy reconnaissance requirements. The BV 222's have been specially requested by Naval Staff for operations in the western area; they are being provided by Air Force, Operations Staff for these operations and they have been included in the planning of Commander in Chief, Air Force.

Only if it should be found in the course of operations that this type of plane is unsuitable for the combat conditions existing in this sea area, shall sufficient reason exist for transferring these flying boats to other areas. It is of the utmost importance to Naval Staff that in such an event despite the difficulties anticipated for the ground organization, the operations of the BV 222 from the Norwegian area be ensured.

Putting the BV 222 crews to a different task - with the 5th Long-Range Reconnaissance Group for instance - is only to be envisaged if for some reason the flying boats are definitely withdrawn from front line operations. In such an event, it is important that these

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especially well trained crews are not lost to the transport service, but are retained for long-range reconnaissance and long-range combat operations at sea."

The Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy will be guided accordingly and will particularly endeavor also to make sure of the ground organization for the operations of the BV 222's which are for the time being to be made from the western area.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

There are no reports available from Gibraltar.

According to photographic reconnaissance of 5 Sept., most of the freighters (about 30, approximately 220,000 BRT) observed on 4 Sept. in Oran and Mers el Kebir have sailed. It is probable that the tonnage withdrawn from the Mers el Kebir - Oran - Arzeu area is making for new landing places in the western Mediterranean. The vessels (large convoy of 60 ships and an aircraft carrier formation on course east) sighted on the evening of 5 Sept., were not, however, located again until the evening of 6 Sept. Insignificant east-bound traffic was observed in the Bougie - Bone area.

There was very little shipping traffic both in the Strait of Messina and off the east coast of Sicily. Neither was the warship formation reported on 5 Sept. north of the Strait of Messina consisting of two battleships, one heavy and one light cruiser, sighted again. And no special sighting reports have been received from the coast of Calabria.

Submarine positions were reported at 1047 on 6 Sept. 45 miles west-southwest of La Spezia, where an unsuccessful attack on a steamer was made, and at 1540 nine miles east of Brindisi, where a successful attack was made on the tanker DORA even though it was possible to tow her in.

There are no sighting reports available from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Shipping and Transport Situation:

In the evening, one of our submarines sank a destroyer on an easterly course approximately 20 miles east of Gibraltar.

The loss of the two naval landing craft, loaded with parts of the 21 cm guns, near Gaeta on 5 Sept. was probably caused by a mine.

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Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff of the following order dispatched to Commander in Chief, South:

1. Commander in Chief, South is to report:

a. When and through whom was permission for transfer of Naval Artillery Detachment "616" given to Commander in Chief, South?

b. When was order prohibiting the transfer of the 21 cm guns received?

c. When was the command responsible for the landing and departure of the vessels informed of this prohibition?

d. When did the naval landing craft sail?

2. Any transfer of additional forces for all branches of the services to the islands requires the Fuehrer's approval, except for the parts of such groups still on the mainland, whose transfer had been already started with the Fuehrer's consent.

The transfer of the two 10.5 cm batteries to Corsica will therefore be made over land as far as Leghorn.

One naval landing craft on the passage between Saprivibo and Valentia, had to be blown up owing to the damage sustained from heavy seas in a thunderstorm in Vibo.

One plane was shot down in an unsuccessful enemy air attack on the convoy of the steamer CHAMPAGNE between Bastia and Leghorn.

Three Italian torpedo boats, 2 corvettes, 7 motor minesweepers and 1 submarine chaser were on convoy escort operations. Eleven steamers, 2 tankers and 8 war transports were escorted in the inter-island traffic and off the west coast of Italy.

Adriatic convoys were carried out without incident.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy submarines were reported at 2310 on 5 Sept. 30 miles northeast of Naxos, at 0630 on 6 Sept. 22 miles northwest of Syra and 52 miles south of Salonika. An anti-submarine operation was ordered. Other available anti-submarine forces are out on operations, concentrated in the sea area of Sunion - Kythnos - Andros and Euboea.

Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

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Group South reported that it is at present planned to keep all mine carriers in the Aegean Sea for the carrying out of overdue operations, and in accordance with the request of German Naval Command, Italy to place the BARLETTA and the MOROSINI at their disposal as soon as German mines have arrived in the Italian area. In view of the strategic situation in the Aegean Sea the transfer of DRACHE and BULGARIA cannot be effected. (See Teletype 1440).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

At 1900 on 5 Sept. vessels in the harbor of Mariupol were attacked with gunfire from enemy planes. At 1237 on 6 Sept. an enemy air raid with bombs and guns was carried out on the convoy of the steamer BURGAS off the southwest coast of the Crimea. Fighter escort shot down two planes. Yalta was unsuccessfully raided by five enemy planes at 1404.

The submarine U "9" put into Sevastopol having broken off operations.

The patrol lines in Temryuk Bay were not taken up. Owing to stormy weather, the towed convoy Genichesk - Mariupol had to turn back for the same reason. Otherwise escort and supply operations were carried out according to plan.

VIII. Situation Far East.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported:

"One hundred and fifty-six bomber raids were carried out against the Marcus Islands on 2 Sept., ostensibly from two aircraft carriers. Target: airfield and planes on the ground. Extent of damage still unknown. No bombardment such as mentioned in press reports occurred so far. Splashes sighted caused by time fuze detonations. Admit that an attempt at landing now possible, but emphasize that it will be quickly and easily routed."

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Items of Political Importance.

In a speech at Cambridge (Massachusetts) Churchill said amongst other things:

"There is at present incessant and intense activity in the combined commands of the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This excellent system did not exist during the last war. It would be unwise and shortsighted to break up this organization straight after the war. Both for their own security and for that of the rest of the world, England and the United States must allow this command to be continued for a considerable number of years after the war until an equivalent organization has been established, which will guarantee the preservation of these achievements."

In connection with the Three-Power Conference the "Exchange Telegraph" reported from Washington that agreement in principle has been reached between Washington, London and Moscow. Roosevelt and Churchill are willing to cover "great distances" in order to meet Stalin, who could not under any circumstances absent himself from the Eastern Front at the moment. It is untrue that Churchill or Roosevelt ever held the opinion that the Kremlin might submit peace proposals to Germany not entirely based on "unconditional surrender". Complete agreement exists amongst the Big Three that there are two cardinal aims which must be fulfilled:

1. the extermination of National Socialism and all its allied manifestations and
2. the elimination of Prussian militarism.

The "Times" writes:

"Two factors are developing, which seem to be trying to achieve closer co-operation in strategic and political relationships between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians:

1. The forthcoming conference of the Foreign Ministers, which will probably take place in the middle of October.
2. The formation of a standing Three-Power Commission, whose task it would be to foster a continuous exchange of political information.

Much closer agreement has already been reached between London, Washington and Moscow than is generally assumed. The proposed standing commission can be compared with an Ambassadors' Conference, such as existed in 1920."

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According to a report from the Military Attaché in Stockholm, the Swedish Government requested that discussions be opened with the object of discontinuing German mineral oil shipments via Sweden by 30 Sept. at the latest, as they are to be regarded as war materials. We have turned down this request for the present. Reprisals by curtailing Swedish imports via Germany and to Goeteborg are being considered.

Irrespective thereof, discussions are taking place in Stockholm on the curtailment of Swedish ore shipments owing to our present foreign exchange shortage.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

No special reports and decisions.

Special Items.

I. Group North informed Naval Staff of the instructions in connection with the schedule for the retransfer of the LUETZOW. Only the JACOBI and the IHN will be provided as an escort from Alta to Aalesund. The BEITZEN and the destroyer Z "38", which will have to be moved to Aalesund by 26 Sept., will join her from Aalesund onwards. Teletype as per l/Skl 2706/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

II. Submarine Operations Division informed Naval Staff of the advice given to Commander, Submarines, West and to Commander, Submarines, Italy that the submarines U "437", U "455", U "667" and a fourth submarine have been chosen for the transfer to the Mediterranean during the new moon period in September.

III. Chief, Group West suggested that Quartermaster Division investigate whether the effort in labor, time and personnel required for the transfer of the péniches from France to the southeastern area on the Elbe - Danube waterway will be worth the strategic advantages, and whether increased building of naval landing craft in the southeastern area would not achieve quicker results, especially as the transfer of the péniches will necessitate two dockyard periods. (See Teletype 2040).

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IV. According to the intelligence report of 3 Sept., Ostrow estimated the enemy tonnage situation on 18 Aug. to be as follows:

1. Allied July tonnage surplus amounted to 514,000 BRT.

2. At present the enemy can at any time have sufficient tonnage available for about eight to ten divisions with all arms and equipment required for invasion operations.

3. On the basis of the present situation in sinkings, the enemy can at any time transport at least one and a half to two additional divisions overseas per month because sufficient escort ships and auxiliary aircraft carriers are available.

4. By April 1944 the enemy will have sufficient tonnage available to move 28 divisions to any given place immediately.

Naval Intelligence Division confirmed that all four points of Ostrow's estimate agree with the figures we have available and with our own opinion. As far as the fourth point is concerned, the tonnage available by April 1944 is here estimated to be higher than thought by Ostrow, for it is obvious that additional tonnage can be drawn from that used for supply operations, for which, according to the intelligence report, there is said to be ample tonnage; furthermore the landing operations will entail a voyage of less than ten days at sea and the greater part of the troops and equipment can be brought in with the first wave of landing craft so that the tonnage requirements would be reduced.

Report of Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 27108/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D "Enemy Situation Material."

V. A counterintelligence office (Josephine) regarded by Intelligence Division as being especially trustworthy, reported on 1 Sept. on the Quebec Conference:

"In principle the attitude hitherto prevailing has not changed. A large-scale operation in northern France, which should decide the war, is not to be expected before next spring. The centers of activity in North Africa and Sicily are regarded as being preparations for operations against Italy and the Mediterranean islands.

As already reported, in the United Kingdom, itself, at least two army corps have been re-transferred from the north of England presumably to the channel ports, which were originally intended for an operation against Norway. A concentration of ships in the southwestern ports was reported on 25 Aug. 1943. Tonnage for a bridgehead operation is undoubtedly available in these ports, but it is insufficient for moving an army of millions. Bomber offensive planned

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against the Reich territory, reaching its height in March/April 1944 with a proposed force of U.S. four-engined bomber formations of 1,200 - 1,300 planes, RAF four-engined bomber formations of 1,800 - 1,900 planes. The formation of a tactical air force of the RAF and the USAAF seems almost certain. No discussions, however, have yet taken place. Transfer of part of the 9th USAAF from the Near East to India, and of RAF formations from the Middle East to India is to be expected."

Situation 7 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, eleven troop transports are due to leave Jacksonville for Liverpool on 11 Sept. For enemy situation report to all in foreign waters on ship movements in the Indian Ocean see Radiogram 2051.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

At 0750 Air Commander, Atlantic reported two steamers and one destroyer on course 160° off Cape St. Vincent which were unsuccessfully attacked. South of Lisbon one Mosquito was shot down and one Hudson damaged.

Seventy-nine planes - the highest number so far - were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 2153 in BE 9930 and one at 2200 in BE 9370.

Minesweepers nearly always covered by a smoke-screen and out of range of our medium guns were continuously located or sighted west of Boulogne.

Commander in Chief, West estimated the situation in agreement with Group West as follows:

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"Enemy minesweeping activity off Boulogne points in the direction of the Cape Gris Nez - Le Havre area, centering approximately around the mouth of the Somme and Dieppe. Enemy air activity seems to be roughly centered on the sector between Cape Gris Nez and Dieppe. This must at present be regarded as an attempt at exhausting our fighters, blocking our traffic lanes, and interrupting any work under construction. **Generally speaking, however, it is not yet intensive enough for immediate action to be anticipated.** The situation has definitely become more serious, but the enemy's ultimate objectives are not yet clear."

According to an intelligence report from London via Spain on 7 Sept., all foreigners in the Southampton district have been evacuated. On 5 and 6 Sept. a convoy of 25 large transports assembled in the Solent. One cruiser and several destroyers are patrolling the Solent. The 6th Commando has been standing by in Hove near Brighton since 1 Sept. Troops quartered around Brighton are ready for embarkation.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

The Batteries "Friedrich August" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" bombarded enemy minesweepers at 1145 and at 1424 for a short time. Targets put up a smoke-screen.

One mine was swept between Dunkirk and Ostend.

The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla put into Ostend, the 4th PT Boat Flotilla put into Boulogne. The torpedo boat T "25" moved from Cherbourg to St. Malo under escort of the 10th Minesweeper Flotilla.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

At 0624 convoy "458" Elbe-Hook had an encounter off Terschelling with enemy PT boats without sustaining damage or suffering losses in personnel. All other escort operations were carried out according to plan. One ground mine was swept off Scheveningen.

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Naval Command, North has released the Danish North Sea fishery on condition that the following instructions be observed:

"1. More **stringent** control of personnel and material and of putting-in and putting-out operations must be exercised by the office of the Naval Control Service Officer and by the Coastwise Shipping Control Office. Should this entail additional personnel, requirements are to be reported at once.

2. The fishery has been unconditionally granted freedom of action in the designated Danish and German-Danish fishing areas and the passage used through the declared mine area to the Dogger Bank fishing grounds will be tacitly tolerated as before. The Danish fishery is especially warned not to fish in the German declared area.

3. Control of Danish fishing vessels at sea is to be effected by special measures of the **Counterintelligence** Office, Denmark."

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Three submarines were located off the Norwegian **arctic** coast. Nine planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Slight **gunfire** was reported in the Petsamo area.

At 0920 in AC 89 (east of Murmansk) our air reconnaissance sighted 1 freighter with 3 patrol vessels on course 120°, 1 small steamer, 1 patrol vessel on course 180° in Gorlo Strait, 2 small steamers on course 360° in the harbor entrance of Archangel.

The ships in harbor on 22 Aug. in Murmansk, Rosta, and Vayenga Bay were ascertained by photographic reconnaissance. For evaluations see Teletype 1155.

According to a **counterintelligence** report, at 1830 on 6 Sept. two camouflaged PT boats moored alongside 'Q' ships, were sighted on the southwest coast of the island of Sandoe near Mandal.

Own Situation:

Two Russian anti-submarine inertia contact mines were cut west of Nordkyn. At 1830 on 6 Sept. 2 of our submarine chasers were unsuccessfully attacked by 4 bombers and 2 fighters in Nordvaranger Fiord.

On 6 Sept. the **ROLAND** group of minelayers had just started their

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minelaying operations in Lylte Fiord when they were attacked by four torpedoes and guns from eight Russian torpedo-carrying planes with fighter escort. The torpedoes missed. Three torpedo-carrying planes were shot down by ROLAND and the minesweepers. Our losses in personnel are slight. For ROLAND's preliminary report see Teletype 0425.

A fishing vessel with five soldiers on board on passage between Helnes and Svaerholt has been overdue since 1 Sept.

Admiral, Northern Waters reported that operation "Zitronella" was sighted by our air reconnaissance at 1310 in AB 6357, which confirms that the operation is proceeding according to plan. The fact that enemy air reconnaissance must have discovered the absence of the heavy units from their berths in Alta and Narvik, does not in the opinion of Admiral, Northern Waters necessitate a change in the operation's plan; Group North/Fleet agreed with him. (See Teletype 2015).

Submarine U "737" has orders to wait between AA 3285 and AC 9775 as from 0800 on 9 Sept. as an escort for the weather ship KOBURG. The KOBURG has orders to meet submarine U "737".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

In the island area of the Gulf of Finland, air raids were being continuously carried out during the day against positions on Tyters, against the locality and battery of Kurgolovo, and against the "Seeigel" patrol. Finnish fighter cover could not go into action before 1045 because of fog. At 1039 our vessels had an encounter with three PT boats which put up a smoke-screen and withdrew.

From 0745 to 1145 minesweeping operations by two groups of twelve motor minesweepers each, with fighter escort and behind a heavy smoke-screen, were observed at the "Seeigel" barrage in AO 3636, 3714, 3639 and 3717. About 15 mine detonations were observed from Tyters. The northern minesweeping group was bombarded by the South Tyters Battery. Three ships appeared to be damaged. One ship was on fire. The group returned under PT boat escort to Lavansaari.

2. Own Situation:

South of Middlegrund one ELM mine was cleared by the Oslo - Aarhusships. On 4 Sept., a Swedish plane approached and circled the steamer PHOEBUS north of Dornbusch.

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Convoy operations were carried out without incident throughout the Baltic.

Sweeping operations were continued in Irben Strait.

During the night of 6 Sept. Finnish PT boats attacked a westbound enemy convoy and sank one tug, one large and one small barge.

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reported on the minesweeping operation in the "Seeigel" minefield which was carried out for the first time according to a set plan as follows:

"A gap will probably be cleared as a channel for surface vessels. Defense of the minefield by surface forces and island and coastal batteries impossible because of strong enemy air superiority. Please request Commander in Chief, Air Force via Naval Staff for reinforcements from the 1st Air Force, so that bombers can attack the vulnerable Russian light naval forces with bombs and guns, and so that fighters can protect our vessels."

Naval Command, Baltic requested equally urgently, that Commander in Chief, Air Force be pressed for reinforcements from the 1st Air Force.

Naval Staff will get in touch with Air Force Operations Staff.

Naval Staff ordered Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries to make a thorough survey of the shores and waters of Lake Peipus in preparation for the formation of a Lake Peipus Flotilla later on.

V. Merchant Shipping.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping stated that the following shipments are expected for September:

"In Norway the tonnage required for the supplies of the Armed Forces and the war industries is approximately 500,000 tons.

Sixty thousand tons of supplies are required for Finland, whereas 192,000 tons are to be shipped to the Baltic Countries.

About 100,000 tons (excepting coal) are to be transported in both directions by German coastal traffic.

About 200,000 tons will be shipped, including 20,000 tons from Rotterdam, by the coastal coal traffic.

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In September shipments of ore from Lulea are expected to be of about 500,000-600,000 t., and from Oxeloesund of about 80,000-100,000 t.

Naval Staff informed Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters; Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; the Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff, Navy; Group North/Fleet; Naval Commands, North, Baltic and Norway; as well as the Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division and the Bureau of Naval Armaments accordingly.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

The British Admiralty and the Air Ministry announced that British warships and the U.S. Air Force have allegedly sunk seven German submarines in individual operations made recently over the Bay of Biscay. These are obviously the losses sustained during the first half of August.

Nothing to report from the Atlantic.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day the enemy continued his attacks with strong bomber formations and fighter escort on our airfields in Belgium and northern France. Furthermore, the construction site at Watten was repeatedly attacked.

During the night of 7 Sept. a few Mosquitoes penetrated into the west and southwest of the Reich; one enemy plane was shot down over Holland by anti-aircraft guns.

A few of our fighter-bombers penetrated the Cambridge area and shot down one four-engined enemy plane.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out air reconnaissance. During the day the enemy had twin-engined planes operating over the areas of Sapri, Catanzarro and Laureana. At noon Foggia was raided by 100 Fortresses and Liberators. At the airfield only two Ju 88's were slightly damaged.

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3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The southern entrance of Gibraltar has been closed since the afternoon of 6 Sept. There continued to be very little shipping traffic in the Gibraltar area. Six ships put out for the Atlantic and the same number put into Gibraltar from the Atlantic. One TEXAS-class battleship was observed in port at 1400. The rest of the port's occupation could not be fully ascertained.

According to counterintelligence reports, strong U.S. Army forces are concentrated in the Bizerta-Tunis area, allegedly for an attack on Sardinia and Corsica. A high-ranking French Officer reported the ports of embarkation and the zero hours fixed for the U.S. 5th Army and the French Expeditionary Corps. Embarkation will begin before 10 Sept. and will continue until 15 Sept. and will include 1 U.S. tank division, 2 U.S. motorized divisions, 1 French tank division and 3 French divisions with equipment. Oran, Mers el Kebir, Mostaganem, Arzeu, Nemdura, Beni Saf and Algiers were mentioned as being the ports of embarkation. (See Teletype 0545).

Our air reconnaissance observed:

On 6 Sept. at 2040 northwest of Cherchell (west of Algiers) three cruisers, four patrol vessels, making for the coast.

At 1655 northwest of Bizerta an aircraft-carrier formation of 18 ships, of which 1 aircraft carrier, 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 2 light cruisers and 7 escort vessels were spotted by photographic reconnaissance.

At 1745 52 miles northeast of Bizerta, 40 freighters and further escort vessels on an easterly course, presumably part of the large convoy of 60 ships located on 5 Sept. off Bone, the remainder of which probably entered Bizerta, for an increase in tonnage has been noted there. At 0740 on 7 Sept. the eastbound convoy of 60 - 80 ships was located 20 miles north of Palermo on an easterly course. Several destroyers left Palermo at the same time. At 1650 this convoy was reported eight miles north of Ustica on a northeasterly course consisting of one cruiser, five escort vessels, and 60 landing craft.

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At 2230 the position of this convoy was reported as being 45 miles northeast of Ustica on a northeasterly course. At 2330 three aircraft carriers were lying 35 miles west-northwest of Trapani, apparently the aircraft carrier formation reported at 1655 on 6 Sept.

The movements reported indicate a landing is to be expected against the west coast of Italy, probably at Salerno Bay.

Commander in Chief, South informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff of the enemy situation at noon and presumed that the 18 landing craft transport ships, which left Mers el Kebir on 4 and 5 Sept. reinforced the landing force. (See Teletype 1130).

Air reconnaissance of Bizerta on 6 and 7 Sept. confirmed that a very heavy concentration of vessels of every description was in this vast port and also in Lake Bizerta, where approximately 200 ships of every size are assembled. The increase in freighter and transport tonnage amounts to more than 245,000 BRT as compared with 28 Aug. A decrease of 14 large and 182 small landing craft was noted, which is probably sufficient for the transportation of three U.S. landing divisions.

Tonnage and landing craft space has also increased in Palermo.

The formation of battleships reported north of the Strait of Messina has not been located again; it is still, however, to be expected in the same area, as according to Italian reports the Calabrian coast is being continuously bombarded.

No naval forces and shipping movements were observed on 6 Sept. in the Gulf of Taranto and in the Apulian Sea.

Submarine positions were reported on the afternoon of 6 Sept. off the east coast of Corsica and off Bastia, and on 7 Sept. near Ajaccio, off Leghorn, and near Pola. No reports on shipping movements are available from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Sea Transport Situation:

On 6 Sept. one of our submarines torpedoed a steamer south of Beirut, presumably a refrigerator ship and sank a sailing vessel.

Our motor minesweepers swept the coastal routes in the Strait of Bonifacio and in the Gulf of Gaeta of mines.

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Two Italian motor sailing vessels were sunk by enemy submarines on 5 and 6 Sept. in the Ligurian Sea and two others off the east coast of Corsica.

At 0430 on 6 Sept. the steamer MAGLINLIC (846 BRT) struck a mine and sank six miles off Punta Standarto in the Gulf of Gaeta.

Thirteen steamers, 2 tankers, and 1 auxiliary vessel were escorted in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Eight Italian torpedo boats, 1 submarine chaser, 6 motor minesweepers, and 3 auxiliary minesweepers were put into operation as escorts. Convoy traffic in the Adriatic Sea was carried out without special incident. One steamer with one torpedo boat and 2 other Italian escort vessels were proceeding from Taranto to Patras.

According to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, a total of six ships equalling 17,000 BRT and which allow for an overall capacity of 26,000 tons of cargo are at present being used for the merchant traffic between the Adriatic Sea and Piraeus and for the bauxite shipments. Two of the six ships are carrying 13,555 tons of bauxite.

During the night of 7 Sept. the French destroyer HARDI will move with two Italian submarine chasers and two tugs from Toulon to Genoa. The destroyer ADROIT will follow during the night of 8 Sept.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Because of an Italian submarine sighting report on 6 Sept. 50 miles south of Salonika, unescorted small vessels were temporarily stopped in the area of Salonika.

On the forenoon of 6 Sept. the Italian strong point on the south-east coast of Crete was unsuccessfully attacked by gunfire from three enemy planes. Anti-submarine operations are being continued by our own submarine chasers. (Compare War Diary 6 Sept.).

Because an enemy airfield is suspected to be on the coastal route between Chalkis and Piraeus, the DRACHE and the BULGARIA are being detained at Chalkis. Motor minesweepers have been ordered to a sweeping operation.

Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan.

Group South transmitted the following information from the Naval Attaché in Istanbul:

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"The naval pilot in Istanbul received orders from his command no longer to allow naval landing craft to pass through the straits. The Turkish Foreign Office is said to have informed the Embassy. In connection with this it is reported that:

1. The superstructure of the naval landing craft was changed for the transfer through the straits so as to make them look like merchant vessels.

2. The craft were transferred with full cargo, partly with lumber on deck. Four naval landing craft are being transferred at present.

Request that steps be taken for a diplomatic agreement to be made. It is to be feared that, if the Turks enforce the orders forbidding passage of naval landing craft, further supply traffic difficulties will arise for steamers."

It is feared that the Turkish attitude is the result of recent propaganda, emphasizing the strategic value of the naval landing craft.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, six submarines were out at sea. At 1135 air reconnaissance sighted a convoy with two patrol vessels and four planes off Mychakov.

Own Situation:

One of our barges struck a mine and sank at the mouth of the Dnieper.

Submarine U "23" started her return passage from the operation area. Transfer of submarine U "9" with escort from Sevastopol to Constanta was postponed because of bad weather.

Crimean convoys, patrols and minesweeping activities were also hampered by weather conditions.

Supply traffic to the Gotenkopf positions proceeded as planned.

August sea transport figures for the Black Sea were 226,661 tons as against 250,694 tons in July.

Three steamers totalling 12,410 BRT were lost, four vessels totalling 7,986 BRT were damaged.

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Decrease in transport results due to shipping losses and to smaller shipments across the Strait of Kerch.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff stated that:

"Impossibility of securing sufficient exchange demands decrease in the number of German troops in Rumania. As a preliminary measure, Chief of Armed Forces High Command intends to reduce the actual strength of the Army and the Navy in Rumania by 20 %.

Opinions on the effect this would have on operations are requested."

IX. Situation Far East.

According to enemy reports small Allied forces landed in a combined sea and air operation along the coast of the Gulf of Huon on the north coast of New Guinea. In connection with this, the Japanese reported that six enemy transports and one cruiser were sunk, and that severe fighting continues.

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Items of Political Importance.

A new situation has developed which, although anticipated, has come at an unexpected time: namely the announcement on the evening of 8 Sept. of the unconditional surrender of the Italian Government.

The fact became known in the late afternoon through Anglo-American news bulletins which gave no details, and though at first denied by General Roatta when inquired into by Armed Forces High Command, it was, however, subsequently confirmed by Marshal Badoglio.

The Supreme Commander of the Allied Armed Forces, General Eisenhower, announced:

"The Italian Government has offered the unconditional surrender of the Italian Armed Forces. As Allied Supreme Commander I have granted an armistice, the conditions of which have been approved by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The armistice was signed by my deputy and by an emissary of Marshal Badoglio and becomes immediately effective.

Hostilities between the Armed Forces of the Allied Nations and the Armed Forces of Italy will cease at once.

All Italians who assist in chasing the German aggressor from Italian soil will be given the help and assistance of the Allied Nations."

Badoglio declared in a radio appeal that the Italian Armed Forces must bring all belligerent actions against Anglo-American forces to a halt. The Italian Army will, however, offer resistance to all attacks from other quarters.

It was officially announced in London that the armistice with Italy is a purely military agreement, and does not include political, commercial and financial conditions; these will follow later.

The consequences of this vile betrayal - unique in the way in which it was carried out - will not be those Italy is hoping for. The country will become the battlefield of the betrayed ally of yesterday and the ruthless victor of today. It will also have to stand up to the impact of political struggles which may well lead to civil war.

The discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill in Washington continue.

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According to Reuter, Great Britain and the United States are said to have already agreed to retain the Joint Chiefs of Staff for some time after the war. What both Governments have in mind is the interval between the cessation of hostilities and the signing of the official peace treaty, during which time this committee would be charged with the maintenance of security. It is hoped that this Anglo-American military control, in which other nations could also join, will lead to a plan which will become the framework for a permanent organization for the maintenance of peace. One of the measures towards this goal would be the formation of a Mediterranean Commission. Roosevelt is said to have stated that this commission was being chiefly formed to keep the Mediterranean countries out of war.

The arguments put forward by Churchill in Cambridge (Massachusetts) in favor of Anglo-American unity have been widely commented on in the Anglo-American press, as was to be expected.

Finally, it is worth noting that side by side with the general attitude that the war is bound to be won and very rapidly moreover, the demand for a sober review of the situation is being voiced in serious circles. Smuts, for instance, declared that the world was in danger of being drawn into an endless war of exhaustion, which would be just as serious for the Empire as actual defeat. All Allied resources should therefore be pooled in order that victory might be secured next year.

On 2 Sept. the German Ambassador in Tokyo submitted allegedly trustworthy information from the Japanese Foreign Minister on the decisions reached at Quebec. According to this information, a triple landing in Italy, in southern France, and on the French west coast is said to have been agreed on as far as warfare in Europe is concerned, whereas operations in the Near East will not begin before December.

The battle of tonnage against Japan will be intensified. Furthermore, Japan is to be attacked from China and from the Aleutian Islands, Burma is to be attacked from India. The U.S. Fleet will push northwards from the southwest Pacific and seek a decisive battle with the Japanese Fleet, whereas battleships and aircraft carriers will be assembled in the Indian Ocean in order to threaten the Japanese flank.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Report of Rear-Admiral Topp on the conference between the Ministry of Armament and Production and the Air Ministry at Rechlin.

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The next meeting will deal with naval matters and is scheduled for the beginning of November at Gdynia.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

II. Report of Chief, Naval Intelligence Division on the highly successful results obtained by one of our counterintelligence offices in Holland, which played the part of an enemy organization for months.

III. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. In considering the question whether mines with a new firing unit can be used for defense against landings off our own shores, it appears that ground mines with a purely magnetic firing will probably be fully effective against enemy landing craft near the eight-meter line, as the operation of minesweeping vessels is unlikely and the landing craft's degaussing apparatus will be inadequate. On the other hand the efficiency of the detonation of the mines with a new firing unit is no guarantee owing to the enemy's low speed and the smallness of the landing craft. Furthermore the number of mines required would be much higher and could not be met. But above all, because these mines cannot be swept, activity would be grossly hampered along our own shores. Naval Staff therefore disagreed with Group West, who in addition to laying these mines off the enemy ports of embarkation also wished to protect landing points. For particulars see "Situation West Area".

Naval Staff therefore instructed Groups West and South, Naval Command, North and German Naval Command, Italy, copy to Group North/Fleet as follows:

"1. Ground mines with purely magnetic firing laid near the eight meter line probably fully effective against enemy landings, as operations of minesweepers unlikely and degaussing apparatus insufficient.

2. Investigate possibilities of laying LMA and LMB mines at especially vulnerable points, whilst taking our own freedom of movement into consideration, and submit plans.

3. Makeshift devices against rolling of the mines in heavy seas and storms under construction."

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

b. According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy none of our submarines are at present in the operational area of Sicily and southern Italy. Two submarines are awaiting Hagenuk equipment in Toulon but are otherwise ready for sailing. Naval Staff

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suggested that, regardless of this, sailing orders be immediately given.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. German Naval Command, Italy has been given the relevant order.

c. Operation "Zitronella" seems to be progressing according to plan. The enemy was not sighted by our air reconnaissance. The 5th Air Force ordered an additional reconnaissance to be carried out with five BV 138's along the position lines AF 8270 - 5650 and 4730 - 1980. At 0245 radio intelligence intercepted a message from Green Harbor radio station about having sighted our force. This message, which mentions three cruisers and seven destroyers, was transmitted at 0457 by a British home radio station to Murmansk. Should the enemy take immediate action, there is the likelihood of an engagement with an equally strong enemy which is not to be avoided. Our air reconnaissance, however, did not sight the enemy until the afternoon.

I. In "Enemy Situation Report No. 17/43 7 Sept." Naval Intelligence Division made the following remarks on the general situation:

"It must be stressed that the army units assembled in the British theater not only allow the enemy to carry out small-scale landing operations in the Scandinavian theater but at any moment to start a very large-scale offensive against the northwest of France, for which transport units of all types are available in sufficient number. The minesweeping activity latterly observed in the eastern part of the Channel (area west of Boulogne) close to the coast of northern France may be an indication that the enemy is making preparations for an operation against the French Channel coast and also that perhaps an early start is to be anticipated.

In the Mediterranean the expected new operations of the enemy against Europe started on 3 Sept. with the landing on southern Calabria. So far comparatively few units of the forces assembled in the Sicilian area are engaged, and in general only enemy landing craft and freighters stationed there are being used. The majority of the forces in Sicily and the bulk of the transport tonnage stationed in the area of Algeria and Tunis is still available for further large-scale landings.

There are no indications of the imminence of large-scale operations in the eastern Mediterranean. They would seem at present unlikely, because the number of landing craft located there is small. It must, however, be mentioned that the tonnage of large ships in the ports of Alexandria and Port Said is increasing."

Naval Intelligence Division reported as follows on the war against merchant shipping:

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1. New constructions:

During August new constructions in enemy merchant shipping tonnage for overseas operations are estimated at 1,200,000 BRT.

2. Tonnage sunk:

According to figures, which have been checked, 442,590 BRT of enemy and enemy-operated tonnage was lost during August. Losses in the battle area around Sicily and the Mediterranean amounted to 56 % of the monthly total. 476 merchant ships totalling 2,200,000 BRT were damaged since 1 July 1943. Against a total loss of 29,200,000 BRT (excluding the Baltic, Black Sea and Caspian Sea) sustained since the beginning of the war up to 1 Sept. 1943, newly constructed tonnage amounts to 18,900,000 BRT.

3. Tonnage available:

The total of vessels over 1,000 BRT available to the enemy at the beginning September 1943 is estimated to be about 33,900,000 BRT, of which about 19,300,000 BRT of shipping space can be used for overseas operations. The troop transport tonnage and tanker tonnage suitable for operations has probably not substantially changed compared with last month. (2,200,000 BRT passenger ships and troop transports and 6,800,000 BRT tankers).

Owing to the extension of transit traffic through the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, it was in August presumably possible to make further reductions in the 17,600,000 BRT of merchant tonnage engaged in enemy supply traffic, including military supplies, and the tonnage used in operations in the Mediterranean. Therefore merchant tonnage available for operations including the further increased surplus in newly built tonnage is at present estimated as about 3,000,000-4,000,000. Tonnage which could be made available in the event of temporary restrictions in supply traffic is not included in this estimate.

II. Preparations for operation "Achse":

1. On 6 Sept. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff ordered:

"In the event of operation "Achse", the Croatian naval detachment at present stationed in the Black Sea is to be retransferred to Croatia for employment on the Dalmatian coast."

This matter is being investigated by the Naval Quartermaster Division.

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2. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff requested Naval Staff to submit a statement on the strategic demands which are to be embodied in a note it is intended to send to the Italians. Operations Division reported that the Navy was undecided about the following matters:

Command of the naval units in the Aegean Sea, transfer of Supreme Command, and the question of the Toulon coastal batteries; these matters are, however, in the opinion of Naval Staff scarcely fit for discussion in a note.

For order received and order of 1/Skl I a 2705/43 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Quartermaster Division ordered Group West, Naval Commands, North, Baltic and Norway to form all commands planned for operation "Achse" at once.

In connection with the start of operation "Achse" see "Warfare in the Mediterranean".

III. On 3 Sept. Group North/Fleet advised Naval Staff for information of the instructions issued to Naval Commands, Baltic, North, Norway; Training Unit/Fleet; Commander, Destroyers; Commander, PT Boats; Commander, Minesweepers; Commanding Admiral, Submarines; with copy to Admiral, Northern Waters, Task Force and Group West in connection with the preliminary order of measures in the event of large-scale enemy operations against southern Norway, Skagerrak and Jutland. Relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 2655/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. VIII 3.

Start of the measures planned and taking over of the overall combined command by Group North/Fleet will be released by keyword "Wallenstein".

No comment has been made by Naval Staff on these instructions.

IV. On 2 Aug. Group North/Fleet proposed the formation of a Naval Operations Detachment for the northern area (Norway, Baltic, North Sea). The matter is under investigation by Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division.

Operations Division is of the following opinion:

"Formation of a Naval Operations Detachment as proposed by Group North/Fleet would doubtless fill a long-felt need.

Operations Division is, however, of the opinion that, if the plan is carried out as submitted, the full effect cannot be expected.

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Ample supply of weapons and material and the commissioning of selected personnel alone will be insufficient, as experience with coastal infantry detachments has shown. The basis on which to carry out this plan effectively is to find an officer who not only has the necessary imagination for thinking out such operations, but who also has the necessary flair for planning such operations and the initiative to carry them out.

It is first of all necessary to find the officer, who will then be appointed "Commander, Naval Operations Detachment, North". (Placed under the command of Group North/Fleet).

The "Commander, Naval Operations Detachment, North" will start his activities by submitting a few concrete proposals. These operations will then be prepared and carried out by the formation of the necessary organization. As experience is gained, "Commander, Naval Operations Detachment, North" will gradually be given more scope. Should it be deemed inadvisable to extend the activities of "Commander, Naval Operations Detachment, North" to other areas also, similar naval operations detachments will be created in those areas later on. Naval Staff considers it important that Commander, Naval Operations Detachment, North be absolutely independent of Armed Forces, High Command. Close co-operation with Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division is of course necessary."

Proposal of Group North/Fleet and order of 1/Skl I op. 22064/43 Gkdos. in File 1/Skl I op. IX, 3.

V. According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Tokyo on 1 Sept. the MARCO POLO was handed over to the Japanese Navy with due ceremony.

VI. "War time experiences with mine tactics No. 12" issued by order of 1/Skl IE 24466/43 Gkdos. It deals with the tactical use of ground mines against enemy landings and when retreating from our own ports. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

VII. Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command reported on the results of interrogations of the British submarine SARACEN about R.D.F.-Asdic-sets with which British submarines either are or will be equipped in order to detect enemy direction finding bearings. Particulars as per 1/Skl 27191/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

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Situation 8 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an agent's report, 21 single ships making for South America and 32 coming from South America passed Freetown in July 1943. Convoys to the north start at Casablanca. The Freetown - Casablanca route is well patrolled by planes and naval vessels. Since the end of June neither troop transports nor U.S. warships and freighters have passed Freetown to the south. Three flying-boat squadrons of ten planes each are stationed in Freetown, which carry out reconnaissances half-way to Brasil. The RESOLUTION with the cruiser GAMBIA and two destroyers anchored off Freetown from 10 - 12 Aug. before proceeding north.

According to a further agent's report a convoy of 27 freighters arrived in Sidney on 18 July from the United States. The escort included the battleship NEW YORK, the cruiser HONOLULU, two auxiliary aircraft carriers including the BOGUE, and destroyers. The warships proceeded north after a short stop. This was said to be the first time since the beginning of the war that U.S. battleships put into an Australian port.

2. Own Situation:

There are no reports available from our own ships.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Sixty-two planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 2144 in BF 4630.

In the Channel at 1100 a group of 25 - 30 vessels was sighted south-east of Dungeness sailing behind a smoke-screen on a southwesterly course. At 1243 three destroyers were lying 10 - 15 miles northwest of Etaples. During the afternoon enemy PT boats activity was observed 10 - 15 miles northwest of Etaples. During the afternoon enemy PT boats activity was observed 10 - 15 miles off Boulogne. At 1711 several hollow detonations were heard far away to the north of Le Tréport. The targets sighted were repeatedly bombarded by our batteries without any results being observed.

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Attacks against the airfields in northern France and Belgium continued on a larger scale. Between 1800 - 1900 violent attacks were carried out by numerous twin-engined bombers with heavy fighter escort against our coastal artillery and anti-aircraft gun positions in the Dieppe - Boulogne area. From 2220 onwards the town and harbor of Boulogne and the Pois Nord airfield were attacked by strong formations.

Group West considers that the situation has grown even graver.

According to radio intelligence British radio traffic on the south coast and in the Channel was normal in the evening. Nothing especially noticeable was detected. At 1700 a British warship reported that she was withdrawing because of heavy German gunfire.

According to intelligence reports the Commandos' Headquarters are in Dover, where the 5th and 7th Commandos are ready for embarkation.

According to a further intelligence report from London via Spain received at 2345 on 7 Sept. from an allegedly most trustworthy source, landing operations against northern France will start on the morning of 8 Sept. A delay of one or two days because of weather conditions is possible. According to investigations made by the Security Branch in France, the release of the keyword for the start of large-scale actions by the underground movement is expected by 10 Sept.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off Brest, one southwest of Lorient, one west of La Rochelle, and one west of Lorient.

The torpedo boat T "14" and the FALKE put out from Bayonne at 1030 for individual training and gunnery practice, and put into St. Jean de Luz in the evening.

Channel Coast:

Seven mines were cleared in the Channel during a check sweep, six of them west of Dunkirk. At 0135 east of Fécamp a group of five minesweepers (of the 38th Minesweeper Flotilla) encountered five enemy PT boats lying immediately under the shore. The minesweepers M "3810", M "3811" and M "3816" sank almost simultaneously after detonations. Whether caused by torpedoes or mines was not definitely ascertained. For brief action report see Teletype 1400. Our own losses were heavy.

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During the night of 8 Sept. the 6th PT Boat Flotilla with four ships moved from Boulogne to Ostend, the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla with five ships and PT boats S "85" and S "65" from Ostend to Ijmuiden.

Special Items.

1. Naval Staff informed Group West by teletype 1/Skl Ik 2718/43 Gkdos. Chfs. about the plan of operations for the blockade-runners. The sailing dates previously set for 20 Sept. and 20 Oct. have now each been postponed by one month. Departures and arrivals are at the earliest planned to take place not before the December new moon period, depending on the situation. Copy of teletype in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

2. On 2 Sept. Group West submitted a detailed commentary on the operational possibilities of the new firing units for the prevention of a British landing on the Continent. It recommends blockading the ports of embarkation, mining the approach routes and supply lanes, and the minefields in and off the ports and points chosen for landing. Group West considers that the most effective use of these new firing units would be for an early and intensively carried out blockading of enemy ports of embarkation; such an operation would have to be primarily carried out by the Air Force supported by PT boats. Group West intends to discuss matters with the 3rd Air Force and to make preparations, provided Naval Staff agrees in principle.

Naval Staff cannot, however, approve of this. Minelaying from planes off the ports of embarkation is out of question, because the new equipment might thus fall into enemy hands. Whether in the interests of the front line tests ordered by Naval Staff it would be opportune for PT boats to operate against the ports of embarkation within the stipulated limits remains to be seen. A decision on the mining of our own coast line with these new firing units was already reached on 7 Sept. The D.M. (pressure magnetic fuse) can therefore not be released for coastal defense. Group West will be informed accordingly, and will at the same time receive orders that the new firing units are also to be protected against enemy seizure at moments when our strong points are only temporarily captured. It has therefore been ordered to move them from the coastal area to Rotterdam and Chateaudun. Only as many LMB mines with DM 1 or AA 1 may be kept in the ports as have been actually requested by Commander PT Boats for immediate operations.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy 458 Elbe-Hook has been carried out. The tanker LOTHRINGEN's convoy starts at 0500 on 9 Sept. from the Hook to the Elbe. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla moved with seven ships from Ostend to Flushing. Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twelve planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Slight artillery activity was reported in the Petsamo area. At 1135 one of our westbound convoys was unsuccessfully attacked by five torpedoes from a submarine east of Tanahorn. Own air reconnaissance located a submarine at 1730 120 miles northwest of Namsos.

Own Situation:

On 7 Sept. 23 ships were escorted north, 15 south, and on 8 Sept. 21 north and 32 south. Either 16 or 6 ships were postponed because of a shortage of escorts in the Arctic coast area.

In connection with operation "Zitronella" see "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Patrol vessel traffic and air activity in Kronstadt Bay and in the island area revealed nothing unusual. One submarine left Kronstadt, apparently for exercises and returned in the evening.

2. Own Situation:

Preparations for the towing off of the NIELS JUEL will probably take three weeks, because dredging must first be done.

Fifty miles north of Leba submarine U "983" was rammed by submarine U "988" and sank. Thirty-eight survivors were rescued.

The motor coasters KM "6" and KM "30", which were damaged in an air raid near Somery, have been towed into Kotka.

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As no fighter cover is available, our patrol vessels in the "See-igel" area are withdrawn into the islands during the daytime. Submarine hunting has been ordered between Revalstein and Vaindlo. Sweeping operations in Irben Strait have so far been without result. Minelaying operations were observed near Reval. During the night of 8 Sept. the patrol group off Tyters reported an encounter with three enemy motor minesweepers; the enemy withdrew to the northwest.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Between 31 Aug. and 10 Sept. 16 homeward-bound and 22 outward-bound submarines passed through the Bay of Biscay; one of these was probably lost.

Those submarines equipped with the "Zaunkoenig" anti-destroyer torpedo will assemble west of the Bay of Biscay to take on supplies so that they can then resume operations against the North Atlantic convoy traffic very suddenly, entirely unexpectedly, and in complete radio silence.

Submarine U "760" homeward-bound from Vigo was towed back to Vigo owing to serious engine trouble. Negotiations are in progress with Spain for the granting of sufficient time for repairs.

The supplying of the Monsun boats through BRAKE will start on 8 Sept.

Special Items.

According to a list prepared by Submarine Branch, Quartermaster Division, the number of submarines available for operations decreased from 184 to 167 on 1 Sept. 32 submarines were lost in August as against 27 in July.

Fourteen new submarines came into operation for the first time in August. Twenty-one new submarines were commissioned.

In August 57 % of the submarines put into operation in the Atlantic and 28.6 % of those in the Mediterranean were lost.

The monthly average loss since the beginning of the war amounts to 6 % of the total number of boats available for operations.

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the western area the 3rd Air Force had 257 planes out on operations and three in the Mediterranean.

Planes belonging to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast shot down one Liberator 240 miles west of Brest. Fourteen of our fighter-bombers are scheduled for an operation against Cambridge during the night of 8 Sept.

On 8 Sept. the enemy made daylight raids on airfields in Belgium and northern France and also had heavy formations attacking coastal gun emplacements and anti-aircraft gun positions in the Dieppe - Boulogne area. For further details see: "Situation West Area".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Fifty-seven of our fighter-bombers attacked ship targets at the enemy landing point in the Gulf of Eufemia. One freighter was sunk, one cruiser and one transport damaged. Hits on other vessels and landing craft were observed. In the afternoon the enemy attacked the airfields of Foggia and Frascati with heavy formations; Headquarters of Commander in Chief, South were hit. Capri was also raided: four enemy planes were shot down by fighters, two by anti-aircraft guns. In Greece, Lamia was raided at 1030 by ten enemy planes.

3. Eastern Front:

Seventy-five enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 6 Sept. and 86 on 7 Sept.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Operation "Achse":

As soon as Italy's unconditional surrender became known, the following information was dispatched by Naval Staff to Naval Command, Italy at 2000:

"According to enemy broadcasts the Italian Armed Forces have surrendered. The Fuehrer has ordered the highest degree of alarm to the German Armed Forces in Italy." According to information received in advance by telephone, Armed Forces High Command put operation "Achse" into immediate effect at 1950, as soon as Marshal Badoglio confirmed the accuracy of the Anglo-American radio

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announcement. Naval Staff immediately transmitted the keyword "Achse" by teletype and radiogram at 2025 to German Naval Command, Italy; Commander, Submarines, Italy; Group South; Admiral, Aegean Sea, and Group West. At 2025 German Naval Command, Italy was ordered by radiogram, with copy to Commander, Submarines, Italy, to put our submarines into operation chiefly off Spezia.

At 2310 Naval Commands, Baltic, North, Norway, Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with copy to Group North/Fleet, were informed by teletype that Italy had unconditionally surrendered, that the Fuehrer had released the keyword "Achse" and had ordered that the measures drawn up for such an emergency on 29 July 1943 be carried out.

At 2045 radio intelligence intercepted a message from Algiers in which Admiral Cunningham requested the Italian Navy to move her ships to the ports of Alexandria, Haifa, Gibraltar or Malta. If short of fuel, they are to put into neutral ports. Ships in the Black Sea should put into Russian ports. If all these possibilities fail, the ships are to be scuttled. At 2210 radio Daventry announced that the Italian Government has ordered all conveyances carrying German troops on land or sea, to be stopped.

At 1925 German Naval Command, Italy had already reported that because of the situation, it was moving to the Frascati - Marino area with Commander, Submarines, and that communications were assured. The accomplishment of the move was reported at 2240. At 2300 the Army teletype station in Italy reported everything ready for demolition.

As Commander, Submarines is moving to Toulon according to plan, the command of the submarines in the Mediterranean was temporarily taken over by Submarine Operations Division. The two submarines in Toulon ready for sailing received orders to leave at once without awaiting Hagenuk equipment and to attack ruthlessly any Italian warship trying to escape from Spezia. At 2320 Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued orders that all Italian liaison staffs attached to German commands and administrative offices as well as all Italian officers and enlisted personnel stationed outside Italy in the areas of the German Armed Forces, be immediately placed under guard according to rank and without offending their honor, and all important documents seized. The required measures were taken by Naval Staff with regard to the Liaison Staff of the Royal Italian Navy. The Chief of the Liaison Staff could not be placed under guard as he is also the Naval Attaché and therefore comes under diplomatic protection.

Our Naval Liaison Officer to the Italian Commander, Submarines reported that all Italian officers and enlisted men in Bordeaux have orders not to leave their barracks. In order to prevent any sabotage, the Italian submarines I "2" and I "12" have been manned

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by absolutely trustworthy officers and men. First Army Headquarters should be consulted as regards further security measures. The Italians have been cut off from communications with the outside world.

The higher naval commands were informed about the situation as follows:

"1. Italy surrendered unconditionally, armistice already effective. Admiral Cunningham requested the Italian Navy to put into Allied or neutral ports; if short of fuel ships are to be scuttled. According to unconfirmed reports the Italian Commanding Admiral, Fleet is said to have already given orders not to scuttle the ships but to put into Allied ports. Other Allied demands not yet known.

"2. Because Italy's withdrawal from the war was foreseen by the Fuehrer all possible measures for the safeguarding of German interests were taken and are now being carried out. It is planned to hold northern Italy and Corsica under Rommel's command; the troops stationed in southern Italy are to withdraw to northern Italy, if necessary fighting their way out. The Italian occupied French Zone will be taken over by German troops, the Dalmatian coast will be patrolled."

2. Enemy Situation Mediterranean - Further Items:

At 1630 a convoy of 19 freighters put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic. In the afternoon a westbound convoy of 22 freighters and four tankers passed the Strait of Gibraltar - presumably the westbound convoy sighted off Oran on 7 Sept. Eleven freighters and four gunboats belonging to this convoy put into Gibraltar.

According to an intelligence report from Spain, the NELSON is said to have put into an Algerian port with numerous killed and wounded on board.

Our morning air reconnaissance spotted several large formations in the south of the Tyrrhenian Sea namely:

at 0730 62 miles west-southwest of Cape Palinuro 35 ships, ten destroyers on a northerly course, presumably the convoy reported at 2030 on 7 Sept. 70 miles north-northeast of Palermo;

at 1030 68 miles west-southwest of Cape Palinuro a further 80 - 100 vessels on a northerly course;

at 1030 40 miles southwest of Naples five cruisers, ten destroyers on a northerly course;

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at 0735 63 miles northeast of Palermo 15 ships, ten destroyers on a northeasterly course;

at 0743 off Palermo 150 large ships on a main course of 35°.

The expected landings started during the early hours of the morning at the southern corner of the Gulf of Salerno and at Pizzo in the Gulf of Eufemia. These landings are obviously somehow connected with the announcing of the surrender of the Italian Armed Forces.

No other activities were observed in the Mediterranean, mainly because of a shortage of reconnaissance planes. Nor were any reconnaissances carried out over Malta. It can be safely assumed that there are formations of carriers and battleships near the landing areas.

In the forenoon an enemy air raid was carried out on the Naples area and, as already reported, bombers attacked our Headquarters in Frascati for the first time. Additional submarine locations were reported on the evening of 7 Sept. 40 miles southwest of La Spezia and six miles southwest of Durazzo.

3. Own Situation Mediterranean - Further Items:
Transport Situation:

Three of our PT boats are moving from Maddalena to Nettunia. Our naval and merchant ships in the area south of Gaeta have orders to move at once to the north. Nettunia is now considered to be the most southern port.

On 7 Sept. Naval Staff ordered the PT boats S "33" and S "30" to move as quickly as possible from Pola to the Aegean Sea and to carry out repairs in the Aegean area. No reports on the carrying out of the convoys are available.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

At 1760 on 7 Sept. an enemy submarine shelled the mining installations at Cape Prasso on Amorgos. At 2030 Corfu was attacked by an enemy bomber which afterwards crashed. At 2245 the steamer P.L.M. "24" (5,391 BRT) was sunk by an enemy submarine 20 miles north of the northern point of Euboea. Anti-submarine operations were continued southeast of Piraeus by three submarine chasers and two "Q" ships. Minesweeping operations were carried out off Cape Sunion without result. The DRACHE and the BULGARIA put into Piraeus with escort vessels.

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According to a report from Group South, the Italians laid 1,000 meters of explosive nets on the east-west wall in the Aegean Sea between Stapidio and Dragonisi and east of Dragonisi. A netlayer group left Salonika for Cavalla in order to remove these nets.

Black Sea:

Convoy traffic was partly hampered by weather conditions. Ferry traffic in the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan. Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

On the events leading to the Italian surrender, radio Algiers reports that the armistice was already signed on 3 Sept. It was stipulated, however, that it should only become effective at a date to be decided on by the Allies.

The Allies apparently consider the landings in the Gulf of Salerno so important for the situation in Italy that they chose this day as being the most suitable for the agreement to go into effect and the armistice to be announced.

Particulars of the conditions are still unknown. But General Wilson's instructions to the Italian Armed Forces in the Balkans, asking them to offer resistance to the Germans since this is one of the terms of the armistice agreement, suggest that the Army is expected to continue fighting on the Allied side, whereas the Navy, the Merchant Marine, and the Air Force are to be placed directly under Allied control.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division on measures and instructions for the start of operation "Achse" and on the situation report to the higher naval commands as per notes in War Diary 8 Sept. Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

II. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division

a. on the proposal made by Group West to use mines equipped with new firing units against enemy landings and the decision of Naval Staff as found in War Diary 8 Sept.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

b. According to Group West's observations, enemy minesweeping operations during the last few days have shown that owing to the inadequacy of our location service and the enemy's use of smoke-screens, even minefields close to shore and within range of our guns are being swept. As an immediate countermeasure, Group West therefore intends to lay mines fitted with new firing units to form flanking minefields; the first step will be to lay a minefield during the night of 9 Sept. with the AA 1 mines available in the Netherlands at Vergoyer Bank, south of the ten meter line. Further

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minefields with the same firing units are planned as soon as Naval Staff's approval has been received. Naval Staff raised no objection to the release of the AA 1 mines, provided the necessary security measures were carried out, and approved the position proposed for the minefield; but the release of the DM 1 mines has not been granted.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

c. According to a report from Group South, the transfer planned for operation "Achse" is being peacefully carried out in accordance with an agreement reached between the German and Italian commands in the Aegean Sea. Officers are retaining their weapons, enlisted men are each retaining one rifle and one round of ammunition. All other weapons are being taken to a place of safety.

The Italian radio station and the Italian ships in the Black Sea have been taken over. The material is in a place of safety. The crews are being kept in honorable internment.

Ratings and petty officers have been disarmed in Constanta; the two officers were permitted to keep their weapons. Further participation in the war depends on the decision of the Commander of the flotilla in Sevastopol.

Naval Command, Baltic reported that the Italian smoke-screen battalions in Gdynia, Memel and Pillau offered their services at once. Leave has been cancelled. The attitude of the Italian officers at the Anti-Aircraft Gunnery School and at the Mining and Barrage Defense School is one of indecision. Italian workmen in the naval installations in the area of Naval Command, Baltic have unanimously agreed to carry on their work.

The Italian submarines in Gdynia have been placed under German guard. The crews were taken off the boats. The Italian flag is to be left flying for the time being.

III. Meanwhile it was learned that at 0941 our air reconnaissance sighted an Italian naval force of three battleships, six cruisers and six destroyers making for Maddalena. The departure of the battleships from Spezia, at 0300, was only reported by intelligence service at 0900.

In view of this extremely regrettable fact - especially so for the Navy - Chief, Naval Staff decided to take the same precautions with the Italian submarines in Bordeaux as taken with those in the Baltic. Group West with copy to Commander, Submarines West, Submarine Division, received the following orders:

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"In view of departure of Italian Fleet, Commander in Chief, Navy is also obliged to order special measures for Italian submarines in Bordeaux. Place boats under German guard until situation clarified. Leave Italian flag flying. Take crews off boats and retain them in a small unit. Allow Captain Grossi as much freedom as possible and treat him well. Report on execution of order. No objections against Grossi communicating by wire with Italian submarine commanders in Gdynia."

At the same time Captain Grossi in Bordeaux, copy to Group West and Commander, Submarines, West, received the following teletype from Commander in Chief, Navy:

"In view of the developments in Italy I was obliged to order special measures for the Italian Naval Commands within the German sphere of influence.

I regret most exceedingly that, in view of the action taken by the Italian Fleet, I was forced to apply these measures - though only officially - to your unit, also, of whose loyalty I am convinced. I hope to clear up the situation by having a personal discussion with you as soon as possible.

Doenitz, Grand Admiral."

As regards the escape of the Italian Fleet from the naval bases, Naval Staff can only emphasize that the very fact that operation "Achse" was released without warning at a moments' notice, made effective intervention impossible. The ships could only have been successfully held or seized with strong support from the Army; and this had been constantly emphasized by the Navy during preparations. Moreover, the Navy had demanded 48 hours' notice for the measures she would have to take (submarine and PT boat operations and laying of minefields).

Special Items.

I. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has re-organized the commands in Italy. Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 25328/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Amongst other changes the re-organization includes the withdrawal of the 2nd Air Force from the command of Commander in Chief, South.

II. With regard to the future treatment of Italian soldiers in our sphere of influence, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued the following instructions at 2115:

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"Italian soldiers who are not prepared to continue fighting on the German side are to be disarmed and treated as prisoners of war. For the time being, they are to be taken over by Chief, Prisoners of War, Armed Forces High Command. In conjunction with the Commissioner General for Manpower, all skilled workmen amongst the prisoners of war taken over are to be picked out and placed at the disposal of the Commissioner General for Manpower. Furthermore, all Fascists still amongst the prisoners of war are to be selected in conjunction with the Reichsfuehrer SS and placed at his disposal. All remaining prisoners of war will then be placed at the disposal of Quartermaster General, Army General Staff and Quartermaster General, Air Force in the ratio of 7:1 as workmen for the construction of the East Wall.

The selections are to be made continuously, whenever prisoners of war arrive, so that the camps are cleared ready for new contingents of prisoners of war as quickly as possible.

Chief, Prisoners of War will report to me every fifth day, beginning 15 Sept., on their total number and on how they have been disposed of.

If Chief, Prisoners of War, Armed Forces High Command has insufficient guards for this task, Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, Replacement Army is to grant him temporary assistance by providing convalescents, etc. as guards.

The transportation of British and American prisoners of war from Italy has priority over that of Italian prisoners of war."

Quartermaster Division intends also to put in a request from the Navy for an allotment of prisoners of war as workmen for badly needed naval building construction.

III. Further instructions from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff defined the question of defense of strategic buildings as follows:

"The responsibility for the security of military buildings, in as much as they require special protection against air raids and sabotage, rests in the various commands with the command offices of the branches of the Armed Forces located there. For buildings where it is difficult to place responsibility or which need the assistance of other branches of the services for their protection, the respective Commanding Generals are responsible for arranging such protection. All such buildings and all buildings under construction are to be reported to him in good time by the offices in whose name the buildings are being constructed."

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IV. Finally, the following decision by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff was handed to Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, Replacement Army, and High Command, Navy:

"According to Fuehrer Directive 40, the Commanding Admirals are responsible for the coastal defense of home war areas. With this assignment goes the right to give orders to the offices of all other branches of the Armed Services in their area."

The Commanding Admirals must be left to decide whether, and how long, they wish to exempt the naval schools from operations."

It is obvious that this order was occasioned by an inquiry from Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, Replacement Army, the context of which is not known to Naval Staff.

V. Draft of order from General Section, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division on evaluation of present war experiences as per 1/Skl 27353/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VI. Compilation of enemy messages intercepted by radio deciphering and radio intelligence from 30 Aug. - 5 Sept. are contained in special Radio Monitoring Report No. 36/43.

Note: For sea areas for independently routed ships in the South Atlantic, see pages 5 - 6 of that report.

No change in experiences of anti-submarine defense in the outer part of the Bay of Biscay, see page 8.

For operations of our PT boats and enemy PT boats in the Channel, see pages 10 - 12.

For northern sea route, see page 18.

Situation 9 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a consular report from Lourenço Marques on 7 Sept., the following U.S. warships are said to be stationed in New Zealand: PENNSYLVANIA, TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON.

2. Own Situation:

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Naval Staff informed Ship "28" of the Italian surrender by Radiogram 1025.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo, copy to all in foreign waters, received the following instructions by Radiogram 2027:

"1. Italian submarine crews in Bordeaux have been left on board for time being because of their loyal conduct. Owing to escape of Italian Fleet, they have, however, been taken off boats. Italian Commander, Submarines, Captain Grossi, is being allowed as much freedom as possible. Have impression that submarine crews loyal to Germany and trustworthy.

2. AQUILA soldiers there possibly have same attitude. In any case, amicable transfer preferred to use of force. Yokoi has been similarly informed."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifty-six planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 2046 in BF 4590. During the night of 8 Sept. naval forces were very active along the entire Channel coast, the center of activity was located in the areas off Dunkirk, Cape Gris Nez/Boulogne and north of Brest at a distance of two to ten miles off shore.

Air raids on Boulogne started again at 0825. Targets exclusively concentrated on were the batteries, airfield and coastal road north and south of the town. The raid lasted until 1130.

A number of intelligence reports state that landing operations on the channel coast are imminent or already under way.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off the Gironde and one off La Pallice, three were swept off Lorient and four south of Brest.

In order to carry out operation "Achse", ten Italian freighters in Bordeaux and one in Nantes were occupied during the night of 8 Sept. with the consent of the Italians and without friction. Crews were billeted on shore.

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Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division plans to transfer these ships, except for the four blockade-runners, to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

Two Italian submarines have docked in the U-boat pens in Bordeaux and are being guarded by the 12th Submarine Chaser Flotilla.

Channel Area:

Two mines with snag lines were swept off Ostend and one mine was swept off Gravelines during channel sweeping. Convoy traffic in the Channel and between the Channel Islands was carried out according to plan. Owing to the tenseness of the situation a state of immediate readiness has been ordered for all vessels in the eastern part of the Channel up to and including Cherbourg for the night of 8 Sept. The transfer of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla with four ships from Ostend to IJmuiden is planned for the night of 9 Sept. During the same night, the Air Force plans to carry out the first operation with mines fitted with a new firing unit over the Thames estuary.

For the state of readiness of the destroyers, torpedo and PT boats stationed in the western area see Teletype 0830. Three destroyers, ten torpedo boats and 21 PT boats are operationally ready.

Damage sustained in enemy air raids was light. Four enemy planes were reported to have been shot down by noon. A further plane was shot down over Dunkirk in the afternoon.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

At 1800 the convoy of the tanker LOTHRINGEN proceeded from Den Helder to the Elbe.

According to a report from Naval Command, North the 3rd Italian Smoke Laying Battalion, stationed in its area, has agreed to continue serving on our side.

According to information from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping three Italian charter ships are in the North Sea area: the steamer MAGGIO in Bremen, the steamer FIDELITAS, and the steamer EUGENIO C in Hamburg.

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2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

A Russian submarine was sighted operating off the arctic coast. According to radio intelligence on 8 Sept., Beluchya informed the vessels under its command of the approach of German submarines and ordered more sea and air reconnaissance. In the afternoon of 9 Sept. Moscow radioed a very urgent message to Dickson for transmission to 20 addresses, which included Amderna.

Twenty-two planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

Our air reconnaissance reported:

at 0655 east of the Faroes, one aircraft carrier, two light cruisers, three destroyers;

at 1305 in AE 1870 (north of Iceland), one heavy cruiser and one destroyer;

at 1400 west of the Faroes, ten freighters, course and speed not known;

and at 1515 in AE 9559 in the same area, two cruisers and one destroyer.

On 7 Sept. minor reconnaissance activity was observed in the Banak-Vardoe area and in the Alta area, where the ship anchorages were reconnoitered.

As stated by intelligence service, the PQ convoy is expected in Reykjavik on 16 Sept. and will leave on 20 or 21 Sept. on a direct course to a point 20 miles north of the North Cape, and is to divert to the north in the event of heavy attacks.

Own Situation:

In the evening of 8 Sept. the steamer RAUTHENTHALER (3,727 BRT) sank with a cargo of iron ore after colliding with the steamer SIGNAL north of Trondheim. The steamer SIGNAL was heavily damaged.

Twenty-four ships were escorted north and 29 south. In the arctic coast area five ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escorts.

According to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping one Italian charter-ship, the steamer DREPANEN, is operating in the area of Naval Command, Norway. Naval Staff informed Naval Command, Norway of her position, and she was thereupon seized at Sandnes near

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Stavanger. Operation "Zitronella" was carried out according to plan. The participating ships dropped anchor in Kaa Fiord in the evening. Details of the operation and results are given in a brief action report by Admiral, Task Force as per 1/Skl 25292 Gkdos. and other numbers. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa. Otherwise all documents relating to this operation are in File 1/Skl I op. "Spitsbergen".

Commander in Chief, Navy expressed his pleasure at the successful completion of this operation by the task force and especially on the courageous action of the destroyers in a radiogram to Admiral, Task Force:

The operation developed just as Naval Staff had foreseen. What is of importance is not the relatively small strategic success gained but the fact that our heavy units could at long last be put into action again. This has not only had an excellent effect on the morale of the crews, but it has more especially reminded friend and foe alike of the strategic importance which the presence of these naval units far north represents when related to the war situation in general. Furthermore, it was hoped that they would make the enemy feel uneasy; that they also achieved this has been confirmed by the appearance of the enemy forces sighted by our air reconnaissance.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During the day in Kronstadt Bay there was slight harassing artillery in our shore areas. Heavy formations carried out a continuous succession of raids on Tyters; the South Tyters Battery was considerably damaged so that it can now only bring three guns into action and only under certain given conditions. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. One bomber and four fighters were shot down over the Gulf of Finland on 8 Sept. The Finns reported an unsuccessful encounter during the night of 8 Sept. south of Viborg between two gunboats and five guardboats and three Russian guardboats.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic check sweeps and escort operations were carried out according to plan. One mine was detonated at Grena.

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No special occurrences are reported from the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic.

According to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the Italian charter-ship AMICITIA is in Memel, the AFRICANA in Gdynia and the MOMBALDO in Copenhagen. All three ships have been secured.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

One Wellington was shot down by four FW 190's 110 miles west of Brest.

There was lively enemy air activity over the western area during the day. Besides the air raid on Boulogne, already reported, airfields and aircraft factories in the outlying districts of Paris were attacked by heavy formations. A total of about 700 bombers in numerous large or small formations and always under strong fighter escort, attacked airfields in the area of Belgium and northern France. In the course of these attacks ten planes were shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. During the night of 9 Sept. four planes crossed the Baltic heading for the area around Warsaw, presumably for landing agents or dropping sabotage material.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Fifty-four of our bombers were out on operations against enemy landings in the Gulf of Salerno during the early hours of the morning. One cruiser exploded after being hit by a bomb. Direct hits were observed on another cruiser and on seven vessels. Our ground attack planes were out on operations during the whole day. Very heavy fighter escorts were reported over the enemy landing fleet.

The Italian naval force proceeding southwards to the west of Corsica was attacked by one of our bombers at 2005 about 120 miles west of Bonifacio. According to a preliminary report from the 3rd Air Force, one battleship was definitely sunk, one cruiser was heavily damaged or probably sunk. These results were confirmed by reconnaissance planes. The bomber formation itself only observed bomb hits on one battleship, one cruiser, and one destroyer.

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3. Eastern Front:

Thirty-two planes were shot down on 8 Sept. over the Army front lines.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Operation "Achse":

Land Situation:

According to the situation report received from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South the process of disarmament was begun in Rome. Two battalions of the militia were taken over. The Tiber bridge between Ostia and Rome was occupied. The repeater station in Rome was defended by the Italians; the German communications personnel expelled from the Italian offices. Telephonic and teletype communications were interrupted thereby. Our attacks against the enemy landed near Pizzo did not produce any noticeable effects. The disarmament of Italian troops is in full swing in the area of Naples. In Sardinia the garrison of Maddalena was reinforced by one Italian battalion. In Corsica the port of Bastia and the Italian ships there have been in our hands since the early hours of 9 Sept.

In the evening Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported that the 10th Army's fuel situation is extremely serious. Italian troops are making common cause with the enemy in the Salerno area.

The King, Badoglio, Ambrosio and Roatta are no longer in Rome. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command ordered the moving of reinforcements to Corsica to be stopped. Units already disposed in Leghorn will be put under the command of Army Group B. Likewise all reinforcements on their way to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will be held back north of the **Apennines** and put under the command of Army Group B. Also reinforcements of the other services destined for central and southern Italy are to be kept north of the **Apennines**.

2. Situation at Sea:

The Italian naval vessels which put out from Spezia at 0300 were detected for the first time by radio intelligence at 0941 30 miles west-northwest of Ajaccio on a southerly course. This force later entered the Strait of Bonifacio from the west; it seems, however, to have put about off Maddalena and to have with-

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drawn to the west. It was on this course that it was, as reported, successfully attacked by our bombers.

According to an intelligence report, one cruiser left Genoa on the afternoon of 8 Sept. and another during the night of 8 Sept., allegedly the GARIBALDI and the DUCA D'AOSTA. According to radio intelligence, one cruiser and three destroyers were located at 2345 on 9 Sept. 50 miles west-northwest of Ajaccio on a southwesterly course.

According to a report from Commander in Chief, South, the approach to Taranto was mined in the course of operation "Achse". Genoa harbor was for the most part occupied by our naval forces.

Whilst in the interior of Corsica, De Gaullist resistance forces were smashed with the assistance of Italian battalions, one of our submarine chasers was bombarded by Italians. But the Italians also bombarded an enemy submarine.

Still more fantastic sounds the message that the Italian battleships bombarded the ferry traffic in the Strait of Bonifacio.

As the Italian Fleet has put out, Naval War Staff ordered German Naval Command, Italy by Radiogram 1540 not to lay any mines off La Spezia for the time being, but instead to prepare for minelaying for defense purposes only.

The PT boats S "54", S "61" and F "478" put out from Taranto in the early morning, making for the east. They will receive orders from Naval Staff by radiogram to try and reach Patras.

Commander, Submarines, Italy moved to Toulon in the forenoon.

In connection with the situation in Pola it is reported that the battleship GIULIO CAESARE has put out. The submarine U "407" which was in the port, was unable to carry out an attack in the harbor because of the net barrages. The departure of this submarine and of the PT boats S "30" and S "33" was interfered with by the Italians; the harbor boom was guarded by corvettes. Submarine U "407" attempted a break-through but failed. The Italian command threatened to open hostilities against the submarine base if they again attempted a break-through. According to a message from the submarine base in Pola, the only hope of putting out for the submarine and PT boats will be if German forces receive support from the Army.

Submarines U "616" and U "565" put out from Toulon at 0400. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean will be ordered by Naval Staff to use the submarines now operating off Spezia against the landings of supplies in the Salerno area.

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In connection with the situation in Bordeaux our Naval Liaison Officer to the Italian Commander, Submarines reported that the Italian order read: "Return Danzig submarines, destroy own". Grossi expects the majority of the crews will remain on the side of Germany and requested that the measures taken on the German side in Danzig and Singapore be carried out in such a way that the crews will feel that they can honorably declare allegiance to Germany. He contemplates a trip to Danzig as soon as the situation permits.

Admiral Matteucci revealed in Toulon that he had orders to hand the fortress of Toulon over to the Germans. His request to postpone the surrender scheduled for 10 Sept. was refused by Admiral, French South Coast. Furthermore the request for an unimpeded retreat to Italy was turned down as not being within the competence of Admiral, French South Coast.

The coastal batteries in the Languedoc area will partly be manned by the personnel of an Army gunnery school.

Admiral, French South Coast further reported that all Italian batteries, except two, have been occupied, and that the occupation of the Italian warships and of the Italian-manned French warships and merchantmen has been almost 90 per cent carried out. The main Italian wireless station, La Craf, has been taken over by the German Naval Communications Officer. All measures were carried out without incident. For details see Teletype 1110.

The offices of Naval Shore Commander, French Riviera, located at Toulon, and the Toulon and Nice port commanders under them have taken over the work.

According to a report from "Group West, the Italian Navy in the area of the 715th Infantry Division between Cape Landier and the river Var was disarmed without incident.

Naval Staff informed German Naval Command, Italy and the 7th Coastal Patrol Force that the occupation of the remainder of southern France was carried out according to plan, and that the Italian surrender in Greece was peacefully carried out in accordance with an agreement between the German and Italian commands.

As already shown, the departure of the Fleet from Spezia and the sudden release without notice of the keyword "Achse", created extraordinary difficulties as regards the tasks involved in the port towns, and the results planned for could only be partially obtained.

3. Enemy Situation Mediterranean - Further Items:

There are no enemy sighting reports available from the Gibraltar area, nor from the western and eastern Mediterranean. In

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Gibraltar there was 1 TEXAS-class battleship, 1 transport, 50 freighters, and 10 tankers. Remainder of the harbor's occupation was only incompletely observed.

Between 0750 and 0850 our air reconnaissance reported three heavy cruisers or battleships and about 20 transports, probably LST's, and 25 landing craft standing on and off in the Gulf of Salerno and to the south of it. There was traffic in the Bay and port of Naples. The harbors of Salerno, Feroppe and Vietrie are on fire. The operations of the Air Force are reported under: "Aerial Warfare".

4. Own Situation Mediterranean - Further Items:
Transport Situation:

Nothing to report.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In compliance with the agreement made over operation "Achse", 4 Italian torpedo boats, 2 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 5 PT boats, 6 auxiliary minesweepers, 14 small auxiliary naval vessels, 2 tankers, 2 troop transports and 2 freighters were taken over. The torpedo boat MONZAMBANO escaped in spite of several attacks from the Air Force.

Preparations have been made for laying mines in the Corinth Canal and blockading the entrance to Piraeus. On Crete Italian ships and wireless stations were occupied by German guards without incident. In Patras, too, the disarmament and occupation of the harbor was peacefully carried out. One tug was sunk by the Air Force when the ships in port attempted to escape. All radio stations in Athens and on Crete were taken over by the German Navy. Because of large-scale demonstrations by local civilians in Volos, two coastal patrol vessels and one naval landing craft were dispatched there to reinforce the Port Commander's company.

During the night of 8 Sept. Salonika was raided by enemy planes without any special results being achieved. Convoy traffic was stopped because of the general situation. According to the latest report, the steamer P.L.M. "24" did not sink after being hit by a torpedo but ran aground. Salvage operations are being prepared. Part of her cargo of ammunition was carried off by partisans. To prevent further pillaging, coastal patrol vessels are standing by.

Group South reported that there are now no naval forces of strategic importance left in the Aegean Sea because the Italian naval vessels there are no longer available and because it is impossible to man these vessels with German personnel on short notice; it therefore

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requested reinforcements in submarines to be dispatched from the area of Commander, Submarines, Italy.

Naval Staff replied that a transfer of submarines to the Aegean Sea is not yet possible but that it had been taken into account in the plans made for the reinforcement of the Mediterranean submarines.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

About 100 soldiers and partisans landed near Yalta at dawn on 8 Sept. By the end of the afternoon this group had been either wiped out or taken prisoner.

The guard company of the Commander, Ukraine took part in this operation. At the same time and also at noon, the coast between Mariupol and Berdyansk was bombarded by PT boats. At noon the Berdyansk lighthouse was attacked by three enemy planes with bombs and guns.

Own Situation:

The execution of operation "Achse" is reported on in "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff".

Submarine U "23" put into Constanta, submarine U "9" left Sevastopol for Constanta.

A Rumanian tug was damaged by a magnetic mine explosion in Ochakov roads. Patrol line positions in Temryuk Bay were unoccupied during the night of 9 Sept. owing to the weather. Otherwise patrol, escort and transport operations as well as ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch were carried out according to plan and without incident.

VIII. Situation Far East.

On 4 Sept. heavy American and Australian forces landed about 35 km east of Lae, thereby cutting off the Japanese troops engaged in fierce land fighting near Salamana and Lae from supplies from Rabaul and Wewak. A new front line was established in the interior of the island by Allied paratroop landings, which aggravated the situation still further.

Japanese Headquarters announced defense successes as follows: 6 enemy transports, 1 cruiser and numerous ships sunk, 5 enemy transports, and 2 destroyers bombed and set on fire. Twenty-seven

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planes shot down, nine of their planes did not return.

American reports consider this landing to have been a great success. Their reports are in gross contradiction to the Japanese reports. The enemy extended his air raid operations as far as Wewak.

Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, Roosevelt declared in a broadcast that the armistice in Italy is not to be regarded as being the end of the war in the Mediterranean. The ultimate targets in this war are still Berlin and Tokyo. In the many months yet ahead the war will develop on an even larger scale and instead of becoming easier will become even more strenuous. Furthermore it is going to cost a lot more money.

In a statement made by the Japanese Government it was emphasized that the developments in Italy had been anticipated and that the necessary countermeasures had been taken so that Badoglio's betrayal of the Three Power Pact would have no decisive influence on the war situation in general. Japan would increase her co-operation with Germany and the other allies in Europe and the Far East.

In official Spanish circles it is feared that Spain's position, already precarious enough since the fall of Tunis and Sicily, will now be still further endangered. It is feared that Anglo-American pressure will markedly increase should the blockading of Spain be achieved not only from the west and south but also from the east.

"Pravda" stated that Italy's unconditional surrender was mainly due to the Red Army's victories on the Eastern Front.

According to a press report, the Russian Ambassador in Ankara is said to have requested the Turkish Government to state how far Turkey considers the Balkans as vital to her own security and as part of her sphere of interest, and whether she intends to commit herself there. Turkey is said to have made evasive answers.

Iran declared war on Germany.

Chief, Naval Staff accompanied by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff left for Fuehrer Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.I. Army Situation:

The situation on the southern front is still extremely tense. The Russian advance on the Dnieper bend and on Kiev made further progress. Furthermore, preparations for a major offensive in the direction of Roslavl/Smolensk are also being made in Central Army Group's sector. Our countermeasures are characterized by a complete lack of reserves,

so that troops needed for the points of penetration must be drawn from other sectors, which are in their turn occupied by very small numbers who are exhausted and therefore only offer new possibilities of attack to the enemy.

II. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. On the summary of operation "Zitronella" as reported in War Diary 9 Sept.

b. On the aggravation of the situation in the Gulf of Finland and the threat to the island of Tyters. The island defenses and the supply traffic will be in great danger, if we do not manage to increase our fighter cover. According to Naval Command, Baltic, heavy Russian supply traffic to Lavansaari and Seiskari is an indication that the island is not only being heavily supplied for the winter, but also that it is perhaps being made into a base for operations against Luga Bay, Tyters and the north coast of Esthonia. This opinion is confirmed by the appearance of large minesweeping forces near Vigrund and heavily covered reconnaissances of Luga Bay. The 1st Air Force has been requested to carry out a few heavy air raids on the islands and the enemy supply traffic.

An investigation into the measures which could be taken for the reinforcement of our own positions should be carried out.

c. The Fuehrer has issued a directive on raising the standard of the Croatian Armed Forces and on the High Command in Croatia. This concerns the Navy, inasmuch as Croatian troops are only to be used for the defense of Croatia and service on other fronts has not been envisaged. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the appointment of a Naval Liaison Officer to the General Plenipotentiary in Agram is necessary to guarantee the co-ordination also required with the Croatian Navy.

d. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has ordered that wherever Italian troops or other armed individuals are at present still offering resistance, an ultimatum is to be handed to them at short notice stating that those Italian commanders responsible for the resistance will be shot as insurgents if they do not issue orders to their troops within the stipulated time to surrender their weapons to the German forces. Execution of this measure rests with Commanding General, Armed Forces, West; Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; Army Group B and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast. According to the same directive it is eventually intended to put Montenegro together with Albania and treat them as an autonomous state.

The German Military Government in Greece will now be extended to cover the whole of Greek territory. Copy of this directive as per 1/Skl 25349/43, Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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III. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division:

a. In connection with the re-organization of the naval commands in Italy, carried out on 9 Sept., a clear statement was required as to whether the naval offices envisaged for Corsica and Elba are still to be moved to their destinations. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that inquiries be made at Armed Forces High Command.

b. It was proposed to lessen the degree of secrecy for operation "Achse" and to remove it from the "for senior officers only" category.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff concurred. Relevant order as per 1/Sk1 25716/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

c. Quartermaster Division requested Chief, Armed Forces, Transportation to give priority to all naval transports to Italy. This request is to be granted.

d. In view of the considerable number of Italian warships and auxiliary warships acquired, Quartermaster Division wished to know how it was proposed to man these vessels. The warships taken over can only be manned at the expense of other ships which it is planned to commission. A request was received from Group South to dispatch the personnel designated for the occupation of the ports in Dalmatia and on the Adriatic coast quickly, so that it arrives there at the same time as the Army. Quartermaster Division is trying to arrange an air transfer. Operations Division, Armed Forces High Command ordered that all troop formations and units being moved to the southeastern area for the first time, must either report in Agram to the German General Plenipotentiary in Croatia or in Belgrad to the Military Commander, Southeast for briefing on the partisan situation.

IV. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division: No confirmation was available on our side of the rumors of alleged enemy landings on the Dalmatian coast and in Leghorn and Genoa. In view of our incomplete reconnaissance it seemed advisable to take notice of these rumors.

The new Regency Council which has been established in Bulgaria conforms with German interests.

Reports have been received of a Russian plan to carry out a large-scale landing operation in the Crimea from the Sochi area.

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Special Items.

I. Submarine Division announced that three more boats, namely the submarines U "420", U "450" and U "466" are to be prepared for transfer to the Mediterranean.

II. Commanding Admiral, Submarines confirmed the orders previously given verbally to the offices under his command regarding the Italian submarine personnel as follows:

"1. Submarine crews to be kept together and only allowed limited freedom of movement within the immediate neighborhood of their billets. The submarines are not to be boarded. If Italians should ask why the crews are being kept in confinement their attention is to be drawn to the conduct of the Italian Fleet. Moreover, no final decision has yet been reached.

2. The Italian flag is to remain hoisted. The Italian flag is to be hoisted again on the Italian boat at present in Koenigsberg as soon as it has been moved to Pillau. This is the boat from which the Italians themselves lowered their flag before disembarking when the crew was transported to Pillau.

3. The Italian submarine commander may communicate by wire with Captain Grossi. The Chiefs of the 8th and 26th Submarine Flotillas should in such a case try to arrange for Captain Galezzi, Chief of the Italian Training Group, to communicate with Grossi in the name of all submarine commanders.

4. Further orders will follow from time to time."

III. In view of future Japanese submarine calls, the Japanese Navy again submitted a request to Naval Staff to enlarge one of the submarine pens in western France so that the large Japanese submarines can be also docked there. Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section will be requested by Naval Staff to look into this matter taking into consideration that the Japanese will be far more willing to dispatch transport submarines if given the impression that everything is being done for their security. Copy of relevant letter l/Skl I ops. 2750/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

IV. In connection with the reinforcements needed by the Toulon anti-aircraft gun defenses, the urgency of which had been recognized by Naval Staff, as the dockyard submarine repair capacity of this port will be increased to twelve boats as from 1 Aug. 1943, and as Toulon will be the main base for the Mediterranean submarines, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff stated that the anti-aircraft gun defenses in Toulon and Marseilles would be reinforced from the monthly assignment of new forces to the 3rd Air Force.

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And apart from the above measures, the promise made by Commander in Chief, Air Force to place four batteries of six 8.8 cm guns, without personnel, at our disposal for Toulon still holds.

V. In connection with the refusal to let naval landing craft pass through the Turkish straits, the German Ambassador in Ankara has been informed by the Turkish Foreign Office that until now the Turkish authorities permitted passage because Germany had declared that naval landing craft were not warships. In a German broadcast made on 18 Aug. these ships were defined as warships and this had made Turkey feel very uneasy. To avoid any complications arising from permitting passage, and to avoid similar requests being made by the other side, the competent authorities were issued instruction by the Turkish Government, effective immediately, no longer to allow naval landing craft to use the passage.

Group South will be informed accordingly by Naval Staff and ordered to desist for the time being from attempting to transfer naval landing craft and told no longer to count on permission for passage to be granted through diplomatic channels. For further particulars see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VI. Naval (Ship) Construction Division, High Command, Navy has drawn up a new warship building plan based on the situation prevailing at the beginning of Sept. Copy as per 1/Skl 25712/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VII. Naval Intelligence Division reported on the general instructions given by the Americans for operating the small types of landing craft; in particular the vehicle and personnel landing craft, the vehicle- and motor landing craft of various types, furthermore the fast personnel landing craft and landing craft supports used to a large extent in the Mediterranean. Copy of this report as per 1/Skl 27607/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "Intelligence Evaluations of Foreign Navies".

Situation 10 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported:

"1. Approach orders for the CAGNI: Via 20° S 70° E, via 02° S 92° E to rendezvous position 06° 10' N 94° 50' E. Will be met there two hours after sunset on 22 Sept. by Japanese naval vessels.

2. The Japanese Navy requests immediate information as to whether further Italian boats or ships are in the Indian Ocean; give code names and area of location.

3. The Japanese Navy stated that the Italians scuttled the ERITREA in Singapore, the gunboat LEVANTE and the passenger steamer CONVEVERDE in Shanghai."

According to a further report from the Naval Attaché in Tokyo the scuttling of the ERITREA was not confirmed. On the contrary it is assumed that this ship will be making for a British port. Whatever the case, the necessary precautionary measures will have to be taken.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifty-eight planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British ship was located at 1049 in BF 4480.

Although weather conditions were ideal, no enemy minesweeping operations were observed in the Channel area. Nor were any raids carried out in the Boulogne area. At 1540 and at 1825 **rumbling** detonations, sudden flashes and heavy smoke clouds were observed near the English coast northwest of Boulogne. Group West presumes it was **gunnery practice**.

On 9 Sept. Reuter announced that the large-scale amphibious **exercises** carried out in the English Channel were highly successful and that valuable experience **was gained by military and civilian** authorities. The **exercises** reached a climax on 9 Sept. One thousand bomber and 2000 fighter operations were flown over northern France and the Channel during the final 24 hours for its protection. Complete air **supremacy has prevailed during the last ten** days.

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Naval Intelligence Division has rightly drawn attention to the novelty of making this practice public, which must undoubtedly be interpreted as a sign of preparations for a large-scale landing. But on 6 Sept. a representative of Allied Supreme Command warned the French nation over the British radio not to believe German rumors about the assembly of an invasion army along the British coast, but to await the announcement of the day on which active intervention will be imperative, so that the date fixed for the start of an operation of this kind must still be undecided. Operations Division, Naval Staff is of the opinion that it **must still** be proved whether this merely was a practice of whether it was actually the start of an operation which for some reason or other was discontinued. The fact that this operation coincided with the events in Italy allows for both possibilities, as the enemy could very well anticipate that a rehearsal or mock maneuver, seen in connection with the fact that the weeks of preparations were openly known, would deter us from withdrawing German forces from northern France. The Navy's reaction (omittance of France from the 20 % withdrawal of forces for the south) confirmed the correctness of this presumption.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was cleared by a minesweeping plane off the Gironde. Otherwise nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 8 Sept. the KONDOR moved to Cherbourg, the 4th PT Boat Flotilla to Ijmuiden, the torpedo boat T "25" from St. Malo to Brest.

The radar station Alprech went out of action on 9 Sept. because it was hit by a bomb.

The patrol vessel VP "1517" sank in the dockyard at Rouen after a detonation whose cause was undetermined. Otherwise nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

The convoy of the tanker LOTHRINGEN to the Elbe was carried out.

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Nine ground mines were swept in the Texel - Ameland area and one north of Ijmuiden. One enemy plane was shot down at Flushing by naval anti-aircraft guns.

At 1320 two Rhine Flotilla ships were attacked with guns by eight enemy fighters near Wissekerk. The ships suffered losses in personnel and had to be beached.

The 6th PT Boat Flotilla moved with four ships from Ostend to Ijmuiden.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. At 1730 on 9 Sept. a British unit was located in AF 7170. According to air reconnaissance a force consisting of one aircraft carrier, four light cruisers, and ten destroyers was sighted at 1020 in AN 1174 (west of the Shetland Islands) on course 160°.

At noon on 9 Sept. a plane was sighted over the Alta area. In the afternoon four planes penetrated the Bergen - Stavanger area, and during the night of 9 Sept. one plane was reported south of Stavanger.

Own Situation:

No reports have been received from the arctic coast area owing to disrupted lines of communication. In the other areas 30 ships were escorted north and 23 south.

Group North informed Naval Staff of the following orders given to Admiral Northern Waters and the 5th Air Force:

"1. The enemy will probably make an attempt - from England or Russia - to rescue the scattered Spitsbergen garrison, and possibly also try to re-establish the station. Enemy advance reconnaissance will probably be carried out by submarine.

2. It is, therefore, imperative to patrol the area. Investigate whether one of our submarines could be stationed there for patrol duties in the course of which there might be an opportunity for a torpedo attack. Conditions for air reconnaissance operations by the weather plane service are also promising, as the defenses have been wiped out.

3. Air reconnaissance is at present important to current meteorological operations. The weather ship BUSCH will probably put out from Kiel on 12 Sept. for operation "Kreuzritter". Report plans for all three weather ships."

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively offensive air activity continued. In the morning ten motor minesweepers put out from Kronstadt for the west. During the night of 10 Sept. lively harassing fire was observed in Kronstadt Bay. The Army coastal battery "509" was attacked at 1600 by 43 planes with heavy caliber bombs and guns. In the forenoon Tyters was also bombed and machine-gunned by 16 planes. Pillets and traffic installations were damaged. A submarine was sighted by the Finns northwest of Hogland. Four LM mines were detected in Helsinki approaches. Naval Command, Baltic's survey of the enemy situation given in: "Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff".

Naval Intelligence Division reported on the Russian Submarine Brigade belonging to the Baltic Fleet and on the Russian submarine losses in the Baltic since the beginning of the war. Copy of report as per 1/Skl 27294/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III. According to this report, the four Baltic Fleet submarine brigades existing at the beginning of the war have been merged into one brigade owing to the heavy losses suffered. The Brigade's Headquarters were moved in May 1943 from Leningrad to Kronstadt, obviously in view of the operations planned for these submarines last spring. Prior to the attempted break-through in May 1943, the brigade numbered 20 operational submarines. We may assume that seven submarines were lost in this year's attempts at breaking through even though they have not yet been accounted for by their actual identification number.

According to the records of Naval Intelligence Division, the number of identified submarine losses in the Baltic rose to 45 boats. The majority of these losses were probably caused by mines.

2. Own Situation:

A harbor defense vessel was rammed in Aalborg and sunk by a patrol vessel.

One ELM/K mine was swept northwest of Anholt.

Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic.

At 0520 the steamer INSTERBURG was unsuccessfully attacked by torpedoes from a low flying plane west of Oesel. The anti-submarine net and barrage patrol vessels at "Seeigel" are being withdrawn during daylight into the area of the coastal islands.

V. Merchant Shipping.

In the course of a discussion at the Foreign Office on 20 Aug. on the transportation of chrome ore, Krupp's blamed High Command, Navy for not giving due consideration to the number of ships required.

The representative of the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas already stated in connection with this that the tonnage is provided by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and that only the escort is provided by the Navy. Incidentally, the representative of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping promised to ship 60,000 tons of chrome ore by the end of September. These shipments can only be speeded up, as demanded by the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition, if measures are taken by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping who controls the merchant tonnage in conjunction with the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VIII. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 48 planes out on operations in the western area and 19 in the Mediterranean. There was slight enemy air activity during the day and none during the night. No reports have been received from the 3rd Air Force, either for the night of 9 Sept., or for the night of 10 Sept., on the operation on which, according to Group West, it had been planned to use aerial mines with a new firing unit for the first time.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

It was belatedly reported that in the operation of our forces during the night of 8 Sept. in the Gulf of Salerno, in which 158 planes participated, direct hits were registered on 38 transports and 14 naval vessels and landing craft; of these one heavy cruiser, one transport of 9,000 BRT, and six LCT 250's were sunk. Towards noon ten bombers set out on an operation against the battleship GIULIO CAESARE which was proceeding from the southern part of the

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Adriatic towards the Strait of Otranto, but they only achieved one near hit without observing any further effect. Two small coastal steamers were sunk by five bombers off Corfu. Our operations centered on the areas of Naples, Potenza, Castro Villari and Scalea. In the Aegean area, Stukas and ground attack planes attacked Italian pockets of resistance on Rhodes. There is nothing to report on enemy air activity.

3! Eastern Front:

Except for the 5th Air Force reconnaissance reports already given, there is nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

At midnight on 9 Sept. a convoy of 24 transports and 19 freighters entered the Mediterranean. Five of the freighters put into Gibraltar. One tanker, 8 freighters, 3 LM boats and 9 escort vessels put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean, while 10 freighters and 2 corvettes put in from the Mediterranean.

At 0705 our air reconnaissance reported the Italian naval force, which put out from Spezia, 20 miles north of Cape de Fer on course south, at high speed and consisting of two battleships, five cruisers and five destroyers. According to the 3rd Air Force's report which gives a detailed description of the attacks carried out against this force by Air Force formations on 9 Sept., it can be definitely assumed that one battleship was sunk. Furthermore it is assumed that one cruiser was probably sunk and a further cruiser and destroyer heavily damaged. The fact that the force, compared with its strength prior to our air attack, is now minus one battleship, one cruiser, and one destroyer, may well confirm the 3rd Air Force's claims. Radio communication of the force with Malta shows that the Italians at first thought that they were being attacked by British planes until Malta informed them of the true situation. The force's anti-aircraft defenses are not even mentioned in the 3rd Air Force's report, so that they were probably only very weak. Which may be explained by the fact that the Italians believed the planes to be British.

No sighting reports on the Italian battleship formation which put out from Taranto have been received. It is possible that a message from a British vessel, intercepted at 1017 by radio intelligence about having sighted two battleships and three cruisers in the Malta area, bears relation to the above.

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In connection with the GIULIO CAESARE see "Aerial Warfare". One battleship having, therefore, been sunk, five Italian battleships in all are proceeding to British ports as ordered.

According to information from the Spanish Navy three destroyers and the cruiser REGOLO, with 400 survivors - perhaps belonging to the battleship formation - on board, arrived in Mahon (Balearic Islands) and a further Italian destroyer put into Polenca; they were probably all from Spezia. Furthermore, according to press reports from Lalinea, two Italian light cruisers, two destroyers and two auxiliary aircraft carriers put into Gibraltar.

According to air reconnaissance, many ships and surfaced submarines were located at about 1000 in the southern part of the Adriatic making for the Straits of Otranto; the 2nd Air Force has been granted permission to attack. These are obviously the Italian ships fleeing from the Adriatic ports.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Transport Situation:

Execution of operation "Achse" is progressing in the ports. It is, however, very handicapped wherever sufficiently strong army forces are not available. According to radio intelligence at 1118 Malta repeated a radio message from Rome:

"Ports of Trieste, Monfalcone, Bari, Metcovich, Ragusa, occupied by German forces. Avoid landing."

There are no reports available from Fiume. The situation in Pola ~~has~~ ~~become~~ more acute. The Italians moved further heavy weapons into position against the submarine base, and thus effectively delayed the departure of our submarines and PT boats. The Commander of the base and Commander, Submarines lodged strong protests against this unjustified action. Commander, Submarines recommended that strong action should immediately be taken by the Air Force, using a training group of home formations for the purpose: (See Teletype 1130).

It was impossible to prevent the departure of units of the Italian Fleet from Taranto. Two PT boats and one naval landing craft barred the harbor entrance with 32 TM mines without being observed. The naval command was closed down and left for the north.

According to radio intelligence, Taranto was occupied at 1430 by British paratroops, and a few Italian warships were taken over there.

The PT boats which put out from Taranto and a naval landing craft sank an Italian minesweeper. Subsequently they were attacked by an Italian cruiser, which sank the naval landing craft, but escaped being attacked by the PT boats, because they were restricted in their speed. The situation in Spezia is not yet entirely secure. The

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situation is also still **unclear** in Porto Ferreiro (Elba). Our motor minesweepers were prevented from putting in by artillery gun fire. Our radio station was no longer functioning.

Italian resistance has again broken out in Bastia, where the occupation of the harbor was at first successfully carried out; the Italian ships, however, were prevented from departing by force. Two of our submarine chasers and five naval landing craft were sunk by an Italian destroyer when putting out from Bastia.

According to a report from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, ferry traffic in the Strait of Bonifacio is at present being carried out without incident. One LCI was sunk at Palau by a bombardment from the shore. In the afternoon the Bonifacio coast was bombarded by two enemy destroyers, which passed the strait westward bound.

The situation in Maddalena is still not entirely clear. The most important positions seem to be in our hands. The measures in Porto Vecchio and Civitavecchia were carried out according to plan.

Group West reported that the occupation of the Italian batteries, billets and installations continued to be without incident. Details have been reported by Commanding Admiral, French South Coast. Copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 25343/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The PT boats we put into operation during the night of 8 Sept. were unsuccessful. A new operation is planned for the evening of 9 Sept.

Six of our naval landing craft had an engagement with two PT boats off Gaeta. One naval landing craft sank. Our own minelayers sank two fairly large steamers and some small vessels.

German Naval Command, Italy has been instructed by Naval Staff that sea transport operations must at present be concentrated on transferring troops from Sardinia to Corsica.

No reports of successes are available from our submarines. The boats have been continuously informed of the location of Italian mines in the Gulf of Salerno and of the positions of Italian formations.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

A group of four vessels proceeding in line ahead on course south was sighted from Mythilene at 0500 on 9 Sept. along the limits of Turkish territorial waters. It is, therefore, suspected that the entrance to the Dardanelles was mined.

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Four more Italian freighters were taken over in Patras. The situation in Rhodes is obscure. Heavy Italian resistance will probably have to be overcome there.

The partisan situation has grown tenser especially on Euboea.

The steamer RE ALLESSANDRO en route Zanta - Piraeus had to be beached after an explosion and later foundered. Sabotage is suspected.

Group South submitted its survey of the situation. Teletype as per 1/Skl 2747/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. The enemy is free to launch operations against Greece and the Balkans. What forces we have in this area are insufficient for land, sea, or air defense. The area is no longer being supplied by Adriatic traffic. The supply situation is, therefore, extremely serious. Furthermore, large-scale penetrations into the area of Greece can be expected at any moment. The jumping-off position of southern Italy and the present isolation of Crete and the Dodecanese allows for a selection of landing places in the areas of western Greece, Albania and Thrace. Our strategy on the mainland must aim at making the enemy expend himself to the maximum in the hope that it will also have a strategic effect on the situation and keep the enemy air force's jumping off positions as far away from home territory and the Rumanian oil fields as possible. To achieve this, it will be necessary to concentrate all our resources in a compact position with well secured flanks and supply lines. It would be wrong to dispose our forces in widely scattered positions as they could then be very easily by-passed.

This survey of the situation was forwarded to Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff, at present at Fuehrer Headquarters.

As the minelaying operations, planned by German Naval Command, Italy have been overtaken by present events, the available mines and minelayers will be placed at the disposal of Group South for the protection of the Aegean Sea and the east coast of the Adriatic Sea.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence located four submarines out on operations. The Air Force sighted smaller vessels on a southerly course off Utrich Point.

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On the morning of 10 Sept., after a heavy preliminary artillery bombardment, a force of about the strength of one battalion landed south and west of the western pier of Novorossisk from small ships. Further attempts at landing made by about 20 ships at 0455 were frustrated by our guns. Western and submarine pier as well as the north harbor are in enemy hands. The Port Commander's 1st Company was cut off in the harbor basin. Communications were interrupted. One guardboat and one gunboat were so far destroyed by our defense forces.

At the same time another enemy landing took place at Melekino west of Mariupol by a force of unknown strength on which no further details have yet been reported.

Own Situation:

Mariupol is going to be abandoned according to a report from 6th Army, High Command. The harbor entrance will be blocked by scuttling ships. As many harbor installations will be blown up as the supply of explosives will allow. Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine and the last forces from Mariupol arrived in Berdyansk.

At 0720 our towed convoy Odessa - Sevastopol was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine 60 miles west-northwest of Eupatoria and again later on six miles off Sevastopol.

A ground mine check sweep of the Danube and the Strait of Kerch carried out by a minesweeping plane, and a check sweep for moored mines in the Strait of Kerch, were both carried out without result. Sweeping operations have been completed off Sevastopol.

Convoy and ferry traffic proceeded according to plan.

During the night of 10 Sept. four ships belonging to the 1st PT Boat Flotilla will operate in the area southeast of Gelendzhik, three ships belonging to the 11th PT Boat Flotilla will operate southeast of Utrich Point. A minelaying group of three naval artillery lighters and two naval landing craft put out from Berdyansk to mine an area 20 miles south of Mariupol.

IX. Situation Far East:

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported that according to a prisoner's statement, the attack on Minamitorishima was carried out by the three enemy aircraft carriers, ESSEX, YORKTOWN 2 and INDEPENDENCE, the battleship INDIANA, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers. Japanese

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fighters and reconnaissance planes have recently been stationed on the island again.

At 0300 on 4 Sept. about 15,000 men landed without trouble behind small Japanese forces near Salamaua and Lae. One U.S. and two Australian divisions are engaged in the attack on Salamaua. A second landing wave consisting of six transports with seven destroyers covered by 40 fighters was detected in time. All the transports and two of the destroyers were sunk, and 27 of the fighters shot down.

On 5 Sept. 1,000 enemy airborne troops landed northwest of Lae. The majority of the Japanese troops are stationed on Madang, Wewak, and Hollandia.

Items of Political Importance.

According to an "Exchange" report, all preparations have been made for handing over Mussolini to the Allies should the occasion arise. It is planned to bring him before a United Nations Tribunal and to put him on trial in Italy.

According to intelligence reports, it is said that the Anglo-Americans have been negotiating with Switzerland since the middle of August on the possibilities of marching through the southern passes from northern Italy. At the beginning, the Swiss Army will offer mock resistance. Germany can no longer spare the forces which would be required to carry out the precautionary measure of occupying the Alpine passes. The operation in southern Italy is said to be only a diversion from the main landing operation in northern Italy.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.I. Army Situation:

The critical situation in the southern sector of the eastern front shows slight improvement. The tempo of the retreat has slowed down. The situation in the Kharkov area has been maintained despite continuous enemy pressure, so that two divisions are being withdrawn from there to meet the enemy wedge pushing towards the Dnieper bend.

II. The Naval Attaché in Rome reported over the telephone from Verona to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and was ordered to proceed to Army Group B in order to be at the disposal of Field Marshal Rommel. On the recommendation of Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division, the Naval Attaché's four assistants, who are not indispensable to him, will be placed at the disposal of German Naval Command, Italy which had requested the dispatch by air of five first-class officers for working out and re-organizing the tasks which will arise until the necessary communications organization has been completed. German Naval Command, Italy furthermore asked for two fast courier planes to be delivered. As for the fifth officer requested, he will be Captain von Kamptz. The relevant order will be dispatched through the Naval Attaché by Radiogram 1455.

III. According to a report made by Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division, it will be somewhat difficult to release the Croatian naval personnel as ordered by Armed Forces High Command. It will be impossible to avoid transferring the Croatian Naval Artillery Battalion of about 500 men from the Black Sea area to the Adriatic. It must be investigated how far other personnel, either serving on units afloat or in training schools,

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comes under this order. Withdrawals from actual operations should only be carried out gradually and step by step at the discretion of Group South.

Four hundred men left by air to take over the coastal naval offices in the Adriatic ports. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division has already told Armed Forces High Command several times that the formation and transportation of the necessary commands takes time.

IV. Chief of Staff, Army Group B informed Chief of Staff, Naval Staff by telephone that both in Spezia and Genoa there are 23 coastal batteries with four to six guns each which are unmanned, and asked the Navy to supply the necessary personnel, if possible. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff drew attention to the Navy's own shortage. The matter will, however, be investigated. Quartermaster Division already suggested some time ago that Armed Forces High Command should withdraw the Army coastal batteries from the western area's coast. Army personnel could to a certain extent be retrained by the Naval Shore Commander. Furthermore, careful consideration should be given as to whether the originally intended 20 % withdrawal from the Channel and the west coast is not in fact justified. This would make the 2nd Naval Artillery Detachment available for manning the 16 batteries in Italy. Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff, now at Fuehrer Headquarters, will be informed accordingly by telephone so as to obtain the approval of Commander in Chief, Navy and of Armed Forces High Command, if possible, at once.

V. Chief, Naval Communications Division pointed out the great risks run by the presence of the Italian monitoring control station and thought it necessary to place the entire personnel under guard and to seize all documents. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that German Naval Command, Italy be immediately warned of the danger so that the necessary measures may be taken in advance.

VI. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armaments remarked that in the armaments division the Navy has been showing a tendency to hoard ship-building allocations at the expense of weapon production. It would, therefore, be advisable for Naval Staff to re-examine the whole subject of weapon supply in line with the ship construction program and in accordance with new strategic demands, and to submit the requirements to the Bureau of Naval Armaments accordingly. As the Shipbuilding Commission has not drawn up any plans of the type which used to be drawn up by Naval (Ship) Construction Division, the naval ordnance experts have no data from which to estimate the quantities needed and the time which would have to be allowed for their production plan, for it is well known that weapons usually take far less time to deliver than the ships and craft for which they are intended (for example: torpedo-tubes for submarines).

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This matter will be put before Commander in Chief, Navy on his return.

Special Items.

Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command ordered:

"All railroad engineers and railroad men are to be separated from the rest of the Italian prisoners of war:

1. The Italian railroad men are to be placed through Chief, Armed Forces Transportation at the disposal of the General Transportation Organization for Italy for employment under Armed Forces, Railroad Traffic Control on special assignment: "Upper Italy". The railroad men not required there are to be employed by Chief, Armed Forces Transportation, in the railroad traffic within the Reich.

2. Chief, Armed Forces Transportation is going to form the Italian railroad engineers into Companies of Prisoner of War Railroad Engineers, who will be employed in the Reich in order to release German personnel."

Situation 11 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a U.S. broadcast there are U.S. bases in Chile, Peru, Ecuador and on the Galapagos, Christmas, Tongarewa, Atutak, Borubora, and Tongtabu Islands.

This information was transmitted to all ships in foreign waters by Radiogram 1741.

Information on the U.S. warships which called at Sidney while acting as convoy escorts and on shipping movements in the Freetown area (compare War Diary 8 Sept.) has been dispatched by Radiogram 2231.

2. Own Situation:

In reply to an inquiry, the Naval Attaché in Tokyo has been informed that there are no other Italian vessels in the Indian Ocean

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besides the CAGNI. Reliable communications have not yet been established with the CAGNI, but are still being attempted. Information will be dispatched as soon as a reply has been received from the CAGNI. (See Telegram 0100).

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported by Telegram 1632:

"1. ERITREA sailed at 1100 on 8 Sept. from Singapore ostensibly for Sabang. Despite well prepared air reconnaissance not yet located by Japanese Navy; therefore escape to the enemy must be assumed. Commander very anti-Japanese.

2. It must, therefore, be assumed that because the Commander must have seen and heard much while in Singapore, the enemy is acquainted with all details of the AQUILA operations, the approach point of the MARCO POLO, the waiting position of the BOGOTA, the CAGNI's anticipated time of arrival together with some knowledge of the supply operations of the SCHLIEMANN and the BRAKE. And through the AQUILA "6", the enemy will also be informed about submarine U "178".

3. AQUILA boats "2", "3" and "6" secured by Japanese Navy. Crews on shore under guard. Japanese Navy bases claim to boats on this, but will probably agree to lend them to Germany.

4. Please inform BRAKE about escape of ERITREA as she may put out through Sunda Strait."

Naval Staff had feared that the ERITREA would do this. Necessary precautionary measures are being taken. The Japanese claim to the AQUILA boats is to be rejected because they are German boats, operated by Italian personnel and under the Italian flag solely for convenience and because German combat submarines were given to the Italians in exchange.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-one planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British ship was located at 1537 in BF 1460 and one at 2219 in BE 9921.

At 1200 250 miles northwest of Cape Villano air reconnaissance reported one battleship or heavy cruiser on a southerly course and at 1716 200 miles northwest of Cape Villano one destroyer with six Mosquitos on a southerly course.

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At 2112 and at 2245 several vessels were sighted and also detected by radar north of Cherbourg. These targets, presumably PT boats in waiting positions withdrew after a few salvos were fired at them from an Army coastal battery on 12 Sept. at 0337.

Naval Intelligence Division reported on the convoy traffic in British coastal waters as it was on 1 Sept. 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 17878/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, Vol. "British Coastal Waters."

According to intelligence reports from London via Madrid, 15 warships between 10,000 and 35,000 tons are expected in ports in southwest England on 12 and 14 Sept. which are said to include two ARIZONA's and one CALIFORNIA. The reason for the transfer is not known. (See Teletype 2350).

One report, received today from Jewish circles in Vichy on the possibility of enemy landings on the Channel coast near Sables, claims that the operation will take place between 10 and 20 Sept.

Group West interprets the very obvious enemy activities in the Channel up to 10 Sept. as having been a mock maneuver whose specific purpose was to tie the Army's forces down over the period of the Italian surrender. Training was of secondary consideration. Reasons for this construction as per teletype 1/Skl 25584/43 Gkds. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b. For Naval Staff's opinion see War Diary 10 Sept.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

For 10 Sept. it is additionally reported that a convoy in the area of the Channel Islands, escorted by minesweepers, was twice attacked by enemy PT boats. In the second attack at 0358 one PT boat was definitely sunk. The convoy reached its destination without loss.

Furthermore, four of our patrol vessels in positions west of Dieppe were attacked by enemy PT boats. Of the six attacking boats, two were sunk and one was set on fire. (See Teletype 0805 and 1055).

Otherwise nothing to report.

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Special Items.

1. On 10 Sept. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued the following order:

"As the péniche operation has almost been completed, large numbers of forces can now be withdrawn and employed elsewhere for the time being."

In connection with this Naval Staff submitted a report received from Group West on 6 Sept. on how acts of sabotage were endangering French inland waterways and drew the attention of Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command to the danger which may arise from further crippled supply lines.

2. Group West submitted the results of the discussion held on 6 Sept. between Group West, the 3rd Air Force, the 9th Air Corps, Commander PT Boats, and Mine Warfare Section, Operations Division, Naval Staff about operations with mines with new firing units.

Owing to the state of training the crews are in, the 9th Air Corps is unable to carry out minelaying operations during dark nights. Therefore the Air Force's operations are not expected to commence before 14 Sept. The 9th Air Corps expects to be able to lay 1,000 mines a month. It is estimated that PT boats will be able to lay 500. Mining operations will be confined to the east and south coasts of England. The operations will be concentrated on the Thames, Humber and Tyne and on the south coast mostly at the harbor entrances and the area round the Isle of Wight.

Commander, PT Boats intends to intersperse minelaying operations with torpedo operations. The 9th Air Corps plans to carry out the first operations in the Thames area. Commander, PT Boats will carry out the first two operations in the Orfordnes area.

Commander, PT Boats is preparing Lux-light buoys, which are to be laid by PT boats in order to help planes find their bearings on dark nights. These are light signals with a burning time of several hours and are laid with or without anchor.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy "459" Elbe-Hook commenced the Elbe-Hook passage with one steamer and seven escort vessels. The 8th PT Boat Flotilla will be moving from Cuxhaven to Ijmuiden. Otherwise nothing to report.

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2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Only three planes were detected over the North Sea. At 1214 air reconnaissance sighted two PT boats about 100 miles north-east of Lervik on course 250°. The enemy naval force in the Shetland-Faroes area has not been detected again.

Own Situation:

At noon on 9 Sept. 110 rounds fired from the Rybachí Peninsula were answered by 159 rounds from one of our batteries.

At 0625 on 11 Sept. the patrol vessel M "09" sank at Bodoe in a collision with a Norwegian steamer in dense fog. In Malangen Fiord the steamer ANKE (3,800 BRT) was sunk in ballast by two enemy PT boats with torpedoes.

A prisoner taken in the Spitsbergen operation stated that the meteorological station "Nussbaum" was attacked and destroyed this summer by eight or ten Norwegians who had come by motor boat from Longyearbyen. The station personnel fled except for one man who committed suicide before being taken prisoner. On the return passage the motor boat was shelled by one of our submarines; the crew managed to reach the shore and was rescued by a British submarine and brought to Barentsburg. Three wireless stations were maintained on Spitsbergen, namely at Barentsburg, Longyearbyen and Svea. The latter is still operating (see Teletype 1831).

Submarine U "277" has been stationed at the entrance to Ice Fiord because some kind of reaction to the Spitsbergen operation is anticipated. Three submarines have been dispatched to the rescue of a BV plane which made an emergency landing north of Novaya Zemlya.

Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff of the request it made to the 5th Air Force and to Commander in Chief, Air Force Center for the air reconnaissance and escort needed to comply with the operational order for the transfer of LUETZOW under operation "Hermelin".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The German Embassy in Stockholm learned from the Swedish Foreign Office that the DICTO and LIONEL did not sail but only moved to another berth. The location of the new berth has not yet been found by our intelligence service.

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Air attacks on our batteries and on Tyters were extremely heavy.

At 0629 one torpedo boat and 24 motor minesweepers with a heavy air escort were sighted south of Lavansaari making for Neugrund. When bombarded by an Army coastal battery, the vessels put up a smoke-screen, and south of Neugrund turned away to the northeast. Presumably this was an exploratory sweep for mine reconnaissance. At noon a group consisting of one torpedo boat, one minesweeper, and 20 motor minesweepers was cruising in the area between Lavansaari and Tyters.

2. Own Situation:

Escort and defense duties in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic were carried out according to plan. Convoy traffic was carried out without incident throughout the Baltic.

At 1537 the Battery "Prinz Heinrich" bombarded Kronstadt with 20 high explosive shells and scored five hits. Eight targets were smoke-screened. Despite a heavy enemy counterbombardment, neither damage nor casualties were sustained.

On the west coast of Tyters a freshly replenished Russian provision depot was found. Naval Command, Baltic ordered the immediate reinforcement of the island garrison by a company of the 531st Naval Artillery Detachment. The 1st Air Force will request the Finns to operate their fighters from German airfields situated in closer proximity. Finnish acquiescence is, however, doubtful.

Because of the urgency of the request made by Naval Staff for fighter escort for Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, Air Force, Operations Staff submitted a request for Finnish fighter escort through their Liaison Officer to the Finnish Air Force High Command in which it was stressed how urgent was the need for the Finns to take over fighter escort duties during the next few days and weeks until relieved by the formation of a new German fighter group for the 1st Air Force, by which time, also, the general tension in the air situation in the Gulf of Finland should have decreased.

Naval Command, East has been informed accordingly by Operations Division, Naval Staff.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Submarine U "107", which had already been posted missing, reported completion of the minelaying operation "Charleston".

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A second case has been reported from the Bay of Biscay in which a boat was spotted by searchlights during the night although nothing had registered in the Hagenuk apparatus. Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

One Mosquito was shot down by a Ju 88 380 miles west of Brest. During the day the enemy attacked the dockyard of Le Trait, an airfield, anti-aircraft gun positions and railway installations in northern France. The 3rd Air Force reported that three planes were definitely shot down and eight probably.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In combatting enemy landings in the Gulf of Salerno during the night of 8 Sept., the batteries of General of the Anti-Aircraft Gun Batteries, Army Group, South sank 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 2 transports, 5 large and 3 small landing craft loaded with equipment and personnel, in direct gun action. Hits were also registered on many other ships, and high casualties were caused by shells with time fuses from anti-aircraft guns. Furthermore one enemy plane was shot down.

On 11 Sept. our dive bombers went out on an operation against Rhodes. Two enemy fighters were destroyed, one damaged. At Cephalonia dive bombers forced an Italian hospital ship to return. Fighter-bombers were continuously out on operations over the battle area in southern Italy.

The large passenger steamer CONTE DI SAVOIA was set on fire by six of our planes, whilst trying to put out from Venice. During the night of 10 Sept. 92 of our bombers attacked ship targets in the Gulf of Salerno in two waves. Hits were registered on 19 vessels. Of these, one cruiser and two transports were probably sunk.

The enemy carried out numerous operations over the front lines in Calabria and Salerno. During the night of 11 Sept. 130 enemy planes attacked our airfield near Rome, destroying three of our planes.

In the Balkans six planes carried supplies to partisans and dropped pamphlets over the Salonika area.

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3. Eastern Front:

Twenty enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 10 Sept.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean Theater:

One DELHI-class cruiser put into Gibraltar from the Atlantic. One TEXAS-class battleship put out for the west. At noon 11 transports, 7 freighters, 2 tankers and 12 U.S. destroyers passed through the Straits of Gibraltar from the Mediterranean making for the west. According to an intelligence report from Spain the reports on the arrival of Italian warships in Gibraltar are incorrect.

At 1630 on 10 Sept. the convoy of 30 freighters with ten escort vessels and air escort, which entered the Mediterranean during the night of 9 Sept. was sighted north of Alboran. There are otherwise no sighting reports available from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

In the Italian area our air reconnaissance reported:

at 0900 18 miles north-northeast of Porto Vecchio, four auxiliary aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser on a southerly course;

at 0910 eight miles west of Maddalena, five landing craft on a northerly course;

at 1100 ships were sighted putting into Porto Vecchio, probably the group reported at 0900. Between 0800 and 0845 one cruiser and two destroyers on a northerly course, in the Gulf of Salerno; 15 freighters, 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers on a southerly course 45 miles north-northwest of Palermo; and one destroyer on a westerly course 55 miles north-northeast of Ustica.

At 0930 2 cruisers and 13 transports with 30 sea planes were north of Brindisi, unfortunately the course was not given, and 25 miles west-southwest of Durazzo, four ships of 5,000 BRT each. According to radio intelligence, all U.S. ships are still located in the area southeast of Naples, and rumors of U.S. landings north of this area must, therefore, be incorrect.

According to British radio reports, four Italian battleships, seven cruisers, and ten destroyers put into La Valetta. It was furthermore learned from a British broadcast that the battleship ROMA was sunk in one of our air attacks, and that the Italian Commanding Admiral, Fleet was killed in action.

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According to radio intelligence, urgent radio messages were exchanged in the evening between Malta and Alexandria. The dispatch of the meteorological messages to the east was given top priority.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Transport Situation:

Ground Situation:

The situation south of Eboli was very tense around noon. Enemy advance columns which included tanks, reached the Eboli - Serre - Albanella line. Up to now four divisions have landed in the Gulf of Salerno between Amalfi and Agropoli. Salerno has been in enemy hands since 9 Sept. Landings were also carried out on the western point of the Sorrento peninsula. Our troops began a counterattack which by evening had achieved successes in the direction of Vietri. It is planned to push forward towards the coast east of Salerno and to annihilate the enemy on 11 Sept. in a concentric attack.

Disarmament of the Italian formations in the 10th Army's Sector was carried out without difficulty owing to the co-operation of the Commander in Chief of the Italian 7th Army. Considerable booty was taken at Gaeta.

The troops stationed in the Rome area have surrendered. Their disarmament will be completed by this evening.

On Sardinia details of the situation are still unknown. The most important positions seem to be in our hands. Movements are being carried out according to plan. In Corsica the situation is quiet except for Bastia which seems to be occupied by Gaullist troops. In the interior of the island partisans were overcome by Italian troops whose disarmament was, therefore, postponed for the time being.

Naval Situation:

Submarine U "617" (Commander-Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi) sank two eastbound destroyers of the JERVIS class in CG 9657. Despite bright moonlight neither destroyers nor planes located the submarine.

Submarine U "616" has been assigned the operational area north of the parallel of CJ 6785, submarine U "565" the area south of this parallel. Commander, Submarines, Italy plans to station the next two submarines becoming operational on 12 and 16 Sept. in the narrows between Bougaroni and Galite and in CJ 84 and the southern half of CJ 85.

With reference to execution of operation "Achse":

According to instructions from Chief, Naval Staff, which Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff transmitted by telephone, Commander, Submarines, Italy in the submarine base of La Spezia has received the following orders:

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a. The Italian Commanding Admiral in La Spezia is to be shot immediately;

b. The Italian Chief of Staff, the Director of the Arsenal, and all persons chiefly responsible for the departure of the battle-ships are to be arrested, their names reported, stating the degree of their guilt as regards the betrayal, together with recommendations for further executions.

Commander, Submarines, Italy assumes that Chief, German Naval Command, Italy will arrange for the arrest of the guilty with the Italian Admiralty in Genoa. Commander, Submarines, Italy is of the opinion that in the name of justice alone the execution of Admiral de Courten and Admiral Sanssonetti is imperative. (See Teletype 0100).

In Pola the Commander of the base prevailed upon the Italian Admiral to grant his request to let our boats put in and out. The harbor boom has been guarded by our own forces since 0700. The Italian ships in port received neither orders to scuttle nor to depart and have ceased putting up resistance. It is impossible to disarm the 12,000-14,000 Italians in Pola and take over all the offices and centers of communication owing to lack of personnel. Therefore, the arrival of large German formations would be welcomed by the Italian Admiral. The submarine base was ordered by Commander, Submarines, Italy to inform the Italian Admiral immediately that his head will be at stake if Italian vessels depart and go over to the enemy.

The occupation of Pola by the Army is planned for 12 Sept.

The full report of the operation of four PT boats in the Gulf of Salerno during the night of 10 Sept. is not yet available. The radio message received was so garbled that it at first led to the erroneous belief that there had been an encounter with the enemy.

The transfer of the 90th Division from Sardinia to Corsica is being carried out without interference. According to radio intelligence the Italians handed the wireless station on Corsica over to the Gaullist forces. The situation in the Piombino - Elba area is still obscure. A torpedo boat at Piombino reported gunfire. Although requested to do so, no further reports have been received from the motor minesweeper R "7" in tow and of the motor minesweepers R "13", R "137", R "138" since 9 Sept. at 0300 and 10 Sept. at 1500.

The BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN are calling at Toulon to load up with mines.

Naval Staff dispatched the following order to German Naval Command, Italy:

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"The results obtained in the Straits of Messina should be held up as an example for the transfer of the troops from Sardinia. Attempts should also be made to recover the valuable material. Efficient leadership, which will guarantee the accomplishment of the task, must be assured. Report name of officer appointed."

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The partisan situation has grown tenser. Except for Chalkis, the ports of Euboea are in the hands of the insurgents. The Volos Port Commander is in danger, as the Italian troops are leaving Volos and several thousand insurgents are in the vicinity. The naval radio station moved its equipment and secret documents onto a coastal defense vessel. The situation in Zante is still tense. The Italians have begun the surrender of heavy weapons.

The hospital ship GARDICA has been sighted since morning standing on and off between Cephalonia and Zante. The Air Force is trying to force her to enter port.

At 1220 Rhodes surrendered unconditionally. Disarmament is being carried out according to plan. The reported arrival of British warships proved to be incorrect.

The Italian torpedo boat CALATAFIMI has been put into commission with German personnel. The Coastal Defense Flotilla, Attica has commissioned four Italian minesweepers and one auxiliary ship and taken over three submarine chasers. One ship of the Coastal Defense Flotilla, Crete was sunk off Gavdos by enemy planes and sustained losses in personnel. The steamer RE ALESSANDRO which ran aground off Patras has been refloated. Ship's papers and secret documents were taken off.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence observed an increase in radio traffic. Movements of larger ships not yet ascertained. Two torpedo boats together with PT boats were probably out at sea off the east coast during the night of 10 Sept.

According to an intelligence report from Vienna, Russian landings with 60,000 men will be carried out within the next few days at various points along the Bulgarian Black Sea coast. Warships and transports are said to have been assembled in Batum, and 29 American landing craft were sighted. Six hundred planes are said to be standing by to provide cover.

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Own Situation:

A submarine chase, six miles north of Sevastopol was apparently successful. At 1755 three boats of the 23rd Submarine Chaser Flotilla were unsuccessfully attacked north of Sevastopol by six Russian planes with six aerial torpedoes.

During the night of 10 Sept. the enemy's repeated attempts to land in Novorossisk harbor failed in the face of our defensive fire.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla operating off Utrich Point sighted nothing and observed no traffic while in lurking position off Cape Idokopas. On the return passage the group was subjected to a dive bombing attack 30 miles east-southeast of Feodosiya by ten fighter-bombers with three to four centimeter caliber guns. After all the engines had broken down, two torpedoes exploded in the tubes through enemy gunfire. The whole complement, which was seriously wounded, was taken on board the PT boat S "49" during the attack, and the PT boat S "46" was blown up. Our own guns were unsuccessful, because the two centimeter shells ricocheted from the enemy planes. Three boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla again put out for operations during the night of 11 Sept. but returned owing to weather conditions.

The minelaying operation in the Gulf of Taganrog was carried out according to plan. The returning minelaying group was attacked at 0750 east of Berdyansk by six low-flying planes and suffered losses in personnel. The Commander of the naval artillery lighter MAL "1" was killed in action. Mines were laid by enemy planes in the Danube between Galatz and Sulina. Sweeping operations have commenced; the fairway is blocked from Galatz. Five enemy planes unsuccessfully raided the harbor area of Yalta in the afternoon.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch and the Anapa transports were carried out according to plan and without incident.

Group South reported that the Air Force is urging the Navy to occupy the Adriatic ports. The commands are being transported by air from Belgrad on through the influence of the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group F. (See Teletype 1740).

Furthermore, Group South requested the appointment of a Naval Shore Commander, Dodecanese, in order to safeguard naval interests after the surrender of Rhodes. (See Teletype 1741). Finally Group South requested Commanding Admiral, Adriatic to place one Ju 52, two W 34's and three Fieseler Storch planes, including the crews, at his disposal (see teletype 2000).

These requests will be dealt with by Quartermaster Division.

Group South has made an urgent request for 300 LMA mines and 300 LMB mines for minelaying in the Strait of Kerch. The 1st Air Corps refused to part with their supply of LMB mines. Furthermore, in order to mine the harbor, the release of the available 80 TMB II mines has also been requested.

Naval Staff arranged for the immediate shipment of 300 LMA mines, including 200 with a special device for use at three meters depth. TMB mines are only to be released in the case of an emergency. LM mines are also suitable for laying by surface vessels. Group South, copy to Commanding Admiral, Black Sea has received the following instructions from Naval Staff in connection with the order to carry out operation "Krimhild":

"1. Novorossisk: It would be useful to lay LM blue mines with ZK*12 mechanism in the berths which will probably be used for discharging transports, and LM mines, with MA**I mechanism between the heads of the outer piers.

2. Strait of Kerch: the Yenikale fairway must be blockaded as well as the Pavlovski Narrows. Here LM mines with a special device for use in water three meters deep and without ZK mechanism, 4/5 blue, 1/5 red will be required; the minefield's strong point will be off the southern tip of Chushka where the water is three to four meters deep up to the shore. Replacements for the gaps cleared or fairways swept should be provided."

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

* period delay mechanism.

** magnetic-acoustic firing device.

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Items of Political Importance.

On 11 Sept. radio Palermo broadcasted Badoglio's proclamation in which he reminded the Italians that they were being attacked on their own soil by the Germans and called upon them to rise up against this use of force with force. The King stated that circumstances had forced the Crown and Government to leave Rome.

According to the press, the King and his Government are in Palermo. According to press reports from Agram, Croatia annexed the Dalmatian coastal area from Fiume to Cattaro.

Special Items.

I. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued the following instructions:

"1. In order to secure the lines of communication between the Italian mainland and Corsica and to avert the occupation of Elba by the enemy, the island should be immediately occupied. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has been commissioned to carry out this task. The units still remaining on the mainland belonging to the forces which were transferred to Corsica are being put under his command again for this operation.

The occupation is to be carried out in a simultaneous attack from sea and air.

2. To ensure the security of Leghorn, Army Group B is to reinforce the forces stationed there, and in preparation for the operation against Corsica, the coastal area from Leghorn up to and including Piombino is to be mopped up by mobile forces in good fighting trim.

3. The boundary between Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B, becoming immediately effective, will be Elba - Piombino - Perugia - Porto Civitanova (Places named to be within the territory of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South)."

Naval Staff informed Group West accordingly by teletype. Furthermore Naval Staff issued the following instructions:

a. To German Naval Command, Italy:

"1. Armed Forces High Command's latest plan:

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Corsica is also to be evacuated. Transportation of personnel from Sardinia and Corsica to the mainland of primary importance. Heavy weapons and equipment will have to be abandoned where absolutely unavoidable.

2. Submit statement on available means of transportation and your plans."

b. to Group West:

"Armed Forces High Command's latest plan: Corsica is also to be evacuated. A request for available means of transportation to be expected from German Naval Command, Italy. Statement of large and small vessels on the French south coast available for operations to be drawn up and cabled here."

II. Chief, Armed Forces High Command submitted the following instructions:

By order of the Fuehrer, all Italian units which have allowed their weapons to fall into the hands of the insurgents or even collaborated with the insurgents are, when captured, to be dealt with as follows:

1. Officers are to be shot in accordance with martial law.
2. Petty officers and men are to be transported directly to the east, if possible avoiding transportation routes through the Reich, by Chief, Prisoners of War, General War Administration Bureau, Armed Forces High Command and placed at the disposal of Quartermaster General, Army General Staff for employment."

Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 25630/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

III. Army General Staff has been requested by Chief, Armed Forces High Command to draw up uniform instructions in conjunction with all the Armed Services on the organization and employment of the emergency units in Italy, which are being formed by a special staff under the command of Major General Stahel.

IV. An urgent request has been again received from Naval Command, Norway for the transfer of the 9th PT Boat Flotilla to Norwegian waters after the completion of its training in the Baltic. Copy of the letter as per 1/Skl 25884/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

V. Because of Commander in Chief, Navy's request for assistance in the submarine operations which are starting up again, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff ordered the 3rd Air Force imme-

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diately to detail the BV 222's ready for operations in Travemuende for reconnaissance operations in the Bay of Biscay. The planes must have joined the 3rd Air Force by 16 Sept.

The order was the result of the discussion between Chief, Naval Staff and Commander in Chief, Air Force at Fuehrer Headquarters on 10 Sept. For details see statement as per 1/Skl Ib Kr 2807/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

VI. Intelligence submitted further reports from England giving details about preparations for landings on the French and Belgian coasts which are supposed to start soon after Italy's surrender. For copy see Teletype 0830.

From the character of radio communications the radio intelligence service surmises that Churchill has started his return trip to England.

Situation 12 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In connection with the evening of 8 Sept. it must be supplementarily reported that the Naval Attaché in Tokyo, copy to all in Foreign Waters, received the following instructions by Radiogram 2236:

"Obtain possession of Aquila ships. Induce Italian crews to hand the ships over peacefully. New crews should be formed from the personnel of Schneewind's submarine, some personnel from Dommes submarine, as well as from other personnel available there."

In view of the assumed desertion of the ERITREA to the enemy, the BRAKE was given the following instructions:

By Radiogram 1245: "Because of possibility that ERITREA has escaped to the enemy there is danger of ordered courses being compromised. Withdraw 300 miles south. Further instructions to follow."

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By Radiogram 1345: "If still on supply operation, only withdraw south if weather permits. Otherwise permission is given to move to an area with favorable weather conditions in easterly or northeasterly direction."

By Radiogram 1922:

"1. Having checked orders issued to her, ERITREA can have no knowledge of supply date and place. Naval Attaché, Tokyo assumes supply operations common knowledge because there have been so many rumors about them in the southern area.

2. The following supply places, made known to Aquilas and ERITREA must by all means be avoided:

30°S, 70°E
18°S, 78°E
25°S, 64°E
35°S, 55°E

3. On return voyage steer course much further south than on your outward voyage. Naval Staff plans a return voyage via Bali or Lombok Strait.

Further instructions will follow once a reply has been received from Tokyo.

4. It is assumed that Italian submarine CAGNI is in KT or KK. She only has general information that German tanker is somewhere in Indian Ocean. So far efforts to communicate with CAGNI have failed; therefore caution is advised."

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo will be instructed by Telegram 2000 as follows:

"1. Aquila boats are German property and in accordance with an agreement manned by Italian crews. Japanese claims are to be rejected.

2. It is assumed that radio messages for BRAKE are also read there. Please submit new routing instructions Bali - Lombok or Sunda Strait as soon as possible."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-eight planes were detected on operations over the

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Bay of Biscay. One British unit was located in BE 6860.

At 1835, our air reconnaissance reported a convoy of 35 merchantmen (2,000-8,000 GRT) with eight escort vessels, on course 200° in BE 8284 and at about the same time ostensibly one troop transport with one escort vessel and a plane on course south in BE 8319.

Numerous detonations were heard in the Channel between 1942 and 2030 west and southwest of Le Touquet.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off St. Nazaire by a mine-exploding vessel. The submarine convoy, which had put out from St. Nazaire, put in again because it was damaged by a mine.

Channel Coast:

Owing to bright moonlight and fog convoy operations were only maintained for the Channel Island traffic.

In the enemy air raid at 1800 on 11 Sept. on Le Trait, west of Rouen, the dockyard was hit by 28 bombs. The magazine and workshops were hit. No losses were sustained amongst our own personnel.

It is planned to transfer the 4th PT Boat Flotilla from Boulogne to Flushing.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy "459" Elbe - Hook was carried out. PT noises were heard west of Ijmuiden at 2330.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Thirteen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

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At 0215, the Russian signal station, Zhelaniya reported sighting two of our submarines. At 1214 our air reconnaissance sighted PT boats 200 miles west-southwest of Aalesund on course 150°.

Own Situation:

On 10 Sept. the living quarters of the Petsamo battery were destroyed in the course of an artillery duel by a direct hit; other damage was also sustained.

On 11 Sept. the submarine chaser UJ "1217" was sunk by an enemy submarine off Sylte Fiord. Twenty-six men are missing.

Twenty-eight ships were escorted north, 23 south. Twelve ships were delayed in the arctic coast area owing to a shortage of escorts.

From her position in Ae H 8872 the weather ship KOBURG requested the immediate supply of 500 demolition charges by Radiogram 1730. Ship probably frozen in. Group North/Fleet recommended dispatch of the demolition charges in jettisonable containers by a Do 24 or FW 200 plane.

The matter will be dealt with by Chief, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

At sunrise 25 Russian motor minesweepers and one gun-carrier pushed forward east of Tyters into Narva Bay as far as grid square AO 3663 (15 miles south-southeast of Tyters) and seven mine detonations were observed in grid square AO 3714 (ten miles east of Tyters). At 0927 the group returned on a northerly course.

From 1020 to 1330 one vessel and 19 motor minesweepers were observed southeast of Tyters on alternating courses; they later withdrew to the east. This group was last reported in AO 3636 (six miles east of Tyters) on a northerly course.

On the afternoon of 11 Sept. there were 30 PT boats, 8 motor minesweepers, 3 guard vessels, 1 auxiliary vessel, 3 freighters, 5 tugs together with other craft in the port of Lavansaari. North of Lavansaari one minesweeper and seven motor minesweepers were located on a southwesterly course.

2. Own Situation:

There is nothing to report from the area of Commanding

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Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

The cruiser LEIPZIG put out from Libau at 1430 making for Gdynia.

The laying of barrage "Seeigel VI a" was completed on 11 Sept.

Convoy and escort operations were carried out according to plan.

On the situation in the Gulf of Finland, Naval Command, Baltic reported as follows to Naval Staff and also to Northern Army Group and the 1st Air Force:

"1. The thrust contemplated by Russian minesweeping vessels under cover of fairly large vessels and heavy air formations to the south of "Seeigel" cannot be prevented by Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, as owing to the strong Russian air force it would cause unnecessarily heavy losses. The vessels of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic should therefore be kept in reserve for moments of extreme emergency. In view of this situation it is pointless to continue laying new unguarded barrages.

2. The discovery of a Russian supply depot on Tyters confirms that the Russians intend to reconnoiter the defense forces. They may be planning to occupy the island - a move which cannot be prevented by our naval forces. The Russians must have gained the impression that the occupation of Tyters could at present be successfully carried out, even if at the cost of heavy losses.

3. The 1st Air Force is at present so weak that even preparations for operation "Walfang" are inadequate. Prevailing opinion is that ships larger than torpedo boats will not put out from Kronstadt for the present. If, however, the Air Force continues to be so passive, it will be seen that larger vessels will begin to appear at sea.

4. The possibility that the Russians will lay a defense barrage approximately in the direction of Neugrund - Aseri must be taken into account. It will then be very difficult to keep the sea cleared and it will become impossible to patrol "Seeigel" even at night.

5. It is strange that no air raids are being carried out on Hogland or on the Finnish cities despite the fact that the enemy knows the anti-aircraft gun defenses to be weak. The enemy is obviously concentrating on Tyters, as a break-through east of Tyters would be the most promising, if his aim is to weaken the left flank of our eastern front."

Naval Command, Baltic further reported to Naval Staff:

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"The island of Tyters is supplied with two months' provisions; a five months' provisioning will be completed by the beginning of October. A ferry barge with 100 tons of provisions will be leaving Reval on 14 Sept. Two barges with supplies of ammunition are on their way from Aseri, the first shipment has already been unloaded (four freight-car loads), two more are on the way; supply therefore assured. Over two million rounds of rifle ammunition and 23,000 hand grenades on the island; further deliveries by the Air Force on their way. Investigations are being made which will be reported on later as to whether ferry traffic, which will, if possible, be changed to the night or early morning hours, could be protected by the forces of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. The ferries are only equipped with two centimeters anti-aircraft guns. Supply of 3.7 centimeter light anti-aircraft guns is urgently required because the two centimeters ones are ineffective.

The occupation of Little Tyters by one petty officer and 20 men has been ordered. All observations will be reported by wireless.

The Tyters antiaircraft defenses are at present being reinforced by one heavy battery of Naval Antiaircraft Detachment 711. The Battery "Prinz Heinrich" has been mounted and taken over by the Air Force."

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 11 Sept. 28 of our bombers were out on operations over the Gulf of Salerno. One enemy torpedo boat was sunk 2 large steamers destroyed, 2 transports and 2 cruisers damaged. Training ships were hit during a daylight operation against ground attack planes in the same area.

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In the morning two large burning transports were sighted in Naples.

Extensive air reconnaissance was furthermore carried out, including photographic reconnaissance of Tobruk roads. For evaluations see "Enemy Situation Mediterranean".

The enemy carried out a daylight raid on the airfield of Frosinone and lost three planes. Two of our planes were destroyed, five heavily damaged. The enemy also attacked two airfields on Rhodes with heavy formations and during the night of 12 Sept. carried out a supply operation to the insurgents in the area of Greece with 15 planes.

3. Eastern Front:

Twenty-five enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 10 Sept.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean Theater:

At 0325 three destroyers and ostensibly six LST's of 12,000 GRT each passed Ceuta westbound.

No enemy forces were sighted in the western Mediterranean. On the evening of 11 Sept., in the Tyrrhenian Sea, our air reconnaissance reported several groups of ships off the Gulf of Salerno, namely 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers on a westerly course and 3 groups of 8 - 14 vessels each, - presumably consisting of transports, - which left the Gulf westbound.

On 12 Sept. at 0110, 15 - 20 ships, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer, course not given, were 35 miles south of Salerno; at 0215 six ships were 60 miles north-northwest of Messina and at 0218 one battleship was in the same area.

On the forenoon two battleships on alternating courses were sighted in the Gulf of Naples.

On the afternoon of 11 Sept. there was lively shipping traffic in Taranto and in the Gulf of Taranto. One seaplane tender 1 battleship, 1 transport, and 1 destroyer were sighted on a north-easterly course and 12 large, 17 medium, and 45 small vessels as well as 2 cruisers on a southerly course.

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Photographic reconnaissance of the enemy landing places in the Salerno area revealed that 35% to 40 % of the total landing craft tonnage estimated to be in the Mediterranean was in operation. Furthermore, the NELSON, RODNEY, WARSPITE, and VALIANT, three ILLUSTRIOUS aircraft carriers, and five auxiliary aircraft carriers were spotted.

According to radio intelligence, radio traffic from U.S. ships was noticed in the Gulf of Gaeta. According to Reuter, the town and port of Brindisi and of Catanzare are in British hands.

According to photographic evaluation, 12 LCT 250's, 56 LCM's, 3 LCT 250's and 12 LCM's were in a bay near Tobruk roads.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean - Transport Situation:

During the night of 9 Sept. in an Italian attack on one of our convoys in Piombino three Italian PT boats were sunk by the torpedo boat TA "11". The torpedo boat TA "11" itself also sank, but went on firing to the end. One péniche was scuttled. The remaining vessels of the convoy put into Leghorn with the survivors from the vessels lost. On 11 Sept. the situation in Piombino had not yet been cleared up.

On 9 Sept. Army engineers scuttled 15,000 GRT of merchant shipping space in Bari because a transfer of the ships proved impossible. Bari is probably occupied by the enemy.

During the night of 10 Sept. three of our PT boats sank a transport of 10,000 GRT off Salerno. Four PT boats were again operating in the Gulf of Salerno during the night of 11 Sept. The report of success has not yet been received.

The motor minesweepers R "187" and R "188" put into Leghorn.

The PT boats S "54" and S "61" are on passage to Pola with one troop transport and one freighter as prize. The motor minesweepers R "7" and R "13" have been probably lost. Their complements are probably engaged in shore combat. The PT boat S "158" had an encounter with an enemy submarine two miles west of Capraja, and scored a direct hit. Further hunting was prevented by planes. One plane was shot down southeast of Capraja by the fast convoy escort SG "11".

In connection with the execution of operation "Achse" the following is reported:

Leghorn is entirely in German hands. Approximately 1,000 tons of fuel have been captured.

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Nettunia is occupied by the Italians.

Bastia is also in the hands of large Italian forces. German garrison has been eliminated. The mopping up operation is planned for 13 Sept.

Brindisi is in enemy hands.

In Naples, Spezia and Genoa all is quiet.

The occupation of Pola was completed by the Army on the afternoon of 12 Sept. Disarmament is in progress. The escape of Italian units was successfully prevented by the vigorous action taken by the Submarine Base Commander. Chief, German Naval Command, Italy expressed his appreciation. The Army requested the assistance of the two PT boats now in Pola for two days. The submarine base has orders to imprison the Italian Admiral and the Chief of Staff, as being responsible for the departure of the battleship CAESARE.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio was carried out without hindrance.

German Naval Command, Italy moved its Battle Headquarters from the Italian Admiralty to Santa Rosa.

The minelayer BRANDENBURG received orders to speed up mine loading in Toulon. Minelaying operations in the Strait of Bonifacio are being planned for the near future.

Commander, Submarines, Italy reported that two submarines are stationed off the Gulf of Salerno and one east of Gibraltar. Another submarine is leaving Toulon for the Salerno - Gaeta area. And yet another will be putting out from Toulon on 16 Sept.

Group West submitted report of Commanding Admiral, French South Coast on the condition of the batteries and positions taken over from the Italians. According to this report, Toulon can only be defended to a limited extent, given the batteries at present ready for action there. Facilities for communicating between the commands are being improved by extending the communications system. Specialist personnel will be required for the Battery Cepet which is the most modern and technically complicated one.

With regard to the land situation German Naval Command, Italy reported that developments in the Salerno area do not look unfavorable. The enemy seems to be withdrawing landing craft towards Bizerta.

According to the report on the situation by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, British landings at Taranto were carried out from sea and air during the night of 9 Sept., obviously with the

assistance of the Italian Navy which had put out on the afternoon of 9 Sept. with 19 ships.

The offensive for the recapture of Salerno has started. The situation in the area of Rome quietened down as a result of the surrender of further Italian units.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In the afternoon an enemy submarine shelled the coast 40 miles east of Salonika. Another enemy submarine was located in the forenoon 30 miles south of Piraeus. Army reinforcements for the Port Commanders of Volos and Khalkis are on the way. The town and harbor of Volos are being held. The situation in north Euboea has grown worse. The Italians have abandoned the heavy battery and are withdrawing towards Khalkis. An assault detachment is being brought up on two motor minesweepers from Piraeus for the defense of the radar station at Ariopolis on the southern Peloponnesus. The Italian hospital ship GRADISCA has been brought into Prevesa.

The PT boat base at Calamata has been taken over by the Army. Fuel and equipment are intact. The Italian garrison on the island of Syra has offered to surrender.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, two torpedo boats were located in the Gelendzhik- Tuapse area. Furthermore a total of seven submarines were detected at sea. One of our long-range reconnaissance planes attacked a submarine with bombs south of Sevastopol.

Own Situation:

According to a report from the Port Commander of Novorossisk, the west pier up to and including the submarine pier has been cleared of the enemy. Mopping up by naval forces of the remainder of the west pier still in progress. Three officers, one commissar and about 1,200 men have so far been taken prisoner. Our casualties amounted to about 100 men. An attempt will be made to mop up the eastern part of the harbor. No Russian reinforcements have so far arrived.

The minelaying operation off Taganrog was carried out during the night of 11 Sept. according to plan. No naval forces were out on operations last night owing to the weather. The patrol lines off Temryuk have

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been taken up. Convoy traffic along the Crimean coast was cancelled owing to the weather.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch and transport traffic in the Sea of Azov was carried out according to plan and without incident.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Reuter has published the text of the armistice terms with Italy and has given also a report on the events which led up to the agreement. Noted down by Foreign Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 27630 and 27631/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

According to Swedish press reports from London, in the opinion of leading circles there, a second front cannot be established in western Europe before spring 1944. Nor would successes - on whatever scale - in Europe and Asia permit the Allies to start dealing seriously with the overwhelming complexity of political and economic postwar problems before December 1944.

In a broadcast on the principles of American foreign policy Cordell Hull declared among other things that although Germany and Japan are now weaker, they are still very strong. Continuous U.S. pressure against Japan is helping Russia. The pact made by the American Republics in the interest of their common security has made possible the establishment of lines of communication through the Caribbean Sea via Brazil and the South Atlantic, which have been of such overwhelming importance for supplies shipped to North Africa as well as for the operations of the American Air Force over the Pacific Islands and in China. Allied operations in the Mediterranean have depleted the number of German planes on the Russian front, just as the Russian stand has prevented Germany from parrying the Allied thrust against her southern flank.

According to Turkish sources of information, the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara was called to Washington for discussions on the situation in southeastern Europe. The possibility of negotiations for an armistice with the Balkan countries is anticipated.

The daring and sudden liberation of Mussolini, successfully carried out on 12 Sept. by German parachute troops and SS men, thwarted the plan to turn him over to the Anglo-Americans. This may lead to developments of a far-reaching nature in the political situation. Leaving Italy herself to one side, the first reactions will be marked by a decrease in anti-Axis tendencies in the capitals of southeastern Europe. In Italy at the moment, the chief importance of the event will probably be the splitting up into different factions, and this will favor our defensive plans in the same ratio as it will reduce the value of the Badoglio agreement for our foes. It is impossible to foresee the long-term effects; they will depend entirely on developments in the strategic situation in general.

Chief, Naval Staff and Chief of the Operations Division, Naval Staff returned from Fuehrer Headquarters on the evening of 12 Sept.

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Notes on discussion as per 1/Skl I b Kr 2807/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

They also include notes on the discussions of 1 - 3, 8 - 11 and 19 Aug. 1943, as per 1/Skl I b Kr 2804,05 and 06/43 Gkdos. Chfs. which could only now be typed and filed, because they deal amongst other things with the measures for Mussolini's liberation, information which naturally had to be limited to a highly restricted circle. The preparations made by the Navy in this connection, known under the keyword "Eiche" will be found in file "Eiche" which has been attached as an appendix to War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

In the southern part of the eastern front remarkable defense successes were gained in various sectors. The situation remains unchanged.

The number of Italians being withdrawn is given as 40,500 men. The activities of the resistance in Greece and Yugoslavia are very much increasing. Our operation against the Dalmatian ports is developing according to plan. The general situation in the Balkans - occupied until now by Italy - is, however, still very tense.

Given certain conditions, there would appear to be a chance of achieving a large-scale success in the landing area of Salerno.

II. Report of Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division on the reinforcement of the anti-aircraft gun defenses of Toulon by supplying four captured batteries with six 8.8 centimeters guns each and by the Air Force installing smoke-screen defenses, and also on the necessity of a ten per cent cut in the Diesel fuel supplies, except for submarines, PT boats and motor minesweepers.

Report of Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division on the following:

- a. The creation of Naval Shore Commands in Adriatic ports;
- b. the proposal to employ the artillery personnel, originally designated for batteries on the Dalmatian coast, on the Ligurian coast in exchange for the Croatian Naval Artillery Detachment from the Black Sea;
- c. the recommendation made to Armed Forces High Command to distribute the Italian prisoners of war in the ratio of 6:1:1 between the Army, the Navy and the Air Force respectively;

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d. Group South's request for 8,000 men for the occupation of the Dodecanese, which cannot be met.

The relevant information on b) and d) will be submitted to Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command. On d) see: "Special Items" paragraph I.

IV. Report of Rear Admiral Topp (Shipbuilding Commission) on:

a. The mine equipment and supplies to type XXI submarines.

b. The transfer of 6,000 tons of iron from the submarine allocation to Siebel ferry construction.

c. The decrease in the production figures of new constructions since production was taken over by the Ministry of Armament and Production.

d. The Rohrbach engines, which will take three to four years' development before they can be used at the front and then only for the Air Force.

V. Report of Chief, Naval Ordnance Division on:

a. The difficulties confronting the Ordnance Division owing to the lack of a ship construction plan and the inability of obtaining through Minister Speer a plan of this kind from the main committee. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered the Ordnance Division to carry on as if all new construction orders were being carried out without any reductions.

b. The special mine program.

Commander in Chief, Navy stated that its execution has in principle been agreed to by Minister Speer. Requirements are to be drawn up in consultation with Operations Division.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

VI. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. On the measures taken in connection with the desertion of the Italian supply ship ERITREA to the enemy.

b. On submarine positions in the Mediterranean.

c. On the instructions from Armed Forces High Command in connection with the withdrawal from Corsica.

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The Navy was unable to guarantee the safe shipment of supplies for 30,000 men to Corsica.

d. A new Fuehrer directive on the warfare in Italy is to be expected;

e. On the number of naval vessels available in the Ligurian Sea and in the north of the Tyrrhenian Sea as per statement of Operations Division, Naval Staff in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV,

f. On the instructions given to Group South on the blockading of the Strait of Kerch as per notes in War Diary 12 Sept.

g. Group North/Fleet will reach a decision on the execution of operation "Husar" by the LUETZOW in the Kara Sea by 15 Sept. at the latest. In connection with the summary of the situation submitted by Group North, it should be noted that as far as the lunar period is concerned, the decision could be postponed until 20 Sept. Ice conditions must, however, also be taken into account. Relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 2768/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl 2768/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in File 1/Skl I op. VIII, 21.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

Special Items.

I. At the Fuehrer conference on 12 Sept. the reinforcement of our troops on Crete and the Dodecanese was considered. Naval Staff submitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy a statement by Chief, Naval Staff indicating that already at present the supplying of the islands by sea is not fully assured, and that it will become impossible to maintain supplies in sufficient quantity if further reinforcements are sent there, especially as soon as the enemy takes real action against this traffic. The reinforcement of the garrison is, therefore, advised against.

Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl I a 25802/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. (Compare also with "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff", paragraph III d).

II. On 12 Sept., Chief, Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued instructions to Army Group B for the restoration of peace and order in Italy.

Copy as per 1/Skl 25896/43 Gkdos. in File 1/Skl I op. II, 16.

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In a further directive, Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command declared the entire area of Commander in Chief, South to be a theater of operation in accordance with military decrees. Copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 25659/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Furthermore, Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued instructions for guidance in the evacuation of Italy in the economic field. Copy of this order as per 1/Skl 25688/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. All three of the matters referred to above will be further dealt with by Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff.

III. On 10 Sept. Group North/Fleet issued and submitted orders for the voyage of the LUETZOW from the altitude of Trondheim to Gdynia-Libau - keyword "Hermelin". The report made to Chief, Naval Staff is still being withheld.

IV. Compilation of the reports of Groups West and South, and Naval Commands, Norway, North and Baltic on the operations, successes and losses of the defense units under their command during August was attached as an appendix to the daily situation report of Armed Forces High Command. Copy in War Diary, Part B, Vol. 5.

V. Naval Liaison, Secret Intelligence Section, Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command submitted for our information a remarkable report from the United States on a submarine location gear in the form of a miniature radio transmitter in a buoy which would be dropped from a plane. Copy as per 1/Skl 27927/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

VI. Naval Intelligence Division reported in the summary of the Enemy Situation Report No. 16/43 on antisubmarine action, tonnage losses, and Allied warship construction.

It also gave the names of warships operating off the Calabrian coast. The report contains very revealing information. Copy as per 1/Skl 27605/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D "Material on the enemy situation".

Situation 13 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

On 9 Sept. the British steamer DURHAM on course 297° was reported on fire in the South Pacific. Position not given.

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A report on the enemy situation was dispatched to all in foreign waters by Radiogram 2038 and 2215.

2. Own Situation:

In order to turn down the Japanese claim to the seized Aquila boats, the Naval Attaché in Tokyo has been provided with the following information:

"Prior to operation "Aquila", the Aquila boats were exchanged for German combat submarines. German combat submarines became Italian property; Aquila boats German property. To carry out operation "Aquila" as quickly as possible and to avoid the resulting loss in German combat submarine personnel, the Aquila boats continued to be manned by Italian personnel under the Italian flag in accordance with the agreement. Out at sea, the Aquila boats were controlled by Naval Staff through the Italian radio station at Bordeaux. Yokoi has been similarly informed."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-five planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay.

One British ship was located at 1205 in BF 2640, one at 1930 in BE 9860, one at 2006 in BF 4750 and one at 2354 in BE 9790.

At 1040 in the area 360 miles west of Vigo our air reconnaissance sighted eight merchantmen with one cruiser presumably belonging to the same convoy, and six escort vessels and seven freighters with five escort vessels on a northerly course.

Our air attack on transports in BE 8238 on 12 Sept. was unsuccessful.

In the Channel from 0900 to 1400 in a sector northwest to northeast of Cape Gris Nez under the English coast, possibly in the area mined with our LM mines, more than 100 detonations were observed, which may have been caused either by bombing practices, mine clearing by bombs, or by gunnery practices.

Between 1236 and 1250 13 splashes were observed about five miles off the Battery "Grosser Kurfuerst" probably caused by artillery shells.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Two ground mines were swept off Brest, one off St. Nazaire and one off Bayonne.

The torpedo boat T "14" and the FALKE are carrying out torpedo practice off Bayonne. The destroyer Z "32" moved from Bordeaux to Le Verdon.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla did not move from Boulogne to Flushing as planned. Otherwise nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.1. North Sea:

There is nothing to report from Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. In the air raid on the ferry ZIJPE one barge was sunk, one péniche damaged. One plane was shot down, another one set on fire.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:Enemy Situation:

Eight planes were detected over the North Sea. According to radio intelligence, the Russian minesweeper MS "59" shelled two of our submarines at 2305 on 12 Sept. off the northeastern tip of Novaya Zemlya. Furthermore a submarine sighting report was intercepted at 0047 on 12 Sept. in AT 1280. On 12 Sept. at 2258 the submarine U "277" sighted a British submarine of the TAKU class surfacing in AeG 7588 (southwest coast of Spitsbergen). Contact was lost at 0530 on 13 Sept. The submarine U "277" received orders to proceed unnoticed to Barentsburg and to attack the submarine assumed to be there.

Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway on 10 Sept., 23 ships were escorted north, 18 south, and on 12 Sept., 24 north and 22 south. First eleven and then 13 ships were delayed in the arctic coast area owing to shortage of escorts.

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Admiral Northern Waters reported that the weather ship KOBURG became ice bound in AeH 8872 while en route for Greenland.

The BV 138 which made a forced landing was discovered by submarine U "307". The submarine attempted to tow the flying boat towards the Fridtjof Nansen Land in order to find a starting place. The attempt was unsuccessful. The flying boat was scuttled in AeF 7249 after all the valuable parts had been dismantled.

Group North/Fleet transmitted the following information from the 5th Air Force:

"The loss of another BV 138 in connection with operation "Wunderland" proves that this seaplane type - the only one available - is unsuited for operations in such far off areas, given existing Polar weather conditions. In view of the aircraft situation in general, the 5th Air Force Command feels forced to discontinue providing further planes for operation "Wunderland".

Group North expressed its opinion on the above as follows:

1. Group North/Fleet intends to discontinue operation "Wunderland" probably as from 15 Sept., so that air reconnaissance could be dispensed with.

2. Lack of air reconnaissance for the submarines at present still operating in this area is regrettable as strategic consequences are bound to arise from the lack of operational air reconnaissance and the inadequate observation of changes in ice conditions.

3. It is requested that investigations be made whether and to what extent reconnaissance could be carried out in this area by long-range planes based on land, for besides locating the shipping traffic, the observation of the ice boundary, especially north of Novaya Zemlya, is of special importance.

4. In the light of present experiences the operation will in any case have to come to an end at the end of September, and this includes the submarines."

Naval Staff informed Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Navy accordingly and made the following comments:

"Our submarines will probably operate in the area in question until the end of September. Observation of the shipping traffic and especially of ice conditions is imperative. Naval Staff does not consider that the losses so far sustained in operations are especially high, particularly as the crews were rescued and the planes' valuable equipment saved.

It is therefore requested to try and persuade the 5th Air Force not to discontinue using the BV 138 in conjunction with the submarines."

Furthermore Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff of the exchange of teletype messages with the 5th Air Force on the discontinuance of the present daily air reconnaissance of Denmark Strait ordered by the 5th Air Force owing to fuel shortage. It is proposed to resume it, should the development of a special enemy situation demand it. Instead, the 5th Air Force proposes to carry out air reconnaissance of the ports and airfields off the east coast of Scotland - weather permitting - and furthermore to carry out daily reconnaissance of the Shetlands at the same time patrolling our minefields. Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 25749/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

A tremendous explosion, presumably ammunition, was observed on the Oranienbaum mole at 2015.

At 0650 a Russian minesweeping group consisting of one minesweeper or motor minesweeper and 17 minesweepers put out from Lavansaari on a southwesterly course. This group was located at 1045 south of Namsi Banks, where it reversed course to a point south of Lavansaari, and then proceeded again on alternating courses until it was southwest of Vigrund, and at 1635 reversed course to the northeast. Sweeping operations between Vigrund and Namsi are presumed. The Minesweeper Flotilla detailed to attack, did not have an encounter with the enemy because he sheered off.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla out on operations on the Hogland-Little Tyters patrol line observed no activity.

2. Own Situation:

In AO 9595 (northwest of Pillau), a mine detonated in a cutter's drag-net. Otherwise nothing to report from the entire area of Naval Command, Baltic.

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V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report from the Atlantic.

Operations Division, Naval Staff handed the following request to the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin:

"In accordance with the agreements reached so far, German submarines will commence operations in the Arabian Sea at the beginning of Sept. It is planned to make the boats operate at the following centers of heavy traffic:

Mombassa
Gulf of Aden
Gulf of Oman
off Bombay and
off the southwest tip of India.

Please obtain the approval of the Japanese Admiralty immediately."

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 125 planes out on operations over the western area and six over the Mediterranean.

At 1040 Air Commander, Atlantic reported that three FW 200's had made an attack in CF 3340 (270 miles west of Porto) on a northbound convoy (see "Enemy Situation West Area") and damaged a steamer (8,000 GRT) with a direct hit from a SC 250 bomb.

Enemy air penetrations during the day were very few and limited to minor machine-gun attacks against our patrol vessels and traffic installations. Penetrations on a larger scale were made towards evening by fighter formations but they carried out no attacks. During the night of 13 Sept. about ten enemy planes were detected over the Rhineland. A few bombs were dropped on airfields in Holland.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force carried out air reconnaissances. No combat activity either by our own or by the enemy air force was reported, except over the Salerno area.

3. Eastern Front:

Twenty-eight planes were shot down on 11 Sept. and 18 on 12 Sept. over the eastern front.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

At 0630, a convoy of 60 freighters and 5 tankers with 8 destroyers, which was joined by 6 freighters and 6 escort vessels from Gibraltar, passed through the Strait of Gibraltar making for the east.

One CAIRO-class cruiser put out from Gibraltar at 1700 making for the west.

According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Madrid made on 11 Sept., the two Italian destroyers which put into Mahon are the CARABINIERE and the FUSILIERE. Two further Italian torpedo boats, the PEGASO and the IMPETUOSO put into Pollenza on 10 Sept. The boat previously reported is the ORSA. The PEGASO and the IMPETUOSO were scuttled on 11 Sept. off Pollenza. Only the submarine SIRENA put into Gibraltar.

At 0830 on 13 Sept. Tres Forcas reported a westbound convoy of 32 freighters with four escort vessels.

At 0828 125 miles east of Cape Spartivento our air reconnaissance reported eight merchantmen, two submarines on a southwesterly course, and then, without giving the time, 50 - 60 transports and merchantmen, two battleships, numerous cruisers and destroyers, and many landing craft 12 miles southeast of Salerno and five large vessels and 30 - 40 large landing craft north of Licosa. According to a report from the 2nd Air Force which was not, however, confirmed in other quarters, Salerno was recaptured in the forenoon and the enemy was seen re-embarking.

According to radio intelligence, radio traffic in the Gulf of Salerno was remarkably light; this probably led the decoding office to the hasty assumption that the warships had been partly withdrawn and that the Salerno area was being evacuated. (See Teletype 1405).

In view of the surrender of the Italian Fleet, German Naval Command, Italy thinks it highly likely that some of the British naval forces will now be withdrawn from the Mediterranean.

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Naval Staff considers this assumption to be premature as naval forces will have to be retained for further landing operations: for instance, heavy ships for bombarding the coasts. In any case no withdrawals worth mentioning are yet to be anticipated.

No sighting reports are available from the eastern Mediterranean.

A radio press report from New York describes the Italian Fleet being brought into La Valetta. The sinking of the flagship ROMA by our Air Force is also confirmed in this report.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Sea Transport Situation:

No conclusive report on the PT boat operation in the Gulf of Salerno during the night of 12 Sept. has yet been received. One vessel seems to have been brought in as a prize. Two motor minesweepers escorted one Italian PT boat and one Italian fast submarine chaser from Gaeta to the north. At Bonifacio the submarines FRANCESCO RISSONDO and the H "6" which were ready for sailing were seized.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio was carried out according to plan and without incident. Ten naval landing craft, 7 Siebel ferries, 3 landing boats, 8 LCI's were operating there. On 13 Sept. another ten naval landing craft and the war transport KT "31" were added. Escort provided by four motor minesweepers and four patrol vessels.

Fuel supplies were moved to Leghorn, Gaeta and Civitavecchia. The following are ready for operations: the torpedo boat TA "9", 8 motor minesweepers, 3 anti-submarine chasers and the fast escort boat SG "11" in Leghorn; 7 PT boats in Civitavecchia; the BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN in Toulon; 4 motor minesweepers in Maddalena. The commissioning of small Italian vessels is in progress.

According to a report from German Naval Command, Italy, preparations have been started for the evacuation of Corsica.

In Genoa 88,600 GRT of shipping space, ready for sailing, were secured.

Commanding Admiral and Chief of Staff Pola were imprisoned as ordered.

Chief, German Naval Command, Italy reported that only a small part of the merchant tonnage secured can be made ready for sailing and then only in a makeshift way, as the officials at the head of the organization of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping's Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean who were responsible for the crews of the merchantmen have left Italy. (See Teletype 2307).

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Quartermaster Division will communicate with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

At the request of German Naval Command, Italy, Group West permitted the departure of four Siebel ferries and five torpedo boats which were being kept back.

Despite the change in the situation, German Naval Command, Italy continued to maintain its request for the supply of mines it had applied for and asked for their immediate shipment because Commanding General, Army Group B had made a request for the Ligurian coast to be extensively mined.

Naval Staff stated that on 10 Sept. 418 UMB mines were shipped to Toulon from home; they will be followed by 118 UMB mines on 13 Sept. As much of the requirements requested for Brindisi and the Adriatic Sea as are available will be allotted to Group South for defense measures along the Dalmatian coast. Only 400 EMF mines are at present available for further requirements along the Dalmatian coast.

According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Madrid, one of our submarines was stranded off Afracu (Melilla) on 12 Sept. The boat's complement is well. Submarine Division assumed this to be submarine U "417" (Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi). The necessary steps for the safety of the boat and with the Spanish Government were taken at once. Details in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

As regards the land situation, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported that the 10th Army, after a four days' heavy defensive battle, started a converging attack on the enemy landed both near and south of Salerno. Enemy resistance is breaking down in the area of the 76th Tank Corps. In this battle the enemy has so far already suffered substantial losses in men and materials and lost more than 1,400 prisoners. The total losses suffered are estimated at 8,000-10,000 men.

The disarmament of Italian units is continuing in the Rome area.

The transfer of the 90th Light Tank Division from Sardinia to Corsica which the Italians have only made very weak attempts at interfering with, will be completed by the evening of 16 Sept.

Numerous skirmishes took place in the eastern part of Corsica mainly with French members of the resistance but also with Italian troops. The continuation of the march on Bastia was forced after strong resistance had been overcome. The attack on Bastia was stopped by heavy gunfire four kilometers outside the town.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 12 Sept. one enemy plane was reported over the Salonika area, three over the Prevesa area, and one over the Nish area. An enemy submarine was sighted off Lemnos at noon.

The operation for the occupation of Leros was postponed from 14 to 15 Sept. owing to lack of support from the Air Force. Syra has surrendered.

Two steamers with 3,000 Italians put out from Chalkis for Salonika in the evening of 12 Sept. A submarine chaser shelled guerillas near Chalkis where a tense situation had developed. Naval Shore Commander, Patras received orders to assist the Army in fighting guerillas in the Gulf of Corinth by putting naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters into operation.

The hospital ship GARDISCA is being escorted by two motor minesweepers from Patras to the Piraeus.

The torpedo boat CALATAFIMI and the minelayer MOROSINI have been commissioned with German complements.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic submitted an urgent request from Army Group, Southeast for the transportation by sea of provisions and ammunition to the Dalmatian ports and of bauxite back from there. Naval Shore Commander intends to comply with the request and to use as escorts the war transport KT "6" and the Italian auxiliary cruiser RAMB III and asked for the approval of Quartermaster Division, as in view of the unsettled situation at sea this operation will demand the full use of the ships.

Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation Far East.

According to information received from the Japanese Liaison Officer, the MARCO POLO will lower the German flag on 16 Sept. and hoist the Japanese one.

According to further information, the Italian river gunboat LEPANTO and the Italian steamer CONTE VERDE were scuttled.

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The ERITREA put out from Singapore at 1943 on 8 Sept. and has not been sighted since. At Kobe an attempt was made to scuttle the steamer GALATEA but it was fortunately prevented in time.

All other Italian ships within the Japanese sphere of influence have been seized. The Italian Naval Detachment in China has been disarmed.

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Items of Political Importance.

In the evening of 13 Sept. Radio Palermo again broadcasted Badoglio's proclamation to the Italian civilian population, once more emphasizing the need for forcible resistance against the Germans.

With regard to Mussolini's liberation, authoritative circles in London stated that it would not have repercussions either on the armistice or on allied relations with the Italian Government. Mussolini will be unable to induce the war-weary Italians to take up arms against the Allies again. The New York Times dealt with the question of Turkey's neutrality, which, if maintained, will lead to Turkey's being refused not only a place at the peace conference but also further lend-lease deliveries. Likewise her foreign trade would be curtailed.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Commander in Chief, Navy stated that Minister Speer was taking over the rush order for the construction of the Command Station Lanke for Naval Staff. The Command Station is expected to be ready by next November.

II. Army Situation:

The fighting in the Salerno area is considered to be progressing favorably. Confirmation of the capture of the town is, however, lacking.

According to the opinion of Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, Foreign Armies West Branch, the British operations in the Channel on 10 Sept. were not mock maneuvers but real operations which for some reason were discontinued.

III. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Ice conditions in the Arctic Ocean make it possible for decisions on the operation of the LUETZOW in the Kara Sea to be postponed until 20 Sept.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

b. The Naval Attaché in Madrid confirmed that the Italian crews of the ships in the Balearic Islands have been interned.

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IV. Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reported that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has not kept his word as regards the disposition of tugs in the Black Sea area.

V. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division:

a. The attempt also to obtain Italian prisoners of war for the Navy did not materialize. The request was declined because the Navy was not participating in the construction of the East Wall.

Commander in Chief, Navy will submit a detailed and well founded request by teletype to Chief, Armed Forces High Command.

b. Five torpedo boat crews for the Aegean Sea will be dispatched by air.

VI. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported that British press comments show irritation at the unexpected difficulties prevailing in England. According to a further press report, British fleet units are said to be on their way to the Far East.

The report of the Military Attaché in Budapest deals with the atmosphere of depression in Hungary owing to the developments in the Italian situation. The logical tendencies which became apparent, have for the time being subsided after the liberation of Mussolini.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported on the information which the Greek Ambassador in Ankara received through the Turkish Foreign Minister on the unfavorable developments in the situation in Bulgaria after the assassination of the King.

VII. Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section, Operations Division reported on the enemy air force. Superiority, especially in bombers, is constantly increasing in the west, as well as in the south and on the eastern front. A decrease in the number of types is noticeable.

VIII. Mine Warfare Section, Operations Division reported on special new enemy anti-submarines mines, on defense experiments made by Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, and also on the outcome of the discussions held in Paris on the launching of a mine offensive with new firing units. The 3rd Air Force will already commence operations during the bright nights, because the crews have not yet sufficient navigational experience for dark nights.

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IX. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reported that Naval Staff recommended the dispatch of the following instructions to German Naval Command, Italy:

"Endeavor to arrest the Italian Admiralty's senior officers. If proof exists of their being guilty with others of belligerent acts against German naval forces, court martial them. The same applies to the senior officers of all the other Italian commands."

Chief, Naval Staff concurred, subject to obtaining the approval of Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

The order was dispatched after the approval had been obtained through Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters. Copy of teletype 1/Skl Ia 25844/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

X. Chief, Operations Division reported on the instructions for avoiding incidents with Sweden and on the settlement of the affair with Admiral de Laborde as per notes in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items.

I. The predicted Fuehrer directive for future warfare in Italy (see War Diary 13 Sept. - "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff" - VI d) is filed under 1/Skl 2773/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in file 1/Skl I op., II, 16. - The Navy has been given the following orders:

"The Navy is to support the Army's supply and evacuation operations with all available resources. Italian ships with prize crews on board are to be used for this purpose. As much tonnage as possible is to be transferred as quickly as possible from the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea."

The line of demarkation between Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B runs from Elba through Piombino Perugia to Porto Civitanova and is to become immediately effective.

II. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters has been instructed to report the following aims of Naval Staff to the Fuehrer at the daily conference on the situation:

"The 8th PT Boat Flotilla which was withdrawn from Norway for dockyard repairs at the end of May 1943, will now be transferred to the western area for minelaying operations when it becomes operational again. There are six PT boats (five old German boats, one captured British boat) in Norway, all of which are at present operating in the area of Commanding Admiral, West Coast."

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III. In view of the agreement reached between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Reich Minister for Armaments and Production for a special output of mines, Naval Staff has drawn up the following request:

By increasing the output to double the figures reported on 19 Aug. as being the strictly strategic requirements, a reserve of mines equivalent to about three months' supply will have been acquired. This means that, limiting production to the most essential types of mines, the following monthly output should be demanded:

6,000 EMC mines
4,000 UMB mines
2,000 EMF mines
2,000 EMR mines
1,000 UMA mines

Once the three months' reserve has been built up, the output can again be reduced step by step to the monthly quota demanded up to now.

IV. In connection with the Shipbuilding Commission's report made on 31 Aug. to Commander in Chief, Navy, Naval Staff has been asked to make a request for 25 ships a month to Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Bureau of Naval Armaments, so that it can be passed on to the main committee for discussions on research on coastal defense measures to be started as soon as possible.

Operations Division, Naval Staff pointed out to Quartermaster Division that before a request for 25 PT boats a month is submitted, it should be ascertained whether the increase in PT boat construction will not affect the delivery of the 96 motor minesweepers a year demanded under the Fleet Construction Program. Quartermaster Division has been requested to make the necessary arrangements. Furthermore Chief of Staff, Naval Staff requested that Chief, Quartermaster Division, Chief, Operations Division and himself should participate in the proposed discussion with the technical offices on the current research on coastal defense measures.

On the evenings of 13 Sept. and 14 Sept. Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command submitted no less than six reports from different sources on the imminence of enemy landings at the end of September, which not only provide many important details about the preparations, but go as far as to say where landings are to be expected: namely on the Channel coast, the west coast in the Bordeaux area and on the Mediterranean coast of France. It is, furthermore, said that the troops assembled in Scotland for operations against Norway and Denmark have completed their preparations.

Copy of reports as per l/Skl 27725, 27853, 27857, 27861/62 and 27864/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D File: "Notes on Enemy Situation".

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Situation 14 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff informed Ship "28" in Radiogram 1021 that on the recommendation of the Naval Attaché in Tokyo permission for Ship "28" to operate in the North Pacific will only be requested after she has started out on her homeward voyage as it is feared that the Japanese may categorically refuse to let her return through the North Pacific.

In Radiogram 1041 Naval Staff made a statement on the requests for supplies made by Ship "28" and points out that the auxiliary cruiser can expect that full supplies of fuel will be available for new operations but that supplies of materials and provisions will only be available in limited quantities. For copy see Radiogram 1041.

The BRAKE was informed by Naval Staff in Radiogram 1441 and 1917 that according to a report from submarine U "168" the five Monsoon boats were supplied to their complete satisfaction and that in recognition of this, two Iron Crosses, First Class and fifteen Iron Crosses, Second Class had been awarded by Commander in Chief, Navy, their distribution being left to the discretion of the Commander.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported that submarine U "178" will dock in Singapore at the beginning of October and that she will be operationally ready again by the middle or end of October.

Present instructions have been altered because the Naval Attaché Tokyo has been given the following sailing dates from Djakarta:

| | | |
|------------|---|---------|
| OSORNO | - | 26 Oct. |
| RIO GRANDE | - | 29 Oct. |
| ALSTERUFER | - | 2 Nov. |
| WESERLAND | - | 22 Nov. |
| BURGENLAND | - | 25 Nov. |

The moment for the departure from Japan is left to the Naval Attaché.

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-six planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. At 1150 in BE 9711 our air reconnaissance reported 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer, 2 escort vessels, course and speed not given, and at 1330 in BE 9471 a convoy of 30 freighters with 4 escort vessels on course 180°. The previously reported warships probably belong to this convoy's escort.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine was swept west of La Rochelle and one off Lorient.

At 0207 on the Ile d' Yeu alarm light signals were observed on the barbed wire entanglements. Whilst searching the area, fire was exchanged with unknown persons, two of whom were civilians who escaped into the forest.

Channel Coast:

The dependent minefields Ostend - Dunkirk - Calais were relaid after they had been swept and are now reported to be ready. The Seine barrage has been laid off Tancarville.

At 1600 one tug was sunk off Cherbourg in a low-flying enemy air attack; one minesweeper was set on fire. Losses were suffered in personnel. Shortly after midnight on 14 Sept. the minesweeper M "155" was damaged in an enemy air raid off Zeebrugge and had to be towed in with losses in personnel.

Owing to the bright moonlight convoys were only carried out in the Channel Islands' traffic.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Between 0213 - 0300 the patrol boats in position "Kairo" had an encounter with six enemy PT boats and sustained no damage. In a second attack, the minesweeper M "3410" was sunk by a torpedo hit at 0335. Eighteen men are missing. At 0525 a further encounter took place in AN 8582. For brief action report see Teletype 1950.

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At 0830 the same vessels were machine-gunned by five Spitfires off the Hook, but no damage was sustained or losses suffered.

In the Texel - Ameland area and off Ijmuiden 16 mines were swept in all.

At 1120 a boat belonging to the River Minesweeper Flotilla was sunk by a machine-gun attack from 10 - 15 enemy fighters northwest of Bergen op Zoom. Three men were killed, three injured.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Ten planes were out on operations over the North Sea.

No traffic was observed by our submarine in the area west of Vilkitski Strait. During the last six days fog prevailed more than half the time. The enemy submarine operating off the west coast of Spitsbergen was located again on 14 Sept.

Own Situation:

In the forenoon of 13 Sept. minor enemy artillery activity was reported in the Petsamo area. On 14 Sept. the motor minesweeper R "121" reported an enemy submarine off Kiberg and three torpedo detonations on shore without torpedo track observation.

At 1835 our eastbound convoy consisting of 9 ships, 1 large minesweeper and 11 escort vessels was attacked by 10 Russian fighter-bombers at the entrance of Varanger Fiord. Well aimed anti-aircraft fire prevented them from dropping their bombs accurately. Four of the attacking planes were shot down by escort vessels:

At 1730 four minesweepers belonging to the 30th Minesweeper Flotilla were attacked with torpedoes and machine-guns by three low flying Hampdens southwest of Kristiansand South. Machine-gun hits on two of the minesweepers did no damage. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

In the area of Naval Command, Norway, 23 ships and two submarines were escorted north, and eleven ships south. In the arctic coastal area five ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escorts.

According to the ice report from the Barents Sea, the sea area as far as 40 km south of the western parts of Franz Josef Land was found to be free of ice except for a few icebergs. Navigation in this sea area as far as 81' N, 40' E was practically unhindered. Ice conditions are also relatively favorable in the other parts of the Barents Sea. For particulars see Teletype 1900.

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Group North/Fleet forwarded to Naval Staff, for information, a copy of the instructions given to Admiral Northern Waters on strengthening the control of the approach area to Ice Fiord with a second submarine.

Despite the air reconnaissance curtailments ordered by the Air Force, Group North does not consider the temporary weakening of convoy route patrols through the withdrawal of another submarine to have created an impossible situation.

Naval Staff raises no objections either.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

At 0634 a group of 27 Russian motor minesweepers was sighted southwest of Lavansaari making for Vigrund and was attacked by the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla south of Vigrund. Three Russian PT boats joined into this engagement. It appears that the minesweeper group attempted a break-through between Namsi Banks and Vigrund. One PT boat was sunk. Three survivors, including the captain, were taken prisoner. During the engagement with the PT boats our vessels were attacked by eight planes, two of which were shot down. For brief action report by the Commander of the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla see Teletype 1900.

According to our air reconnaissance, five Fugas, 60 patrol vessels, motor minesweepers and PT boats were sighted in Lavansaari. In Battaranya Bay four Fugas, 20 patrol vessels and motor minesweepers. Lively air activity was reported over Tyters. During the night of 14 Sept. lively artillery activity was reported in the coastal area and in Kronstadt Bay. Furthermore, bombing by several planes was reported.

2. Own Situation:

There is nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

In the evening enemy planes penetrated into the area northeast of Ruegen as far as Bornholm, presumably to lay mines. One Halifax crashed near Ruegenwalde. One further plane was shot down in the area of Korsoer and one in the area of Esbjerg.

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It is supplementarily reported for 11 Sept. that the German steamer SABINE HOWALDT was approached several times off Gotska Sandoe, within the practice area of the Swedish Navy, by a plane which appeared to be Swedish. On its third approach the plane was fired on.

Convoy traffic throughout the Baltic was carried out according to plan and without incident.

In the evening Kronstadt was bombarded with 12 rounds from one of our batteries. Fires and explosions were observed. The bombardment had to be broken off owing to heavy smoke-screening. In the lively artillery counterbombardment battle headquarters Peterhof sustained a direct hit, causing only material damage.

According to a Finnish report, the Finnish ice breaker SISU was damaged by a ground mine in the Helsinki - Porkkala fairway south of Melki. The fairway had been swept for AT mines, after minelaying operations had been observed there.

According to information from the Naval Liaison Officer to High Command Army, Northern Army Group submitted to High Command Army an urgent request from the 18th Army to request High Command, Navy for available naval forces in order to avert the imminent danger to Tyters. (See Teletype 0720).

At the same time, Naval Command, Baltic reported that Northern Army Group had asked for the operational attachment of the island of Tyters to the 18th Army to be abolished as the island was solely occupied by naval forces who came under the command of Admiral, Baltic Countries for discipline and supplies. The Navy alone is responsible for the defense of the island. The defenses were much more closely connected with the barrage measures in the Gulf of Finland and with naval warfare than with coastal defense. Naval Command, Baltic agrees with this request which it had itself already proposed. (See Teletype 1155). Naval Command, Baltic recommends that the Tyters garrison be reinforced by the 3rd Company of the III. Submarine Training Detachment, Schleswig. The personnel of this company of about 260 men is unsuitable for submarines. Commanding Admiral, Submarines agreed to the release of this personnel. (See Teletype 1833).

The question under whose command Tyters should be placed requires further study of the principles involved and will be examined by Quartermaster Division.

V. Submarine Warfare.

According to radio intelligence on 13 Sept. Reuter and the BBC reported the sinking of the submarine commanded by Lieutenant (s.g.) Guggenberger by a U.S. AAF plane off the Brazilian coast. The commander and six other members of the crew were rescued. The submarine did not submerge during the attack but opened fire with her anti-aircraft guns. She was hit from a height of 50 feet.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 178 planes out on operations over the western area and eight planes over the Mediterranean. The attack by four FW 200's on the reported convoy (see "Situation West Area") was unsuccessful.

During the day the enemy carried out attacks with light forces against patrol vessels and traffic installations in Holland and Belgium. No planes were shot down.

During the night of 14 Sept. five fast enemy planes penetrated into Reich territory through Holland as far as the Berlin - Stettin area. Flying at a height of 9,000 meters, none of the planes were shot down; no attacks were made. Ten Halifaxes and Liberators flew over Jutland and Pomerania to Warsaw. No attacks were carried out by these planes either.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

On 13 Sept. the 2nd Air Corps reported an attack made by 21 ground-attack planes against ships in the Gulf of Salerno. Direct hits were registered on three freighters. One ship was separately reported damaged. During further attacks by eight planes against ships in the Gulf of Salerno one cruiser was hit. These attacks were continued on 15 Sept. Three transports were damaged. Four of the 35 planes out on operations were lost. Twenty-five ground-attack planes destroyed a freighter of 4,000 GRT and damaged another with a near hit.

Furthermore our Air Force carried out air reconnaissance over southern Italy. For evaluations see "Enemy Situation Mediterranean".

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3. Eastern Front:

Two fighter-bombers belonging to the 5th Air Force damaged a coastal freighter in Eina Bay.

In the afternoon the PT boat mooring pier in Pummanik Bay, where two PT boats were berthed, was attacked in three waves by 36 of our planes.

Although accurate hits were scored, the results could not be observed in detail owing to the smoke which rose up.

There are no reports of successes available from the Army front lines.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Sixteen vessels belonging to the westbound convoy of 32 freighters, reported on 13 Sept. at 0830 at Tres Forcas, branched off to Gibraltar; the remainder proceeded towards the Atlantic and passed the Strait at 1845 on 13 Sept. They were followed at 2045 by 14 freighters from Gibraltar.

At about noon on 14 Sept. one DELHI-class cruiser put into Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

No sighting reports are available from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

Our air reconnaissance confirmed continuous heavy concentrations of shipping in the Gulf of Salerno and new landings at Castellomare. According to air reconnaissance embarkations are in progress. Enemy air activity over Italy was noticeably light. Ground organizations are probably being moved. On the evening of 13 Sept. our air reconnaissance reported two heavy warships and 19 fairly large ships in the port and roads of Taranto, and at noon on 14 Sept. according to air photographs there were 3 destroyers, 7 torpedo boats, 21 patrol vessels and minesweepers, 6 submarines, 8 floating docks, 1 railway ferry, 1 transport, 1 tanker, 10 freighters, 1 LCT 350, 2 LCT 120's and 7 LCM's. There were 1 cruiser and 7 large merchantmen in Brindisi. At 0210 15 merchantmen of 10,000 GRT, 15 LCT's and several escort vessels were detected east of Ustica and at 0814 one cruiser west-southwest of Naples.

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2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

During the night of 11 Sept. two detonations were observed in the course of an attack by our PT boats against a cruiser in the Gulf of Salerno. The attack was repeated during the night of 12 Sept. and a torpedo was unsuccessfully fired against a steamer. Two Italian motor sailing vessels were seized on the return voyage. A new operation is planned for the night of 14 Sept.

The 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla seized the fleet tender CIGNIO, one tug, and three drifters off Sestri Levante. Two of our péniche tankers were sunk by an enemy submarine on 13 Sept. in the same position.

The BRANDENBURG and the POMMERN, which will be ready for sailing in the evening, received orders from German Naval Command, Italy to carry out a minelaying operation in the east of the Strait of Bonifacio and then to proceed to Leghorn. (See Teletype 0044).

No reports have been received from the PT boats S "54" and S "61". A search is being made. German Naval Command, Italy thinks the ships may have put into Venice.

The night fighter control ship KRETA is moving from Toulon to Genoa.

The Commander in Pola urgently requested German Naval Command, Italy to provide large ships for the removal of 30,000 prisoners of war, as transportation by railway is impossible and he is threatened with the most serious provisioning difficulties.

The Italian Navy's communications equipment depot in Spezia was seized by the Navy with a large stock of equipment. For details see Radiogram 2301. Thirty box cars have been requested for its removal.

With regard to the ground situation in the evening of 13 Sept., Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported severe fighting near Salerno, an enemy paratroop descent on the Torre Annunciata - Pompei - Vietri road, our taking of Bastia by surprise after severe fighting, the disarmament of the Italians in Bonifacio, and the occupation of the batteries there.

According to an intelligence report, Bari was occupied at 1615 by a small enemy force coming from the land side.

For the total successes of our Air Force in the Gulf of Salerno from the time of landing until 1800 on 13 Sept. as per report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, see Teletype 0830. Reported sunk:

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5 transports (31,000 GRT), 1 heavy cruiser, 7 landing craft, 7 torpedo boats; probably sunk: 6 transports (31,000 GRT), 1 cruiser, 3 unidentified warships, 2 destroyers, 1 patrol vessel, 3 landing craft.

Operations Division issued the following instructions to Naval Shore Commander, Trieste in reply to his inquiries made on 13 Sept. to Quartermaster Division:

"Transport of supplies needed by the Army and bauxite shipments to be met with available vessels. Daily developments of the enemy situation in the Adriatic must be taken into account. The attention of all offices concerned should be drawn to the high risk involved. Endeavor to use steamers equipped with antiaircraft guns and try to obtain air cover."

Furthermore the following order has been dispatched by Naval Staff to German Naval Command, Italy and Group South, copy to the Maritime Shipping Commissioner's Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean; Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas and others:

"1. In agreement with the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and his Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean, it has been decided that 18,000 GRT are to be left in the Adriatic for transport operations there. All other tonnage above this figure is to be moved at once to the Aegean Sea. Particulars are being dispatched today by the Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean in a teletype message to his branch office in Trieste.

2. German Naval Command, Italy and Group South are to report their aims and the latest measures they have taken."

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 13 Sept. eight enemy planes penetrated central and northern Greece to supply the insurgents.

In the afternoon of 13 Sept. Leros attempted unsuccessfully to get into touch with British wireless stations.

The DRACHE, with one motor minesweeper and one Italian PT boat, is moving from Piræus to Patras to carry out a minelaying operation.

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Two steamers with 3,000 Italian soldiers on board put into Salonika from Chalkis.

Group South submitted the following summary of the situation:

"1. According to air reconnaissance and agents' reports, the number of ships in Egyptian ports, of landing craft in Cyprus, and of troops along the Syrian and Palestinian coasts is increasing. According to radio monitoring reports, there has been increased activity on the Syria - Palestine coast. These observations would lead to the conclusion that enemy operations against the Dodecanese, perhaps also against Crete, are shortly to be launched. It is obvious that the enemy will try to take advantage of the present moment of weakness caused by the Italian surrender, and of the situation on the islands which in some respect is still unclear due to the presence of numerous Italian troops there. Even if the preparations for an operation have not yet been fully completed, this is a favorable opportunity for taking possession of the Dodecanese with minor forces. If the attack does not take place, important strategic considerations will have decided against it. The attack must also be expected if by the occupation of the Dodecanese and Crete, the Mediterranean routes are finally secured for the center of enemy operations in Italy or southern France, whereby bases for the complete isolation of the Aegean traffic could be seized which would also cut off southern Greece, thus securing freedom of action for landing operations throughout the Balkans.

2. From this point of view the present delay in the execution of an operation against Leros makes the situation more difficult, offers new temptations to the enemy, and increases his chances of success. It should therefore be attempted at all cost to start the Leros operation simultaneously with an operation against the Ionian Islands, or else to complete the Ionian operation as soon as possible in order to follow it up immediately with the Leros operation."

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, on the evening of 13 Sept. a torpedo boat put into its base. Lively traffic of small shipping was detected along the east coast, mostly in the northern part. Of five submarines at sea, two were located in the southwestern, two in the eastern, and one in the northwestern part of the Black Sea.

Air reconnaissance observed moderate shipping traffic close to the Turkish coast, and that Gelendzhik continued to be heavily occupied with ships.

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In the afternoon of 13 Sept. five planes attacked Berdyansk harbor with bombs and machine guns. Only one fishing cutter was sunk.

Own Situation:

At 1900 the Port Commander of Novorossisk reported that communications with the surrounded harbor guard company had been re-established in the morning. The withdrawal of the Port Commander from Novorossisk has been ordered for the evening of 15 Sept.

A submarine chase was unsuccessfully carried out by planes and three armed fishing vessels off Cape Khersones. Submarine U "18" is returning from her operational area to Feodosiya.

Two mines were swept off Sevastopol. Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan. No Crimean convoys were carried out. Two to three towed convoys and six to eight naval landing craft between Berdyansk and Genichesk are operating daily in both directions in an operation to assist the Army's retreat.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Special reports that might be of interest to naval warfare are not available.

Chief, Naval Staff left for Norway on an inspection trip accompanied by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division, Naval Staff.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

In the southern sector of the eastern front the situation seems to have somewhat improved despite continuous enemy pressure.

II. Naval Staff recommended that the decision as to whether Tyters should be placed exclusively under the command of the Navy (see War Diary 14 Sept.) be postponed until Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Command, Baltic has returned from his discussions on the spot with Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries and the 18th Army Headquarters. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff concurred.

III. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported that a patrol vessel belonging to Commander, Submarines, Baltic (Gdynia) committed high treason by exchanging radio messages with a British radio station, which amongst other things led to a regular transmission of weather reports.

IV. Naval Attaché Section reported that the Spanish Secretary of the Navy promised Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi special treatment. Lieutenant Brandi will probably be set free.

V. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported amongst other things that information was received from diplomatic sources in Vatican City that the Allies are planning to invade the Balkans on a broad front from southern Italy and not to proceed further north than Rome. The newly appointed Turkish Military Attaché in Berlin is said to have remarked that Bulgaria will soon withdraw from the war.

VI. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy compiled a list of requests which he submitted during the last few days. He urgently asked either for action to be taken or a reply to be made on these matters. Copy as per 1/Skl 25857/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered all the points in question to be immediately examined.

Commander in Chief, Navy's plane was forced to turn back north of Anholt and return to Berlin. Weather conditions made a landing in Oslo impossible.

Subsequent Conference with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. It is still doubtful whether the two Italian submarines, the FRANCESCO RIMINI and the H "6", which were seized in Bonifacio, can be moved to Spezia. If need be these boats will be blown up.

II. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported that he told the responsible officials of the Communications Equipment Experimental Command very plainly about the disastrous results of the Metox set, as ordered. He said that he had quite a favorable impression of the officials and experimental station itself.

III. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported on the difficulties encountered in manning Italian merchantmen. Neither the Navy nor the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping have the required personnel available. Commander in Chief, Navy said that the Navy should assist the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping in this matter in every possible way. Only as a last resort is the scuttling of the vessels to be considered.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

IV. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reported:

a. On Ship "28"'s latest success as in "War in Foreign Waters".

Commander in Chief, Navy approved the recommendation to confer awards.

b. That the Japanese Liaison Officer had submitted the following radiogram, received from the Japanese Naval Headquarters:

"As enemy warship activity in the Indian Ocean is increasing, it is urgently necessary for the number of submarines operating in the Indian Ocean to be increased so that enemy movements can be observed. Reconnaissance and patrol operations are of particular importance in the areas of Diego Suarez, Mombassa and other central points. The Japanese Navy therefore requests the German Navy to examine the possibility of moving German submarines to the operational area south of 13° S."

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This radiogram and our message giving submarine operation plans for the end of September must have crossed each other.

Naval Staff intends to make the following reply to the Japanese Naval Attaché:

"Naval Staff has learned of the Japanese Navy's plan to increase the submarines in the western part of the Indian Ocean. Naval Staff thinks it to be of the utmost importance for the plan to put German submarines into operation in the Arabian Sea to be carried out to the extent advised, for it was planned a long time ago and already agreed on. Large stocks and lengthy preparations were made to ensure the success of these operations. Naval Staff sees nothing in the Japanese plan which might hamper or disturb the set tasks of the German submarines; on the contrary, Naval Staff is of the opinion that it should be possible for the submarines of both nations to operate simultaneously in the northern part of the Indian Ocean without difficulty. To prevent clashing with each other our submarines have strict orders not to attack submarines on sight. It is requested that a similar order be given to the Japanese submarines.

It goes without saying that all experiences gained and observations made by German submarines will be at once passed on to the Japanese Navy. The appearance of German submarines will therefore immensely improve the Japanese plan to observe enemy activity.

Naval Staff considers operations by submarines of both partners in the Indian Ocean a further step forward along the road to combined warfare."

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

Copy of relevant order as per 1/Skl Ik 2801/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

V. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reported on the situation prevailing on the island of Tyters. Naval Staff is to investigate whether a temporary reinforcement of naval forces is possible.

Chief, Naval Staff decided that Tyters must be reinforced at all costs. He agreed that it was undesirable that the entire responsibility for the island's security be transferred to the Navy and said that the suggestion should therefore be turned down.

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Special Items.

I. Armed Forces High Command has made known the various opportunities for service open to those Italian officers, soldiers and units who, now that the liberation of the Duce has been made known, will probably be willing to continue fighting on our side. Copy of this teletype, which Quartermaster Division has passed on to all interested naval commands with the information that preliminary executive directions will follow, is filed under 1/Skl 25929/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. Developments in the fighting in the southern sector of the eastern front make it imperative for supply depots, especially hospitals and repair shops, immediately to be moved to Transnistria. Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command has ordered the German General attached to the Rumanian Armed Forces High Command to make the necessary arrangements. Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 25979/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a.

Situation 15 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" reported at 0636 by short signal:

"Effected silent sinking* of 10,000 ton tanker INDIA on 11 Sept. in large grid-square UK."

Naval Staff confirmed the arrival of this good news in Radiogram 0755.

Naval Staff calculates by dead reckoning that Ship "28"'s fuel oil reserve must have been approximately 700 cubic meters on 11 Sept.; sufficient for a stay at sea of about 50 days. From the position given on 11 Sept. it is assumed that Ship "28" has started on a delayed return passage and that she is due to arrive in Japan either in the middle or at the end of October. Naval Staff deduces from the wording "silent sinking" that the raider did not refuel her bunkers from the INDIA.

*Method whereby the raiding ship's plane swooped down upon the victim, cutting her antennas by means of a specially designed gear, to prevent her from sending out radio messages.

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Ship "28" has been informed in Radiogram 2250 of this assumption and has been given further instructions with reference to the directions given on 20 Aug. in Radiogram 2011.

Information on the award made by Commander in Chief, Navy of three Iron Crosses, First Class, to be bestowed at the Commander's discretion, was dispatched in Radiogram 2324.

Enemy situation report dispatched to all in foreign waters in Radiogram 2216.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-four planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 1107 in BE 6830.

At 1620 our air reconnaissance reported three destroyers in BF 4785 on a northerly course.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast corrected his report of 14 Sept., in which it was stated that a convoy of 30 merchantmen had been sighted. He now states that only seven merchantmen were counted and adds that even this number may be inaccurate owing to poor visibility.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four ELM/J mines were swept between 12 and 14 Sept.

The steamer LIVADIA (3,090 BRT) is leaving Royan on her transfer to home waters. This transfer will be carried out during the coming new moon period. At Le Havre the ship will be joined by the steamer MADLI.

It is planned to move the torpedo boats T "14" and FALKE from Bayonne to Bordeaux during the night of 15 Sept. Submarine escorts were carried out according to plan.

Channel Coast:

With reference to the enemy fighter-bomber attack on our boats off Zeebrugge shortly after midnight on 14 Sept., it is supplementarily reported that the boats were attacked twice with rocket bombs from a height of 80 - 100 meters. The minesweeper M "155" was heavily damaged.

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Patrol positions in the Channel remained unoccupied owing to heavy seas and bright moonlight; no convoys were carried out for the same reason.

No report of damage to naval installations or of losses in naval personnel were received after the enemy air raid on Paris at 1925.

Group West submitted for information a copy of the instructions given to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West with regard to laying of flanking minefields in the Channel:

In addition to the flanking minefields already laid, a minefield will be laid during the coming new moon period (between 21 Sept. and 2 Oct.) where mines equipped with the new firing unit will be used for the first time. This minefield will give flank protection to our routes and will at the same time strengthen the defenses against landings. It is planned to lay this minefield, which will have no gap, at Vergoyer Bank. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West will have the torpedo boats T"26", T "27" and the GREIF and the KONDOR with 160 LMB/S mines with AA 1's at his disposal for this operation.

Naval Staff already approved the minefield at Vergoyer Bank on 9 Sept.

Special Items.

On 11 Sept., Commanding Admiral, Group West submitted a survey of the situation drawn up by his Operations Staff in the form of a review of August 1943. This report is also contained in the Group's War Diary. Copy No. 1 as per 1/Skl 2792/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

The patrol vessels in position "Rome" reported an encounter at 0115 with enemy PT boats, which withdrew to the northwest after an unsuccessful bombardment. The 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla had an encounter at 0300 in AN 8558 with enemy PT boats, which withdrew to the south under cover of a smoke-screen, dropping incendiary charges, after a brief and unsuccessful exchange of gunfire.

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One ELM/J mine was swept in AN 9671 and one in AN 8584. Minesweeping operations were carried out with only minor restrictions despite bad weather conditions.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Nine planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. At 0203 the convoy of the war transport KT "3" with two naval landing craft was attacked southwest of Kiberg by two PT boats, which withdrew under cover of a smoke-screen after two approaches and an exchange of gunfire. All other escort operations were carried out according to plan and without incident.

Forty-eight ships were escorted north and 16 south. Four ships were delayed in the Polar coastal area due to a shortage of escorts.

On the west coast of Spitsbergen submarine U "277" reported the hydrophone location of an enemy submarine from AeG 7688 to 7535. Our air reconnaissance reported that the houses and heaps of coal that were set on fire in Barentsberg during operation "Zitronella" are still burning.

Group North/Fleet advised Naval Staff for information of its instructions to Naval Commands, Baltic, North, Norway; Commanding Admiral, Submarines; Training Unit, Fleet; Commander, Destroyers; Commander, PT Boats; and Commander, Minelayers on the measures planned in the event of enemy large-scale operations against southern Norway and Jutland. No operational orders or advance plans for the deployment to be carried out in the ports will be drawn up, as decisions of this kind will depend on the situation and on enemy action. Preparations are therefore restricted to the speedy registration, preparation and assembly of all units that will be employed in such an operation, including their supply. Copy as per 1/Skl 2752/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in file 1/Skl I op. VIII, 3.

Naval Staff has no objections to this procedure. Naval Staff, Operations Division will give Submarine Division the necessary orders.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

In the Kronstadt area our coast line and rear-communications were under constant heavy gunfire from 2100 to 2150, but without noticeable effect.

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According to a Finnish report, 1 freighter, 1 tug with 4 barges in tow, and 11 patrol vessels were observed on an easterly course east of Lavansaari at 1900.

2. Own Situation:

No special reports have been received from Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

A Swedish steamer struck a mine and sustained damage north of Darsserort. She was, however, able to proceed to Trelleborg.

Escort and shipping traffic was carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic. Russian planes unsuccessfully attacked the steamer DIETER HUGO STINNES with torpedoes at 0545 on 14 Sept. seven miles northwest of Lyserort. On the same day at 0620 the steamer MEMPHIS observed a plane dropping two mines from an altitude of 10 - 15 meters in AO 6468.

Enemy bombers sank the heavy gun-carrier WEST at 0320 in AO 3741. Thirty-five survivors including the commander were rescued.

The minesweeper M "22" struck a mine in AO 3638 (south of Tyters). She sustained damage and was towed into Kotka.

Minesweeping operations have been completed in the Strait of Irben.

Naval Command, Baltic requested minesweeping planes for immediate operation, because of the danger of ground mines in the Finnish coastal island waters.

Naval Staff forwarded the relevant request to the Reich Air Ministry and to the Commander in Chief, Air, Inspectorate of Aerial Mines Ordnance. According to a telephone inquiry made, there are certain prospects that this demand will be met.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Submarine U "406", as being the last of the submarines returning from the southern operational area in mid-Atlantic, has given the ordered passage report. Submarine U "378" fired a Zaunkoenig torpedo on a destroyer in BE 50; it unfortunately proved to be a tube sticker. The misfire has nothing to do with its being a special type of torpedo.

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Submarine U "963" was already damaged by ice floes in AD 2663 on 11 Sept. and was forced to return. Passage of submarines through the Denmark Strait must, therefore, be given up for the time being.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported 75 planes on a minelaying operation in the area of Boulogne.

In the afternoon large enemy formations attacked the airfields at Merville and St. Pol. In the evening 400 planes bombed industrial installations in the Paris area. Rubber factories in Montluçon, Belgium, were attacked by 150 - 200 heavy bombers. Anti-aircraft guns shot down one plane. Smaller enemy forces carried out harassing raids over Reich territory as far as the river Oder and in the Rhineland and Westphalia. For the damage sustained in France and Belgium from these raids see appendix to the "Daily Situation".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

On 14 Sept. 25 planes attacked ship targets in the Gulf of Salerno. A few landing craft were sunk. Bombs exploded and started fires amongst parked motor vehicles and fuel dumps on shore. Thirty-seven fighter-bombers attacked ship targets and sank one freighter and damaged six others. Further ships were damaged in a fighter-bomber attack in the Salerno area on 15 Sept. Otherwise only air reconnaissances were carried out by our air forces.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reported a fighter-bomber attack on a ship of 1,000 GRT in Motka Bay. The ship was heavily damaged.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the evening of 14 Sept. a DELHI-class cruiser put out from Gibraltar, presumably making for the Atlantic. On the forenoon of 15 Sept., four tankers, four freighters and two escort vessels put

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in from the Atlantic. The large convoy that entered the Mediterranean from the Atlantic in the forenoon of 13 Sept. has not been relocated up to now.

Our air reconnaissance confirmed that there are still heavy concentrations of shipping in the Gulf of Salerno. On 14 Sept. at noon three battleships or heavy cruisers were standing by a group of 15 large transports and 35 landing craft. Another group of 35 medium-sized transports was located about ten miles south of Montecorvino and was seen to be maintaining lively landing craft traffic with the shore. The coast five miles further south was bombarded by a cruiser. South of Praiano a ship that was taken to be an aircraft carrier was sighted on an easterly course. In the Gulf of Salerno on 14 Sept. at noon German Naval Command, Italy reported 6 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 3 escort vessels, 15 small naval vessels, 212 landing craft and auxiliary naval vessels, 2 special service vessels, 27 freighters totalling 156,000 GRT and also landing craft on shuttle service. On the morning of 15 Sept., two battleships, of which one was presumably an aircraft carrier, 86 large and medium-sized transports, and about 95 landing craft were observed. The heavy increase in merchant tonnage seems to indicate that further troops and supplies have arrived. Units that have been relieved have probably also been moved out. In the late evening 20 warships and merchantmen were located 15 miles northwest of Licosa, course not given. In the same area 1 landing craft, 1 transport, and 3 escort vessels were sighted on south-southwesterly course.

On 12 Sept. and on 14 Sept. our air reconnaissance for the first time observed a large number of landing craft in Tobruk. Twenty LCT's and 80 - 90 other landing craft were counted, which would provide sufficient space for the transportation of half an American landing division. Landing craft were also sighted in Port Said on 13 Sept. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has come to the conclusion that the enemy is also making preparations for landing operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

On 15 Sept. at noon and in the afternoon one submarine sighting was reported southeast of Toulon and one north-northwest of Elba.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

One of our submarines operating off Salerno reported a direct hit on a camouflaged large transport or auxiliary carrier that started to list. Then the submarine fired a spread of two on four overlapping destroyers. Detonations and sinking noises were heard. The boat reported that no opposition was met with nor was any air location detected.

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Another submarine reported that she fired an unsuccessful spread of four against a cruiser.

Our PT boat operations in the Gulf of Salerno during the night of 14 Sept. were unsuccessful. The boats were chased by a cruiser southwest of Capri. No operations are planned for the night of 15 Sept.

The PT boats S "54" and S "61" arrived in Venice where the crews under the command of Lieutenant (j.g.) Schmidt disarmed two admirals and 3,000 men.

According to a report from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the port of Bastia can now be entered and is in fact already being used by some of our ships. The most important batteries and the airfield are being occupied by the 616th Naval Artillery Detachment. Traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio as well as to and from Corsica was carried out according to plan.

At 1350 seven Italian planes unsuccessfully attacked our ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio. One of the attacking planes was shot down by a Siebel ferry. At noon the motor mine-sweeper R "189" that is escorting the steamer CHAMPAGNE shot two out of 12 attacking planes down north of Elba. The Italian commander on Elba offered to surrender. The war-transport KT "14" put into Leghorn with Italian prisoners of war aboard. A naval officer seized an Italian patrol vessel off Manfredonia (50 miles northwest of Bari) and with this patrol vessel captured on 14 Sept. two steamers and a motor tanker loaded with 250 tons of gas, and brought these ships into Ancona. Pola has been completely occupied. According to a report received from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, coastal defenses are being built in the Gaeta - Civitavecchia area. In the afternoon of 14 Sept. 60 captured Italian guns, located between Gaeta and Terrachini, were reported to have been manned by German personnel and ready for action.

Group West reported to Quartermaster Division that of the former French warships in Toulon, the fleet tenders CURIEUSE and IMPETUEUSE will be ready for operations on 15 Sept., the DEDAIGNEUSE on 1 Oct. and the CHAMOIS on 30 Oct. The torpedo boats BAYONNAISE and BALLISTE will be ready for operations during the first quarter of 1944. Of the vessels already moved by the Italians, the destroyers LANSQUENET, SIROCCO, VALMY, and HARDI, and the submarine POINCARE are in Imperia, Genoa, and Savona.

The completion of repairs on the remaining French warships that have been raised cannot be expected before the second quarter of 1944.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

A Greek submarine was rammed and sunk north of Triceri Strait after a long drawn-out engagement with the submarine chaser UJ "2101". Fourteen members of the submarine's crew were taken prisoner. One member of the submarine chaser's crew was killed and twelve were injured. On the recommendation of Group South this news will not be released to the press.

Euboea is in the hands of the insurgents, except for the town of Chalkis. The situation is still tense. An enemy plane bombed Chalkis at 0020. The island garrison of Skarpantos surrendered unconditionally. Negotiations for the surrender of Syra have not yet been completed. The Italian commander of Cephalonia promised to surrender by 16 Sept. The commander of Corfu refused to surrender. Army Group E is preparing to launch an attack against the island.

At 0700 on 13 Sept. Italian batteries opened fire against two of our naval landing craft which were putting into Argostoli carrying two 15 centimeter batteries. One of the landing craft was sunk, the other one was towed into Lixuri with killed and wounded on board.

In the course of actions on Rhodes we suffered 60 killed and 250 wounded. The anti-aircraft gun crew on the steamer TAGANROG which was lying in Rhodes was held prisoner by the Italians from 9 to 11 Sept. Meanwhile the steamer sailed with a Greek crew presumably for a Turkish port.

The motor minesweeper DRACHE completed her minelaying operation and put into Patras. The netlayer group called at Lemnos after completing its task off the Thracian coast. All convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea was carried out without incident.

Group South has given orders to move the steamers CAGLIARI, BOCCACIO, MARIO ROSELLO and the tanker PROMETHEUS from the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea, where they are needed to carry out the Fuehrer directive. The steamers will be moved to Cattaro before the coming new moon period, from where forces of the Commanding Admiral, Aegean will escort them further.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean informed the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping that apart from the warships seized in the Aegean Sea naval prize crews have so far seized 20 freighters, tankers, and transports with a total tonnage of 56,000 GRT. This tonnage has now been secured and protected by anti-aircraft guns.

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Unsuccessful attempts have been made for days to unload and dispatch this urgently required tonnage. Until now, however, the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has been unable to provide crews in any number worth mentioning. Commanding Admiral, Aegean therefore requested that naval personnel be dispatched. (See Teletype 0728).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The enemy air raid on Sennaya caused heavy damage. A lighter was sunk and 500 tons of ammunition exploded.

Attacks made during the day and night of 14 Sept. with bombs and machine-guns against the harbor of Berdyansk were unsuccessful. An enemy plane, probably on a minelaying operation, was shot down over the mouth of the Danube.

During the night of 15 Sept. the 11th PT Boat Flotilla will operate with two boats off the south of the Taman coast and the 1st PT Boat Flotilla with three boats in the area off Novorossisk.

The submarine U "18" put into Feodosiya from her operational area. The submarine U "20" will put out from Constanta for her operational area on 16 Sept.

Two Italian midget submarines are submarine chasing along the south of the Crimean coast off Sevastopol. According to a preliminary report received, one of these boats torpedoed an enemy vessel south of Cape Sarich.

The harbor of Berdyansk has been mined according to plan. Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

According to a Japanese broadcast, the Japanese seized seven Italian warships and 40 merchantmen in the Far East.

No other news reports of interest to naval warfare are available.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.I. Army Situation:

On the eastern front the evacuation of Berdyansk has been ordered. The 6th Army has orders to withdraw to the last line of defense Melitopol - Zaporozhe. The important railroad to the Crimea is therefore now directly in the operational area.

On the enemy side large-scale strategic movements have been observed from the Kharkov front towards the south. The forces withdrawn from there are possibly going to be used to carry out a very strong thrust in the direction of the Dnieper bend.

In the northern sector too, offensive activity was again lively in the Leningrad area.

The strength of the insurgents in the Dalmatian coastal area has visibly increased since they were equipped with Italian arms. Large parts of the coasts are in their hands. On the Istrian peninsula also the situation is still obscure.

II. Commander in Chief, Navy approved the change in designation of Commander, Submarines, Italy to Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean, effective as from 1 Oct. in accordance with the new developments in the situation.

Chief, Bureau of Naval Armaments and Chief, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch reported on the economic measures taken in Italy, for which Reich Minister Speer was specially authorized by the Fuehrer. Arrangements have been made whereby all available dockyard material is to be taken over by the Navy in its entirety. The relevant orders have been issued to German Naval Command, Italy. Baurat (civil servant with the rank of a Lieutenant Commander: Tr.N.) Hartmann of High Command, Navy has been attached to the commission for collecting captured material set up by Reich Minister Speer. By order of Commander in Chief, Navy, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group Command B will be similarly informed.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

III. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division, Naval Staff reported:

a. on the instructions issued by Group North/Fleet on the countermeasures for large-scale enemy operations against southern Norway and Jutland. (See War Diary 15 Sept.). Chief, Naval Staff has nothing to add.

b. that investigations as to how far naval forces in the Gulf of Finland could be reinforced led Operations Division, Naval Staff to propose that Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic should each lend four minesweepers with which a new flotilla for operations in the Gulf of Finland could be created. Chief, Naval Staff approved.

The relevant orders have been issued to Naval Commands, Baltic and North; Commanding Admirals, Defenses, Baltic and North; Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, copy to Group North. Copy as per 1/Skl 26050/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

IV. In accordance with the Fuehrer directive, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that mines be held in readiness for use off the Dutch coast. Group West will be ordered to make the necessary preparations.

From the conclusion drawn from enemy operations in the channel narrows during the last fortnight, Group West submitted plans for our minelaying operations. The plan in the future only to lay mines near our own routes is not considered very advisable. Flanking barrages should primarily only be laid where they can offer flank protection to our routes and protection against the danger of enemy landings. In view of the period of bad weather to be expected soon and the shortage of mines, it is planned to postpone the laying of the minefields N 3 - 6 in the Dieppe area until 200 day firing units become available and also so that a fully active minefield may be ready for spring when the danger of landings will again increase.

It is also planned to extend in early spring the flanking minefields close to our routes in the area on both sides of Cherbourg, on the east coast of Cotentin, and in the Seine bay. Mine baffels with ground mines with AA 1 firing units will be laid at Vergoyer Bank during the coming new moon period. Six more minefields of the same kind will be prepared and held in readiness for laying at short notice should the danger of landings again become imminent. These minefields will, however, be laid in the spring of 1944 at the latest. It is further planned to lay UMB mines with snag lines in the Channel narrows during the new moon period at the

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Armed Forces High Command; Operations Staff, Navy; and to the Naval Liaison Officers to Army Groups B, F and E:

"Fuehrer directive:

1. As much tonnage as possible should be transferred from the Adriatic Sea to the Aegean Sea;

2. The occupation of Taranto, Brindisi and Bari has still further aggravated the precarious situation of our shipping in the Adriatic Sea and the Strait of Otranto. Owing to the loss of Italian escort vessels and the shortage of our own forces, the provision of escorts for convoys through the Adriatic Sea and the Strait of Otranto cannot at present be guaranteed. Fast individually routed ships will still be able to pass through the Strait of Otranto during the next few days. Such ships should therefore be dispatched as soon as possible.

Additional Note: German Naval Command, Italy has been similarly instructed by radiogram."

c. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quarter-master Division informed all naval commands affected of the order issued by Armed Forces High Command declaring the north-western boundary of Croatia to be the command boundary between Army Groups B and F. The command boundary between German Naval Command, Italy and Group South will be altered accordingly. Therefore, contrary to the organization so far ordered, Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic comes for the time being under the command of German Naval Command, Italy. There are no changes in the ordered designations and deployments.

On the recommendation of Group South, Naval Shore Commander, Peloponnesos will establish his headquarters at Calamata and not at Nauplia.

IV. Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command forwarded to Chief of Staff, Naval Staff for information a report on the distribution of forces in the different theaters of war which had, however, been drawn up prior to the Italian betrayal with the intention of correcting the current misconception that forces were being withheld from the hard fighting on the eastern front for no good reason. The Fuehrer concurred with this estimate of the situation. Copy as per 1/Skl 2810/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. a.

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V. Commander, Destroyers advised Chief of Staff, Naval Staff for information about the report submitted to Group North/Fleet on the creation of the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which is to be formed out of two Italian destroyers and four torpedo boats and which will be mostly manned by personnel under Commander, Destroyers to whom it will be subordinated as to discipline and supplies. Commander, Destroyers drew attention to the consequences of a heavy withdrawal of personnel from his unit. Furthermore he recommended that the newly created flotilla, like all the other flotillas in the western and northern operational areas, be subordinated to him both as regards discipline and supplies because detached subordination has so far shown very poor results.

It is furthermore recommended that all torpedo boats stationed in the Aegean Sea should also be subordinated as regards discipline and supplies to the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

Group North/Fleet does not agree with the opinion of Commander, Destroyers on subordination as regards discipline and supplies. Group North considers a detached subordination to be adequate as it in any case includes the right of inspection in matters pertaining to training, organization and behaviour of personnel. In northern and western areas the position is different in as much as transfers between the operational area and home waters are occasionally made. Group North/Fleet agreed to the subordination of all torpedo boats and destroyers in the southeastern area to the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

The matter will be further dealt with by Quartermaster Division.

VI. Notes on the discussion with Chief, Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch on the creation of naval commandos as per 1/Skl 26127/43 Gkdos. are filed in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V. Agreement on the course to be taken and on the co-operation of the Navy with Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command has been reached with the representative of the Intelligence Service. Group North will be informed by Quartermaster Division on the outcome of the discussion.

VII. During the conference held on 11 Sept. between Quartermaster Division and Naval (Ship) Construction Division on the construction of naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters these were some of the points made:

1. Naval Staff is anxious to maintain the allocations demanded in the 1943 Fleet Construction Program.

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2. In view of the latest developments of the naval landing craft available, about a third should be allotted to each of the following areas: northern area (Germany and occupied countries); the Tyrrhenian and the Adriatic Sea; the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. However, not more than three flotillas of 30 naval landing craft each are to be stationed in the Tyrrhenian Sea, the surplus being assigned to the Adriatic Sea. It will be possible to make adjustments between these two sea areas by overland transportation.

3. Of the naval landing craft for the northern area, 50 per cent are to be constructed as minelayers, and of those for the Adriatic Sea, and for the Black and Aegean Seas 25 per cent.

4. Construction of further gun-carrying naval landing craft is planned for the Black Sea only. Naval artillery lighters will be constructed within the limits of the available iron allotment.

5. Priority measures to be taken are:

a. The immediate construction in Salonika of a building yard for naval landing craft. Organization Todt will assist in this construction, giving it top priority.

b. Immediate measures for the start of naval landing craft construction in Adriatic dockyards.

c. The moving of naval landing craft from Genoa to the Adriatic Sea by overland route.

d. The adjustment of current supplies to the new plan.

e. The immediate conversion of 20 naval landing craft in the northern area into minelayers.

VIII. A compilation of all information on the enemy communications obtained by radio intelligence and radio decyphering from 6 - 11 Sept. is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 37/43.

Situation 16 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported that the Straits of Lombok and of Bali are still blocked. It is, therefore, necessary to put in through Sunda Strait. He transmitted the new approach points A-E, as given by the Japanese Navy. The BRAKE should approach via points B and D. Combat submarines are not bound to these points.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo has received the following instructions from Naval Staff:

"1. Radiogram sent through Yokoi: as agreed, German submarines will start operations in the northern part of the Indian Ocean at the end of September. For the time being five boats will operate at the focal points: Mombassa, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, southwestern tip of India. Request approval.

2. The above radiogram crossed with the following surprising proposal from Tokyo:

Enemy activity in the Indian Ocean livelier. Therefore intensified Japanese submarine operations for reconnaissance and attacks in the northwestern area imperative. Therefore transfer of German operational area south of 13° S requested.

3. With reference to paragraph 2. a reply was sent through Abe that Naval Staff attached the utmost importance to this operation which was specially prepared and agreed on. Joint operations are possible without danger of overlapping or friction. A concentrated move will hit supplies to India and Russia and may also intercept forces being withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The latter is, however, unlikely so long as the enemy continues carrying out landings in the Mediterranean, for heavy warships are the backbone of his operations and the Italian Fleet has no fighting spirit even under British leadership. Recognition signal exchange prepared. Boats have strict orders not to attack submarines."

II. Situation West Area.1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-four planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. A British vessel was located in BF 1640 at 1701.

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2. In view of the latest developments of the naval landing craft available, about a third should be allotted to each of the following areas: northern area (Germany and occupied countries); the Tyrrhenian and the Adriatic Sea; the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. However, not more than three flotillas of 30 naval landing craft each are to be stationed in the Tyrrhenian Sea, the surplus being assigned to the Adriatic Sea. It will be possible to make adjustments between these two sea areas by overland transportation.

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At 0940 in BF 1694 our air reconnaissance sighted two destroyers, two minesweepers with their gear out on course 95°.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The torpedo boats T "14" and the FALKE which are moving to Bordeaux put out from St. Jean de Luz at 2030. One ELM/J mine was swept at St. Nazaire and three off the Gironde. Submarine escorts were carried out according to plan.

According to information received from the 3rd Air Force, two BV 222 planes put into Biscarrose. Unless different orders are received from Naval Staff, Group West plans to use these flying boats for Atlantic reconnaissance as far as their range will permit.

This matter will be further dealt with by Submarine Division.

About 220 four-engined enemy bombers carried out a heavy raid on Nantes between 1610 and 1640. Smoke-screening was ineffective owing to the lack of wind. Considerable damage has been caused. The following ships were sunk: the motor minesweeper R "19" and the Mining and Barrage Trials Command boat HEISTERNEST, the mine-exploding vessel "184" with losses to the personnel, a tug, a small floating dock and a French destroyer under construction. The following were damaged: the mine-exploding vessel "134", the minesweepers M "366", M "408" and M "226", the patrol vessel VP "620", a steamer and the large floating dock. The Port Commander's office was destroyed. Total losses in personnel are not yet known. Means of communication within the city are mostly out of order.

Between 1900 and 1905 about 80 planes raided La Pallice where damage was also heavy. In the outer harbor a dredger, a buoy layer and two tugs were sunk and the mine-exploding vessel "16" was very heavily damaged. Furthermore traffic and dockyard installations were hit and the lock was slightly damaged.

Group West recommended that crews for manning the torpedo recovery boats of Commanding Admiral, Submarines be drawn from the Italian submarine personnel in Bordeaux. (See Teletype 2360).

Channel Coast:

At 0820 the patrol vessels "1513" and "1515" were machine-gunned by 20 American fighters and heavy fighters off Le Havre. The boats were damaged. The patrol vessel "1515" sank off the harbor entrance whilst attempting to tow patrol vessel

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"1513" into Le Havre. The captain of patrol vessel "1515" is amongst the eleven men killed and the captain of patrol vessel "1513" amongst the 38 injured. In this connection Group West stated that the accident proved that gunnery training with sea targets is also impossible in the Seine - Somme area and that the relevant orders forbidding this area have been issued.

Patrol positions in the Channel were unoccupied owing to moonlight and weather conditions. Convoy operations were only carried out within the Channel Island traffic area.

During the night of 15 Sept. 75 planes of the 3rd Air Force attacked the Thames area using for the first time mines with new firing units in accordance with the new minelaying offensive.

It is planned to move the 4th PT Boat Flotilla from Boulogne to Dunkirk during the night of 16 Sept.

About 36 enemy bombers attacked Rouen at 1930 and caused some damage to the power plant and a phosphorus factory.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

The mine-exploding vessel "11" was damaged by a mine north of Borkum and will have to put into dry dock.

Five boats of the 21st Minesweeper Flotilla were attacked with bombs and machine-guns by a heavy enemy formation at 1907 west of Texel. Four planes were shot down by our boats, while our fighters shot down one enemy plane. The boats sustained much damage and returned to Helder with two killed and 36 injured.

Convoy "1175" Hook - Elbe consisting of four steamers sailed at 2030.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Fifteen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. On 14 Sept. there was slight artillery activity in the Petsamo area and air reconnaissances over the Banak - Vardoe area. An air raid on Kirkenes carried out at 0904 on 15 Sept. caused no damage, but a further raid on 16 Sept. is reported to have caused losses in personnel and damage. On 15 Sept. a Spitfire

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carried out a reconnaissance over Alta Bay. Five bombs were dropped on Petsamo harbor during the night of 14 Sept.

Own Situation:

In the attack reported on the convoy of the war transport KT "3" during the night of 14 Sept. southwest of Kiberg, one of the two attacking PT boats was probably destroyed.

In the forenoon of 16 Sept. our convoys in the Egersund area were attacked by three Hampdens. An attack on the convoy of the minesweeper M "407" with three steamers was unsuccessful. In an attack on the convoy of the minesweeper M "456" with two steamers, the steamer GRAZIELLA was torpedoed and had to be beached. Salvage is thought to be possible if weather conditions improve. One Hampden was shot down.

Altogether 19 ships and 2 submarines were escorted north and 22 ships south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The 25th Minesweeper Flotilla was re-assigned to Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic after having completed its operations in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Merchant Shipping.

Naval Staff sent the following instructions to Naval Commands, Baltic, North, and Norway regarding the Italian charter-ships:

"Commissioning of captured Italian ships will be carried out by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping who will make the necessary arrangements against desertion or sabotage by manning these ships with specially selected crews. The requests made by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping for anti-aircraft gun crews that would be stationed aboard ship will be met."

VI. Submarine Warfare.

For the re-opening of the battle of the North Atlantic, 18 submarines equipped with Zaunkoenig torpedoes will be stationed at 2000 on 20 Sept. in patrol positions from grid-square AK 24 to AL 47.

Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic.

VII. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The report of 16 Sept. must be corrected in so far as the 75 planes were not on a minelaying operation in the Boulogne area but in the Thames estuary (compare also with "Situation West Area"). At the same time 25 planes carried out a nuisance raid on London.

On 16 Sept. enemy planes attacked Nantes, Rouen, St. Nazaire and our escort vessels, as already reported under "Situation West Area". Furthermore raids were carried out on our Air Force station at Tricqueville, the airfield at Beaumont le Roger, as well as at Cognac, Schouwen and Walcheren. The submarine pens in La Pallice sustained 20 direct hits but no noticeable effects could be seen inside them.

During the night of 16 Sept. ten planes on a harassing raid flew over Berlin and dropped a few bombs at random. Another five planes penetrated the Baltic area and flew as far as Warsaw in order to parachute agents. Two hundred planes crossed western France making for northern Italy.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 15 Sept. and also during the day and night of 16 Sept. our fighter and bomber formations attacked ship targets in the Gulf of Salerno. Altogether one heavy ship - battleship or heavy cruiser - and one destroyer were damaged, two ships sunk, and hits scored on eleven other vessels. The result of the operation during the night of 16 Sept. is not yet known.

Seven enemy planes attacked Formosa. Large enemy fighter and ground attack plane formations actively assisted ground forces in the Salerno area. Sittoria was raided during the night of 16 Sept.

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Ten reconnaissance planes were detected over the Aegean - Crete area and four enemy planes were on supply operations to the insurgents in Greece. It is presumed that one plane dropped mines off Cape Sunion.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

One French cruiser of the JEANNE D'ARC class and two destroyers of the CYCLONE class put into Gibraltar in the forenoon. In the afternoon the cruiser put out again for the Mediterranean.

During the night of 15 Sept. and on 16 Sept. particularly heavy shipping concentrations were observed in the Gulf of Salerno, mostly in the southern part. One battleship, nineteen cruisers and destroyers supported the enemy ground forces in their battle for Salerno with continuous gunfire and tried to relieve the troops of the 5th U.S. Army who were being pushed back to the coast. This bombardment stopped the advance of our divisions just before they were able to reach their goal which was to drive the enemy into the sea.

Besides these warships, 47 transports, 50 - 80 landing craft, and 20 other ships were counted.

At 0310 50 miles north of Stromboli 15 - 20 ships were sighted, course not given, which put up a smoke-screen. At 0320 two destroyers and one escort vessel were located 30 miles northeast of Palermo on course 30°. At 2355 on 15 Sept., 75 miles west of Paola (Calabria) a group of 60 landing craft, merchantmen and escort vessels was observed on a westerly course.

There was minor traffic in the Ionian Sea and in the Gulf of Taranto. The port occupation of Taranto has decreased owing to the departure of all the warships. In Brindisi an increase in the port occupation was noticed. The ships in this port included one light cruiser, seven torpedo boats, transports and landing craft. One transport was on fire.

No sighting reports are available from the eastern Mediterranean. According to press reports, part of the Italian Fleet is said to have arrived in Alexandria.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

According to a report from the leader of the PT boats S "54" and S "61" which are on passage from Taranto to Venice, they sank an Italian torpedo boat, two minesweepers, and an escort vessel, captured three steamers plus the troop transport LEOPARDI (4,800 GRT) which was on her maiden voyage with 1,000 Italian soldiers on board and brought them in as prize. Port Commander, Venice reported the capture of two Italian submarines. The PT boat S "30" is escorting the prisoner of war transport VULCANIA (24,496 GRT) from Pola to Venice.

The torpedo boat TA "9" and two motor minesweepers put into Piombino in the evening. The fast escort vessel SG "11" shot an enemy plane down off Piombino harbor.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Bonifacio continues day and night without interruption and without much enemy interference. On 15 Sept. 5,594 men, 728 motor vehicles, 124 guns and 2,654 tons of equipment were transferred. Maddalena has been completely evacuated by our troops. The batteries are in Italian hands. Shipments from Corsica to the mainland have started again from Bastia.

With regard to the ground situation in the battle for Salerno, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported that the gunfire from heavy ships and the almost complete domination of the battle area by the enemy's far superior air force is causing very serious losses to our troops and will eventually lead to the gradual depletion of our forces. Should the counterattack by parts of the 1st Paratroop Division, now being brought up from Apulia, not achieve the expected results by 17 Sept., then the present operation will have to be discontinued.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that Commander Sestini will hereafter also act as Liaison Officer to the Commissioner of the Italian Admiralty.

According to a report from the Commander of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla, it has been conclusively established that during the PT boat operation on the night of 14 Sept., our boats were located by radar from a British hospital ship and that a larger destroyer group went into action as a result of this location. The matter is further dealt with in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

German Naval Command, Italy requested that all available EMF mines be shipped at once to Toulon. Naval Staff allotted 410 EMF mines with 200 meter cables and arranged for their immediate shipment to Toulon.

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3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The enemy submarine, sunk by submarine chaser UJ "2101" on 14 Sept. north of Trikkeri, was the Greek submarine KATSONIS. One officer, one British chief petty officer 2nd class, and 13 Greeks have been taken prisoner.

For a short summary see Teletype 0915. The torpedo boats CASTELFIDARDO and SOLFERINO are moving from Suda to Piraeus.

The attack planned on Corfu has been postponed because Cephalonia must first be mopped up. The troops for Cephalonia will embark on the motor minesweeper R "210", the submarine chaser UJ "2015" and the naval landing craft MFP "131". Furthermore, the motor minesweeper R "194" that is to take part in this operation will be moved from Piraeus to Prevesa. The hospital ship GRADISCA, manned by one of our prize crews, is in Prevesa ready to move Italian troops away. The steamer CITTA DI SAVONA completed her trial run with a German crew. One of our "Q" ships and two armed fishing vessels, escorting three Italian ships with about 120 unreliable Italian soldiers on board, put into Piraeus from Syra. Submarine chaser UJ "2111" has been newly commissioned and dispatched to Kythnos with the order to disarm the Italian garrison there.

Group South reported that Italian resistance on Corfu, Cephalonia and Leros continues. The landing operation attempted by the 22nd Army Corps without naval support, failed. Preparations for the operation against Cephalonia are handicapped by a shortage of adequately armed vessels. It was for the same reason that the removal of the Italians from the islands which surrendered was very slow. Owing to the proximity of the enemy occupied Apulian ports and the increased enemy activity in Syria, Egypt and on Cyprus, just at a time when we are weaker than ever before, Group South anticipates that enemy landings will soon be taking place, especially on the Ionian Islands. Our sea traffic along the west coast of Greece would thus be cut off. As naval forces are not available, Group South recommended that the Air Force be requested to attack the jumping-off positions of southern Italy ruthlessly and continuously in order to gain time until we succeed in occupying the islands.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Naval Staff advised Commanding General, Armed Forces, South that our evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead would begin on the night of 15 Sept. and that Novorossisk would be the first port city to be evacuated. The front line early on the morning of 16 Sept. will be: Lake Abrau - Gaiduk - Gornoye - east of Gladkovskaya - Kesslerovo.

Our PT boat operation during the night of 15 Sept. was unsuccessful. The operation will be repeated during the night of 16 Sept. A minelaying operation was carried out by ten motor minesweepers, one Rumanian minelayer, and one naval landing craft west of Sevastopol according to plan. Traffic on the Danube between Reni and Tulcea has been stopped because mines are suspected. River traffic south of Bucharest was stopped for the same reason: minesweeping planes had cleared two mines there. The vessel that the Italian midget submarine CB "1" sank near Yalta was probably the minelayer escorted by two PT boats.

The task of taking up the barrage net at Anapa has begun. The submarine U "20" put out for a minelaying operation off Poti. The submarine U "18" put out from Feodosiya for the operational area. The towed convoy Kerch - Feodosiya was unsuccessfully attacked at noon by two enemy planes with two torpedoes and machine-guns. In an enemy air raid on Sennaya, where two lighters with 520 tons of ammunition exploded, serious damage was also caused to the jetty and office buildings as well as the radio and signal stations.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was hampered by loading delays owing to a shortage of trucks and waggons.

Otherwise convoy traffic was carried out according to plan.

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine moved from Mariupol to Melitopol.

IX. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

The withdrawal of the southern sector of the eastern front to the Melitopol - Zaporozhe line and the evacuation of the Kuban positions are being carried out with ever accelerating speed. The enemy advance towards Kiev is gaining ground. Our countermeasures are being handicapped by railroad difficulties. The large-scale enemy attack in the Central Army Group's sector was only partly successful. The enemy has been unable to interfere with our planned withdrawal of troops to the new positions we had prepared. The situation in Dalmatia and Istria remains unchanged. Offensive operations in the Salerno area will be discontinued should the final attempt being made today fail. And southern Italy will come indisputably under enemy control as a jumping-off position to the Balkans. It will then be essential to dispatch further reinforcements to the Balkans and it will probably even be necessary for Army Group B to concentrate everything on this point. The traffic problem will offer considerable obstacles. Pola must at all cost be retained as a base for submarines, PT boats, and escort vessels, so that the Adriatic Sea may be fully utilized in such an event.

II. With reference to the situation report on enemy air activity over northern France it must be stated in view of the resumption of large-scale air operations, that distinct interest in the French area is being obviously shown by the enemy. But neither this nor the various reports in this connection answer the question as to whether it would definitely indicate a large-scale operation against western Europe or whether it is simply all a carefully devised plan diverting our attention and harassing us, or again whether it is merely to be regarded as an effort at quietening down Russia's constant demands for a second front in Europe.

III. On the recommendation of Operations Division, Chief, Naval Staff decided that the request of Naval Command, Norway for the transfer of the 9th PT Boat Flotilla to their area is not to be granted in view of the urgent need for the creation of a strong point in the west. For the relevant order see l/Skl I ops. 26147/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. D.

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IV. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported that:

The First Lord of the Admiralty Mr. A.V. Alexander, has given a detailed account of the situation in the Mediterranean and told of the crisis which the British faced there during the winter of 1941/1942. After the loss of the ARK ROYAL and the damage sustained by the three battleships in the eastern Mediterranean there were for some time only three cruisers left there. Supplies to Malta could therefore only be got through with the utmost difficulty. He gave the number of British submarines lost in the Mediterranean as forty-one.

According to information received from Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command, an Italian Fascist Government is being formed, but the creation of an Italian armed force is not envisaged.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

V. The Battle Group requested that, in view of previous considerations, permission be given for the TIRPITZ, the SCHARNHORST and eight destroyers to launch an operation against Belushiya or Iokanga, or both. The aim of the operation would be the destruction of shore installations by bombardment and the destruction of warships and merchantmen found there. Admiral, Northern Waters even prefers the Belushiya operation to the planned minelaying operation by destroyers. Compared with the risks which are bearable, Group North/Fleet anticipates only very uncertain results from the Belushiya operation and in no event a large-scale success. As for the Iokanga operation it will be considerably endangered by the enemy defenses which have been strongly consolidated with batteries and minefields and also provided with air cover. Casualties and damage are to be expected on a scale which will in no way compare with the results obtained. The same may be said about combing the coastal waters from Iokanga to Murmansk. Group North considers the minelaying operation by destroyers, planned for the middle of October, to be more important and cannot therefore for strategic reasons recommend an operation by the task force. After operation "Zitronella", psychological considerations are in the opinion of Group North no longer of decisive importance. Group North asked whether the LUETZOW and three destroyers should be sent out alone on the Belushiya operation because psychological considerations are for the ship as important as the limited success to be anticipated.

Operations Division, Naval Staff concurred with the points raised by Group North in connection with the task force. On the other hand the operation proposed for the LUETZOW and three destroyers was considered to be pointless.

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Chief, Naval Staff concurred. The relevant information will be dispatched to Group North/Fleet.

Special Items.

I. The delays in the mooping-up operations on the Ionian Islands, especially the delays in the occupation of Corfu on the one hand and the growing occupation of Brindisi where the enemy is now also bringing in landing craft, together with the appearance of enemy landing craft convoys in the Strait of Otranto on the other hand, has caused Naval Staff once more to draw attention to the following points:

1. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the enemy landings carried out in southern Italy are solely in preparation for the assault to be launched against the Balkans. Naval Staff considers it very unlikely that the enemy will push on to northern Italy.

2. Should the enemy seek for a decisive action in his campaign against the Balkans, then the area between Montenegro and northern Albania (Gulf of Drin - Cattaro) including the Scutari lowlands together with western Greece and the Ionian Islands must be considered especially endangered.

3. The special importance of Corfu is once more emphasized. This extremely spacious port is not only of great value to the enemy as a base for light naval units (blockading of the Strait of Otranto, submarine hunting), but above all a very favorably placed jumping-off position for landings on the Epirus.

The relevant teletype was dispatched to Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, copy to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters; the Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff, High Command, Army and to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Naval Liaison. Copy as per l/Skl I op. 2829/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued the following instructions:

"1. Should the situation in Salerno no longer allow for a decisive success to be expected, the Fuehrer agrees to the delaying action planned. Prolonged resistance should be offered at line B. Extensive measures for withdrawing and for carrying out thorough demolitions should be prepared. More specific instructions will follow.

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2. Corsica is to be evacuated.

3. The garrison battalions evacuated from Sardinia and Corsica will be placed at the disposal of Army Group B so that the 24th Tank Division can be released.

4. The transfer of the 90th Armored Infantry Division and of the Assault Brigade of Reichsfuehrer SS to another theater of war must be anticipated. The 2nd Parachute Division will also have to be released when the line B positions are withdrawn."

III. A discussion took place on German and Japanese submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean between Admirals Abe and Yokoi on the one hand, and Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Chief, Naval Staff on the other. Notes as per 1/Skl I opa. 2823/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

Having first thoroughly gone into the situation Vice Admiral Abe agreed to inform Tokyo of the German proposal to let both navies operate simultaneously in the northwestern area of the Indian Ocean and to add his own comments.

Furthermore the possibilities of Air Force operations against the Italian warships assembled in Malta were discussed.

IV. Group North/Fleet submitted an abridged survey of the situation for August 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 26033/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

Admiral Schniewind reported that the morale of the naval forces under his command continued to be good.

"Commanding officers must, however, pay special attention to the effect the following factors are having on morale: the terrorizing air raids on home territory, the uncertainty of the strategic situation especially on the eastern front and in Italy, and the continual waiting for the enemy to take the initiative."

Naval Staff has no comments to make on the above.

Situation 17 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff considers Sunda Strait to be extremely risky after the desertion of the ERITREA to the enemy, as both the ERITREA and the CAGNI (Italian transport submarine Tr.N.) seemed to know about the BRAKE's supply operations.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo has therefore been ordered to see to it that the BRAKE, which is very valuable to us, is met by escort vessels south of Sunda Strait. He is also once more to make enquiries as to whether a passage through the Bali or Lombok Straits could not be granted in this particular case. (See Radiogram 2045).

Naval Staff dispatched the following instructions to the BRAKE by Radiogram 2138:

"1. Japanese Navy gave new reference points A - E. According to Japanese Navy's instructions you should approach via points "Bruno" and "Dora Lilie". Positions from "Anton" to "Emil" will follow separately. Naval Staff assumes that BRAKE has already passed point "Bruno".

2. Do not approach "Lilie" before 25th. Because this route may have been given away by desertion of ERITREA, you must be particularly on the alert there. Negotiations with Japanese Navy over escorts from approach point are in progress."

The positions of the approach points were given to the BRAKE by Radiogram 2205.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-eight planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay as far as 12° W; activity was most intense between 1700 and 2300. One British vessel was located at 2312 in BF 4450.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine escorts were carried out according to plan. Five ELM/J mines in all were swept off Brest, La Rochelle and Bayonne.

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For the report on the enemy air raid on La Pallice on the evening of 16 Sept. see Teletype 2358. According to this report the submarine pen sustained 35 direct hits, which penetrated about 80 centimeters. The interior of the submarine pen was only slightly damaged owing to air pressure in the ventilator shafts. Furthermore the power supply was cut in several places. Repairs will take about a week.

Besides the damage already reported, a fuel depot was set on fire in the air raid on Nantes. Furthermore, the mine-exploding vessel "146", three submarine chasers, a naval landing craft, and a harbor defense vessel were slightly damaged. The Naval Victualling Depot and the Naval Motor Transport Company sustained direct hits. Naval casualties were: 18 killed, 8 missing and 44 injured.

Channel Coast:

Convoy traffic was resumed. The minesweepers M "3604", M "3606" and M "3600" struck mines, probably ELM mines, and sank between 2230 and 2300 six miles east of Ostend. Seven men were killed, 14 are missing and 39 were injured. The transfer of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla from Boulogne to Flushing, which was not carried out on the night of 17 Sept., commenced at 2030.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy "460" Elbe - Hook consisting of four steamers sailed at 1200. Convoy "1175" Hook - Elbe completed its passage. At 0730 the locks at Wemeldinge and the ferry at Hansweert were attacked by enemy fighters. One Dutch vessel was sunk.

At 1315 the crash boat "504" in the port of Scheveningen was unexpectedly attacked by ten men who obviously intended to capture the vessel in order to escape to England. Attempts to start her engine failed. The culprits escaped.

Single enemy reconnaissance planes were reported at noon over the coast of Holland and of the East Frisian Islands.

In the Halifax plane shot down near Esbjerg on 14 Sept., two civilians with four German passports and two hundred thousand American dollars in their possession were found amongst the ten persons killed; supply bombs were also discovered filled with pistols, sub-machine-guns, machine-guns, ammunition, explosives and incendiary charges.

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On 14 Sept. Naval Command, Baltic submitted the minefield plan and the mine requirements for the minelaying operation 4 c and asked for the dispatch of two minelayers from Commander, Minelayers.

Naval Staff approved the minefield's position in principle. As, however, an operation by minelayers is considered inadvisable because of the danger from PT boats and from the air, it is considered necessary to subdivide the minefield into two or three sections. Instead of the requested 870 UMB mines, only 700 can be allotted due to depleted stocks.

Naval Command, North, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, Group North/Fleet and Group West have been given the relevant instructions.

By order of Chief, Naval Staff, Naval Command, North has been instructed by Naval Staff to investigate the possibilities of protecting the Dutch coast against enemy landings by using ground mines with magnetic firing units. Five hundred LMA/B mines with firing unit M 1 can be supplied for this operation. The mines are to be layed in shallow waters close inshore and, if possible, only shortly before enemy landing forces are sighted. The necessary preparations are to be made and the mine requirements reported.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Ten planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Our reconnaissance planes were shelled over Barentsburg by two anti-aircraft guns. The pit-heaps of coal in Barentsburg and Longyearbyen are still burning.

Own Situation:

Twenty-eight ships were escorted north and 16 south. Ten ships were delayed in the arctic coastal area owing to a shortage of escorts.

The weather ship KOBURG was not located on 16 Sept. by the FW 200 sent out to look for her. It is planned to repeat the attempt on 18 Sept.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Between 1030 and 1130, 17 motor minesweepers were observed in the area northeast of Tyters.

A hiding place, big enough to hold two men, has been discovered on Tyters. It is obviously used for spying or sabotage. An enemy torpedo plane attack on one of our minelaying groups north of Juminda was unsuccessful. The Finnish escort vessel UISKO was, however, sunk by a torpedo plane on 16 Sept. northeast of Revalstein.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the western and central areas of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

The Seeigel VIIa minefield was laid by four naval landing craft according to plan.

The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla started sweeping the area between Tyters and Neugrund. The Finnish naval vessels swept a ground mine south of Helsinki.

Naval Command, Baltic transmitted a report received from Admiral, Denmark on a conversation with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the internal political situation and on problems connected with a civilian minesweeping service. The discussion has shown that it will be a long time before this service can be brought into operation. To bridge this over it is planned to form Danish vessels into a coastal protection flotilla for assignments in the Great Belt and to man this flotilla with personnel temporarily withdrawn from our own flotillas. Teletype as per 1/Skl 26168/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

For a further report from Admiral, Denmark, dealing with the report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark on the evidence found in support of re-organizing the Danish Army see Teletype 1842. According to the same report, martial law will be lifted on 27 Sept. The question of the formation of a Danish Government is still unsolved.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Submarine Division assumes that the Italian submarine CAGNI has particulars of route "Herz" from Point 352 - 452 (Atlantic coast) and of all homeward and outward bound routes for Le Verdon and La Pallice aboard.

Group West and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West have been informed.

Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 46 planes on operations over the west area and 10 over the Mediterranean.

During the day enemy reconnaissance planes carried out operations over Reich territory: namely in southern Germany, central Germany, and over the Baltic Sea.

Thirty-eight planes were reported to have crossed the French coast. Our night fighters shot down two enemy planes in this area at 0322. For air activity over Holland see "Situation North Sea".

During the night of 17 Sept. ten fast planes penetrated Reich territory; some of them flew as far as Berlin. Three bombs were dropped on Potsdam.

It is assumed that mines have been laid off Brest.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Eighteen of our planes attacked ship targets in the Salerno area. Ten burning ships were sighted. Six Ju 87's were put into operation against anti-aircraft positions and ship targets at Cephalonia (Argostoli).

The enemy carried out continuous harassing raids over the Rome area. At Pratica de Mare two of our planes were destroyed, 48 damaged, and a fuel dump hit. The 3rd Fighter Wing suffered heavy casualties at the Campino airfield.

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3. Eastern Front:

Nine enemy planes were shot down over the eastern front. We lost two planes.

The 5th Air Force reported that 16 of its planes were on operations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the afternoon of 16 Sept., the seaplane tender ALBATROS put into Gibraltar from the Atlantic with two destroyers. In the evening a CAIRO-class cruiser and two destroyers put out from Gibraltar for an unknown destination.

No reports are available from the western and eastern Mediterranean, as no air reconnaissances were carried out there.

Only slight homeward and outward-bound traffic was observed in the Gulf of Salerno in the morning. A few transports were lying outside the port under the protection of cruisers. In the southern part of the Gulf of Salerno there were: 2 battleships, 19 cruisers or destroyers, over 100 transports, as well as 50 - 60 naval landing craft and escort vessels. According to sighting reports there have been no additions to the number of ships at Taranto, Bari and Brindisi. There was only slight shipping traffic in the Strait of Otranto.

In the afternoon submarines were sighted 85 miles west of Gaeta and 85 miles east of Maddalena. Radio intelligence detected lively air reconnaissance activity over the Naples area, over the coastal areas of Corsica, and over the north of the Tyrrhenian Sea.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The PT boat operation carried out during the night of 16 Sept. was unsuccessful. This operation will be repeated during the night of 17 Sept.

The minelayers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN put out from Toulon in the evening for a minelaying operation off Spezia. The transfer of the 90th Light Division from Sardinia to Corsica had been almost

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completed by 1630. The Corsica beachhead, Bastia, Porto Vecchia and Bonifacio are firmly in our hands. The Elba operation has been completed. Occupation forces were landed at Porto Farraio from a special formation consisting of the torpedo boat TA "9", the fast escort vessel SG "11", four motor minesweepers and four naval landing craft right after the surrender of the enemy in the forenoon.

One Italian PT boat and two Italian torpedo boats with mixed German - Italian complements made for Leghorn. Six steamers of varying size, one tug, three motor sailing vessels, and three torpedo peniches were captured. Prisoners will be moved on the captured steamers. This will start on 18 Sept.

The port and dockyard of Ancona were occupied by a small German naval force (advance detachment). Seven steamers were seized. In the dockyard two cruisers, several naval landing craft, two small steamers, and 80 pontoons were found under construction for SF (Southern France. Tr.N.). The citadel with large supplies of arms and ammunition has been occupied and 400 Italian soldiers disarmed. The batteries have been demolished. The Commanding Admiral of the local Italian Naval Command, his Chief of Staff, and a Divisional General have been taken prisoner. In view of the local unrest, 1,000 policemen and members of the militia were left under arms as a security measure.

Work was partly resumed in the dockyards in Spezia and Leghorn. There are also three small privately owned dockyards in operation.

The PT boat S "3" and the prisoner of war transport VULCANIA dropped anchor in Venice roads.

German Naval Command, Italy recommended that a commission be formed and encharged with the task of investigating which of the numerous captured Italian warships under construction, up to cruiser size, should be completed.

German Naval Command, Italy further reported that in order to commission the first batch (3 torpedo boats, 5 corvettes, 2 minesweepers and 2 submarine chasers) altogether 810 men from all branches will be needed, apart from the personnel already requested for 4 PT boats, 2 motor minesweepers and 1 minesweeper. Additional requests for personnel for the next batch will have to be made later. (See Teletype 1300).

Despite the uncertainty of the enemy situation, the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces, Overseas, Armed Forces High Command has recognized the legitimacy of the request made by

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Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and Naval Shore Commander, Northern Adriatic for the speedy removal of Italian prisoners from Pola by a shuttle service, and has issued the relevant instructions to the Reich Maritime Shipping Commissioner's Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean and to the Sea Transportation Office, Trieste.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Group South submitted an extract from its War Diary of 16 Sept. on the discussions held by the Naval and Army Commands on the measures to be taken in Rhodes. Copy as per 1/Skl 26095/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Naval Staff fully concurs with the opinion held by Group South and Commanding Admiral, Aegean.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 16 Sept. our air reconnaissance observed lively traffic in the Gelendzhik area. On 17 Sept. radio intelligence located two destroyers, one torpedo boat and two submarines in the southeastern Mediterranean.

In the afternoon 30 bombers with fighter escort attacked Temryuk in four waves. Numerous bombs were dropped, but no outstanding damage was caused. The enemy air force was also active in the Sevastopol area where a torpedo attack was carried out, and over the Danube estuary where mines were dropped.

Own Situation:

The PT boat operation on the night of 16 Sept. off Utrich Point and off the south coast of the Taman peninsula was without result. Two enemy PT boats were sighted, but escaped owing to their superior speed.

During the night of 18 Sept. two boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla will be put into operation at the patrol positions off Utrich Point.

In the course of minesweeping operations on the Danube one mine was discovered on shore.

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Berdyansk was evacuated according to plan. The harbor has been mined and all the installations demolished.

Escort and ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan.

Naval Staff gave the following instructions to Group South:

"1. We will be unable to pass through the Strait of Kerch as soon as the current evacuation of the "Gotenkopf" position has been completed. Therefore, all naval vessels and tonnage no longer required by them in the Sea of Azov, should be withdrawn in time. Naval Staff considers that only naval artillery lighters and a few coastal protection patrol boats should be left in the Sea of Azov. These vessels will have the task of protecting the northern coast of the Kerch peninsula, and are to be based at Genichesk.

The difficulties that may arise from the withdrawal of the entire transport tonnage, as for instance in the re-transportation operations from Berdyansk will simply have to be borne.

Please report your plans.

2. Russian attempts to land on the Crimea must be expected as soon as the "Gotenkopf" position has been evacuated. The Kerch peninsula is considered to be particularly exposed. The present condition of coastal defenses on the Kerch peninsula and future plans are to be reported.

3. In the interest of the security of the Crimea (Kerch peninsula) it is vital that Russian forces be at all costs prevented from moving through the Strait of Kerch. It is, therefore, especially important that as much attention be paid to emplacement of coastal batteries, as to the minelaying operations. Present battery positions, planned re-locations and sites for new batteries should be re-examined in this light. Future plans are to be reported."

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

In his message to Congress Roosevelt stated among other things that Allied troops are now engaged in an extremely severe battle south of Naples and that casualties are heavy. The landing in Italy is not the only landing envisaged by the Allies. In Quebec new plans for blows against German and Japan were made, and dates and places for further landings on the continent of Europe and elsewhere agreed upon.

About the negotiations with the Italians he was unable for obvious reasons to divulge the actual facts as yet. The surrendered Italian Fleet should prove a powerful weapon. The Allies are now aiming at the construction of bases which would bring southern and eastern Germany within range of their bombers. The air offensive is causing losses which will have to be made up by increased U.S. production. Operations in the Mediterranean and the air offensive are of considerable assistance to Russia. Events in the Mediterranean also have a direct bearing on the war against Japan and will lead to the reestablishment of complete Allied supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Considerable British naval forces are already now available for transfer to the East. It is now possible to close the serious gap in Allied world-wide naval supremacy between northwestern Australia and Ceylon. The Allies are facing a long and hard battle in the Far East. In India a switch-over to the offensive is being planned. Since the beginning of the war the Allies have been weakening the enemy forces by a wearing-down process. Their own forces must continue to fight those of the Axis in deadly combat. The superiority in men and especially in material which this requires demands that the present rate of production be kept up and intensified. Great Britain has already reached full production figures. Uneasiness was felt in June and July because of a drop in production. The curve has, however, been rising again since August. This war is essentially a war of production, in which the transport problem plays a decisive part. The Allies are actually still far from final victory in any one theater of war.

And the tasks ahead are tremendous.

To everybody's surprise Knox, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, arrived in London. It is rumored that he intends to discuss the disposition of the British and United States fleets in the Pacific and in the European theater of war, and also how the Italian fleet can best be utilized.

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Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

Our troops in the southern sector of the eastern front are fast retreating towards the Dnieper. Four to five divisions of the Northern Army Group have been moved to the Kiev area. Heavy rain is hampering our operations.

The heroic resistance of the troops of the Central Army Group in the area southeast of Smolensk has been highly rewarding.

The situation in the Balkans is marked by the increasing fighting strength of the insurgents. Some of the Italian troops are wearing Soviet stars on their uniforms. The military value of the Croatian Army is small. Heavy fighting is in progress in the area of Split. It is planned to bring two divisions up from upper Italy by the land route.

News of the liberation of Mussolini did not produce any noticeable reactions that might have been helpful to our armed forces in the areas occupied by the Italians.

Chief, Naval Staff stressed the fact that defensive warfare has never led to victory. The importance of the tonnage warfare has never been shown more clearly than at present. The enemy's operational liberty is based on tonnage. Submarine warfare must be resumed again at all cost.

II. In view of the transfer to home waters of the LUETZOW and the TIRPITZ, Group North/Fleet recommended that Commander, Destroyers should temporarily take charge of the duties of Commanding Admiral, Task Force until the task force is reinforced in the spring, and that when the TIRPITZ is re-transferred to the north, the Admiral at present commanding the Task Force should resume his duties as Commanding Admiral, Task Force. Chief, Operations Branch, Commanding Admiral, Task Force, could also be re-called a month after Admiral Bay takes over command. Commander, Destroyers would be deputized in home waters by a flotilla commander.

Chief, Naval Staff approved this recommendation. Naval Staff transmitted the approval to Group North/Fleet with the remark that the date for re-calling Chief, Operations Branch would have to depend on the situation.

III. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported on the effect of the Italian betrayal on the naval communications service. It must be assumed that a few radar sets and search gear and also the regulations for the naval tactical radar service have fallen

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into enemy hands. Furthermore the enemy will probably have full knowledge of the stage our radio decyphering of British codes has reached and he will also know what captured British material is in our possession. The enemy will undoubtedly have been enlightened as to his own mistakes and will take vigorous counter-measures.

IV. Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reported on the mine-exploding vessel situation in the western area. The additions in new mine-exploding vessels expected from September to December will bring little relief. Two Italian ships, the ATLANTA and the MADDALENA, are under survey as to their suitability for re-conversion. As both ships burn oil, their use as mine-exploding vessels could only be considered in an emergency.

According to a further report by Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division, the Reich Maritime Shipping Commissioner's Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean left Rome on 9 Sept. His office has been moved to Trieste. A request has been received from German Naval Command, Italy to move the office of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping back to Rome and to place this office, if possible, under the command of German Naval Command, Italy. Just because of the present critical development in the transportation situation it is absolutely imperative for all our forces to be concentrated together so that they can be used as economically as possible. Governor Kaufmann will be advised accordingly by Quartermaster Division.

Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division finally reported that up to 7 Sept. altogether 153 peniches of all kinds had been transferred from southern France to Italy.

V. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division reported on German - Croatian co-operation which is necessary in the Adriatic area and which can only be guaranteed if competent well-adjusted relationships exist between the commands. Group South pointed out the difficulties which will arise and which have arisen from the politically determined organization of the commands in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. The suggestion that part of the coastal defenses in the Adriatic area should be handed over to the Croatian Armed Forces in accordance with the Fuehrer directive on reinforcing Croatian military strength would, even if generally placed under the operational command of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic, carry with it all the disadvantages of coalition warfare and would thereby hamper the speedy erection of an effective coastal defense; such a measure should, therefore, be solely determined by the requirements of Germany which is after all defending the southern flank of Europe alone. Furthermore, in the interest of gaining further Italian support the presence of the Croatian Navy in the Adriatic should not be overemphasized at the moment.

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Opinions on the matter are therefore still very much divided.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Naval Staff should issue clear instructions in accordance with the Fuehrer directive.

VI. The Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission, Rear Admiral Topp reported:

a. that a preliminary submarine construction program has now been drawn up and a final one can be expected in the near future. No building program has yet been drawn up for the other constructions planned.

b. that delivery of the full steel allotment for the construction of submarines and PT boats under the 1943 Fleet Building Program has been promised. There is the danger that allotments for the dockyards in the western area may be reduced; this would affect the repairs of the vessels of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.

Commander in Chief, Navy rejected such a measure. If reductions have to be made anywhere, they are to be ordered by him alone.

VII. Chief, Operations Division reported on the telephone conversation he had with Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy at 2100 on 17 Sept. For the notes on it see Teletype 2100. According to this report, all tasks in the area of German Naval Command, Italy are, considering the difficult situation, being carried out, more or less according to plan. There is, however, an acute shortage of personnel. German Naval Command, Italy will exhaustively comb out its own area for personnel.

The administrative section of the Italian Admiralty (harbor administration, lighthouses etc) will shortly resume its functions again.

Certain people have been found in what is left of the Italian Admiralty and the Italian Navy who are willing to continue fighting on our side and who will be absorbed into the service of German Naval Command, Italy. A clear survey is not yet available, however.

The instructions given by Armed Forces High Command are being strictly adhered to by plainly ordering the utmost suspicion to be exercised in every single case. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy has no objections to the further employment of Commander Sestini. He considers him to be absolutely reliable. All operationally ready vessels are being used for escort duties; they are concentrating their activity on the evacuation of the islands. Furthermore there is considerable convoy traffic along the west coast as far as Capri.

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Lieutenant Commander Koehn, who is a tried expert on sea transportation, has been dispatched to Trieste in order to assist the Naval Shore Commander in getting transportation started in the Adriatic.

The offices of German Naval Command, Italy are at present still in the vicinity of Frascati at the Headquarters of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South. It is planned to move to Santa Rosa on 20 Sept.

Chief, Naval Staff pointed out that Commander Sestini must under no circumstances fall into enemy hands, as he has detailed knowledge of German submarine warfare. His transfer to another post, in the western area or in the Reich, will eventually have to be considered.

Commanding General, German Naval Command, Italy will receive the relevant instructions by teletype 1/Skl I op. 2838/43 Gkdos. Chfs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

VIII. Report of Fleet Operations Section, Operations Division:

a. The Naval Attaché in Tokyo recommended, on the assumption that the rubber situation is still as precarious as ever, that submarine U "178" be also used as a transport boat in order to speed up the manning and dispatch of the Aquila boats.

b. Commander, Destroyers again voiced his misgivings about the use of mines with new firing units for minefields in the Channel. Group West is willing to agree to a compromise, whereby mines with new firing units would only be interspersed in the minefields. Naval Staff is of the opinion that the use of mines with DM 1 firing units should be abandoned, but that mines with AA 1 firing units could be used within the experimental minefields ordered.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

IX. Mine Warfare Section, Operations Division reported that minelaying is possible off Brindisi, but impossible off Taranto and Bari owing to the depth. Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Commander, Submarines, Italy be given instructions to prepare a minelaying operation off Brindisi for one of the next operationally ready submarines in Pola. Thus it would be possible to form three new crews by filling up the vacancies with Italians. Lieutenant (s.g.) Dommes assisted by Lieutenant (s.g.) Silvestro should be commissioned to carry out the training. The appointment of

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Lieutenant (s.g.) Sparr as the commander of submarine U "178" was recommended, and of Lieutenants (s.g.) Schneewind, Petram, and Striegler as the commanders of the three Aquila boats. Lieutenant (s.g.) Dommes would be appointed Base Commander Penang when the training is finished.

Submarine Division will deal with this matter further.

According to the same telegram the Japanese Commanding Admiral in Penang proposed a short operation for submarine U "178" in the Gulf of Bengal with its subsequent return to Penang and permission to operate in all "L" naval grid squares on passage to the operational area. Lieutenant (s.g.) Dommes considers an operation by a single boat to be but a half measure. The proposal of the Japanese Admiral in Penang still requires the approval of the Japanese Naval Staff.

Naval Staff recommended that this suggestion should not be agreed to. Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

The relevant order has been dispatched to Commander, Submarines, Italy, copy to German Naval Command, Italy with the additional request to report the remaining stock of torpedo mines and their present location, and also to report further requirements and their destination.

X. Chief, Operations Division:

a. Prisoner of war transports through the Dardanelles are not dealt with in the treaty of Montreux, but the general neutrality law would rule against it. The matter will be investigated with the Foreign Office.

b. The Air Ministry confirmed that there would be a delay in the production of type "He 177" planes and, indeed, that, before a reserve of 470 fighters could be built up, there would be a one to two months' delay in reaching the monthly maximum output of 100 "He 177's".

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Field Marshal Milch's attention be drawn in writing to the special importance played by combined air and submarine operations in the tonnage warfare.

According to further information from the Air Ministry, the construction of further "FW 200" planes has also been stopped in favor of fighter production.

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Special Items.

I. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division ordered the immediate reduction by 20 per cent of the actual strength of the Army and Navy in Rumania as from 1 Sept. 1943, in order to save personnel wherever possible, especially where there is no fighting.

The Army's actual strength is 5,569 men, the Navy's 3,197. The execution of this order is to be reported by 1 Nov. 1943.

II. Quartermaster Division submitted to the Reich Minister for Production and Armament, Shipbuilding Commission an alteration to previous plans by requesting the construction of 25 PT boats per month. This must, however, not have an adverse effect on the building of other warships, such as motor minesweepers or minesweepers. The PT boats should be constructed of wood. With regard to the light PT boat program, Naval Staff only counts on completing the light PT boats LS "7" - LS "17".

III. Our Liaison Officer to the Italian Commander, Submarines suggested that the Italian submarines captured by us in the occupation of Spezia, Pola and Monfalcone be converted into transport submarines. This suggestion has been passed on to Submarine Section, Quartermaster Division and High Command, Navy, Submarine Section, Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Bureau of Naval Armament to be further dealt with.

The Liaison Officer further recommended that the transport submarines be not entirely manned with German personnel, as the Italian submarines are very different from our boats. He suggested that a number of Italian specialists be added to the German complement. He believes that ten men per boat would be sufficient.

This suggestion has been passed on to Commanding Admiral, Submarines for attention.

IV. Naval Intelligence Division, compiled and checked most of the reports obtained between 4 and 14 Sept. on the plans for enemy operations in the French area. Investigations show that in all probability nearly all the reports checked, except for a very few, came from enemy controlled sources and were simply transmitted with varying localities. Whereas the individual messages would at first sight often appear to be fairly important, seen collectively they showed that the enemy intended to deceive. Copy of the report from Naval Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 28446/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, "Enemy Situation Material".

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Situation 18 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" will receive the following order by Radiogram 0831:

"1. It is assumed that considerable supply traffic is moving between the Hawaiian Islands and the United States which probably scatters only very little and keeps to fixed routes. There are also ships with supplies on the run from the Hawaiian Islands to the bases in the South Seas and Australia. Furthermore there are warship movements of varying strength and running on an irregular schedule. The sea routes from the Hawaiian Islands to the South Seas are most probably patrolled by planes, as these routes lead to the battle area. Air patrol between Hawaii and the United States is probably light, as, given the situation, no enemy attacks are to be expected there.

"2. Naval Staff therefore considers a return passage east or north of Hawaii to be safer. This is, however, purely based on assumption, as details are not available."

Naval Staff dispatched to Ship "28" its comments on the engine log in her war diary of July 1943 by Radiogram 2231. See copy.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported that the changing of the flag on the MARCO POLO took place on 16 Sept. with appropriate ceremony in the presence of the Under Secretary of the Navy, Commanding Admiral, Naval Station, Kure, Chief, Submarine Division, Japanese Admiralty and other high ranking officers. The Japanese crew has been trained to the extent that the officers completely control all stations, but the enlisted men only their own station.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 50 planes were detected on operations as far as 14° 30' W. Activity most intense between 1100 and 2200. One British vessel was located at 2230 in BE 6610 and one at 2312 in BF 4450.

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According to an intelligence report, received from Ostrow dated 17 Sept., up to 15 Sept. no concentrations of shipping were noticeable that could indicate landings in France. Nor have any further landing craft arrived in the southern ports. Restrictions within the 10 mile zone have been greatly relaxed. The concentration of light naval vessels in Falmouth has increased.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off the Gironde, two south of Concarneau.

The torpedo boats FALKE and the T "14" dropped anchor in Royan roads in the forenoon. With regard to the damage sustained in La Pallice, an inaccuracy is now reported; namely that the mine-exploding vessel "16" was not sunk but is still afloat.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were unoccupied owing to the weather and the phase of the moon. On 17 Sept. three mines, presumably ELM/J mines were swept west of Blankenberghe. Escort operations in the Channel were carried out according to plan. Between 2243 and 2300 our batteries shelled targets located by radar northeast of Cape Gris Nez and northwest of Gravelines.

The 36th Minesweeper Flotilla submitted a brief report by Teletype 1135 on the loss through mines of the minesweepers M "3604", M "3606" and M "3600".

On 3 Sept. Group West submitted plans for the transfer of ships from the western area to home waters. The transfers will commence at the end of September and should be completed by the end of March 1944. It is planned to transfer nine ships belonging to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and five belonging to the Navy. Four further ships are not included in this plan, as they are too large and some are also too slow, so that in view of the tense enemy situation in the Channel their loss would certainly have to be expected. Group West is particularly set against the transfer of the steamer KERTOSONO of over 9,000 GRT. Group West based its plan on the consideration that by first moving all the smaller vessels, the enemy's attention will not immediately be drawn to this operation. Naval Staff approved this plan for the transfer and informed Quartermaster Division, Submarine Operations Staff and Commanding Admiral, Submarines accordingly.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Three PT boats moved from Cuxhaven to Ijmuiden. Two barges and a tug were sunk in an air raid on the port of Zipe and the shipping there.

Convoy and escort traffic in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North was carried out according to plan and without incident.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Only seven planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Single planes carried out air reconnaissances over the Petsamo - Vardoe area.

The submarine that operated in Ice Fiord between 14 and 16 Sept. did not see anything of the enemy submarine sighted there some time ago.

Own Situation:

The weather operation "Schatzgraeber" started at 1800 on 17 Sept. from Narvik via Tromsoe.

The supplying of the weather ship KOBURG was unsuccessfully carried out on the afternoon of 18 Sept.

In the area of Naval Command, Norway 20 ships were escorted north and 26 ships south. In the arctic coastal area twelve ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escorts.

Two submarines put out for a minelaying operation in the Kara Sea.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1640 minelaying by Russian planes was observed off the entrance to the port of Windau.

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No special reports are available from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries.

2. Own Situation:

Escort and supply traffic was carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic.

Otherwise nothing to report.

On 17 Sept. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North voiced his objection to the transfer of four minesweepers to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. After repeated deliberations Naval Staff decided that the order given was to stand and that the boats should be dispatched as soon as possible.

Naval Command, Baltic approved the proposal of Admiral, Denmark in connection with the formation of a Great Belt Coastal Protection Flotilla with Danish River Police ships based at Nyborg under the command of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. The necessary personnel - amounting to about 255 men - will be temporarily drawn from the flotillas of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and from the Harbor Protection Flotillas of Admiral, Denmark. As soon as Danish personnel is available, the boats of the Great Belt Coastal Protection Flotilla will be re-manned by Danes and controlled by Admiral, Denmark through Danish civilian authorities. (For copy of relevant report see Teletype 1915).

Operations Division has no objections.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 218 planes on operations over the western area and 11 planes over the Mediterranean. In the course of four air encounters during reconnaissance operations over the Bay of Biscay, one Halifax and one freight-carrying glider were shot down. No reconnaissance results were obtained.

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Smaller enemy forces attacked airfields, traffic installations and ship targets in Holland and western France during the day. During the night of 18 Sept. ten planes penetrated into the Aachen area where a few bombs were dropped. One plane penetrated into the Baltic Sea area and flew as far as Lodz presumably to drop agents. Eighty-six planes were reported to have penetrated into western France, presumably on minelaying operations off St. Nazaire, the Gironde estuary, and off Bordeaux.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported that during the night of 15 Sept. and on 17 Sept. harassing raids were carried out on ship targets at Palermo and Salerno and that altogether one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, two destroyers, and four steamers were damaged. We lost one plane in this operation.

Air Force Command, Southeast reported 28 dive-bomber operations against Cephalonia and an attack on Kos in the course of which five enemy planes were destroyed or damaged and three planes shot down. It was furthermore reported that an attack was carried out against two enemy destroyers in Stampalia; one of them was damaged and the other one had to be beached because of the damage she sustained. Finally it was reported that a steamer (1,500 GRT) loaded with motor vehicles was sunk and that hits were scored on smaller ships in Corfu.

An air reconnaissance of Cyprus, of the areas southwest of Greece, and southeast of Rhodes, as well as of the Dodecanese achieved no tactical results.

The enemy raided our airfields in Italy. Four of the attacking planes were shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

The 1st Air Force reported that 53 enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines. We lost three planes. The 5th Air Force reported that 34 planes had been on operations without any tactical results being obtained.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Nine freighters and fourteen escort vessels, part of a

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large convoy from the Atlantic, put into Gibraltar in the forenoon. Thirty-five freighters passed through the Strait of Gibraltar making for the Mediterranean and were joined by twelve laden freighters and sixteen escort vessels from Gibraltar. In the afternoon they were followed by a convoy of 15 freighters and 1 large tanker escorted by 3 destroyers and 6 U.S. gunboats travelling in the same direction. On 17 Sept. a U.S. hospital ship put out from Gibraltar into the Mediterranean after making a brief call.

No sighting reports have been received from the western Mediterranean.

In the eastern Mediterranean at 1645 on 17 Sept. our planes sighted two destroyers proceeding northwards approximately 120 miles south of Rhodes.

On 18 Sept. radio intelligence intercepted several messages reporting sightings of our convoys in the north of the Tyrrhenian Sea.

The enemy situation in the Gulf of Salerno showed no important changes. Six to eight large warships were observed in the forenoon in addition to the concentrations of shipping which are still as heavy as ever. The exact details are not available. According to radio intelligence, U.S. naval forces bombarded the coastal sector of the Salerno area in the forenoon.

The port of Palermo was heavily occupied. An increase in merchant tonnage was observed in Taranto. Other enemy-occupied ports in Italy showed no important changes.

An early landing on Sardinia is anticipated. American officers have arrived on the island.

According to an intelligence report, dated 11 Sept., the comments made in British political and military circles on the development of the situation in Italy at that time showed much disappointment as a result of the prompt and effective German countermeasures taken. Military plans seem to have been upset. According to further, as yet unconfirmed, reports, the 9th and 10th British Armies are said to have completed their preparations for operations on 15 Sept.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The submarines FRANCESCO RIMONDO and the H "6", captured in Bonifacio, had to be blown up because it proved impossible to tow them away.

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The rear-guard of the 90th Light Armored Division has been evacuated from Sardinia.

No other reports have been received from German Naval Command, Italy because the lines of communication have broken down.

With regard to the ground situation, see Teletypes 0230 and 0800 from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South. Although the offensive we launched at Salerno did not have the strategic result hoped for, it may nevertheless be considered that a considerable success was achieved. The enemy lost more than 3,000 men in prisoners taken, and it is assumed that his heavy casualties must amount to at least 10,000 men. Moreover his losses in material were heavy. Five infantry and two tank divisions will be out of action for a long time. The delay this will cause in the enemy's future plans and the disappointment felt about it have already found expression in the above-mentioned intelligence report from London. What primarily counts is, however, the time we have gained, and we shall use it to reinforce and assemble the forces in the parts of southern Europe which we still hold.

The recommendations made by the German Armistice Commission with regard to the handling of French warships in Toulon, which were submitted to Naval War Staff with the agreement of Group West, are dealt with in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. (See Teletype 1315).

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The operation for the occupation of Cephalonia has begun. Strong Italian resistance was at first encountered, but further landings were carried out according to plan.

The submarine chaser UJ "2111", an armed fishing vessel, and a PT boat have been sent from Piraeus to the island of Andros with orders to disarm the Italian garrison there.

In northern Euboea 450 Italian officers and men of the Aidepsos Command deserted to the insurgents. They took the gun breech mechanism of their batteries with them. An SS police company will be dispatched there to relieve the remaining members of the battery crew who are in danger. This relief company is due to arrive there on the evening of 19 Sept.

The situation in the area of the Dodecanese has grown very serious since 18 Sept.

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According to British radio news bulletins, British troops occupied Leros and Samos during the night of 17 Sept. Group South believes these to be advance detachments.

According to a report from the Xth Air Corps, the land and seaplane base on Kos is now being used by British planes.

The convoy of the submarine chaser UJ "2104" with the steamers PLUTO and PAUL was attacked by seven low-flying enemy planes at 1430 on 17 Sept. south of Naxos, whilst on passage from Piraeus to Rhodes. The commander and both officers of the watch were wounded, and the escorting Arado (German seaplane) was shot down. The convoy proceeded on its way and called during the early hours of 18 Sept. at the Italian occupied island of Stampalia, presumably to land the wounded. At 0600 the commander of the convoy reported an attack by unidentified surface vessels and the bombardment of the convoy from shore batteries on the island. Last report: "Crew of submarine chaser UJ "2104" taken prisoner by Italians - boat ready to be blown up." Nothing was reported about the steamers; their loss is to be expected.

According to a report from the Air Force, the attack was carried out by two destroyers, presumably those sighted at 1645 on 17 Sept. 120 miles south of Rhodes on a northerly course and which were, according to a report from the Xth Air Corps, sighted at 1230 on 18 Sept. south of Stampalia zigzagging on a southerly course, when they were attacked by our planes (compare also with Teletype 2015).

Lively enemy air activity was observed in the southern part of the Aegean Sea.

In view of this development in the situation Group South reported:

- "1. The penetrations achieved by surface vessels and the landing of British forces on Samos and Leros, probably also on Kos, shows how acute is the danger of the entire Aegean sea traffic being brought to a standstill.
2. We on our part have no vessels available for offensive operations as even the captured Italian torpedo boats are not yet ready for operations.
3. In addition to the request for air forces for operations against the islands, which, however, could not achieve decisive results by themselves, the urgent request for the dispatch of PT boats from the Adriatic and of submarines from the Mediterranean to the Aegean is renewed.

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These boats should be placed under the operational command of Commanding Admiral, Aegean, as he alone is placed in a position from where he can evaluate the rapidly changing situation and make the necessary dispositions.

4. As German submarines have not been operating in the Aegean Sea for quite some time, and as this fact is doubtlessly known to the enemy, prospects of result are good.

5. The possibility of laying mines on known enemy routes is being investigated, but the shortage of fast minelayers and escort vessels as well as the great depth of the water there will be a handicap."

Group South furthermore reported that:

"The development of the situation in the Aegean Sea demands that naval landing craft and Siebel ferries be immediately dispatched there in order to maintain the supply traffic along the coasts and between the islands, and also for the defense of the ports and straits against the insurgents. As disclosures made in our propaganda broadcast have made a transfer from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea impossible, the only way left is to transfer these craft by overland routes to Salonika or Kavalla, where facilities for immediate assembly are available. It is therefore requested that the sections of as many naval landing craft as possible be shipped at once to Salonika and those for Siebel ferries to Kavalla. Please state how many naval landing craft and Siebel ferries are to be expected and when the sections will arrive, so that the necessary preparations for their assembly may be made. (See Teletype 2025).

Naval Staff already has this matter under consideration, it will be further dealt with by Quartermaster Division.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to an indefinite radio bearing, an enemy torpedo boat was located off the central Caucasian coast at 2050.

At 1625 20 enemy planes attacked Anapa from a height of 4,000 meters without much effect. At 1700 eight planes made an unsuccessful low level attack on our Anapa convoy 18 miles northwest of Anapa. The ship's anti-aircraft guns shot down one of the attacking planes.

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Own Situation:

At 0540 the submarine U "18" torpedoed and sank an enemy supply transport (800 GRT) 20 miles northwest of Tuapse.

PT boat, motor minesweeper and Italian midget submarine operations had to be broken off owing to stormy weather.

The Danube has been once again opened to traffic from Giurgiu down to its mouth.

Transport, escort and ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan.

Group South reported that the German battery, until now in Constanta with the Rumanian anti-aircraft batteries, is withdrawing and has handed its equipment over to the Rumanians. (See Teletype 1425).

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Knox declared in London that the German submarines have been thoroughly defeated. He warned, however, against the danger of believing that this peril has been completely banished. A new German offensive is to be expected.

Mussolini made his first public appearance since his liberation in a radio broadcast. Amongst other things he mentioned the disgrace brought upon the Italian people by the surrender of their fleet at Malta.

Reuter reports that on 17 Sept. Chiang Kai-Shek declared that the transfer of the Italian Fleet to the Allies spells defeat for Japan, because large units of the Allied Fleet can now be dispatched to the Pacific.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

Our retreat in the southern sector of the eastern front is being carried out according to plan. In the central sector heavy defensive actions are still in progress. The Army General Staff plans to let the front gradually recede to the final winter positions.

The evacuation of Sardinia was carried out with practically no losses. Altogether 26,000 men and 4,000 vehicles were transferred to Corsica; and 3,000 of the men have already reached the mainland by air.

Enemy attacks were repulsed at Salerno. Seven divisions are badly battered.

Ten thousand insurgents are marching on Pola.

In view of the way the situation is developing in the Aegean Sea, Chief, Naval Staff considers that quite apart from the comments already submitted about Cephalonia and Corfu it will be necessary sooner or later also to draw the attention of Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command to the advisability of evacuating the Dodecanese.

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II. Chief, Naval Staff once more stated his views on the Metox question and refused to compare this matter with the torpedo scandal of 1940. At that time acts of sheer carelessness were revealed, whereas now human limitations are the sole reason. Some time ago Commanding Admiral Submarines was not acquainted with the Metox report, and could therefore neither see nor raise any objections. As matters seem to be developing now, it may be possible to dispatch blockade-runners this winter with no more than normal risks being involved. Our own research efforts in the radar field must not cease. The enemy will search for and find new ways which must be effectively counteracted. The present command of the Naval Communications Division is equal to its tasks.

III. Report of Fleet Operations Section, Operations Division:

a. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued, as ordered, detailed instructions on the demolitions which are to be carried out side by side with the evacuation and salvage operations on a very extensive scale during the retreat from Italy. Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 2841/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

b. Group North/Fleet and Commanding Admiral, Task Force suggested that the date for moving the TIRPITZ to home waters be pushed forward if possible, so that the ship, which is estimated to need a dockyard period of at least four months, can be made ready for action in northern waters by next March.

Chief, Naval Staff said that he felt considerable hesitation about approving the planned dockyard period in Gdynia. This Baltic port, which is most important for submarine training, will be endangered by air attacks to an intolerable extent if the battleship is located there for several months. Not only will the TIRPITZ herself be endangered, which in itself puts the successful outcome of the entire overhauling in question, but the submarine training which cannot be moved even temporarily from Gdynia will also be endangered. Given the present situation, the advantages of having restored one battleship to full operational readiness would be out of all proportion to the risks that submarine warfare would have to run. In connection with this, Captain Assman, up to now the Engineering Officer of the TIRPITZ, reported that the TIRPITZ could if necessary manage another year without a long dockyard period.

After having given due thought to the matter, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Group North/Fleet, Commanding Admiral, Task Force, and the Commander of the TIRPITZ be requested immediately to investigate and to report what the effects of a further decline in efficiency would be on the ability of the TIRPITZ to proceed and go into operation, if, instead of the planned dockyard period,

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she were to be repaired in the Norwegian area with the help of repair ships and workmen sent out there. The ship should be given a longer "non-operational period", and extended leave should be granted to parts of the crew. Relevant order as per Skl Qu A I S 2851/43 Gkdos. Chfs. filed in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

IV. Chief, Operations Division recommended that Field Marshal Milch should not be approached on the matter discussed on 18 Sept. about the delay in the production of "He 177" planes, but that Chief, Naval Staff should instead have a conversation with the Reich Marshal and Chief, Air Force, General Staff.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

V. Chief of Staff of Commander in Chief, Navy reported that the Swedish Naval Attaché in Berlin presented a note on the stopping of the tanker SVEADROTT in Kristiansand South. Operations Division will investigate the matter.

For further particulars see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items.

I. German Naval Command, Italy informed Chief of Staff, Naval Staff on the situation as regards the co-operation of the remainder of the Italian Navy as follows:

"Admiral Ferreri's appointment as Deputy Chief of the Admiralty and Admiral Girosi's as his Chief of Staff have been confirmed and Admiral Fontana is also willing to co-operate.

The Italian Navy will re-establish line telegraphy communications in the coastal network, and will resume in co-operation with the sector commanders, the lighthouse service along the entire coast and the port service, such as pilot service and harbor administration, with tried officers from Italian Naval High Command. The resumption of the arsenal and dockyard services is being prepared by the Admiralty."

II. Submarine Division reached the following decision about the proposal submitted by the Naval Attaché in Tokyo on the operation of the Aquila boats and submarine U "178" in the transport service:

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"1. Dommes' ship is to remain a combat submarine; she will not transfer more of her personnel to the Aquila boats than will then allow her, after having filled the vacancies with personnel from the auxiliary cruiser, to become operational again as soon as possible. She will then carry out operations in the Arabian Sea. Dommes is to remain in command.

2. Schneewind is to be in charge of the training of the Aquila boats and remains at the same time in command of his boat. The crews for the Aquila boats are to be drawn partly from his, partly from Dommes' submarine, and partly from the auxiliary cruiser personnel, and are to be filled up with Italians. Other details such as the dispositioning of the officers are left to your discretion.

3. Information on the radar situation and orders as regards the supply of cypher material to be used will follow."

The above decision was dispatched by Operations Division to the Naval Attaché in Tokyo by Telegram 2000.

Situation 19 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo was informed by Naval Staff as follows:

a. "As there is no change in the situation, and as the route followed by the "Flieder" proved to be all right, the same route is recommended for the "Kiefer" and the "Tanne".

b. No news from submarine CAGNI. It is assumed that this boat, like the ERITREA, deserted to an enemy port. Do not make rendezvous preparations. Should the boat, however, still show up, she must enter without escort."

With regard to the rendezvous for the BRAKE, the Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported:

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"Bali and Lombok Straits are blocked by mines. A rendezvous has been promised off Sunda Strait. The ERITREA did not know that the BRAKE is returning earlier than originally scheduled."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Between 1209 and 2303 single British vessels were located 210, 170, and 160 miles west and 110 miles northwest of Brest, and 250 miles west of Cape Ortegal.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine escorts were carried out according to plan.

In Rouen, the patrol vessel VP "1517", sunk on 9 Sept. by sabotage, has been refloated.

The destroyer Z "23" dropped anchor in Royan roads. The torpedo boat T "14" and the FALKE put into La Pallice from Bordeaux.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

The harbor defense vessel DW "35" hit a mine and sank 3000 meters northwest of Rotersand lighthouse. Nine men are missing.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-two planes were detected over the North Sea,

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making for the Norwegian coast.

There was slight artillery activity in the Petsamo area.

Own Situation:

At 1200 three enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked the submarine chaser UJ "1706" with a torpedo and machine-gun in Stadlandet.

Twenty-eight ships were escorted north and 19 south. In the arctic coastal area eleven ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escorts.

On 18 Sept. one of our submarines destroyed the Pravdy radio station with gun fire. She sighted a battery, a radio station, and eight houses on the eastern point of Nansen Island.

Supplies were dropped to the KOBURG in grid square Ae H 8875. The ship was so well camouflaged against aerial reconnaissance that she could only be found with the help of beacon signals.

Naval Staff approved the request of Naval Command, Norway for permission to remove the Sletta barrage and to lay flanking barrages at Utsire, providing due notice be taken of the wishes of Group North/Fleet as regards their location. Naval Command, Norway will be informed that the EMF mines with shallow settings are prone to self-detonation in ground swell or surf. Orders have therefore been given to avoid, if possible, laying the minefields at Utsire close inshore.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

From 0700 onwards, the sweeping of magnetic mines north of the northern forts was observed in Kronstadt Bay. At noon a group of about 20 motor minesweepers was located north of Vigrund. Our island batteries forced the ships to put up a smoke-screen and to withdraw to the northeast.

Lively air activity and raids on our Army coastal battery No. "509" were reported from the Lavansaari area.

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2. Own Situation:

A minelaying group with the ROLAND and the OSTMARK put out from Fredrikshaven to lay minefield XVIII, but weather conditions forced this group to turn about at 2010.

Escort and transport operations were carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic.

According to reports received from the Finnish Naval Attaché in Stockholm, station Huvodskaer heard submarine noises at 1800 on 15 Sept. and at 2300 on 16 Sept. Swedish shipping is therefore being convoyed through the islands. Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic believes this to be a fake location disseminated by enemy agents in order to spread uneasiness amongst shipping to Germany and Finland.

Minesweeping operations were carried out off the Strait of Irben and off Windau.

Special Items.

Admiral, Denmark and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark differ in opinion as far as the ownership rights of the Danish vessels seized is concerned. (See Teletypes 2221 and 2222). For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. It is urgent that a decision be reached in view of the planned formation of the Great Belt, Protection Flotilla.

V. Submarine Warfare.

On 17 Sept. the submarine tanker UT "488" sighted an aircraft carrier in CF 57. Nothing else of importance was reported from the Atlantic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

No operations were carried out by the 3rd Air Force. During the day the enemy attacked airfields in Holland and Belgium. Two Spitfires were shot down. During the night of 19 Sept. small air formations approached the Dutch coast. Naval anti-aircraft guns shot down one Halifax. Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Planes of the 2nd Air Force carried out a reconnaissance over the sea area off southern Italy. Four fighter-bombers attacked airfields near Salerno and on Sardinia and set 17 enemy planes on fire.

Planes of Air Force Command, Southeast shot two enemy planes down during an operation against Kos. Continuous air attacks were carried out in support of the operation against Cephalonia.

3. Eastern Front:

No reports were received from the Army front lines. The 5th Air Force reported light shipping traffic south of the Rybachi Peninsula; we did not carry out any operations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Ten freighters from the Mediterranean put into Gibraltar in the evening. At 2030 29 freighters, one transport, and five tankers passed Tangiers westbound. The destroyer "H 42" arrived in Gibraltar from the Mediterranean with her bow very heavily damaged. A transport, a French auxiliary cruiser, and a destroyer put in from the Atlantic.

A CAIRO-class cruiser put into Gibraltar from the east on the forenoon of 19 Sept.

An eastbound convoy of 30 steamers was sighted north of Alboran at 2030 on 18 Sept.

Shipping movements in the western and eastern Mediterranean are unknown, as no own air reconnaissances were carried out.

There is still a heavy concentration of shipping in the Gulf of Salerno. Our early morning reconnaissance sighted two southbound and one northbound convoy near Cape Palimuro, each consisting of 17 - 20 vessels including landing craft. New ships entered the Gulf of Salerno at noon. Fresh landings were observed in the afternoon 25 miles south of Salerno in which 50 vessels totalling about 350,000 GRT were engaged.

Salerno was also heavily congested by landing craft, merchant tonnage, and light naval vessels.

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Photographic reconnaissance of Taranto on 18 Sept. shows that there are 15 light naval vessels, 24 freighters, 3 tankers and 4 landing craft in port. Ground minesweeping activity was recognized in the outer harbor. The mines laid there by our PT boats seem to have been effective. One cruiser, 18 steamers and other small vessels were lying in Brindisi on 18 Sept.; and 31 small passenger ships and 8 freighters in Bari.

A submarine was reported to be located 25 miles southwest of Cape Spartivento at 1610.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The PT boat operation in the Gulf of Salerno was unsuccessful. A convoy of LST's was unsuccessfully attacked by torpedoes.

The Corsica traffic and the coastal traffic were carried out without incident. One plane was shot down when nine torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the war transports KT "8" and KT "31".

25,800 men, 4,650 vehicles, 4,765 tons of supplies, 66 medium anti-tank guns, 78 heavy anti-tank guns, 12 light and 12 heavy infantry guns, 62 tanks, 37 assault guns, 23 armored combat cars, 23 light and 8 heavy field howitzers, 4 10-centimeter guns, 119 8.8-centimeter guns, 147 2-centimeter guns and 30 2-centimeter four-barreled machine-guns were evacuated from Sardinia in all.

The steamers CHAMPAGNE and ANJOU, the war transports KT "8" and KT "31", 10 naval landing craft, 5 tugs, and 5 péniches are available for the traffic between Corsica and the mainland. To this tonnage 9 steamers totalling about 10,000 GRT, the war transport K "16", the fast escort vessel SG "11", the KRETA, and some more péniches will be added by 22 Sept., and 23 naval landing craft, 7 Siebel ferries, 3 LCI's, 8 torpedo boats, the war transport KT "2", and 2 Italian war transports will be seized at Maddalena, as soon as the Sardinia traffic ceases.

Naval Staff has sent the following information to the Naval Liaison Officer to Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Staff, Commander in Chief, Air Force with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy:

"As there are no stocks of TMB mines in Pola, and as the supply available in Spezia is required for mining the harbor by motor minesweepers, German Naval Command, Italy has requested the immediate shipment of 72 TMB mines to Trieste and of 60 TMB mines to Spezia."

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Operations Division will arrange the shipments requested and is additionally allotting 60 LMB mines for minelaying operations in Spezia harbor, as TMB mines should, if possible, not be used for this purpose.

The motor minesweepers R "39" and R "188" put into Marseilles from the command area of the 7th Defense Division.

On 16 and 17 Sept. Group West reported several attempted murders in Marseilles and the Rhone delta.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The enemy destroyer that was damaged by our Air Force on 18 Sept., but which was not beached, put into Stampalia. Air attacks on the destroyer that was beached were resumed on 19 Sept. According to air reconnaissance reports the airfield on Kos was occupied by 19 planes. Our air raids were successful.

The escort vessel GA "45" reported that the Italians on Andros refused to surrender their arms. The ship is trying to carry out the same tasks in Seriphos and Siphnos.

The Italian garrison on Syra has been evacuated from the island by the motor minesweeper DRACHE, the steamer HADRIAN and by air. The DRACHE is proceeding to Salonika in order to take on mines. The vessels that participated in the Cephalonia operation put into Prevesa.

Suda Bay and Argos (near Corinth) were raided by enemy planes during the night of 18 Sept.

Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command instructed Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, copy to Naval Staff as follows:

"Although there is at present sufficient tonnage available in the Aegean Sea, it will slowly become depleted, and it will be impossible to replace it.

The possibilities of getting ships through the Strait of Otranto are not however going to improve; they are in fact growing worse from day to day. It must be left to the decision of Naval Staff whether ships can at present still be moved through the Strait of Otranto."

Operations Division, Naval Staff has drawn the attention of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast, copy to Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, to its report of 13 Sept. in which the same opinion had already been expressed.

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Group South asked for a supply of 300 EMC and 200 EMF mines with 200 meter mooring ropes from the allotment reserved for German Naval Command, Italy.

Operations Division, Naval Staff will make the necessary arrangements.

The inquiry made by Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff about the transport facilities available from Rhodes and Scarpanto to Crete in the event of operation "Achse", has been replied to as follows as a result of reports received on 13 Sept. from Group South:

- "1. From Scarpantos to Crete:
one transport, two landing craft for one trip.
2. From Rhodes to Crete:
three transports, four trips each, duration 10 days.
Equipment 10,000 tons equal to four medium-sized steamers, one trip each, duration 10 days. Heavy equipment and vehicles, two or three trips each, duration 25 days. Tanks and similar equipment with naval landing craft only, three available, each landing craft six trips, duration 21 days.

These figures do not apply to normal operations; they are based on the assumption of this being the last chance of transportation."

The above details have been mentioned here again, because the evacuation of the Dodecanese is again under consideration.

Black Sea:

The enemy continued to maintain lively air activity against our naval vessels and ports on 18 and 19 Sept. Enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked two mine-exploding vessels and four naval landing craft on passage from Constanta to Sevastopol with five aerial torpedoes. Three naval landing craft on passage from Sulina to Odessa were attacked by enemy planes with bombs in Anapa. One naval landing craft was damaged; one plane was shot down. The naval artillery lighter MAL "8" was lost on 18 Sept. owing to heavy seas whilst on passage from Genichesk to Kerch.

Weather conditions made combat operations impossible for our naval forces.

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One mine was cleared at the mouth of the Dnieper by a mine-sweeping plane.

Convoy and ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan.

Naval Staff allotted and arranged for the immediate shipment of 400 UMA mines and 200 UMB mines with 200 meter mooring ropes to Kerch as requested by Group South. Minelaying operations in the Strait of Kerch have almost exhausted the supply of mines available to Group South.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance.

Mr. Churchill returned to England. It is expected in London that the Ambassadors conference between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians will take place at the beginning of October.

Highly noteworthy is a very outspoken article on British foreign policy in the periodical "Nineteenth Century and After", which probes beneath the surface and points out the precarious position that Great Britain will find herself in if she fails to maintain the balance of power in Europe. It will, however, be impossible to maintain this balance, should the Russian sphere of influence ever stretch from the Baltic to the Aegean. The influence predominating in these areas will gain control of the whole of Europe. The abandonment of this central zone would endanger Britain's positions in the Mediterranean and the Near East and imperil the security of India and the Persian Gulf. This will ultimately force Britain to revise her policy towards Germany.

Reviewing the Anglo-Russian relationship in all other spheres of common interest, the periodical likewise comes to the conclusion that the differences will undoubtedly lead to conflict if Great Britain does not take a firmer and more self-assured stand. For the complete extract from this article see "Foreign Press Report" 20 Sept. 1943, II 2 c.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.I. Army Situation:

Withdrawals from the Kuban bridgehead and in the southern sector of the eastern front continue without any noticeable enemy pressure. The situation in the Kiev area is not without danger. Our forces are being reinforced. The force of the enemy attacks in the Smolensk area is abating. The Army General Staff anticipates a heavy wedge-like attack against the boundary between the Central and the Northern Army Groups.

The SS Battalion failed in its attack on Split. New landings are expected in southern Italy. According to captured enemy documents, it is planned to occupy Italy up to and including the Rome area. There are 15,000 British prisoners of war equipped with Italian arms located south of Ancona.

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The Croatian Training Division in France mutinied.

II. Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported:

"The execution of Commanding Admiral, Spezia was not carried out, because he was set free on the orders of Commanding General, 51st Army Corps (General Feuerstein) owing to his loyal attitude and great eagerness to co-operate. In the opinion of General Feuerstein, and in my opinion also, a subsequent condemnation without having proved his guilt would harmfully affect the willingness of other officers to co-operate. Instructions are requested for La Spezia."

Chief, Naval Staff agreed that the plan to arrest and court-martial Commanding Admiral, La Spezia should be abandoned.

The Swedish tanker SVEADROTT was prevented from sailing by order of the Foreign Office; this is connected with present negotiations about oil shipments to Sweden. The Swedish Naval Attaché should, therefore, be referred to the Foreign Office.

Special Items.

With regard to Transnistria the following information has been received from Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command:

"Marshal Antonescu agreed to the establishment of rear supply bases in Transnistria on condition that the occupation be kept to an absolute minimum and that a definite plan, giving full details, be submitted prior to the establishment of the bases.

High Command, Navy and Commander in Chief, Air Force are herewith requested to submit to the German General attached to the Rumanian Armed Forces High Command a detailed list of all plans for Transnistria. Plans of the airfields we intend to build are to be included in this list.

The German General attached to Rumanian Armed Forces High Command requested that an Air Force Liaison Officer and, if necessary, also a Naval Liaison Officer be commissioned and stationed with the Liaison Staff in Transnistria (Odessa); it would be in our own interest to comply with this request.

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German Naval Command, Italy reported on the execution of operation "Achse". Copy as per 1/Skl 26312/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV. In the attached survey of the situation it is said:

"Our weakness on land, especially after our failure to stem the attack of the enemy landing divisions at Salerno, but primarily our hopeless air inferiority is forcing us to retreat step by step on the land front. Enemy landings from the sea and from the air are very likely in the Rome area as this would isolate many divisions of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.

Our Air Force is badly handicapped in its combat operations by the occupation of the airfields around Foggia by the enemy who is thus placed in a position from which he can now also harass all traffic routes on the Italian peninsula with fighter-bombers. Moreover the enemy is holding flanking positions on Sardinia and Corsica. The sea traffic, which is now needed more than ever, is immensely endangered thereby. Even without the enemy occupying the Ionian Islands and landing in the Balkans, though that also is still quite feasible, the Adriatic - Aegean traffic will soon be completely stopped because the Strait of Otranto is in enemy hands. The time will therefore unavoidably come when we shall be forced to fall back to the Apennine positions. The inadequate number of our submarines and PT boats, and the weakness of our Air Force prevent us from operating effectively against enemy movements at sea. With the falling out of the Italian Navy - it is very unlikely that it will be used in the Mediterranean - any further threats to enemy naval forces have been eliminated, and they thus become available for operations in other theaters. Certain units will of course be retained to cover landing forces with gunfire from the sea - a measure which has proved so effective.

Operations Staff, German Naval Command, Italy will soon have to be moved north. Preparations for the evacuation have already been made in order to assure an uninterrupted command. The future command station will be Levico. The duties of German Naval Command, Italy have been very much reduced in scope since the transfer of the responsibility for the French Riviera and the Dalmatian - Albanian coast and the discontinuation of the sea traffic. The following recommendation, which has not yet been fully worked out especially as regards coordination with the Army, is submitted to the effect that the following be placed under one Naval Group Command: Admiral, Western Mediterranean, his command area to extend from the Spanish border to the front lines along the Tyrrhenian Sea; Admiral, Adriatic, his command area to include the west coast of Greece; Admiral, Aegean.

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German Naval Command, Italy proposed to amend this as follows:

"1. Under Group West: Admiral, Western Mediterranean, his command area to extend from the Spanish border to the front line on the west coast of Italy.

2. Under Group South: Admiral, Adriatic, his command area to extend from the front line on the east coast of Italy to the now existing command boundary, and Admiral, Aegean with his command area as before. The area boundaries of the Naval Shore Commanders, Italian Riviera (under Admiral, Western Mediterranean) and Western and Northern Adriatic (under Admiral, Adriatic) should correspond to the boundaries of the Army Groups and Army Corps respectively.

3. German Naval Command, Italy should be dissolved, as the tasks to be carried out by the newly planned organization are so small that the present large staff could not be justified in the future. The tasks still remaining can be taken over without any difficulty by the proposed new commands."

Group South made the following comments on the above:

"1. With the loss of Sicily, the Mediterranean has been strategically cut into two parts which it will be impossible to link again.

2. The bordering seas such as the Adriatic, the Ionian, the Aegean and the Black Sea cannot be separated from the eastern Mediterranean.

3. Since the loss of southern Italy, the Adriatic, the Ionian, the Aegean, and the Black Sea form the inshore waters of our most southeasterly flanking positions in the strategically important fortifications of southeastern Europe.

4. Supplies for naval operations in these sea areas can only be fed through ports along the peninsula stretching from Venice to the mouth of the Danube.

5. This necessitates an overall command of the Adriatic - Ionian Sea and the Aegean - Black Sea."

These recommendations will be examined by Naval Staff. The present situation in Italy does not, however, for the time being allow for the dissolution of Operations Staff, German Naval Command, Italy. The matter will be further dealt with by Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division.

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III. On 17 Sept. Quartermaster Division, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command submitted a Fuehrer directive about the appointment of a Greater Germany Plenipotentiary in Italy and about the future structure of occupied Italian territory as from 10 Sept. 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 26667/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IV. Naval Intelligence Division submitted evaluations of newly captured enemy material on the participation of United States naval forces in the landings in the Licata area (Sicily). Copy as per 1/Skl 28686/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, "Intelligence Report Evaluations, Foreign Navies".

Situation 20 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

On 15 Sept. the Simonstown radio station transmitted to the Admiralty in London the names of 129 steamers, presumably from the South African area.

This information has been passed on by Radiogram 0922 to all in foreign waters.

2. Own Situation:

No reports were received from our vessels.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay.

At 0708 one freighter was located in AL 9480. One British vessel was located at 1930 in AL 1970 and another one at 2022 in AM 1730.

According to an intelligence report, a convoy of 34 freighters and tankers will leave the Bristol Channel for Gibraltar between 18 and 21 Sept. The cargo is said to consist mostly of tanks and

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air force material. Some of the ships are carrying landing craft as deck cargo. Eight troop transports with 12,000 men on board left Liverpool for southern Italy on 19 Sept.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On 19 Sept. the tug MORINIE sprang a leak and sank off the outer jetty in Royan. The mine-exploding vessel "135" struck a mine and was heavily damaged off Lorient and the ship was towed into port. Submarine and other escorts were carried out according to plan. Altogether five ELM/J mines and one ELM/A mine were swept off the Gironde, west of La Pallice, and west of Lorient.

The destroyers Z "23", Z "24" and Z "32" of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla left Lorient roads to carry out exercises at sea. An anti-submarine air patrol of the training area has been arranged with Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. Fighters will be held in readiness against enemy air shadowers.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Between 0045 and 0756 eight PT boats attacked boats in our patrol positions at Rom, and in grid squares HJ "02" and "03". The enemy boats had just been firing torpedoes against the wreck of the STRASSBURG. Both PT boats reported damage and casualties. The enemy put up a smoke-screen and withdrew.

Sweeping of channels and other minesweeping operations were impeded by bad weather. Patrol positions off the Dutch coast were unoccupied.

One ELM/J mine was swept west of Neuwerk.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Nineteen planes were detected on operations over the

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North Sea. Slight artillery activity was reported from the Petsamo area. Air activity over the Kirkenes and Banak areas was also very slight. Between 0530 and 1800 on 19 Sept. six raids were carried out with bombs and machine-guns by altogether 43 planes; 15 bombs were dropped. We sustained a few casualties. At 0505 on 20 Sept. a Russian reconnaissance plane was reported over the Nordkyn area. This plane machinegunned the radio station at Cannes. At 0456 the minesweeper M "467" sighted two PT boats west of Buholmraasa which withdrew to the northwest without returning our gunfire. At 0400 one enemy plane was reported south of Stavanger.

Own Situation:

Sixteen ships were escorted north and 23 south. In the arctic coastal area seven ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escorts.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Bad weather forced the minelayer group OSTMARK to turn about at 2010 on 19 Sept. The minelaying operation "Lithium" will be carried out, weather permitting, on 21 Sept. as planned.

A large-scale search operation was carried out from 2015 onwards in the Kiel area, because a larger number of Russian and Polish prisoners of war are reported to have escaped from camps in Germany.

Minelaying planes were observed west of Dagoe; shipping has been warned.

Unfavorable weather conditions to some extent impeded operations in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic.

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V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported 28 planes on operations over the British Isles and vicinity and over the Atlantic and also 20 planes over the Mediterranean.

No bomber or reconnaissance operations by our own planes have been reported.

Fourteen enemy planes were reported over Holland but no attacks were made. Two enemy planes were shot down in Belgium and northern France during daylight machine-gun attacks on traffic installations. Twelve planes attacked railroad stations in western France. During the night 40 planes dropped sabotage containers over the Brest area; one of these containers has been secured.

During the night of 20 Sept. ten planes flew in via the North Sea. Two of these planes penetrated as far as Berlin and dropped two bombs and an LLZ (probably an aircraft mine:Tr.N.) on the Siemens - Plania works in Lichtenberg.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported air reconnaissance operations over the sea areas of southern Italy.

The Naval Liaison Officer to Chief, Operations Branch has again requested Operations Staff, Commander in Chief, Air Force to carry out an air reconnaissance of the east coast of Sicily and of Malta, although these operations will be very hazardous.

Air Force Command, Southeast reported that the two enemy vessels that penetrated into the Aegean Sea on 18 Sept. were not destroyers but large PT boats, probably corvettes, and that both ships ran ashore off Stampalia.

The enemy displayed lively activity over the Salerno area; air reconnaissance was carried out by a few planes over Foggia and Viterbo. Two bombs were dropped on Rhodes. One plane was shot down by our anti-aircraft guns.

3. Eastern Front:

Forty planes were shot down over the Army front lines. We lost two planes.

The 5th Air Force reported 24 planes on operations without any tactical results being achieved.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the morning a British auxiliary aircraft carrier and three destroyers put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

The battleship JEAN BART is said to have been repaired and will leave Casablanca for the Mediterranean between 20 and 25 Sept.

No sighting reports were received from the western and the eastern Mediterranean.

Shortly after noon our air reconnaissance over the central Mediterranean observed 54 transports, 23 naval landing craft, 3 warships, presumably cruisers, and 3 smaller warships, presumably destroyers, as well as 3 other vessels in the Gulf of Salerno. Two small merchantmen were lying in Ajaccio on 19 Sept.

A submarine location was reported on the afternoon of 19 Sept. south of Cape Teulada.

An intelligence report from Athens states that the following ships were in Beirut on 15 Sept.: the British submarine TOROS, 3 Greek submarines, 1 French destroyer, several freighters, 2 of which left under escort of a French destroyer, and some smaller escort vessels.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

No report has yet been received of the PT boat operation carried out off Salerno during the night of 19 Sept.; German Naval Command, Italy's evening situation report has not yet been received.

Operations Staff, German Naval Command, Italy is moving from Frascati to Santa Rosa.

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Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy urgently requested that 150 to 200 men drawn from merchant marine personnel be immediately dispatched to man various 2,000-3,000 GRT steamers that are ready to sail. These ships are urgently needed for the ferry traffic between Corsica and the continent. Attempts to draw the required personnel from his own area have so far been unsuccessful because Italian sailors are absolutely unreliable.

Submarine U "81" ran into the net barrage when leaving Pola.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The commander of an Italian PT boat reported that he disarmed an Italian general, two British majors, and a Greek captain, whilst on passage from Samos to Nikaria. He took them to Syra where they were put into custody.

The commander, who had been ordered to report at Athens, further stated that most of the Italians are anti-British. On 16 Sept. 150 British armed with German submachine-guns landed on Samos from a corvette, 200 British landed on Leros from two corvettes and two destroyers, and 100 British landed on Kos. Seven Spitfires were seen on the Kos airfield. The Italian troops on Nikaria were disarmed by the partisans. A British general is said to be travelling between the Turkish mainland and the occupied islands. The Italians on Leros, most of whom are loyal, urgently requested German help and reinforcements. Eight Italian PT boats are waiting for an opportunity to leave.

The former Italian Chief of Staff of the Aegean Naval Command has been brought to Belgrade by plane.

In the forenoon further troops were landed on Cephalonia. On Seriphos 72 Italians were disarmed and taken away by ship.

The netlayer group is on passage from Lemnos to Salonika, the DRACHE is on passage from Chalkis to Salonika. Seven ships of the Coastal Defense Flotilla, Macedonia, are patrolling the north coast of Euboea and reported the situation there to be quiet.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

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Own Situation:

During the enemy air attack on Taman on 19 Sept. a lighter sprang a leak and had to be beached. Further enemy air raids were carried out on 19 and 20 Sept. on Temryuk, Anapa, and on our last Kerch-Anapa convoy, which had already been attacked on its outward-bound passage. Damage and casualties were slight.

Our mining of Anapa harbor was carried out according to plan. The last convoy of 15 naval landing craft reached Kerch. Since 5 Sept. altogether 61,717 tons of supplies have been shipped from Kerch to Anapa. Between 7 and 20 Sept. 8,553 tons have been transported from Anapa to Kerch.

The minefield operation K7 in the Strait of Kerch has been started.

Submarine U "20" carried out her minelaying operation according to plan. The boat is now on her homeward passage to Sevastopol.

Two boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla will operate in the Anapa sea area during the night of 20 Sept. Three naval landing craft are in patrol positions northeast of Gelendzhik. A naval artillery lighter, a naval landing craft, and nine combined operations boats are in patrol positions off Temryuk.

Bad weather handicapped the convoy traffic along the Crimean coast.

Traffic across the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan.

A Rumanian vedette boat on the Danube reported that one mine had been swept.

Admiral, Black Sea reported that all important supplies have been removed from Sardiensk according to plan. The naval landing craft and other tonnage engaged in this operation will be sent to Kerch as soon as their cargo has been discharged. Four naval artillery lighters, four naval landing craft, and eight boats of the Harbor Defense Flotilla will be retained at Genichesk for the defense of the Azov coast line still held by us. We have to reckon with the possibility that the ships may become icebound.

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VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

Evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead continues according to plan. Army Group A will eventually reach the final Melitopol - Zaporozhe line.

In an enemy drive towards Kiev an Hungarian Light Division fled and left a 40-kilometer wide gap in the front line in the Chernigov area.

In Italy the enemy only continued to follow our retreat movements half heartedly. Sabotage on traffic installations in northern Italy is increasing. In Istria insurgents are offering stiff resistance.

II. In view of the approaching blockade-runner season, Group West again requested the transfer of four additional destroyers to the western area for operations during the coming period of long dark nights. The reasons for this request are stated in teletype 1/Skl 26445/43 Gkdos., copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

It might be possible to assign one destroyer to Group West at the end of October and another one at the beginning of November. Ten destroyers will be available in the northern area until the end of November, beginning of December, and after that seven or eight. In addition to these, the destroyer leader of Commander, Destroyers and destroyer Z "28" may then be available for the northern area. There are twelve torpedo boats available in the western area until the end of this year, besides the four plus two destroyers to which another two may be added later on.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

III. Chief, Naval Communications Division reported that, after three years of unsuccessful attempts, the problem of applying radar location to torpedo firing had now been solved.

IV. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division reported that according to information received from German Naval Command, Italy, the other branches of the Armed Services are requesting the Navy to take a share in guard and other security duties on shore by for instance occupying the dockyards assignments for which present available naval forces are insufficient.

Chief, Naval Staff approved that a report on this be sent to Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, with copies to Army Group B; Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast; Army Group E; Commanding General, Armed Forces, West; and to other Naval Commands involved.

Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division will dispatch a relevant order by teletype.

V. Chief, Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division reported that the exact figures of the tonnage newly acquired in the Italian and Adriatic areas could not be given yet. According to figures, as yet unchecked, given by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, there are about 188,000 GRT in the Genoa area and approximately 288,000 GRT in the Adriatic Sea. The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping can provide only a very limited number of crews. Even if this administration were more firmly organized, a large part of the acquired tonnage could still not be manned.

VI. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reported that according to Reuter, the Italian submarine CAGNI has arrived in Durban and surrendered there under the armistice terms. Thus the only combat submarine from the Bordeaux base which was out at sea has deserted to the enemy.

VII. Conference on the Situation in the Mediterranean:

a. Fleet Operations Section, Operations Division submitted a survey on the state of the coastal defenses. The mounting of batteries and the laying of minefields along the coast of the south of France has been more or less completed. No complete survey is yet available from the coast of northern Italy. There, attempts are being made gradually to build up a defense from the strength of the forces now being brought up. A naval artillery detachment of about 1,000 men was dispatched from home territory on 19 Sept. We have neither sufficient equipment nor personnel at our disposal in southern Italy, and there will only be mobile Army forces available to resist enemy landings.

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Very little material is available in the Adriatic area. There are only very few batteries available in Venice and Trieste. A naval artillery battalion is now on the way to Istria to occupy the coast in the Pola area. All the minefields laid are antiquated; the islands are mostly occupied by hostile Italians or insurgents.

The defense organization along the Dalmatian coast has not yet been fully co-ordinated.

Available naval forces: the 29th Submarine Flotilla under the command of Commander, Submarines, Italy, is operating from Toulon. Those submarines at present still stationed in Pola are operating from the Adriatic Sea.

At present the 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas have one and three ships respectively, ready for operations in the Tyrrhenian Sea. These flotillas are based in Toulon and Via Reggio, and their ships are at present operating from Gaeta and Civitavecchia. In the Adriatic Sea there are at present four ships engaged in convoy and escort operations for prisoner of war transports. These ships are, however, due for a dockyard period. As soon as they have completed their tasks, they will be transferred to the Aegean Sea, where two other ships of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla are already undergoing repairs. The remaining ships of these two flotillas are out of operations in Toulon dockyard, but will be ready again shortly.

The 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla has eight operational vessels and the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla three ships. Five of the ships of these two flotillas are undergoing a short dockyard period. The 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla has two operational ships, seven ships are non-operational. The motor minesweepers are based at Rapallo.

The torpedo boat TA "9" of the 3rd Escort Flotilla is due for dockyard repairs, but is at present still in operation. Also operational are the fast escort vessel SG "11" and the KRETA.

The 22nd Submarine Chaser Flotilla has two operational ships and eight non-operational ships.

Furthermore the minelayers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN are operational in Toulon.

For further particulars of available forces in the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea see the chart in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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In the Greek area Corfu is obviously in enemy hands. Preparations for the recapture of the island are under way. An emergency coastal defense system has been more or less built up in the Gulf of Prevesa.

In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samos, Leros, and Kos are occupied by the enemy. The present minefields that were laid according to plan are more or less of recent date. This defense system consists of minefields against surface vessels and submarines as well as net barrages.

b. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division provided an overall survey of the organizations ordered and those already created, the boundaries of the command areas and the strength of our own naval forces before and after operation "Achse". The relevant details have been given in the War Diary from time to time.

In view of the situation, Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Group West should release one naval artillery battalion to Group South.

c. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division furthermore reported on the deliberations held and the decisions reached on the final organization of the commands in the Mediterranean area, the requests and recommendations made by German Naval Command, Italy and Group West being duly taken into consideration. (See War Diary 20 Sept.)

Chief, Naval Staff agreed with the opinion expressed by Naval Staff that the present unsettled situation does not allow for a final decision to be made yet. In view of the attitude of German Naval Command, Italy the organization should not be altered for the time being.

d. Surface Fleet, Operations Section, Operations Division reported additionally about future plans for operations by the naval forces. The evacuation of Corsica will take about another fortnight. By then most of the convoy and escort tasks in the Tyrrhenian Sea will have been completed. The task of defending the waters off southern France and outside of the Italian ports in the Tyrrhenian Sea which are within our sphere will remain.

In contrast to this diminishing activity in the Tyrrhenian Sea, the tasks in the Adriatic Sea, such as the transportation of reinforcements and supplies, are ever increasing, and in the Greek area larger-scale operations for the transportation of supplies to, and the evacuation of troops from, the islands will probably have

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to be carried out in the near future. At present our forces are still dispositioned according to former centers of operation: they are strongest in the west and weakest in the Adriatic Sea. Certain adjustments will, therefore, have to be made. In order to carry this out it is planned to secure and commission every available and suitable vessel in the Aegean and the Adriatic. Crews for these vessels will be taken from those ships in the Tyrrhenian Sea which are no longer needed there. Furthermore, it will be possible to move the motor minesweepers and naval landing craft in the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic Sea by overland route via northern Italy. Small PT boats can also be transferred that way. It is planned to leave the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, the submarine chasers, the fast escort vessels and the torpedo boats in the western Mediterranean, but to transfer the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Adriatic Sea and the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Aegean Sea. The distribution of the naval landing craft and Siebel ferries will have to be limited to the Adriatic Sea, should their transfer to Salonika overland or via the Danube waterway prove impossible. The transfer of further large PT boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla to the Aegean Sea may be carried out later on.

Chief, Naval Staff approved these plans.

The relevant instructions have been sent to all commands concerned by teletype 1/Skl I op. 26527/43 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

A chart showing the command organization of German Naval Command, Italy has been drawn up by Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division. Copy as per 1/Skl 25890/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that the survey of the situation in the Mediterranean given above be shown to the Fuehrer at the next opportunity. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters will attend to this matter.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

VIII. Surface Fleet, Operations Section, Operations Division
reported that:

a. The planned minelaying operation off Brindisi by submarine U "81" can no longer be carried out during the present new moon period. Chief, Naval Staff approved the recommendation that this boat be released for combat operations and that another submarine should carry out the minelaying operation later on.

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b. Group North/Fleet has asked for a decision on operations by the LUETZOW. Naval Staff recommends dropping operation "Husar" and moving the LUETZOW to home waters for her dockyard period.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. There are no comments to be made on the operational order submitted by Group North/Fleet for the operation that is planned to start from Alta on 23 Sept. The keyword for the part of the operation led by Admiral, Northern Waters is "Hansa" and for that led by Group North "Hermelin".

c. The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported that the Japanese Navy had now agreed to the release of two of the Aquila boats to the German Navy, but that they wished to retain the third boat.

Chief, Naval Staff also declined to accept this compromise.

Special Items.

I. Naval Staff cancelled its order of 2 Sept. regarding the dispatch of destroyer ZH "1" to Group North and informed Group North/Fleet, Group West, with copy to Commander, Destroyers, that the destroyers ZH "1" and Z "34" would be assigned to Group West for operations in the western area. The transfer is to be carried out by Group West as soon as the ships are operational again.

Destroyer Z "28", the destroyer leader of Commander, Destroyers, will be assigned to Group North/Fleet in place of destroyer ZH "1". Order as per l/Skl I op. 2870/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

II. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that the construction of type XXIII submarines be increased from 120 to 140 boats. This decision was reached because Commanding Admiral, Submarines has meanwhile put in a request for 20 type XXIII boats for training crews of the type XX boats in the Baltic Sea. These boats will not be available for operations in the south.

The necessary orders have been sent to the Head Committee of the Shipbuilding Commission by Submarine Section, Quartermaster Division.

III. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command advised Naval Staff for information that orders were dispatched to Commanding

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General, Armed Forces, Norway informing him that the 181st Infantry Division will probably have to be moved to another theater of war (south or southeast). This division will first be moved to Denmark and its transfer is to be so prepared that it can be carried out with the utmost speed from 1 Oct. onwards. (See Teletype 1310).

Commanding Admiral, Task Force and Commander, Destroyers submitted their views on the proposal made by Group North/Fleet recommending that Commander, Destroyers act as deputy for Commanding Admiral, Task Force during the winter months. Relevant staff matters were also discussed of which Naval Staff was advised for information. See teletypes as per 1/Skl 2842 and 2872/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

V. Naval Intelligence Division has summarized the over-all situation as it was on 20 Sept. in: "Enemy Situation Report No. 18/43". (Copy as per 1/Skl 26482/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, file: "Reports by Intelligence Division on the Enemy Situation".

Naval Intelligence Division reports as follows:

"With the withdrawal of the Italian Fleet from the war, the enemy has gained complete naval supremacy throughout the Mediterranean. Heavy naval units no longer have to be tied down to the Mediterranean. The enemy is now able considerably to strengthen his forces in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans without in the least endangering his position in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean.

No estimate can yet be given of the amount of Italian merchant tonnage that has fallen into enemy hands. The Italian Merchant Fleet amounted to approximately 1,000,000 GRT on 9 Sept., including French merchantmen seized by Italy in the Mediterranean. Investigations made until now, but as yet incompleting in the territory we occupy, revealed that about 200,000 GRT of this shipping are seaworthy, including a few fairly large passenger steamers.

It is estimated that about 50 per cent of all landing craft assumed to be available in the Mediterranean, and approximately 600,000 GRT of the larger tonnage have been used in the first wave of enemy operations launched against the Italian mainland and concentrated on Salerno. Owing to insufficient information, no clear estimate can be obtained of the amount of tonnage at present engaged in the operation in this area.

Because the enemy has so far been unable to secure a useful port of disembarkation in the landing area, the demand for landing craft there will still be very high or may even increase in the future.

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Owing to incomplete air reconnaissance, no light can be shed on the percentage of landing material not yet in use in the present operations in each of the North African and Sicilian jumping-off positions, except that it is known that about 5 per cent of the total LCT tonnage is in the Tobruk - Port Said area. It is assumed that the tonnage available there is at least of the same amount as that employed in the Salerno area and that it will be sufficient to transport enemy forces at short notice to any part of the western or central Mediterranean for new operations. The eastern Apulian ports must be very carefully watched as they offer most favorable jumping-off positions for operations against the Balkans. Intelligence evaluations for the eastern Mediterranean show mounting activity in the Levantine ports which may be connected with small-scale landings planned in the Dodecanese and other areas.

There are no fresh indications of the enemy's plans in the western or northern theaters. After the landing in the Salerno area no further enemy minesweeping operations were observed in the sea area west of Boulogne, which leads to the conclusion that enemy activity there was simply aimed at tying down German forces."

Amongst other things the report also mentioned an acceleration of the convoy pace in the North Atlantic and a noticeably increased turn-over of shipping space in the Mediterranean. Transit traffic through the Mediterranean has shown an increase since the middle of August and will probably continue increasing until the beginning of October, when the re-routing of the Cape traffic should have been completed.

Situation 21 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

For news of submarine CAGNI see "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff".

2. Own Situation:

The BRAKE has been ordered by Radiogram 1209 to be at approach position "Lilie" at 1400 on 26 Sept.

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The Japanese Navy has promised that escort vessels will meet her there. The relevant instructions will be issued by the Naval Attaché in Tokyo. The Naval Attaché in Tokyo will be informed accordingly by Teletype 1423.

An enemy situation report was dispatched to all in foreign waters by Teletype 1802.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-nine planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 1230 in BF 4430 and another at 1921 in BE 3860.

The Naval Attaché in Lisbon reported that amongst the British merchantmen that arrived in Lisbon, two freighters of approximately 7,000 GRT were damaged.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine escorts were carried out according to plan.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla carried out its exercises according to plan. The flotilla returned and dropped anchor off Le Verdon and in Royan roads.

Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla reported that the following experiences were gained:

1. Results obtained in nine daylight and six night runs were handicapped by the inadequate training of the junior torpedo officers and the low efficiency of radar location gear.

2. Night attack practices with the predictor "40" most impressively showed the superiority of the Air Force location equipment in night attacks. The exact position of the planes overhead could only be gauged by the recognition lights. Owing to too great an angle of elevation no results were obtainable by radar and it was therefore impossible to put up a defense.

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3. Daylight attack practices were carried out by planes of the Ju 88 type and again showed that an improvement in the anti-aircraft gun armament of destroyers is urgently required. Biaxial quadruple mountings produced serious training difficulties in swell. The 3.7-centimeter guns are too slow. Equipment with fully automatic 3.7-centimeter triaxial quadruple mountings and double bared 2-centimeter guns instead of single guns is an urgent necessity in the western area.

Channel Coast:

A flying boat and several bombers were sighted at 1130 approximately 20 kilometers northwest of Quend Plage near Berk sur Mer. Bombs were dropped at sea. A smoke cloud was seen but the cause is unknown. The flying boat surfaced about 15 kilometers northwest of the Somme mouth. Two of our Army batteries shelled her but hits were not observed. The flying boat then withdrew to the northwest at high speed.

From 2300 onwards enemy PT boats were located in the sector between Boulogne and Le Havre. The Gris Nez Battery fired a spread of star shells but observed nothing.

The patrol positions in the Channel were unoccupied owing to heavy seas. Convoy traffic was only carried out within the Channel Island area.

The decision reached by Naval Staff on the plan submitted by Commander, PT Boats and Group West on front line trials of new firing units (see War Diary 18 Sept.: "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff) was dispatched on the same day by teletype to Group West and Commander, PT Boats:

- "1. Front line trials of DM 1 mines are to be postponed for the present.
2. Front line trials of AA 1 mines can be carried out, but
 - a. they are to be mixed with 50 per cent of MA 1 mines,
 - b. a supplementary contact is to be attached to the clockwork arming switch, so as to make the light fuse effective immediately after the mines have been laid, and
 - c. all plugs must be calked and cemented in order to prevent them from being opened and examined by divers with ordinary tools.

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3. The measures in 2 b) and c) are to be directly arranged by Commander, PT Boats with the Minelaying Experimental Command."

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

No minesweeping operations were carried out owing to the bad weather prevailing, but the patrol positions were occupied.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Fifteen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Furthermore eight enemy planes were detected submarine chasing in the area between Northern Scotland and Iceland. At 1226 on 20 Sept. one of our convoys sighted a submarine in AC 8413 (Bass Fiord). The same convoy (mine-clearing ship BALI) was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes in AC 8177 at 1554 on 20 Sept. (near Berlevaag). Escort vessels shot down six of the attacking planes.

At 1530 on 20 Sept. three enemy planes penetrated the Vardoe area and dropped a few bombs without causing damage.

According to official British press reports, Mr. Churchill returned from Canada in the RENOWN. He is also said to have gone out to Canada by ship, but the vessel's name is not given.

The long absence of this battle cruiser was neither observed by our air reconnaissance nor so far detected by our radio intelligence and radio decyphering.

Own Situation:

The steamer ANTJE FRITZEN (4.330 GRT) belonging to a convoy of six steamers escorted by six motor minesweepers was hit by a torpedo and sunk at 0055 off Nurmansaetti while on passage from Kirkenes to Petsamo. The torpedo was probably fired by a PT boat. The ship's crew has been rescued. This assumption is

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probably correct as one PT boat was located on the outward passage, and three PT boats were sighted on the homeward voyage. Twenty minutes before the attack, the motor minesweeper R "59" had caught and dragged several mines along in her cutting gear. Four to five mines, apparently without lead horns, were moored south of Cape Romanov close inshore with ground weights for testing purposes.

The last check of the Kirkenes - Petsamo route was made by four motor minesweepers on 1 Sept. For the preliminary report of Commander, Inshore Defense Units, Polar Coast see Teletype 1355.

In the areas of Admiral, North Coast and Admiral, West Coast, 21 ships were escorted north and 13 south. No reports were received from Admiral, Polar Coast owing to interrupted lines of communication.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Four of our submarines gained contact with the awaited westbound convoy in grid square AK on the morning of 20 Sept. Contact was lost at 1130 in AK 3931, but was regained by three submarines during the night of 20 Sept. The last report received was from AK 2927 at 0344.

The following has been reported on the enemy defenses:

An air escort has been over the convoy since noon on 20 Sept., being also maintained during the night. Our radio intelligence service only detected two planes on operations at the same time. The submarines maintained contact with the convoy and remained surfaced from 1800 on in order to reach advanced positions and to provide anti-aircraft defense. Two of the boats reported attacks by planes.

Numerous destroyers were on remote escort.

During the day and night of 20 Sept. the boats were able to sink six destroyers, possibly even nine, by using 15 Zaunkoenig torpedoes.

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Moreover two steamers together totalling 10,000 GRT were reported sunk.

Our boats were unfortunately unable to follow up this outstanding technical and tactical success which scattered and annihilated the convoy's screen because heavy fog closed in on the morning of 21 Sept. and prevailed throughout the day and night of 21 Sept. This made it extremely difficult to control the operation, made attacks almost impossible and permitted only chance sightings. Seven boats were, however, able to maintain close contact with the enemy by hydrophone bearings and by bearings on enemy radio telephony, and they will make full use of every chance that may offer itself as soon as the fog lifts. Unfortunately visibility was still only at 200 meters or below at midnight on 21 Sept. Only one further steamer of 5,000 GRT was sunk in addition to the ones already reported. The operation will be continued in the hope that the fog will lift and that the desired success will be achieved during the night of 21 Sept.

The importance of this success against the destroyer escort cannot be overemphasized. The fact that these submarines got through the Bay of Biscay - without Metox but with Hagenuk gear - and apparently suffered no losses, that their anti-aircraft armament and the Zaunkoenig torpedo all came up to expectations and successfully passed their first operational test speaks for itself. This justifies the hope that the period of losses in submarines operating against convoys in the North Atlantic is actually over.

In view of the general situation the importance of having regained the offensive in at least one theater of war is quite obvious especially at the present time.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported that 171 of our planes were out on operations over the west area and the Atlantic, and that 27 planes were over the Mediterranean. Forty-four bombers laid mines in the Humber area. Eleven planes carried out diversionary raids over London.

During the day an airfield and a coke plant were attacked in Belgium and northern France. During the night of 21 Sept. one enemy plane penetrated into the Baltic and flew to the Warsaw area,

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presumably to land agents. Ten planes were reported from the Borkum - Terschelling area, presumably on minelaying operations. Fifteen planes were also reported over the area west of Brest, here too on minelaying operations presumably.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force carried out a reconnaissance over southern Italy and the Tunisian coast. The enemy attacked Leghorn and Bastia during the day. In Bastia fires broke out in the harbor and town, and two ships which were being loaded were sunk.

Furthermore continuous air attacks were carried out over the battle area of the southern Italian front.

3. Eastern Front:

Forty-five planes were reported to have been shot down over the Army front lines. We lost four planes.

The 5th Air Force reported ten planes on operations. There were no special incidents.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the evening of 20 Sept. a French auxiliary cruiser and a destroyer put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. On the afternoon of 21 Sept. the following ships were in Gibraltar: 1 seaplane tender, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 2 transports, 51 freighters, 9 tankers and other vessels, and 236 planes. According to a report received from the Naval Attaché in Madrid, the Italian destroyer VIVALDI was sunk in the Strait of Bonifacio on 9 Sept. The commander, 3 officers, and 71 men landed on the Spanish coast in two lifeboats.

Our air reconnaissance observed 60 large and 150 small landing craft near Salerno in the afternoon; several homeward and outward bound convoys were also sighted. Heavy units were no longer sighted. Battleships were last reported there on 17 Sept.

The report received by German Naval Command, Italy on the evening of 20 Sept. of an alleged enemy landing on Ischia has not been confirmed.

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A convoy of 27 freighters and 4 escort vessels was sighted 60 miles north-northwest of Benghazi proceeding towards that port at 0615 on 20 Sept.; the ships were presumably empty and returning from Sicily or Calabria. Otherwise no sighting reports were received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Our PT boat did not carry out any operations on 20 Sept.

The minelayer BRANDENBURG and the KRETA were torpedoed and sunk off Capraja at 1721 on 21 Sept. The survivors were rescued by motor minesweepers. The minelaying operation in the Strait of Bonifacio was therefore not carried out. It was at the same time also reported that while carrying out operation "Achse" the minelayers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN set an Italian steamer of 14,500 GRT on fire south of Livorno and sank it, and damaged a ship of 16,000 GRT, a minelayer, and a ship that looked like a chaser. The opportunity will be taken to draw the attention of Commander in Chief, Navy to the exceptional achievements of the commander of the minelayer BRANDENBURG, Lieutenant Commander (Naval Reserve) Dr. Brill.

An enemy air raid on Leghorn caused only slight damage. In Bastia two freighters were sunk while being loaded. Bastia is at present unable to accommodate any ships.

Ferry traffic from Corsica was carried out according to plan. On 21 Sept. 250 motor vehicles, 26 guns, 8 tanks, and 1,650 tons of supplies and equipment were transferred. The evacuation of troops is mostly being carried out by air.

Submarine U "81" must put into dry dock to have her propellers changed; they were damaged when she hit the net barrage. Commander, Submarines, Mediterranean, with copy to German Naval Command, Italy, has been informed that the minelaying operation off Brindisi is to be carried out by submarine U "453", which will be available in Pola on 10 Oct. Submarine U "81" is to be scheduled for combat operations in the Gulf of Taranto.

No reports have been received from the land front in southern Italy.

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3. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

One of our planes sighted a submerging submarine at 0930 on 20 Sept. 20 miles north of Trikkeri. At 1225 on the same day a British vessel was located 75 miles southwest of the Peloponnesos. Our reconnaissance planes have been ordered to carry out a search.

During the afternoon and evening of 20 Sept. the island of Scarpantos was repeatedly attacked by enemy planes. Two naval landing craft in Pegadi harbor were hit above the waterline and suffered losses in personnel. According to radio intelligence reports, British troops occupied the island of Castelrosso. Enemy formations on Tinos and Mykinos were disarmed on 21 Sept. Three of our submarine decoy ships and two coastal defense vessels participated in this operation. The report on the completion of this operation is still outstanding. The northern part of the island of Cephalonia has been mopped up. The main attack was launched on 21 Sept. The island of Skyros (northeast of Euboea) has been evacuated by the Italians. Two naval landing craft put out from Chalkis for northern Euboea with SS troops to reinforce their own group which is surrounded there. The torpedo boat TA "10" and one steamer on passage from Piraeus to Rhodes put into Candia.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

At 2238 a Russian submarine was located 60 miles west of Eupatoria. In the evening our air reconnaissance sighted enemy PT boats and 23 smaller vessels that seemed to be landing craft putting into Anapa. The jetty at Anapa was thoroughly blown up before we evacuated the port.

Own Situation:

No serious damage was sustained in the enemy air raid on Temryuk and Anapa.

During the night of 20 Sept. the northern group of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla that was at patrol positions northwest of Anapa encountered five enemy PT boats. Our ships were forced to break off the engagement at 0149 because of the superiority of the enemy gunfire and owing to our unfavorable position. The enemy withdrew to the south. Our southern group northeast of Anapa did not encounter the enemy.

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At 0900 ten miles south of Tuapse the submarine U "18" sighted a northbound convoy of one tanker of 7,000 GRT and one freighter of 1,000 GRT. The attacks made on both ships failed. The boat was vigorously attacked with depth charges and started on her return passage when she had used up all her torpedoes.

During the night of 21 Sept. the 1st PT Boat Flotilla will operate in two groups at the patrol positions off the south coast of the Taman peninsula. During the same night three naval landing craft are to attack troop concentrations and batteries on the point between Ozero Molochnoye and the Sea of Azov (30 miles northeast of Genitchesk).

In connection with the withdrawal to the Wotan position on the north coast of the Sea of Azov, four naval landing craft, four naval artillery lighters, and the Harbor Protection Flotilla, Genitchesk have been placed as far as operations are concerned under the command of Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine.

The last transport for Temryuk left Kerch on 21 Sept.

Group South reported on inquiry about the naval positions and naval forces in the Sea of Azov and on the Kerch peninsula. Copy of the relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 2874/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV a. The allocation of at least two modern 15-centimeter batteries for Cape Chauda and Sevastopol - North has been urgently requested to reinforce the artillery group in the Feodosiya area. Quartermaster Division will take further action.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Mr. Churchill stated in the House of Commons that he had never looked upon the operations in North Africa as a substitute for a direct attack on Germany across the Channel and through France and the Netherlands. On the contrary, the opening of the front in the Mediterranean was planned as a preliminary offensive to the main offensive against Germany and her neighbors. Furthermore he fully described the favorable position aerial and anti-submarine warfare are in and gave a detailed account of the negotiations that led to the armistice with Italy. He said that the Italian capitulation is simply the normal and "absolutely humanitarian" conclusion.

The time will come when Italy will once again take her place amongst the free democratic nations. National Socialism and Prussian militarism have to be entirely destroyed. The Badoglio Government and the King of Italy should be supported in the interest of all concerned. The most crucial part of the war still lies ahead. A tripartite conference of the Foreign Ministers will take place within the next few weeks (according to a Reuter report from Moscow) and it is hoped that Roosevelt and Stalin will meet before the end of the year. The war in the Far East will be intensified.

In his statements on submarine warfare Mr. Churchill repeated the familiar story of the collapse of the so-called "Doenitz offensive" and mentioned that enemy submarines had for the first time gained contact with Allied convoys in the North Atlantic again; he gave no details, however.

According to Reuter, the United States House of Representatives passed the so-called "Fulbright" Bill. This bill pledges the United States to participation in an international organization after the war.

Exchange reports reveal that the Italian embassies in Spain, Turkey, and Argentina, and the Legations in Finland and Sweden declared themselves in favor of the Badoglio Government, as did also the Italian Legation in Ireland, according to a Reuter report.

The latest Badoglio proclamation calling for war against Germany has given the Italian population the distinct impression that there is a definite agreement between Badoglio and the Anglo-Americans which goes beyond the terms of the truce negotiated.

According to press reports from Washington, the Turkish Government is said to have informed the Greek Government in Exile that Turkey will not lay any claim to the Dodecanese Islands.

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Reuter reports that Mr. Eden declared in the House of Commons that Great Britain does not intend to annex either Sicily or Corsica.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

A. On Technical and Tactical Torpedo Research Problems.
Torpedo Branch, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament were able to discuss the following problems:

1. Problems of Increasing Torpedo Range:

Here Commander in Chief, Navy decided that the G7S torpedo should be kept at its present stage of development, namely, with a speed of 45 knots. The final achievement to be aimed at would be an Ingolin torpedo.

2. Progress of Depth Firing Trials:

Results have so far been obtained to a depth of 50 meters only. Commander in Chief, Navy agreed that this result would in practice suffice. Attempts to reach a greater depth could be postponed.

3. Research and Production Progress of the FAT III Torpedo:

Trials conducted to ascertain the firing efficiency from any angle have not yet given satisfaction.

Commander in Chief, Navy said that the solution of this question was of primary importance.

Production of the G7e FAT III torpedo will start in October 1943; at the beginning 125 torpedoes will be produced monthly, by May 1944 output will be stepped up to 600, and by July 1944 to 1,000 torpedoes per month.

It is expected that by January 1944 sixty submarines and by June ninety submarines will have been fitted out with these torpedoes.

Two hundred FAT III will be available in the submarine bases by December 1943, 400 by March 1944, and 1,000 by November 1944.

4. "Zaunkoenig".

In October/November the monthly production will be

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80 torpedoes. It is possible to increase this figure to 160 if the engineering personnel is not reduced. Commander in Chief, Navy will ask Reich Minister Speer for the time being to stop the further withdrawal of engineers temporarily placed at the Navy's disposal.

On the occasion of the first success gained with the Zaunkoenig torpedo, Commander in Chief, Navy took the opportunity of expressing his satisfaction and said that we were on the right road with this weapon and that as a result it was once again possible for us to take the offensive.

B. General Situation.

I. Army Situation:

It is reported from the eastern front that the Southern Army Group occupied the East Wall positions (Wotan-position). The enemy attempted to frustrate our retreat movements with heavy air attacks on roads and bridges in the rear. The situation is rather difficult to assess in the area between Gomel and Kiev. There enemy pressure is so heavy that it is still doubtful whether the East Wall position can be reinforced in time. Chernikov has been re-captured by the enemy. Moreover guerrilla activity in the rear of this sector of the front is having a telling effect on our supply lines for the first time.

In the Central Army Group's sector the enemy is following our retreat movements quickly.

A division will be brought up to the eastern front from the western theater.

British forces have landed on Sardinia, French forces on Corsica. Porto Vecchio will be held a few days longer than originally planned, in order to facilitate the evacuation of our troops from the island.

Divisions newly brought up from Africa have been observed in the Salerno area. The General Staff of Foreign Armies, West believes that the increase in landing craft observed at Taranto and Brindisi indicates that preparations for a crossing to Dalmatia or Albania are being made by the enemy.

Acts of sabotage directed against traffic installations are increasing in northern Italy. The areas of Fiume, Gorizia and Ljubljana are the centers of guerrilla activity. So far 225,000 prisoners of war, including 42,000 British and American, have been moved from Italy to the north and east.

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Our attack on Split is being continued.

II. During the conference on the situation a radiogram was received from the task force, dispatched at 1125, announcing that a midget submarine had been destroyed at 0930 within the net barrage of the TIRPITZ and that four British had been taken prisoner.

Further details will have to be awaited. It seems certain, however, that an enemy midget submarine penetrated the net enclosure of the battleship in Kaa Fiord.

The Commander of the Italian PT Boat Flotilla in Spezia, the Duke of Borghese, who like Captain Grossi offered his services to us, is an acknowledged expert on the use of small battle weapons in action. Chief, Naval Staff therefore approved that this officer be called to Berlin.

III. A decision as regards the allocation of submarines to the Aegean Sea has again been postponed.

IV. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division reported on the situation in the area of Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic and said that the latter informed German Naval Command, Italy; Group South and Chief, Naval Staff on 20 Sept. that the dislocation of the whole Italian naval organization would make it necessary to create an entirely new coastal defense organization and shipping administration. But no personnel for the staffs required for these organizations has arrived up to now. There are neither coastal or anti-aircraft defenses, nor air raid warning, reconnaissance, or security services. The restoration of the radio network is another urgent necessity, as the wires have been cut by insurgents. Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic furthermore asked that he be informed as to future plans for the captured ships and the dockyard maintenance. He feels that in view of the unsettled situation, preparations to destroy all material of any potential value to the enemy should be made immediately.

Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division informed Captain Loycke by telephone about the organization at present prevailing in the area of the north Adriatic and amongst other things how it was hoped it would be in the future.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic will remain for the time being under the command of German Naval Command, Italy. A transfer to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic, thus coming under the command of Group South, will be considered later. According to the latest orders, Captain F.T. Schmidt has been appointed Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic, whereas Captain Loycke has been appointed Naval Shore Commander, South Adriatic. As regards the

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personnel shortage in view of the extreme urgency of this matter, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division has once more taken steps to secure the immediate railroad transportation of the staffs and office personnel. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division recommended that Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division and Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Bureau of Naval Armament dispatch a commission to Trieste at once to decide which of the captured ships are to be commissioned and which dockyards are to be maintained in operation. Every attempt should be made to make the smaller naval vessels in the Adriatic Sea, including destroyers and auxiliary warships, operational under top priority. According to information from Captain Loycke, the following vessels are operational: 6 coastal steamers, between 100 - 300 tons, mounted with guns, which had already previously been converted into auxiliary warships, 2 PT boats, 1 torpedo boat at Pola and the auxiliary cruiser RAMB III.

The situation is very tense in the dockyard at Monfalcone. This dockyard will probably have to be closed as there are insufficient troops available for guard duty and the Naval Shore Commander has no forces at his disposal. Land communications between Pola and Trieste have been entirely interrupted.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

V. Through negotiations with Chief, Japanese Naval Staff, the Naval Attaché in Tokyo obtained the release of the entire Indian Ocean including the Arabian Sea for the operations of German submarines. His statement that combined operations were believed to be possible without causing friction, decided the matter. Japanese submarines will only operate in the area south of 00° north of 15° S, and west of 60°. But no objections were raised against German submarines also operating there. The Japanese Navy has only asked to be notified whenever German submarines are in the area, as Japanese planes are sometimes on operations as far as the southern coast of India.

Submarine Division has been informed accordingly.

VI. In his report on the situation in the Mediterranean, Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff made special reference to the exceptional merits of Lieutenant Commander Dr. Brill in command of the minelayer BRANDENBURG. Since January 1940 Lieutenant Commander Brill has distinguished himself in the North Sea, in the western area, the Baltic Sea, the northern area, and now also in the Mediterranean.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that a recommendation for the award of the oakleaf cluster to the Knights' Cross be considered.

Copy as per 1/Skl I op. 26590/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Measures:

Lieutenant (s.g.) (Naval Coastal Artillery) Vogt, Quartermaster Division's anti-aircraft defense officer, made a report on the present state of the Navy's anti-aircraft defense problems. He fully stated the reasons for establishing a special organization for which 149 officers, to be attached on full time duty to the various operations staffs and commands, have been requested.

Commander in Chief, Navy decided that the possibilities of being able to carry out this request first be investigated.

Special Items.

I. In accordance with orders received from Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 21 Sept.: "Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff") Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division issued the following instructions to Group West, Group South, and Commanding Admiral, Adriatic:

"Commander in Chief, Navy considers the southern Adriatic to be the center of the enemy threat. He therefore ordered that one of the six naval artillery battalions at present stationed in the area of Admiral, Southern France be transferred without its batteries but with its own anti-aircraft guns to the area of Naval Shore Commander, South Adriatic. Group West is to decide which of the Naval Artillery Battalions is to be transferred and will take steps for an early transfer by making all the necessary arrangements directly with Group South. The probable date of departure, the route and expected date of arrival should be reported to Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division."

II. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division had to refuse the request made by German Naval Command, Italy for the assignment of further naval anti-aircraft battalions, because the necessary forces are not available. It has been suggested to German Naval Command, Italy that in compliance with the relevant instructions issued by Armed Forces High Command, the Naval Artillery Battalions could be reinforced or else a third one created, for which a staff could be furnished, by drawing personnel from the 622nd Naval Artillery Battalion already assigned, and the 616th already in the area, plus Italians willing to fight for us.

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III. German Naval Command, Italy submitted a report of all the successes achieved by the Navy in the Italian area since the start of operation "Achse". Copy as per 1/Skl 26529/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Copies have been sent for information to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; High Command, Army; Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff; Naval Liaison Officer to Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Staff, Commander in Chief, Air Force, and Group South. This report contains not only figures on British and Italian vessels sunk and damaged at sea by our naval forces but also shows the large number of vessels seized in the ports in this area and the operations carried out by our naval forces in disarming the Italian forces.

This report gives a vivid picture of the part played by the Navy in the execution of operation "Achse" and which is not minimized by the fact that the plan to occupy and seize the Italian Fleet failed. This failure cannot be held against the Navy, as already repeatedly pointed out. The task could only have been successfully carried out, had the Army and the Air Force, in accordance with the experiences gained at Toulon, been available at the time of the operation in sufficient numbers.

IV. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued general instructions, dated 15 Sept., on the treatment of members of the Italian Armed Forces and Militia. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division passed this directive on to the Naval Operations Staffs concerned and ordered that the Smoke Screen Battalions, stationed in their home territory, should remain as independent Italian detachments.

Copy of this directive as per 1/Skl 26680/43 Gkdos. in files 1/Skl I op. II, 17.

V. In the "Summary of the Enemy Situation: 17/43", Enemy Situation Branch, Naval Intelligence, Division reports the statement made by the United States Secretary of the Navy on anti-submarine warfare, losses in personnel suffered by the enemy merchant marine, warship construction and losses; the statement made on 16 Sept. by the First Lord of the British Admiralty on naval warfare in the Mediterranean; pre-invasion practices held in the Channel and other items.

Copy as per 1/Skl 28947/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, file: "Information on the Enemy Situation".

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Of special interest is the statement made by Mr. A.V. Alexander on the naval warfare in the Mediterranean which was already briefly reported in War Diary, 17 Sept. The critical situation in which the British Fleet found itself in November, December 1941 now reveals the opportunities that offered themselves at that time had the Italians taken the initiative at sea in support of our operations in North Africa. The ARK ROYAL had just been sunk and the three QUEEN ELIZABETH-class battleships in the eastern Mediterranean were so badly damaged that ALEXANDER described the British Fleet as "seriously hit". The contention that the damage to the battleships was successfully hidden during those decisive months is incorrect. Reports about the damage inflicted did get through, even if somewhat delayed.

Situation 22 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In accordance with the orders issued by Chief, Naval Staff, the following directions were dispatched to our Naval Attaché in Tokyo in reply to the compromise proposed by the Japanese in connection with the Aquila boats:

"Aquila boats are German property. It is, therefore, impossible for them to be taken over by the Japanese. During negotiations you must above all insist on our claim that they are German property."

Operations Division; Chief, Naval Communications Division; Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Section III all agreed that an adequate number of blockade-runners should be equipped with Hagenuck gear. Operations Division, Naval Staff has requested Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Section III also to equip the tanker OST-FRIESLAND which is under the command of Foreign Section III with this gear. This tanker is operated by Supply and Fuel Branch, Quartermaster Division. Furthermore, a certain stock of gear and personnel for equipment, and personnel for operations on board the blockade-runners should be kept in immediate readiness.

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II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty-eight planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 1704 in BE 55.

At 1055 in BE 3217 our air reconnaissance sighted eight merchantmen, one transport and two corvettes on course 20°.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept on 20 Sept. off La Pallice by a minesweeping plane. Submarine escorts on 22 Sept. were carried out without incident.

Channel Coast:

Between 0130 and 0238 the minesweepers M "3823" and M "3824" and the patrol vessel VP "1516" were unsuccessfully attacked by four enemy PT boats with guns and torpedoes north of Le Havre. One of the enemy ships withdrew from the encounter after sustaining several direct hits, but sinking was not observed. For preliminary action report of the 15th Patrol Vessel Flotilla see Teletype 1135. Enemy fighter-bomber attacks in the same night on our patrol vessels near Calais, west of Quistreham, and off the mouth of the Somme were equally unsuccessful.

The steamer LIVADIA that was moved during the night of 21 Sept. from Brest to Lézardrieux proceeded at 2000 to Cherbourg. Escort is being provided with four ships of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and with eight ships of the 6th Minesweeper Flotilla. At St. Malo the boats of the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will turn about and return to Brest. From Cherbourg on, the GREIF and the KONDOR will provide escort.

Group West plans to lay three minefields with UMB mines with snag lines but without firing units in the narrows, to be known as Eastern Channel Minefields (OK) 3, 4, and 5, provided Naval Staff approves in principle. These minefields will be laid by motor minesweepers during the coming new moon period and before the MADALI, the LIVADIA and the torpedo boat T "19" convoys are moved through the Channel. Plans showing the proposed positions of the minefields were submitted with a request for the release of 315 UMB mines.

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Operations Division, Naval Staff approved the positions of the minefields and released the required mines. The present situation forces us to forego keeping a channel for deep draught vessels (battleship channel) seawards of Ruytingen bank.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

There was brisk reconnaissance activity over the North Sea during the day and slight activity during the night.

At 0955 on 21 Sept. our air reconnaissance sighted a surfaced submarine of unidentified nationality in Aeg 7540 (west coast of Spitsbergen) which brought its light anti-aircraft guns into action against our plane.

At 0500 on 22 Sept. an agent on the west coast of the island of Assoe (south of Stadlandet) sighted a PT boat.

Photographic reconnaissance on 15 Sept. showed that the following vessels were in Archangel: 2 GNEVNY-class destroyers, 1 LENIN-class destroyer and 1 destroyer being fitted out, 12 freighters, of which one was in dock; in Molotovsk: 1 LENIN-class destroyer, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 1 vessel presumed to be a submarine tender, seven freighters plus a beached one.

Own Situation:

During the night of 19 Sept. an enemy battery fired 140 rounds at our convoy while it was entering Petsamo. Our battery returned fire with 115 rounds.

Group North/Fleet submitted a report received from Commander, Minelayers on the assumed use of aerial torpedoes with acoustic steering control by Russian planes in the attack on the mine-layer group ROLAND on 6 Sept. For copy of report see Teletype 1214.

Twenty-eight ships were escorted north and 18 ships south.

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The preliminary report received on the destruction of an enemy midget submarine within the net enclosure of the TIRPITZ has now been followed by further reports which would indicate that the attack was carried out by three midget submarines. One of the submarines penetrated the net enclosure but was detected and destroyed at 0930. Four men were taken prisoner. At 1012 two explosions took place about 60 meters away on the port side of the TIRPITZ both fore and aft.

At 1035 a second submarine was sighted in the net enclosure 300 meters away on the starboard bow and was destroyed by gunfire. A third submarine that was subjected to gunfire 600 meters away on the starboard beam was probably sunk, but her destruction has not yet been fully confirmed.

The explosions of the mines with time fuses put many stations aboard the TIRPITZ out of action. In its report Task Force gave details of the situation that prevailed at 1515. According to this report, apart from the armament stations, all the power stations are out of action because the bolts in the bedplates have been torn out. Power station 2 is flooded. The steering gear is also out of action. For copy of report see Teletype 2258.

Naval Staff has sent the following report to Fuehrer Headquarters, addressed to the Fuehrer's Naval Aide and to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy:

"In the afternoon of 22 Sept. three British midget submarines penetrated the net enclosure of the TIRPITZ in her mooring berth in Alta Fiord. There were two almost simultaneous explosions a certain distance away from the ship both fore and aft. The first submarine was destroyed; the second submarine further away from the ship was sunk by gunfire; the third submarine was damaged by several shells. No details of the damage sustained by the battleship are yet available (mine action), slight intake of water. Five British taken prisoner."

Although thanks to the defensive readiness of the battleship the enemy was not completely successful in his attack, which must certainly have been very thoroughly prepared and, it has to be admitted, was very courageously carried out, the enemy success and the damage sustained is nevertheless extensive and regrettable. A full report on the circumstances of this incident, with special reference to the net protection, will have to be awaited.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.1. Enemy Situation:

There was slight artillery activity in Kronstadt Bay. It is reported from the coastal area that enemy reconnaissance planes dropped bombs and machine-gunned our positions. There was slight enemy air activity over the Luga sector and over the island of Tyters. Thirty-five small boats were observed in Lavansaari.

2. Own Situation:

The minelaying operation in the Skagerrak had to be discontinued owing to heavy seas. Escort operations were carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic. There is nothing else to report from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers and Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Constant heavy fog handicapped operations against the convoy in the north Atlantic throughout the day. At least twelve submarines were in close contact with the enemy despite the dense fog. It was not until 2100 that the fog began to lift. At the same time considerable enemy air defense forces came into operation. Seven submarines reported air attacks. One of the boats sustained damage and was forced to withdraw.

It appears moreover that additional escort vessels have been brought up owing to the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy on the previous day. Reports of further successes mention that one steamer and two destroyers were sunk. The operation continues.

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported 303 planes on operations over England and the Atlantic, and 6 planes on operations over the Mediterranean. The Humber area was mined by forty planes.

Airfields in Belgium, northern and western France were attacked by the enemy during the day. Hannover was very heavily raided during the night by 200 - 300 planes, causing very extensive industrial damage. A few bombs were dropped on Oldenburg, Bremen and Emden.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force carried out a reconnaissance. The enemy air force was active over the front lines in southern Italy. At noon 23 planes carried out an air raid on Rhodes.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reported 45 planes on operations, but no strategic results were obtained. There is nothing to report from the Army front lines.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A CAIRO-class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic, and a British auxiliary aircraft carrier and one destroyer put out for the Mediterranean. Two aircraft carriers of the ILLUSTRIOUS-class, one of them the FORMIDABLE, escorted by eight destroyers, put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

At 0525 6 transports and 3 large damaged ships escorted by 6 destroyers and ostensibly 1 cruiser passed Ceuta coming from the Atlantic. One transport, 1 tanker, and 1 freighter belonging to this convoy put into Gibraltar.

On 21 Sept. our air reconnaissance reported a large eastbound convoy between Bougaroni and Cape de Fer consisting of 36 passenger ships, 4 tankers escorted by 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, and 4 escort vessels. It is presumed that part of this convoy put into Bizerta. Another part of the convoy was sighted on 22 Sept. at 0950. 35 miles west-northwest of Trapani and consisted of 12 ships presumably on an easterly course. A small outward bound convoy was sighted in the southern part of the Gulf of Salerno.

German Naval Command, Italy reported that the submarine menace is increasing in the Ligurian Sea.

In the forenoon submarine locations were reported near Elba, north of Bari and northwest of Spezia.

One of our convoys was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine 25 miles east of Genoa. A steamer was torpedoed off Porto Ferrajo. The sinking of the minelayer BRANDENBURG and the KRETA on 21 Sept. was most probably also due to submarine action. This particular submarine was attacked by our planes with depth charges.

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Radio intelligence intercepted numerous reconnaissance messages about having sighted some of our convoys in the Ligurian Sea.

According to intelligence reports, the 7th U.S. Army stationed in the western part of Sicily, is preparing to embark. On 19 Sept. one French and one American division were transferred from Oran to Corsica by sea.

According to a further intelligence report, Ajaccio was occupied by British troops on 20 Sept.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Only six or seven men in all are missing as a result of the sinking of the BRANDENBURG and the KRETA. The captains of both ships were rescued.

The steamer NIKOLAUS (6,793 GRT) and the tug KRAFT were sunk in an air raid on Bastia on the afternoon of 21 Sept. Thus the only powerful tug in Bastia has been lost. Some other ships were damaged. In a second air raid on Bastia during the night of 21 Sept. the jetties were again hit. Two Siebel ferries are out of action. It is feared that there are LM mines off Bastia. A naval landing craft and a péniche loaded with 24 torpedoes were sunk in an air raid on Leghorn on the forenoon of 21 Sept. Two péniches have been beached off Sestri Levante owing to sea damage. One 15 centimeter and one 7.6 centimeter battery was reported to be ready for action on Elba.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has withdrawn the II/128th Sea Reconnaissance Squadron from the command of the 3rd Air Force and temporarily assigned this squadron to the 2nd Air Force at La Spezia to escort the transports engaged in the evacuation of Corsica.

During the night of 21 Sept. our base at Bonifacio was evacuated according to plan and without enemy interference after all the equipment had been removed and the prepared demolitions carried out.

Of the total of 32,000 men, 600 guns and 5,000 motor vehicles on Corsica, the following numbers had been transferred to the mainland by 21 Sept.:

| | |
|---------|---|
| by air: | 8,793 men, 236 tons of equipment, |
| by sea: | 887 men, 545 vehicles, 31 guns, 25 tanks and 2,523 tons of equipment. |

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3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 21 Sept. during the day, an enemy air patrol was reported over the central and southern parts of the Aegean Sea. During the night more enemy planes were reported north of Suda Bay and bombs were dropped.

Our advance on Cephalonia is progressing according to plan. The main attack on Argostoli is planned for 22 Sept. The batteries are still in enemy hands. The convoy of the steamer DONIZETTI and the torpedo boat (of foreign origin) TA "10", on passage from Candia to Rhodes, was definitely spotted by enemy reconnaissance planes. Our air reconnaissance reported that two destroyers were seen putting out from Leros at 1300 on 21 Sept. on a southerly course.

An enemy minefield was discovered west of Skiathos.

The situation on Poros is still tense. Two patrol vessels with an assault detachment have been sent there.

After disarming the Italian garrisons on Tinos and Mykonos, the Patrol Vessel Group "Syra" was ordered to proceed to Naxos and Paros and to carry out the same operation there on 22 Sept. Three ships are being kept in readiness for 23 Sept. to land Army forces southwest of Andros.

The Fuehrer granted the request for permission to evacuate the island of Gavdos (south of Crete).

In reply to the request that submarines be dispatched to the Aegean Sea, Naval Staff informed Group South that the operational possibilities are being investigated and that each case will be decided upon individually. Group South has been furthermore informed that it is planned to dispatch the remaining ships of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla to the Aegean Sea. Four ships of this flotilla will, however, first have the repairs they need completed in Venice.

Operation Division, Naval Staff gave its opinion as per l/Skl 26468/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV on the request of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, submitted at the beginning of August, asking that security measures imposed on shipping in the Aegean Sea be eased for the sake of economy.

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Group South has asked that a new Dockyard Control Staff be created and attached to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic; it should be stationed in Trieste for the time being. See Teletype 2201.

Furthermore Group South asked Naval Staff Operations Division that Commander in Chief, Air Force be requested to instruct Air Force Command, Southeast to place eight or ten transport planes at our disposal in Belgrade for the next few weeks, so that the urgently requested occupation of the Adriatic ports can be carried out as soon as possible by at least getting the advance commands established there.

Group South submitted plans dated 14 Sept. for the reinforcement of the minefields off the Dardanelles. Several deep-set minefields laid with UMB mines have been planned both on and directly off the convoy routes in the areas of Tenedos, Lemnos and Imbros, as well as two minefields of EMF mines away from these routes. Moreover two minefields of EMF mines directly off the Dardanelles, regardless of the convoy routes there, and one minefield of ground mines off the Anatolian coast, are planned in case Turkey should join the enemy.

Group South furthermore plans to strengthen the minefield off the Gulf of Orphani, between Thasos and Arthos, and the minefield off Lagos. The minefields off Salonika will also be reinforced.

Group South has been informed that Naval Staff approves the reinforcements planned for the minefields off the Thracian coast and the Dardanelles. The most important minefield seems to be G 98 off Salonika. Commanding Admiral, Aegean has been allotted the following supply of mines for October:

300 EMC mines
600 EMR mines
300 EMF mines
100 UMA mines
200 UMB mines.

Black Sea:

In the air raid on Taman harbor at 0655 two piers sustained direct hits which interrupted loading operations. The northern jetty at Kerch was damaged by fire and jetty no. 3 was damaged by an ammunition explosion. The berths for the lighters can no longer be used. One lighter, loaded with ammunition, caught fire and had to be sunk. The convoy of the PRODOMOS was unsuccessfully attacked at noon by torpedo planes while on passage from Sevastopol to Constanta. At 1700 enemy planes raided the town and harbor of Yalta.

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The 1st PT Boat Flotilla did not sight the enemy while in the patrol positions off the south coast of the Taman peninsula during the night of 21 Sept. This flotilla will operate with four ships in the area northwest of Tuapse and the 11th PT Boat Flotilla with two ships west of Utrich Point during the night of 22 Sept.

During the night of 21 Sept. naval landing craft took enemy positions under gunfire 30 miles northwest of Genichesk. Good results were observed and the enemy guns silenced. It is planned to have three naval landing craft repeat this bombardment during the night of 22 Sept. Two naval landing craft will be stationed in patrol positions off the south coast of the Taman peninsula in order to prevent enemy landings.

The minelaying operation in the Strait of Kerch was carried out according to plan.

Submarine U "20" put into Sevastopol after having completed her minelaying operation.

Immediately after the last transport for Kerch had left Temryuk, the Temryuk channel was blocked by sinking a lighter loaded with cement and by mining the approach route with LMB mines.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Mr. Eden made a statement in the House of Commons on Anglo-Spanish relations, which he said had been compromised by the dispatch of the Blue Division to the eastern front and the activities of the German Consul General in the Tangiers area. In his speech he dealt at length with the nature of Anglo-Russian relations and in conclusion announced that a Conference of the Foreign Ministers would take place in the near future.

The "Daily Worker" called Churchill's arguments about the second front problem weak and threadbare.

According to foreign press reports, Turkish-Russian relations are still as tense as ever.

It is reported from Japan that stringent measures are being taken to achieve the fullest concentration of all national resources. In connection with this Prime Minister Tojo described the general situation as being rather serious.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

A. Report of the Shipbuilding Commission on New Submarine Types: Plans for the electric Broeking boat were first submitted in February 1942. In June 1942 this type was approved by Commander in Chief, Navy and its construction was given priority. The Shipbuilding Commission, Submarine Sub-Committee has met the deadlines set, in order to be able to begin construction of the type XXIII series in February 1944 and of the type XXI series in April 1944. Thanks to the excellent co-operation of all concerned, the deadlines have thus been adhered to. This has never happened before in the building of ships of an entirely new type.

The surface speed of the type XXI boats is comparatively slow and they are more difficult to control because of their size (twice the tonnage of type VII c submarines) and also because they only have one rudder. Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that improvements must be made.

Type XXIII is a single pressure-hull boat with two torpedo tubes and suitable for transportation by rail. Its performance is good, its cruising range approximately 2,000 miles.

Commander in Chief, Navy expressed his appreciation to the Submarine Sub-Committee for the work done.

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Technical data on these submarines are recorded in 1/Skl 2914/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in file 1/Skl I u.

B. Situation 23 Sept.

I. Army Situation:

On the Eastern Front the situation in the area south of Kiev is very tense. The enemy crossed the Dnieper in a few places admittedly with but minor forces; nevertheless our own reserves cannot be brought up at present. In the Desna-Dnieper sector the Russians succeeded in penetrating deeply into the Smolensk area.

Troops are being observed assembling in the south, presumably in preparation for a thrust in the direction of Perekop.

II. Operations Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reported on the midget submarine attack on the TIRPITZ. It is difficult to obtain exact information because telegraphic lines of communication to the arctic coast have been interrupted. Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Commanding Admiral, Task Force be asked to submit plans today for reinforcing the security measures in the battleship mooring berths and to state whether he would recommend moving the SCHARNHORST to Bogen Fiord. For relevant teletype 1/Skl I op. 26699/43 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C. Vol. II a.

III. Chief, Torpedo Branch, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament reported on the possibility of using Zaunkoenig torpedoes in shore based torpedo batteries. Investigations made some time ago showed this to be impossible, not only because it is necessary that the target area be free from noises, but extremely large quantities of material are required for mounting the torpedo batteries, factors which make it practically impossible to entertain this proposal at present.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

IV. Mine Warfare Section reported on the plans submitted by Group West for the laying of protective minefields in the Channel in connection with the transfers of steamers. A report was also made on the minelaying plans submitted by Group South for the west coast of Thrace, the area off the Dardanelles, and the Gulf of Salonika in the War Diary of 22 Sept.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

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V. Report by the Operations Section, Naval Staff Operations Division:

a. Admiral, Northern Waters reported that the LUETZOW will leave Alta Fiord on the evening of 23 Sept. on her transfer to home waters with the JACOBI, STEINBRINCK, IHN and Z "27". (Keyword as far as Trondheim is to be "Hansa", from there on "Hermelin") Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was advised by teletype 1/Skl I op. 2895/43 Gkdos. Chefs. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

b. As regards the Aquila boats in Japan, Chief, Naval Staff has once more declined the Japanese proposal for a compromise and has given orders that the Naval Attaché in Tokyo be instructed to make these boats ready for sailing as quickly as possible. The Aquila boats in western France will not be entirely manned by German crews. Each boat will take ten Italian specialists on board as recommended by the German Naval Liaison Officer to Commander, Italian Submarines, Bordeaux. Commanding Admiral, Group West raised objections to an Italian Naval Detachment being formed from loyal Italian personnel. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff said that in his opinion the order should stand as given. It is planned to employ the Italians on the vessels of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. They will continue to be subordinated to Captain Grossi as far as discipline and supplies are concerned. The relevant order will be dispatched.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

VI. Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reported that Foreign Section III, Armed Forces High Command had been requested to instruct the Naval Special Service Department, Bordeaux to man the captured Italian blockade-runners with German crews exclusively. The flag should be changed without ceremony and quietly so as not to hurt the feelings of Captain Grossi. Captain Grossi should be informed in advance. The Italian crews have been interned in camps and placed under the command of Captain Grossi. Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

Special Items.

I. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division transmitted the following information to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters:

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"The initial assembly of naval units assigned to the occupation of the Mediterranean coast is being impeded by unbearable delays, because the Army Transport Organization is not carrying railroad transportations out on time. Despite the fact that Naval Staff had already at the beginning of operation "Achse" drawn the attention of Chief, Army Transportation to the exceptional urgency of rail transportation for the commands and staffs that are now to be brought up to the Mediterranean area, and despite the fact that Chief, Army Transportation allegedly instructed the offices under his command to give these naval transports highest priority, the naval units assembled at home and ready to be dispatched have been waiting for transportation for many days, some of them for over a week. This applies in the first place to transports to the southeastern area and to a lesser degree to transports to Italy itself. However, transports to the Adriatic and Aegean areas are especially urgent. And Naval High Command has now exhausted all the means at its disposal which might have speeded up the transportations.

Today, Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch tried personally to get into touch with the Army General Staff through the Naval Liaison Officer but was unfortunately unsuccessful because of the latter's absence.

You are, therefore, requested to take the necessary steps through Armed Forces High Command. It must be pointed out in this connection that it is especially the Army commands in the newly occupied areas which are constantly pressing the Navy to bring the detachments and staffs to the coast with greater speed. In other words, something drastic must be done at once, particularly about bringing up the naval forces assigned to the Adriatic coast and the Greek area."

II. Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command issued the following instructions:

"Reports and requests submitted show that all the commands concerned are trying to retain or obtain as many of the available Italian military internees as possible.

In opposition to these endeavors, it is considered that the greatest advantages will be derived from the Italian internees by employing them, if possible without exception, in the armament industry, thus releasing Germans for service in the Armed Forces.

It must, therefore, again be stated most emphatically that it is in the Armed Forces' own interest that all Italian military internees be brought to Germany, except for those who have

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voluntarily agreed to continue fighting on our side and who have been found acceptable.

Manpower required for regular work, especially for constructing coastal defenses and airfields, should be drawn as far as possible from the civilian population."

III. Chief, Armed Forces High Command ordered that:

1. The 181st Infantry Division is to be moved as quickly as possible to the southeastern area, leaving Oslo on 1 Oct. 1943. This division will be placed under Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast. The sector in which it is planned to employ this division, is to be reported.

2. (Further instructions which do not concern the Navy.)

IV. Evaluations of messages intercepted by radio deciphering and radio intelligence service between 13 - 19 Sept. may be found in Radio Monitoring Report 38/43.

Special attention is drawn to the following:

a. The small number of submarine sighting reports from the Bay of Biscay; see page 6 of the above report.

b. The contacting of convoy HX "255" in the North Atlantic route; see page 5.

c. The bombardments of the Salerno coastal area; see page 11.

d. Additional observations made in connection with the landing operations on Sicily; see pages 12 - 15.

V. On 16 Sept. Chief, Armed Forces High Command issued the general instructions to be followed as regards the handling of the Italian prisoners of war and the booty. Copy of this order as per 1/Skl I op. 26429/43 Gkdos. in files 1/Skl I op. II, 17. As far as the Navy is concerned, it should be noted that amongst other things the booty could be used as part of the equipment for newly formed Coastal Artillery Battalions. The necessary requests for an allocation of guns should be submitted to Operations Staff. In other words, all weapons, ammunition, motor vehicles, communications equipment etc., naval vessels and all other kinds of equipment that were only used by the Navy, including real estate, furniture, medical equipment - including hospital equipment - in so far as it was the property of the Italian Navy, is now at the disposal of our Navy.

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Situation 23 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-nine planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located in BF 4640 shortly after midnight on 23 Sept.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On 21 Sept. two mines were swept off the Gironde, two off La Pallice, and on 22 Sept. one off Lorient.

The destroyer Z "23" moved from Le Verdon to Pauillac and the destroyer Z "24" with Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla aboard, moved from Royan to Bordeaux. The 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put into Brest in the forenoon. Two submarines were escorted out of St. Nazaire.

At 0900 Nantes was raided by 60 bombers. Bombs were dropped from a height of 5,000-7,000 meters. The attack was concentrated on the Loire quay and the Bretagne dockyard. The smoke cover was inadequate. The KULMERLAND was a total loss and the majority of her crew was killed. The KERTOSONO, the ERMELAND, the MONSUN, the fast escort vessel SG "2", one harbor defense vessel, and one tanker were hit and badly damaged. The ERMELAND broke in two; the other steamers are on fire. The large floating dock sustained two direct hits and it is feared that it will be a total loss. The number of casualties has not yet been ascertained. Seven of the attacking planes were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft guns.

Between 1910 and 1922 Nantes was again heavily raided by 120 planes from an altitude of 6,000-9,000 meters. The smoke cover was very thin owing to strong wind. Extensive damage was done to buildings in the center of the town and fires were started. Further details are not yet available.

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Channel Coast:

The convoy of the steamer LIVADIA reached Cherbourg during the night of 22 Sept. according to plan and proceeded to Le Havre in the evening.

Between 0043 and 0059 our batteries shelled targets located by radar in the sector between Antifer and Fécamp.

Patrol positions in the Channel were unoccupied owing to stormy weather conditions. Convoy traffic was only carried out in the Channel Island area.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Stormy weather very considerably impeded the activities of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. At 0855 16 fighters in two groups attacked the canal locks and a convoy near Wemeldinge (South Beveland) with bombs and machine-guns. Anti-aircraft guns on board our ships and on shore shot down two enemy planes. We sustained no damage. Later on, however, damage was inflicted and casualties were suffered in an attack on a convoy at Staviness and on the harbor of Zierksee.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Altogether ten planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. At 1030 a Spitfire carried out reconnaissance over the berths in the Alta Fiord area. At 1715 on 22 Sept. two PT boats were sighted west of the island of Kinn. According to an intelligence report from Bergen, they were coming up from the south and proceeding west at high speed. At 0830 on 23 Sept. nine British barrage balloons were sighted over the area between Stavanger and Egersund.

Own Situation:

Twenty ships were escorted north and twenty south.

Eighteen ships were delayed in the arctic coastal area owing to a shortage of escorts.

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Further reports have been received on the midget submarine attack on the TIRPITZ on 22 Sept., as a result of which the following supplementary report will be dispatched to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters with copy to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy:

"1. Chronological Sequence of Events:

At 0930 a midget submarine was destroyed within the net enclosure in Kaa Fiord (the TIRPITZ's anchorage). Four Britishers were taken prisoner.

At 1012 two heavy explosions occurred about 60 meters away on the port side of the TIRPITZ both fore and aft.

At 1035 a second submarine was sighted 300 meters away on the starboard bow and sunk by gunfire, her captain was taken prisoner. A third submarine was detected 600 meters away on the starboard beam and subjected to gunfire. Several hits were observed. Mines with time fuses were obviously laid by these submarines.

2. Security Measures:

Hydrophones were installed at both entrances to Alta Fiord and three submarine chasers constantly patrolled the approaches to Alta Fiord.

The ships' anchorages were protected by net barrages. The gaps in these net barrages were each guarded by a patrol vessel. The ships themselves were furthermore placed in net enclosures.

3. Damage Sustained by the TIRPITZ:

The detonation of the mines rocked the ship badly. The following damage was caused thereby:

(1.) Control stations for heavy anti-aircraft gun partly out of order, but repairs with the resources available on board will be attempted.

(2.) Several range-finders are out of order. Repairs with the resources available on board are only partly possible.

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(3.) Engine and Power Plant:

All the power stations are out of action for the present because the bolts in the bed plates have been torn out. A definite statement as to when the power turbines will be in service again will probably be available in a week's time. It is expected that it will be possible to put the central and starboard power turbines back into action.

(4.) The double bottom has been damaged and leaks have sprung in the inner one. Intake of water to the extent of 800 cubic meters (power station 2 flooded) has so far been reduced to 300 cubic meters by pumping. The power station is still out of action.

(5.) Casualties:

One killed, thirty-seven injured.

Further details will be personally reported by Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer, probably on 24 Sept. He will take charts with him.

Group North submitted the summarized report received from the Task Force. Copy as per 1/Skl 26744/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

In addition to the above, the Task Force in a supplementary report provided further details and surmises. Copy as per 1/Skl 2907/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

Group North transmitted a request received from Admiral, Northern Waters for the immediate dispatch of a minesweeper flotilla for submarine chasing, which he considered to be urgently necessary for the protection of the Task Force in view of the incident in Alta Fiord. In supporting this request Group North/Fleet asked whether it might not be possible for the assignment of a submarine chaser flotilla, formed with armed fishing vessels equipped with location gear, to be considered.

Naval Staff recommended that the following announcement be included in the High Command's communiqué for 24 Sept.:

"On 22 Sept. British midget submarines attempted to penetrate into Norwegian coastal island waters. They were, however, discovered in time and destroyed before they were able to carry out their operation. Some members of the crews were captured."

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Naval Staff considers it unwise not to mention this incident at all, as it is uncertain whether all the participating enemy submarines were destroyed. And even if they were, it is anticipated that information will reach the enemy through his shore-based intelligence service.

For further recommendations made by Commanding Admiral, Task Force on the organization of the staff in his absence, with Commander, Destroyers deputizing for him, see teletype as per 1/Skl 2904/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a. This matter is being dealt with by Group North/Fleet.

On 22 Sept. Group North/Fleet submitted plans for laying minefields in the White Sea entrances by destroyers. Operation "Katharina" would involve three destroyers laying 150 EMF mines in the Kanin Noss area, operation "Feodora" three destroyers laying 150 EMF mines in the area off Cape Gorodetski. It is estimated that about 2,500 cubic meters of fuel will be required for both operations.

The plans for the minelaying operation "Katharina" off Kanin Noss conform more or less to the plans already approved by Naval Staff in August 1943. Operations Division, Naval Staff had recommended that a minefield be laid along the Kola coast and not in the White Sea entrances as originally planned, and the minelaying operation "Feodora" now planned off Cape Gorodetski is in accordance with this suggestion. Group North/Fleet will be informed that the minefield plans "Katharina" and "Feodora" have been approved.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The usual artillery and air activity was observed in Kronstadt Bay.

A minesweeper group of 28 motor minesweepers and 1 vessel, presumably a minesweeper, put out from Lavansaari on a southwesterly course and cruised east of Tyters as far as east of Hogland on alternating courses, and then put into the south bay of Lavansaari at 1600. There was brisk air activity over the island in the forenoon. The batteries on the island of Tyters sustained damage and suffered casualties. One hundred and three mines stored there

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were damaged and are therefore useless. In all 75 enemy planes were detected. In an air attack on the patrol vessels at the "Seeigel" minefield, casualties were suffered on one of the minesweepers. One of the attacking planes was shot down. A Russian torpedo plane unsuccessfully attacked a convoy of two of our steamers northwest of Steinort.

2. Own Situation:

The minesweeper M "343" came into collision with submarine U "962" in the Great Belt and was damaged. The minesweeper was forced to return to port, but the submarine was able to continue on its passage.

During the night of 22 Sept. our bombers attacked Lavansaari. Direct hits on the airfield and on the anti-aircraft gun positions were observed. Escort and transport operations were carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic. Otherwise nothing to report.

Army General Staff, Armed Forces High Command decided that the island of Tyters was to remain under the control of the Army, because the Fuehrer had expressly ordered this subordination some time ago, which indeed corresponds to Fuehrer Directive No. 40, and furthermore because High Command, Navy refused to take over the island.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Ostrow report, a large convoy of 24 transports and 85 fast freighters, including the QUEEN ELIZABETH, the BERENGARIA, the GEORGIA, the AQUITANIA and the WEST POINT, will sail from Charleston, Wilmington, and Baltimore for England between 26 and 29 Sept. A small part of this convoy will probably be diverted to the Mediterranean. Since 12 Sept. large quantities of troops and tanks have been brought up.

2. Own Situation:

The fog in the operational area against the convoy in the North Atlantic only lifted for a few hours during the evening of 22 Sept. The operation was broken off in the morning, as the fog set in again during the night. The convoy was sighted

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once more at noon in AJ 9524. With the sinking of another three destroyers and five ships plus the torpedoing of two ships, the total results obtained from this operation now stand at 12 escort destroyers sunk, 3 escort destroyers probably sunk, 9 ships totalling 46,500 GRT sunk, and 2 other ships torpedoed. As far as can be ascertained at the moment, we lost two submarines.

It is regrettable that the fog prevented us from achieving a major tonnage success in this operation which has, however, proved that our submarines are again able to take up the battle of the North Atlantic. The importance of this fact cannot be overestimated, not only for naval warfare but also for the prosecution of the war in general.

Operations Division passed on to Submarine Division, with its own comments, the information that the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer submitted to it about orders received from Tokyo by radiogram on combined submarine operations in the Indian Ocean. Copy as per 1/Skl I oo. a 2902/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Fifteen planes of the 3rd Air Force carried out long-range night-fighter operations and harassing raids over the south of England. During the day 13 planes were on free-lance fighter operations. One four-engined enemy plane was shot down.

Apart from the raids on Holland already reported, during the day the enemy attacked airfields in Belgium and western France and a power station at Rouen. As already reported, large enemy formations attacked Nantes in the forenoon and in the evening. (See: "Situation West Area".)

During the night 400 planes penetrated into the Mannheim/Darmstadt area via Belgium. The attack centered on Mannheim/Ludwigshafen where heavy damage was done to the residential districts, industrial, and harbor installations. In addition Darmstadt and Aachen were raided. According to reports received so far, at least 30 planes were shot down.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force carried out an air reconnaissance.

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Air Force Command, Southeast put 24 dive bombers into operation against the harbor of Corfu.

During the day enemy air raids were carried out on Pisa and against the airfields on Crete and Rhodes.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty five-enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines. We lost four planes. The 5th Air Force reported 14 planes on operations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

On the evening of 22 Sept. six destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. At 2230 a large convoy of 66 freighters with 7 tankers and 6 escort vessels coming from the Atlantic passed through the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound. Of this convoy 1 tanker and 6 freighters put into Gibraltar. The convoy was reported at 1100 off Cape Tres Forcas consisting of 61 ships and 6 escort vessels, and was joined by 4 more tankers. A third aircraft carrier of the ILLUSTRIOUS class, 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 2 DIDO-class cruisers, and 1 LEANDER-class cruiser put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. Therefore, all auxiliary aircraft carriers except one detected in the Mediterranean, are now in this port. The LEANDER-class cruiser put into the Atlantic in the evening. A BIRMINGHAM-class cruiser that had put in from the Atlantic in the forenoon put out again in the evening for the Mediterranean.

According to a report from Tres Forcas, a convoy of 13 transports carrying troops, escorted by an aircraft carrier, on course east, was sighted at 1320 on 22 Sept. This is presumably the convoy that was reported from Ceuta early in the morning of the same day and which was joined by an auxiliary aircraft carrier from Gibraltar.

No sighting reports were received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

At 0735 our air reconnaissance sighted a large convoy on a west-southwesterly course north of Ustica.

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According to sighting reports, there were fewer warships and freighters in Taranto on 21 Sept. but more landing craft than on 19 Sept. On the evening of 22 Sept. the coast near Ancona and Rimini was shelled from the sea, presumably by a destroyer. The reason for this bombardment was probably to find out the strength of our coastal defenses in preparation for new landing operations.

Twenty-five miles south-southeast of Ancona 15 motor sailing vessels were sighted withdrawing to the south.

A submarine position was reported off Bastia.

According to an intelligence report from reliable sources in Switzerland, Moscow is said to have protested against the agreement reached at Casablanca for an invasion of the Balkans in the fall of 1943. In the discussions held at Washington the Allied General Staff succeeded, however, in obtaining, against the will of Mr. Churchill, a decision in favor of an invasion. Allied fleet units at present in the eastern Mediterranean are said to have received orders to start operations along the Albanian coast. These operations are expected to begin simultaneously in the areas of Ragusa, Durazzo and Saseno on 24 or 25 Sept.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

On 21 Sept. submarine U "593" probably sank a 6,000 GRT freighter belonging to an enemy northbound convoy 35 miles south of Salerno and torpedoed another one.

Submarine U "410" has been assigned to a new operational area between the meridians of grid squares CH 9565 and CJ 7826.

There were no PT boat operations owing to weather conditions.

The Italian minelayer AQUA will replace the lost minelayer BRANDENBURG and be manned with the BRANDENBURG's crew. The German steamer ST. NAZAIRE (2,910 GRT) was sunk by an aerial torpedo in an air attack 17 miles northwest of Spezia. Her crew has been rescued.

The ferry traffic from Corsica can at present only be carried out at night because of submarine danger. Loading ships in Bastia is badly handicapped by the harbor demolitions. Furthermore, rough seas are preventing small vessels from being used.

Bonifacio and Porto Vecchio were evacuated in the forenoon according to plan.

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The work on the dockyards and harbors is progressing satisfactorily, and the Italian units that were taken over have in particular made a valuable contribution to this work.

The offices of the Armed Forces Attachés in Rome are to be closed down by order of Operation Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean and Adriatic Seas:

On 22 Sept. four enemy PT boats forced their way into Valona, sank an Italian submarine chaser and escaped. Our air reconnaissance at the same time discovered six enemy vessels in the area west of Valona and at 1837 sighted west of Corfu, two steamers with escort vessels proceeding towards that island.

Our troops captured the port of Argostoli in Cephalonia. A motor minesweeper has been dispatched there to seize the enemy vessels lying in that port. The disarming of the Italian garrisons on Andros and Naxos has begun. This will be followed by similar operations on Paros and Antiparos.

The convoy of the steamer DONIZETTI and the torpedo boat (of foreign origin) TA "10" which was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes in the forenoon of 22 Sept. off the east coast of Rhodes, was again attacked on 23 Sept. 10 miles south of Rhodes, this time by two enemy destroyers. Both engines of the torpedo boat were destroyed and the engine room was burned out. The ship is drifting off Cape Prasso, but can be kept afloat. Five men were killed and four injured in this action. The DONIZETTI was burning when last sighted, and must be regarded as lost.

Commanding Admiral, Aegean gave orders to scuttle torpedo boat TA "10" and to use her crew on shore, armed, if possible, with small weapons.

The convoy of the DITMARSCHEN consisting of three steamers escorted by two submarine chasers, was attacked by enemy torpedo planes and bombers while on passage to Crete. The steamer DITMARSCHEN (1,171 GRT) was torpedoed. The rest of the convoy reached Candia without further losses.

On the afternoon of 22 Sept. two enemy planes bombed a motor sailing vessel near Gavdos. On the forenoon of 23 Sept. an enemy plane dropped bombs on Milos.

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Group South has in accordance with the Fuehrer directive tried to evacuate all the Italians from Rhodes regardless of losses. Because two steamers and one torpedo boat have already been lost, Group South asked for permission temporarily to discontinue these transports from Rhodes until the captured Italian torpedo boats have been commissioned and manned with German crews.

Naval Staff granted permission and informed Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff accordingly. Copy of teletype 1/Skl I op. 26745/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Group South reported:

"1. According to present directives, the entire Aegean area is to be defended. Therefore, the mounting of batteries on the outer periphery of this area, extending from the Ionian Islands to Rhodes via the Peloponnesos and Crete will be continued.

2. The mounting of guns on already prepared emplacements has begun and it is expected that these guns will be ready for action by the end of October, except for those on Antikythera where, owing to the need for roads to be constructed, the mounting will take yet another six months, and for those on Cephalonia which is still occupied by the enemy, and where two 15-centimeter guns were lost when the naval landing craft on which they were loaded were sunk by Italian mutineers.

Commanding Admiral, Adriatic requested the Air Force to provide reconnaissance planes and fighter escorts for the convoy of three steamers and two torpedo boats that is to sail from Durazzo on 24 Sept. northbound. He also requested anti-submarine escorts and that the enemy coastal batteries on the islands should be prevented from going into action while the convoy is passing by. (See Teletype 1532).

German Naval Command, Italy informed Group South that the transfer of the steamers from the Adriatic to the Aegean would start on 25 Sept., provided that as efficient an air reconnaissance as possible be provided throughout the passage. (See Teletype 2115).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity was still as brisk as ever. Raids were carried out on the ports of Taman, Kerch, and Yalta. In Kerch

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the motor minesweeper R "30" was totally destroyed by a direct bomb hit. Four harbor defense vessels were burned out and became total losses when their fuel caught fire.

With reference to the shelling of the coast by our naval artillery lighters during the night of 22 Sept. it is now additionally reported that two enemy batteries were definitely silenced by our gunfire.

The operation carried out by the 1st and 11th PT Boat Flotillas during the night of 22 Sept. was unsuccessful. The operation will not be repeated during the night of 23 Sept. owing to unfavorable weather conditions.

Minefield VIII in the Strait of Kerch was laid according to plan.

Ferry traffic between Kerch and Taman was carried out according to plan. Unfavorable weather conditions handicapped the rest of the convoy operations.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Mussolini has formed a new cabinet, in which he himself is Foreign Minister as well as Premier. Of the new ministers appointed the name of Marshall Graziani caused a great sensation. He is taking over the Ministry of Defense. According to Radio Rome, Mussolini will convoke a congress in the near future in order to draft a new constitution for the Italian Fascist Republic.

The new Fascist Government has declared Rome an open city.

According to a press report, the United States diplomatic representatives in the Middle East have all been called to Washington.

Chief, Naval Staff left for Fuehrer Headquarters.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

The critical point on the eastern front lies on the right flank of the Southern Army Group. In the Central Army Group's sector the battle is now centering on Smolensk. Our withdrawals are proceeding according to plan. Losses in material are comparatively light.

Nothing was reported from Italy and the Balkans. Large formations of our forces will be moved to the Istrian peninsula from Upper Italy for mopping-up operations.

In accordance with the orders of Naval Staff (see War Diary 23 Sept.), Admiral, Task Force submitted a request for the improvement of the net barrages off Kaa Fiord and off Lang Fiord and asked that an electric warning system connected with depth charge throwers be installed, and stated that he thought it would be unwise to move the SCHARNHORST to Bogen Bay because there is no net barrage, the approach route for submarines from the west is shorter than the one to Alta Fiord, and moreover, there are no anti-aircraft guns there. Admiral, Task Force believes that a submarine attack similar to the one on 22 Sept. will not be repeated, as the surprise element would be missing.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff said that Commander in Chief, Navy is even now still absolutely against the TIRPITZ docking in Gdynia. Wilhelmshaven is too exposed to danger from the air and

at Kiel submarine construction would be affected in the same way as the training of submarine crews would be at Gdynia. Even though this is not very satisfactory, the ship will consequently have to be only provisionally repaired in the northern area. Chief of Staff said that he had asked Commander in Chief, Navy, immediately before the latter's departure for Fuehrer Headquarters, not to consider putting the ship out of commission.

III. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported on the instructions received from Chief, Armed Forces High Command on the employment of Italian prisoners of war and the use made of the booty, as recorded in War Diary 23 Sept. Our request for the allotment of prisoners of war needed for planned naval construction work is therefore superfluous.

IV. Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division reported on the instructions dispatched to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, requesting that naval rail transports to the southeastern area be accelerated. (See War Diary 23 Sept.) Supply and Fuel Branch, Quartermaster Division dispatched an officer to Belgrade who is personally to intervene there.

V. Chief, Operations Division reported that according to information received from Commanding Admiral, Denmark, the planned disbandment of the Danish Armed Forces set for 27 Sep., which was necessary for recruiting volunteers for the German Navy has been deferred for the time being because the Reich Deputy for Denmark suddenly raised the question of the deportation of Jews from Denmark. Teletype as per 1/Skl 2916/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III. According to the Fuehrer directive received, Reichsfuehrer SS was given permission to recruit up to 4,000 volunteers from the released members of the Danish Armed Forces who are to be assembled in SS camps in the Reich. This will force the Navy to continue manning the coastal defense flotillas in the Great Belt with German personnel for the time being. Mine checksweeps in the North Sea and along the coast of Jutland, which are especially important during the fall storms, can, therefore, no longer be carried out to the necessary extent. Output in the Danish dockyards will further decrease.

Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters will be informed of the above report by teletype.

Special Items.

I. Group West submitted, with the approval of the German Armistice Commission, recommendations for the disposal of the

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French ships at Toulon now that the Italians have dropped out of the partnership owing to their surrender. This matter has been dealt with at length in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. Naval Staff approved the recommendations submitted by Group West.

II. According to an intelligence report, whose value cannot yet be judged, an attack on the south coast of France is no longer being planned for this year because it is too late in the season; only heavy air raids will be carried out. During the fall and winter forces are to be assembled in Sardinia and Corsica. This year's target was the conquest of Italy. The reaching of this target was impeded by the strong resistance on Sicily and the political situation in Italy. The quarrel between Giraud and de Gaulle caused a further delay in operations. No attacks on northern France from England have been planned for the near future. Instead the war of nerves and acts of sabotage will be intensified.

An intelligence reports from Lisbon emanating from United States Embassy circles would indicate that plans are being made for a large-scale raid on Fuehrer Headquarters whose location was given away by a high ranking Italian officer.

Situation 24 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo has once more received by Telegram 0200 the following instructions regarding the Aquila boats:

"Boats are German property. Compromises are out of the question."

Otherwise nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Forty-two planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located in BE 6660 at 0808 and one in BE 3550 at 1026.

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2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On 23 Sept. one ELM/J mine was swept off Brest and two off Lorient. Barrages against aerial torpedoes have been laid at Le Verdon roads in preparation for a destroyer berth. Escorts of submarines from Brest, St. Nazaire and the Gironde were carried out according to plan.

Channel Coast:

Convoy traffic and patrol duties have been resumed in the Channel.

The convoy of the steamer LIVADIA put into Le Havre.

It is planned to start the minelaying operation OK3 and also to put 30 PT boats into operation along the southeast coast of England under the new minelaying offensive on the evening of 24 Sept. Both operations are now reported to have started according to plan.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

One ELM/J mine was swept north of Ameland. Convoy "461" Elbe - Hook left at noon; the reciprocal convoy "1177" arrived at 0500. Minesweeping operations and channel sweeps were partly resumed. One steamer is in convoy from Esbjerg to the Elbe.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-eight planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. At 2216 a British vessel was located in AE 5970. At 1015 our reconnaissance sighted two submarines on a westerly course north of Murmansk. On 23 Sept. at 1330 a reconnaissance of our ships' berths in the Alta Fiord was carried out by a Spitfire. Naval Command, Norway reported that the loss of the steamer ANTJE FRITZEN was probably caused by the vessel having struck a Russian inertia contact mine type M 12 and not by a PT boat attack, as previously assumed.

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Admiral, Northern Waters reports that radio intelligence suspects from about one hundred radio cover-names intercepted, that an East-West convoy is assembling in the area east of Vilkitski Strait which will start out as soon as ice conditions force our submarines to withdraw from their positions in the Kara Sea - Vilkitski Strait area. Admiral, Northern Waters and Group North/Fleet do not agree with this opinion. Group North/Fleet believes it to be still quite possible for an East-West convoy to be sailing, but does not regard the radio traffic observed as a sure sign of the start of such a convoy. Group North/Fleet therefore intends to order the minelaying submarines to remain in that area for combat operations after their present minelaying task has been carried out, in case more specific information should be received concerning favorable ice conditions. Later on action against the enemy eastbound convoy will have to be mainly left to the minefields laid. (See Teletype 2238).

Naval Staff concurs with Group North/Fleet.

Own Situation:

During the night of 23 Sept. two adhesive mines exploded under the steamer HARTMUT while at anchor in Guten Fiord. She has been underslung with a collision net and is able to proceed on her passage.

Twenty-two ships were escorted north and 31 south. Fifteen ships were delayed in the arctic coastal area owing to a shortage of escorts. Admiral, Northern Waters reported that operation "Hansa" was developing according to plan.

In connection with the improved defense measures for the ships' berths in Alta Fiord see Teletypes 0010, 0721, 1925 and 2036.

Quartermaster Division will take further action.

Group North/Fleet reported that the reconnaissance operations of BV flying boats no longer serve any useful purpose now that the LUETZOW has been withdrawn from the northern area and only two minelaying submarines are left in the Kara Sea. Air reconnaissance for these two submarines, after the completion of their present minelaying operation, will be furnished by the FW 200 plane at present on reconnaissance operations for the weather operation "Kreuzritter". Group North/Fleet considers this to be sufficient. Further submarine operations in the Kara Sea are not planned in view of the advanced season.

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Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff of the comments it transmitted to Commanding Admiral, Cruisers and Commander, Destroyers and the final decision now reached on the planned appointment of Commander, Destroyers as deputy for Admiral, Task Force. Teletype as per 1/Skl 26853/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Enemy activity in Kronstadt Bay and the island area was generally unchanged. Between 1600 and 2230, continuous air attacks were carried out against our Army batteries in Luga Bay and on Ustluga.

Heavy explosions and a big fire were observed on Lavansaari at 1640.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Command, Baltic reported its plans for the prevention of a blockade-run out of Goeteborg as ordered:

1. The patrol positions between Hanstholm and Arendal will be occupied by four patrol vessels. Should the ships now on the Oslo relay traffic be allowed to sail without escort, it would release one or even two patrol vessels. These boats would then be available for reinforcing the patrol positions and for patrolling the Hanstholm gap.

2. The area between 57° 20' and 58° 20' N is being patrolled by the GREIF and four patrol vessels off Swedish territorial waters.

3. The shipping between Ferder and Struten is being controlled by Naval Shore Commander, Oslo Fiord; the barrage gap at Kristiansand South by Naval Shore Commander, Kristiansand South.

4. An evening reconnaissance along the Swedish coast from Vinga to Kamskaer and a morning reconnaissance over the declared area in the Skagerrak are planned.

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5. Only under exceptionally favorable conditions will these measures prevent a blockade-run. For an effective blockade, more and above all faster vessels are required as well as torpedo planes and bombers.

Otherwise nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries our Battery "Prinz Heinrich" shelled with observed results the Baltic dockyard (in Kronstadt), the assembly sheds, a cruiser under construction and boats assembled around the battleship OKTYABRSKAYA REVOLUTSIYA.

Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries requested that an Army coastal battery be brought up in view of the appearance of Russian minesweeping groups east of Tyters but outside the range of our light guns located there. (See Teletype 1230).

Nothing to report from the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic.

V. Merchant Shipping.

Iron ore shipments from Scandinavia so far in 1943 have been very high. Altogether 7,391,000 tons of iron ore were shipped to Germany between January and August 1943 as compared with 5,415,000 and 5,458,000 tons respectively during the same period in 1942 and 1941. But the figures for August 1943 are nevertheless below those for August of the two preceding years.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Spanish reports from Washington, it has been officially admitted in the United States that German submarines laid magnetic mines in Halifax harbor in June, causing the loss of a 2,000 GRT freighter.

2. Own Situation:

The official Armed Forces communiqué suggested by Submarine Division on the successes gained in the battle of the North Atlantic was worded as follows:

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"After weeks of inactivity German submarines carried out a surprise attack on an enemy convoy in the North Atlantic. One of the submarine groups succeeded in gaining contact with a convoy bound for America which was unusually heavily escorted. The attack had, therefore, first of all to be directed against the very numerous escort destroyers forming the outer defense of this convoy. Here our submarines achieved an outstanding success. In an obstinate and fierce battle which raged for several days, twelve escort destroyers were sunk and three torpedoed which probably also sank. Heavy fog impeded further operations but even so, from out of this scattered convoy, nine more ships totalling 46,500 GRT were sunk and two torpedoed."

Otherwise nothing to report from the Atlantic.

In accordance with the agreement reached between Operations Division, Naval Staff and the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin (see War Diary 23 Sept.), the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer will send the following reply to the instructions he received from Naval Staff with regard to submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean:

"1. In principle, the boundary of the operational area in the Indian Ocean will be 70° E. The boats can, however, operate beyond this boundary, if necessary, provided that due notice of their intention is given.

2. The Japanese Navy plans to let one submarine operate for the time being in the area off the northern approaches to the Mozambique Channel, one in the Gulf of Aden and one in the Gulf of Oman (three boats in all).

3. One German submarine will operate for the time being in each of the following sea areas:

Mombassa
Gulf of Aden
Gulf of Oman
off Bombay
off the southwestern tip of India

(five boats in all).

4. Should the plans in paragraphs 2) and 3) have to be changed, notice must be given in accordance with paragraph 1).

5. Recognition signals will be agreed on at once.

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6. Results will not be made public for the time being. Should it be wished to do so, however, the wording will first be agreed on."

In connection with paragraph 1) the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer said that Admiral Yokoi who is now in Tokyo would use his influence to obtain a flexible interpretation of the 70° boundary line. Submarine Division has been informed accordingly.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Seven planes of the 3rd Air Force were on free lance operations over the Bay of Biscay.

Single enemy planes penetrated southern and central Germany without attacking. Two Fortresses which were amongst the planes that approached the Dutch coast independently were shot down. Our airfields and traffic installations in Belgium and France were attacked. In all, seven planes were shot down. During the night of 24 Sept. eight enemy planes attacked a dummy installation in the Krefeld area.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Forces of the 2nd Air Force carried out reconnaissance operations over the Italian area. Thirty-five dive bombers and fourteen Ju 88's participated in the operation against Corfu. One Italian torpedo boat was sunk. Nineteen dive bombers attacked a convoy south of Salerno; one freighter was probably sunk.

Continuous fighter-bomber attacks were carried out by the enemy over the Salerno front and fighters were continuously out on operations between Corsica and Italy. In addition, the airfield of Borga on Corsica was attacked as well as Pisa and Leghorn. Enemy planes dropped supplies to the insurgents in the area of Greece.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty-six planes were shot down over the Army front lines. We lost five planes.

The enemy showed lively air activity in the area of the 1st Air Force and had 350 planes on operations, 20 of which operated over the Gulf of Finland.

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The 5th Air Force reported that it had 25 planes on operations. At 0900 air reconnaissance reported three destroyers 30 miles southeast of the Faroes on course 340°.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The following ships were reported to be lying in Gibraltar at 1400: 3 ILLUSTRIOUS-class aircraft carriers, 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 1 sea plane tender, 2 DIDO-class cruisers, 10 destroyers, 3 corvettes, 2 transports, 54 freighters, 9 tankers etc., as well as 205 planes.

At 0800 Cape Tres Forcas sighted a convoy of 32 ships on a westerly course.

Large shipping concentrations were observed in the Gulf of Salerno. During the night of 23 Sept. brisk shipping was detected in the eastern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea, including four fairly large convoys on various courses. At 1800 on 23 Sept. three fairly large unidentified vessels shelled the coast between Capri and Campanella. Minesweeping operations are possibly in progress. PT boats have appeared in the Miseno narrows during the last few nights.

Two corvettes and fishing vessels were sighted off Ajaccio. A submarine location was reported at 0410 southeast of Bastia. Radio intelligence noticed mounting urgent radio traffic between Algiers and Palermo.

The number of freighters lying in the harbors of Brindisi and Bari was unchanged. There were also one cruiser and one transport in Brindisi.

According to intelligence reports, the JEANNE D'ARC, three destroyers, three submarines, and transports put out from Algiers on 19 Sept. and headed towards Corsica. Some other convoys also left for an unknown destination.

It is said that a large-scale Anglo-American harassing operation will soon be started from Sardinia directed against the coastal sector between Cannes and St. Maxime with the object of disrupting our coastal defenses and preparing the populace for an invasion at a later date. It is reported that 10,000 armed and 20,000 unarmed partisans have been mobilized, who will join in this operation. (See Teletypes 1210 and 1500).

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2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarine U "565" reported that on 12 Sept. she scored two FAT-torpedo hits against landing craft and on 24 Sept. three hits against a southbound convoy 65 miles south of Salerno.

Submarine U "81" has been assigned the operational area from the Strait of Otranto up to Cape Passero, including the Gulf of Taranto.

During the night of 24 Sept. six PT boats will operate in the Gulf of Salerno. The steamer ST. NAZAIRE was not sunk by an aerial torpedo but by a submarine torpedo northwest of La Spezia on 23 Sept.

An enemy surfaced submarine unsuccessfully attacked the steamer CHAMPAGNE southeast of Bastia at 0410. The motor minesweeper R "178" shelled this submarine and forced her to submerge. Direct hits were observed.

The minelayer POMMERN put into Toulon at 1830 on 23 Sept.

The PT boats S "30" and S "33" left Pola for Venice in the forenoon.

The submarine base at Pola has fully resumed its activity. The arsenal is working at 70 per cent of its capacity. About 60 per cent of the light guns and the anti-aircraft guns are operational, but no crews are available to man them. One torpedo boat and the cruiser CATTARA are operational, but are also without crews. Large supplies of ammunition and explosives were seized in the depots. All operational tugs and auxiliary vessels as well as 40 seaplanes are also in our hands.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reported that so far 13 submarines of the 700 ton type and eleven submarines under construction have been found in the Monfalcone dockyard. At Pola three 35 ton Caproni submarines, about 80 per cent completed, were found on the slipways.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported that the demolitions in Naples harbor are progressing satisfactorily. The activity of the maquis in Corsica is increasing. By order of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, 120 labor groups of 500 men each (60,000) will be drafted by the Italian authorities between 25 Sept. and 1 Oct. from those of the 1921 - 1925 age groups subject to compulsory conscription in the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South for employment in road and defense construction work and for work in airfields and railroad installations. It is planned to transport them later on to the north.

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Group West submitted plans of minefields against enemy landing operations in southern France as a substitute for the operations that will no longer be carried out by Italy. Four minefields are planned for the protection of Toulon and four for Marseilles. The German mine material required is available there.

Naval Staff informed Group West of its approval.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

According to reconnaissance during the morning of 23 Sept., the situation in Stampalia, Kalimnos and Samos is unchanged. It was noticed that four destroyers and three small naval vessels had left Leros. No damage worth mentioning was sustained in the enemy air attack carried out in the early hours of 24 Sept. on the airfields on Rhodes and Crete. The island of Cephalonia is in our hands. The bulk of the Italian division there has been annihilated. On the island of Paros the Italians fled on the arrival of our patrol vessels, abandoning their weapons which our troops collected together.

The first landing on Corfu was carried out during the early hours of 24 Sept. The motor minesweeper R "194" was damaged in an air attack. Fighting is still in progress on Andros. All the troops were landed, except the batteries, because there are no roads on the island. Ships' guns supported the advance of our troops. A submarine chaser and a "Q" ship were dispatched to Syra during the night of 23 Sept. An additional submarine chaser, three naval landing craft and two boats are standing by off Kastoon on Andros. The removal of the remainder of the Italian garrison on Syra has started in order to prevent a resumption of fighting in consequence of the operation on Andros. Ferry traffic transferring disarmed Italians from Euboea to the mainland was in progress.

Torpedo boat TA "10" is lying at anchor in Prasso Bay 300 meters off shore. Her crew is being taken off and the salvaging of her equipment and armament has started.

The steamer DITMARSCHEN and the steamer DONITZETTI have both been sunk. The DONIZETTI had 1,576 Italians on board.

All convoy traffic has been temporarily stopped in the south of the Aegean Sea.

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Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

One naval landing craft was set on fire in the air raid on Kerch. During the night of 24 Sept., three ships of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla will operate off Utrich Point, three naval landing craft will occupy the patrol positions off the southern coast of the Taman peninsula, and two naval artillery lighters and eleven naval landing craft the patrol positions off the north coast of the Taman peninsula. Coastal patrols east of Genichesk will be carried out by three naval artillery lighters.

Submarine U "18" put into Constanta from a war cruise. Submarine U "20" put out from Sevastopol for the operational area.

Minesweeping operations on the lower Danube were carried out by a mine exploding vessel and by minesweeping planes, but without result. Escort operations were carried out according to plan.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch proceeded without incident.

IX. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Mr. Knox declared in London that the crucial test for the British and American Fleets still lay ahead and would be their battle against the Japanese Navy. Admiral King stated that enemy submarine warfare has started anew and that this is probably the beginning of the final and decisive battle at sea. The enemy is applying new methods. Submarine warfare is expected to reach its height in September and October.

Strikes are continuing in some parts of the British armament industry.

According to the B.B.C., the British Government stated that the Italian Fleet did not surrender but only proceeded to the ports designated in the armistice treaty. Its fate is now being discussed.

According to the German News Service, the Finnish Minister of Finance, Mr. Tanner, is said to have declared that Finland is willing to restore her relations with the Soviet Union to a more normal footing if her security were guaranteed. No comment has yet been made by Russia.

According to a statement made by Mr. Nelson in London and reported by Reuter, American war production will exceed the combined 1943 output of Germany and Japan by 150 per cent.

Commander in Chief, Navy returned to Berlin this morning from Fuehrer Headquarters and after a short stop started for Toulon.

Meanwhile, a short report of the situation was made by Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff in Submarine Division's office:

Chief, Operations Division reported that Group North/Fleet assumes that the dockyard period of the TIRPITZ will now definitely be carried out in a home port and intends to ask permission to move the ship to home waters as soon as she has been made ready for sailing.

Chief, Naval Staff decided that the repairs and the dockyard period of the TIRPITZ are to be carried out in the northern area.

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The fact that as a result it will probably be impossible to restore the TIRPITZ to her full fighting strength has been thoroughly taken into consideration, but will have to be accepted. Commander in Chief, Navy arrived at this decision, with which the Fuehrer agrees, for the following reasons:

1. Gdynia:

With the ever intensified expansion of the submarine arm this port is now occupied beyond capacity with submarines and auxiliary naval vessels, so that it already forms a perfect target for enemy attacks. The presence of the TIRPITZ there would certainly increase this danger most considerably. Successful air attacks on Gdynia would deal a decisive blow against the expansion of the submarine arm. In general this also applies to Kiel. Additional risks to the submarine arm expansion drive and submarine warfare must be avoided at all costs as the unhampered continuation of submarine warfare is our only guarantee of victory. In comparison the repair and restoration to full operational readiness of the TIRPITZ is but a secondary consideration. Gdynia and Kiel cannot therefore accommodate this ship.

2. Wilhelmshaven:

Here the TIRPITZ would definitely be the main target of enemy air attacks, as owing to geographical conditions they cannot always be warded off successfully. In Wilhelmshaven the TIRPITZ would undoubtedly be in exactly the same position as the SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU were in Brest. The same applies to Bremerhaven where the northern lock would be the only remaining docking possibility for the TIRPITZ.

3. Even if the ship, impeded as she is in her speed and action readiness, were moved under escort of numerous destroyers and heavy air cover, the danger from enemy naval and air forces would still be high (her reduced speed, limited steering capacity and the inadequacy of her remaining armament), even though this in itself would not constitute a decisive factor. The reasons stated under 1) and 2) force us, however, to abandon the idea of moving the TIRPITZ to home waters.

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The relevant orders have been dispatched to Group North/Fleet; Admiral, Task Force; Admiral, Northern Waters as per l/Skl I op 2925/43 Gkdos. Chfs. and also the teletype from Group North/Fleet as per l/Skl 2917/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

Chief, Naval Staff gave a brief report of the discussions held at Fuehrer Headquarters. Notes as per l/Skl Ib (Kr) 2975/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

Commander in Chief, Navy was forced to cancel his flight to Toulon for technical reasons.

Situation 25 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-two planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 1740 in BF 1680.

At 0209 one of our minesweepers sighted an enemy submarine in BF 9262 lower left (40 miles southwest of the Gironde). Weather conditions forced us to abandon the anti-submarine hunt at 1800.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four homeward bound submarine convoys were escorted into St. Nazaire and the Gironde. One ELM/J mine was swept off Brest.

The civilian population of Nantes will be evacuated by order of the Prefect. It is planned to move the steamers SCHLETTSTADT and NORDVAAED to Brest, the ANTARKTIS to Donges, the tankers

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SUDETENLAND and RUEDEMANN to the Loire and Lorient respectively.

Channel Coast:

The planned minelaying operations were carried out during the night of 24 Sept.

a. The 2nd, 4th and 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotillas laid flanking minefields north of Blanc Nez according to plan. Our boats were unsuccessfully shelled by enemy coastal guns during this operation. Our own long-range batteries returned fire.

b. Altogether 30 ships of the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th PT Boat Flotillas carried out the planned minelaying operation along the southeast coast of England.

For a summary of Group West's short report see Teletype 1842.

Operations Division, Naval Staff sent the following short report to Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, and to the Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff:

"All four flotillas carried out their assignment in connection with which the following incidents are reported:

A. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla left Ijmuiden with eight ships at 2000 and approached according to plan. At 0203 the convoy route between buoy 51 and the buoy south of the sunk lightship was mined. After an unsuccessful attempt to assist the 4th PT Boat Flotilla, all ships returned to the Hook of Holland where they tied up at 0800. Altogether 42 LMB mines were laid at a depth of 15 - 19 meters.

B. Seven ships of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla left the Hook at 2115. In the course of putting out, PT boat S "39" rammed PT boat S "90" while trying to pass a motor minesweeper. PT boat S "90" was towed back to the Hook by PT boats S "39" and S "74". From 0123 onwards the rest of the flotilla was within sight of the convoy route south of buoy 52. Our ships had an encounter with two enemy patrol vessels, one of which was sunk by a torpedo fired from PT boat S "96". Thirty-four active mines were laid and four damaged ones were laid in a safe condition. As a result of rapidly decreasing visibility our ships, whilst withdrawing, came into collision with four motor

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gunboats approaching from the north at high speed. PT boat S "96" collided with a motor gunboat whose bow was cut off. PT boat S "96" herself was heavily damaged and requested permission to scuttle. Orders to scuttle the ship were given by the commander of the flotilla, but the scuttling itself was not observed. The remaining ships searched for her crew until 0425 but without result in visibility that was below 50 meters. The ships then started on their return passage to the Hook. On their return passage the ships were four times forced to evade the motor gunboats. The crew of PT boat S "96" is missing; the ship was probably scuttled.

C. Eight ships of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla left Ijmuiden at 2000 and carried out their minelaying operation according to plan. Owing to engine trouble the first group was forced to return immediately after laying ten LMB mines near Shipwash. The second group started on its return passage after an unsuccessful search for PT boat S "96". In this search it was repeatedly driven off from the scene of the accident by groups of enemy motor gunboats.

D. Six ships of the 8th PT Boat Flotilla left the Hook at 2115. From 0125 to 0145 34 LMB mines were laid in grid square 7693, lower left, at a depth of 20 to 28 meters, according to plan. During this operation our ships had an encounter with enemy patrol vessels against which PT boat S "69" fired two torpedoes which the enemy vessels, however, outmaneuvered. The side engines of PT boat S "68" were hit and as a result, a splinter put her starboard engine out of action. All the ships had returned to the Hook by 0900.

E. Weather and visibility were good on the outward voyage of the vessels. From 0200 onwards visibility started to deteriorate. On the return passage there was a west-northwesterly gale with wind of force six and rain.

F. Final summing up:

The operation was well carried out. Minelaying was partly carried out under enemy action and partly after the elimination of the enemy forces. There are no criticisms of the way in which the operation was carried out navigationally. The loss of PT boat S "96" was caused by poor visibility. She was probably scuttled, and it must be assumed that most of her crew was taken prisoner. Six of the participating ships are now

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non-operational, three of them owing to crank case explosions whose cause is unknown."

Copy of teletype as per 1/Skl 26956/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

During the night of 24 Sept. enemy PT boats were located north of Nieuport and unidentified targets were located north-northwest of Dieppe. Enemy targets that were located west-southwest of Boulogne were bombarded by our coastal guns, but results were not observed.

Convoy operations were only carried out within the Channel Island traffic area.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Three ELM/J mines were swept ahead of the convoy "1177" north of Scheveningen, one on a check sweep northwest of Schiermonnikoog, and seven north of Terschelling.

Convoy "1177" was attacked by 40 low-flying torpedo planes and heavy fighters southwest of Helder at 1250. The patrol vessel VP "316" broke in two and one of the halves sank. Eight men were killed or else are missing. The steamer FUESILIER was hit by two aerial torpedoes but remained afloat and was towed into Helder together with the forward half of the patrol vessel VP "316". Six of the attacking planes were shot down.

Convoy "461" Elbe - Hook has been carried out.

In view of the casualties recently suffered by convoy "1177" and because the situation in the North Sea has become more tense, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North requested that his command area should be adequately supported by the Air Force: namely that the same direct co-operation should prevail as in northern Norway for instance. (See Teletype 1603).

2. Norway, Northern Waters.

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-eight planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

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Own Situation:

In the area of Naval Command, Norway ten ships were escorted north and six south. Fourteen ships were delayed in the arctic coastal area and two in northern Norway owing to a shortage of escort vessels.

Group "Hansa" put into Skjomen Fiord in the afternoon. The 5th Air Force has the following plans for 26 Sept.:

1. Thorough reconnaissance over the sea area between 61° and 64° N in the evening.
2. Position line reconnaissance in the inshore coastal waters of the west coast of Norway from the island of Vega to Trondheim. An air reconnaissance will also be carried out over Scapa Flow and Lerwick, weather permitting. An inshore coastal waters patrol will be carried out over the area off the southern point of the Lofoten Islands.

Naval Command, Norway reported that:

- "1. The incident in Kaa Fiord shows that more stringent security measures are urgently needed.
2. The defense vessels at present available are strained to the utmost limits of their capacity by the ever-increasing enemy activity.
3. As our defenses in Alta Fiord can only be reinforced at the expense of escort vessels, an increase in shipping losses must be expected.
4. It is urgently requested that a patrol vessel flotilla or a submarine chaser flotilla be transferred north to provide additional protection for the task force."

Admiral, Task Force was of the opinion that it would have been wise to keep the midget submarine attack in Alta Fiord secret because it is definitely to be assumed that all the participating enemy submarines were destroyed. Naval Staff thereupon provided Group North/Fleet; Admiral, Task Force and Admiral, Northern Waters with the following information:

"The report of the destruction of the British midget submarines was included in High Command's communiqué at the request of Naval Staff. Naval Staff cannot agree with Admiral, Task Force

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as it is definitely to be assumed that the enemy will at least learn of the fact that the operation was carried out through the efficient intelligence network he has organized in Norway. It is therefore to be anticipated that the enemy will announce through the press and radio that a success was scored against the TIRPITZ either to gain further information or else to obtain confirmation that a success actually was scored from our counterstatement. Naval Staff believes that such a move will best be met by getting ahead of the enemy and reporting our success."

Submarines U "601" and U "960" reported that the minelaying operations "Seemoeve I" and "Seeschlange I" have been completed.

Submarine U "711" shelled and destroyed the radio and weather station Blagopoluchiya. Submarine U "277" sighted two guns in Barentsburg. A new radio station has probably been set up there.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

At noon several detonations were observed on Lavansaari and smoke was seen rising over Seiskari. Enemy aircraft attacked Army Coastal Battery 509 and the office of the Port Commander Molgampia with bombs and machine-guns.

In the afternoon of 24 Sept. there were 50 patrol vessels, PT boats, and motor minesweepers in Lavansaari.

2. Own Situation:

A westerly gale broke up the dummy minefield off Porkkala. The minefield itself is, however, fully effective.

Nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and other commands in the Baltic Sea.

V. Merchant Shipping.

In order to alleviate the difficulties experienced in obtaining personnel for the manning of merchant vessels, every merchant seaman whose present duties could be filled by someone else, should be registered and employed where he is more urgently needed. To obtain the necessary personnel for manning the captured Italian tonnage and the newly built ships to be expected, it must be insisted upon that all commands thoroughly comb their formations out for such personnel.

Group West with copy to Naval Office, Hamburg; Foreign Section III, Armed Forces High Command, will therefore be asked by Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division to make thorough investigations and to report whether it might not be possible to take crews from the steamers that have been so heavily damaged in air raids that they cannot be repaired and put into operation again in the near future. If the answer is in the affirmative, the crews involved are also to be reported.

VI. Submarine Warfare.1. Enemy Situation:

As two out of the four submarines now in grid square CG on an easterly course have been detected by the enemy, the submarines on passage to the Mediterranean have been ordered to break through the Strait of Gibraltar from the southwest only.

British vessels have been located in BD 1230, 1860 and AK 60.

Submarine U "505", U "103" and U "155" are to replenish in CE 75 and then proceed to the operational area in the south.

The submarines in the North Atlantic are to assemble into one group, known as "Rossbach", and to take up patrol positions from AK 2558 to 6781 by 0600 on 27 Sept. where a westbound convoy is expected. Foggy weather prevails in the North Atlantic.

VII. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported 67 planes on operations over the western area and two over the Mediterranean. Two enemy planes were shot down in a free lance hunt.

Enemy planes attacked the Rhine Flotilla near Schouwen and Convoy "1177" off Helder. For further details see: "Situation North Sea".

Airfields and traffic installations in the Belgian area were attacked during the day. Single planes carried out harassing raids over northern Germany. During the night a few bombs were dropped on Duesseldorf and on a dummy target.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out a reconnaissance of the Italian and Greek areas. The ships reported in the Gulf of Salerno at 1255 included a battleship. This report was not taken over by German Naval Command, Italy and Commanding General Armed Forces, South as they probably questioned its veracity.

Ju 88's attacked an enemy convoy northwest of Corfu and raided the harbor of Saranda (southern Albania). A steamer of 3,000 GRT was set on fire.

Enemy planes attacked traffic installations at Bolzano, Verona, Bologna and Florence as well as the airfield at Athens. Our anti-aircraft guns shot down five enemy planes over the front lines in southern Italy.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The FORMIDABLE escorted by destroyers was out at sea east of Gibraltar during the day. One convoy put into Gibraltar in the

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forenoon and one in the afternoon. In the evening a convoy of approximately 32 ships and 11 escort vessels sailed from Gibraltar making for the west.

The large convoy reported by Tres Forcas has not yet been located again. At 0925 our air reconnaissance sighted an eastbound convoy 70 miles west of Cape Spartivento, at 1000 two cruisers and two merchantmen in the same area, course not given, and at 1530 one cruiser and one destroyer were reported 70 miles east of Minorca on a northeasterly course. A decrease in landing craft and transport vessels has been noticed in the Gulf of Salerno.

At 1255 our air reconnaissance reported 1 battleship, 10 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 23 transports, and 70 - 80 landing craft there. The number of ships in the harbor and roads of Palermo has greatly decreased when compared with the observations made on 21 Sept. According to photographic reconnaissance, there are at present sufficient landing craft in Taranto for the transportation of approximately half a U.S. landing division in addition to about 90,000 GRT of freighter and tanker tonnage.

Nothing to report from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

A report of our PT boat operation in the Gulf of Salerno during the night of 24 Sept. has not yet been received.

Ferry traffic from Corsica to the mainland is continuing according to plan. The steamer CHAMPAGNE (9,946 GRT) was hit by two torpedoes at 2000 on 24 Sept. eleven miles east of Bastia. The ship had to be beached south of Bastia.

The minelayer POMMERN has received minelaying instructions for an operation in CJ 1632. She is to return to Toulon for a new supply of mines when she has completed this task.

The Naval Attaché in Madrid forwarded the action report of Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi on his operations from 29 Aug. up to 12 Sept.-the day when his submarine was beached. (For copy see Teletype 2045).

The demolition of Naples harbor was continued. The harbor of Manfredonia was demolished on 22 Sept. after the two steamers there were moved north.

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Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division has been ordered to place up to 300 men picked from the crews of naval landing craft and peniches, at present lying idle or out of war readiness in southern France, at the disposal of Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic for about six weeks.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported with reference to the air situation in the Italian theater that the few reconnaissance planes available would be insufficient to provide High Command with the required tactical and operational information. We have therefore practically no knowledge of the distribution and the whereabouts of the landing craft tonnage, especially of the smaller landing craft and of the movements in the sea areas along the North Africa coast, in the Tyrrhenian Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Central Mediterranean. On the whole only probing reconnaissances are being carried out and only over a few small sectors of the enemy area.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On the forenoon of 24 Sept. our air reconnaissance reported four LCT's unloading in Kos and an increase of six smaller naval vessels and two transports in Leros. During the night of 24 Sept. several enemy planes penetrated the Crete area and one plane was reported over Salonika. According to radio intelligence, the British Communications Officer on Tinos dispatched a situation report to the British Military Governor on Samos, who in turn passed this signal on to Admiral, British Naval Forces, Aegean, on Leros. In this message it is said that the Italian troops on Andros are resisting the German attack. The message further shows that the British are advancing in the Aegean area according to plan.

Mopping up operations on Andros are making very slow progress owing to considerable enemy resistance. The landing of our forces on this island was accomplished under artillery cover provided by our boats on the afternoon of 24 Sept.

The transfer of all Italian prisoners of war from Scarpantos and Crete is under way. The evacuation of Gavdos has been carried out.

The demolition of the harbor and strategic installations on Syra is being prepared.

The presence of enemy minefields at Sciatos and at the Trikkeri narrows has been confirmed.

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Adriatic Sea:

According to observations made so far, Corfu is solely occupied by Italian troops and Greek partisans. The attack on the island is progressing according to plan. The convoy that landed our troops was attacked by Italian planes on its return passage. One naval landing craft and one motor minesweeper have been damaged. The light PT boat LS "6" sank at Igumenitza as a result of a bomb hit.

Mopping up operations on Cephalonia have been completed. The Italian General and all the officers have been shot.

The convoy of the tanker ITALIA, the ARGENTINIA and the DIANA with 6,500 Italian prisoners of war and 1,500 tons of booty, is to sail from Durazzo for Trieste at 1700 and will be escorted by one torpedo boat and one auxiliary cruiser.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, an enemy destroyer was located at 1915 between Tuapse and Anapa.

The enemy landed with about 400 men on the north coast of the Taman peninsula and with about 200 men on the south coast of the Taman peninsula in the early hours of the morning.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla had an encounter with an enemy torpedo boat and a gunboat west of Utrich Point. Our torpedoes were successfully evaded by the enemy ships. Our vessels in patrol positions off the north and south coasts of the Taman peninsula also clashed with light enemy naval forces. Nothing special to report.

Two mines were swept off Sulina.

Naval Staff informed Group South and Commanding Admiral, Black Sea that the evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead is expected to be completed by 10 Oct.

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IX. Situation Far East.

Nothing special to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

Mr. Roosevelt announced the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and the appointment of Mr. Stettinius as his successor. Stettinius comes from heavy industry and in 1940 took charge of the Lend-Lease Administration. At the same time an office for economic control abroad has been established. Responsibility for economic control abroad has so far rested entirely with the State Department. This shows that the traditional foreign policy of the United States has obviously been reversed, a fact from which important conclusions may be drawn as far as the future policy of the United States is concerned. The forthcoming Three Power Conference is at present the center of all diplomatic activity. It would appear that last minute difficulties have again arisen in connection with the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers and it has not yet been decided whether it is to take place in London or Moscow.

According to a Swedish press report from London, Admiral Nimitz will be appointed Commander in Chief, Allied Fleets, Pacific. According to the same sources, Mr. Knox is at present having discussions in London about the dispatching of units of the British Fleet to the Far East to which it is said Great Britain has consented. It is estimated that there will soon be more than 20 Allied aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Commander in Chief, Navy is away from Berlin on a tour of inspection, and for conferences in Toulon and Paris.

Special Items.

Captain Grossi has asked that he be granted a personal interview with the Duce. The Naval Attaché in Rome has been instructed to inform Ambassador Rahn and to ascertain when this interview can take place. The Ambassador is personally to be informed that the Fuehrer approves this visit and that he wishes it to take place as soon as possible.

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Situation 26 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-three planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located at 1344 in BF 4820.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Five outward-bound submarines were escorted out of Brest and St. Nazaire.

The submarine chase southwest of the mouth of the Gironde was discontinued at 2000 on 25 Sept. without any results having been achieved owing to stormy weather. One ELM.J mine was swept off Brest.

Channel Coast:

Between 0501 and 0521 the Army coastal battery No. 3/799 bombarded targets at Fécamp located by radar. The torpedo boats GREIF and KONDOR were moved from Cherbourg to Le Havre according to plan. Between 1248 and 1331 the "Lindemann" battery and battery No "1/725" fired seven salvos at targets located north of Calais, and which, when sighted, were recognized to be 5 - 7 fairly small naval vessels of the motor minesweeper type. Results were not observed.

The convoy of the steamer MADALI left Le Havre in the evening. In connection with this convoy our radar location service detected lively enemy activity in the area off Le Havre and also between Dieppe and Boulogne. Radio intelligence also made the same observations. Up to midnight, however, no encounters with the enemy seem to have taken place.

The minelaying operation OK4 has been postponed for 24 hours owing to the weather.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

One mine was swept north of Terschelling and three in the Borkum area. The 7th Minesweeper Flotilla cleared seven mines, but the area concerned was not reported.

There were no minesweeping operations owing to the weather.

Convoy No. "1177" arrived in the Elbe without any further incidents having taken place, but minus the FUESILIER.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Radio intelligence located the PT boats "618", "619" and "627" at sea. Four radiograms were sent out by the PT boat "619". An enemy plane was reported over the area south of Stavanger at 1745 on 25 Sept. Our air reconnaissance did not achieve any tactical results.

Own Situation:

Seventeen ships were escorted north and 20 south in the area of Naval Command, Norway. Twelve ships were delayed in the polar coastal area and nine ships at Kristiansand South owing to a shortage of escort vessels.

Group North/Fleet most urgently recommended that the request of Naval Command, Norway for the allocation of a submarine chaser flotilla for the additional protection of the task force be granted. (See Teletype 1748).

At 1055 Admiral, Northern Waters reported that Group "Hansa" had continued its passage according to plan. (See Teletype 1055).

Group North/Fleet advised Naval Staff for information about the message to Admiral, Northern Waters and Commander, Submarines, Norway, stating that the BV 138 plane was no longer needed for reconnaissance operations over the Kara Sea and that submarine U "703" could be released for combat operations. As soon as they have met, submarines U "703", U "601" and U "960" have orders to start combing the Kara Sea as far as their range of action and the ice situation permits.

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Reconnaissance of ice conditions north of Novaya Zemlya must be ensured by a FW 200 plane. (See Teletype 1852).

Commander, Submarines, Norway has formed these three boats into Group "Wiking". This group is to proceed in position lines from AT 36 to AS 19.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Swedish tankers FALSTER BOKUS, JULIUS, and SWEADROTT left Kristiansand South for Goeteborg after the Foreign Office had ordered their release.

Commanding Admiral, Denmark reported that during the night of 25 Sept., the birthday of the Danish King, altogether 50 acts of sabotage on traffic installations and supply depots occurred in Jutland. The damage done, however, is relatively small. (See Teletype 1209).

Naval Command, Baltic submitted for information the attitude of Commanding Admiral, Denmark which Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark has submitted at the request of Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, on the problem of how to deal with the Danish Armed Forces and with which he fully agreed. His attitude was expressed as follows:

"1. The premature withdrawal of volunteers from amongst the internees for a civilian minesweeping service will prove quite impossible.

2. Most of the Danish Navy is interned in Copenhagen, and only in three camps, so that at present complete solidarity prevails amongst them. And this solidarity has been further strengthened since 29 Aug. because no clear statement of their position has been made.

3. The one remaining chance of being able to recruit the required force of 500 - 600 men is to release all the internees as quickly as possible, to wait until a certain settling-down period has

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elapsed, by which time personal economic hardships will have begun to make themselves felt on the individual, and finally to make sure that the appeal for volunteers is made exclusively by Danish authorities who must put special emphasis on the Danish interests involved.

4. I presume that in view of the present mood of the Danish people, the Navy is maintaining a united front with the Army. We should, therefore, in the interests of our prestige, avoid the possibility of a refusal.

5. Any further political tension is likely to delay the entire volunteer recruitment drive for an indefinite period."

Teletype as per l/Skl 2936/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark therefore now seems to agree more with the opinion of Naval Staff. The decision of Armed Forces High Command will have to be awaited.

Nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

The sail training ship DEUTSCHLAND will move under escort of two minesweepers to Liepaja.

Our shipping traffic off the Latvian coast was attacked by a twin-engined plane between 1220 and 1230. The steamer HILDEGARD (1,250 GRT) laden with coal for Riga was sunk off 'Backofen'. An attack on the tanker RUDOLF ALBRECHT was unsuccessful.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

At 0915 on 25 Sept. a BV 222 plane sighted a freighter (3,500 GRT) on course 290° in BE 3655 and at 1900 a Catalina seaplane in BE 3562.

A fresh reconnaissance for Commanding Admiral, Submarine Operations is planned for 27 Sept. and will be carried out by a BV 222 plane. A few FW 200 planes will also carry out a reconnaissance of the northbound convoy in the area northwest of Gibraltar.

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2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "161" sank a steamer (8,000 GRT) on course 40° in FJ 6711.

For further reports of the success see: "Own Situation Mediterranean".

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported 189 planes on operations over the west area and 16 over the Mediterranean.

Otherwise nothing to report. For details see daily situation report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Air Force Command, Southeast reported that in our bomber attack on Partaloga Bay (Leros) a direct hit was scored on a destroyer, two further direct hits were scored on two ships that are assumed to have also been destroyers; moreover two freighters, oil storage tanks and ammunition dumps were also hit. Enemy dive bombers sank our steamer KLENIKO CORIO while she was putting out from Skarpantos. Investigations are being made into the incident. There was very little enemy air activity over the battle area of southern Italy.

Four enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked the DRACHE at Syros.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reported that 25 planes were on operations. At 1755 a submarine was sighted on course 40°, 360 miles west of Trondheim.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

At 0820 one LIDO-class cruiser put out from Gibraltar westbound.

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No sighting reports are available from the western and the eastern Mediterranean.

German Naval Command, Italy is now also reporting the information received from the 2nd Air Force stating that a battleship and several cruisers and destroyers were sighted in the Gulf of Salerno on 25 Sept. According to a further report, two cruisers, one destroyer and one steamer were sighted in the Strait of Otranto entering the Adriatic Sea in the morning of 25 Sept. This appears to be the same group as the one that was reported on 24 Sept. proceeding towards Corfu. An enemy submarine off Bastia unsuccessfully fired one torpedo into the old harbor at 1035 on 25 Sept.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean Theater:

Visibility was poor during the PT boat operation on the night of 24 Sept. No enemy vessels were sighted except for a hospital ship and one motor gunboat.

Submarine U "593" reported that she sank a destroyer of the JERVIS class in the Gulf of Salerno on 25 Sept. and submarine U "410" sank in CJ 6794 a steamer of the COLLEGIAN type laden with ammunition and belonging to an eastbound convoy, and one 7,000 GRT steamer almost certainly. Submarine U "431" has been assigned the operational area between the meridians of CH 7733 and 8446.

The minelayer POMMERN put out from Toulon in the forenoon.

Ferry traffic between Corsica and the mainland was subjected to heavy enemy air attacks. The efforts of the naval landing craft have won special recognition with German Naval Command, Italy. Because of the shortage of escort vessels, the moving of the torpedoed steamer CHAMPAGNE from Bastia is being postponed in favor of ships which are ready to sail. The TIBERIADE (2,969 GRT) which was damaged in the air attack on Bastia on 21 Sept. has capsized. As a result of the enemy air attack on Livorno on 25 Sept., one péniche was sunk and the Orlando dockyard is lying temporarily idle because the electricity has failed. Otherwise damage of military importance was insignificant.

A light battery with a naval crew is ready for action on the northern jetty of Ancona. Supplementary reports show that operation "Achse" was carried out with complete success in Genoa and Trieste without the assistance of the Army but solely by minor forces.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Adriatic Sea:

At 1900 on 25 Sept. the convoy "Italia" (3 steamers) with the

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torpedo boats PILO and MAURO, and auxiliary cruiser ALBAREA put out from Durazzo making for the north. The torpedo boat PILO disappeared from the convoy during the night of 25 Sept. Details are not yet available.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic advised the Naval Liaison Officer to Fuehrer Headquarters for the Air Commander, Croatia, with copy to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic; Group South; German Naval Command, Italy; Chief, Supply and Transport, Leghorn and Naval Shore Commander, Dalmatia that between 27 and 29 Sept. five independently routed steamers without distinguishing marks and without escort will be dispatched from Pola to Cattaro on independent routes. (See Teletype 1032).

Group South is placing 21 tanker-péniches, at present being transported by railroad to Trieste, and eight Siebel ferries at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Adriatic. (See Teletype 1523).

Aegean Sea:

Photographic reconnaissance shows that 1 Italian destroyer, 2 minelayers, 18 smaller naval vessels, 4 steamers and 1 floating dock were in Leros on 25 Sept.

Corfu has now been completely occupied by our troops. Cerigotto has been mopped up and the Italians there have been transferred to Suda. The Italians on Cerigo have joined forces with the insurgents. The Italians on Andros are still offering resistance. There the advance of our forces is being supported by ships' guns. The removal of the Italians from Syra has been completed except for 30 officials.

The DRACHE carried out a minelaying operation in the central part of the Aegean Sea according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, an enemy torpedo boat was out at sea at 0925, presumably in the Tuapse area. The enemy force that landed on the Taman peninsula during the night of 24 Sept. has either been annihilated or taken prisoner. In the evening a new landing was carried out by four ships two miles west of Temryuk.

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Naval landing craft and naval artillery lighters on patrol duty off the north coast of the Taman peninsula shelled the landing forces at day break. At 0945 enemy planes attacked our naval landing craft group off the north coast of the Taman peninsula. No further details are yet available. Further air attacks were carried out against Kerch and Sevastopol. One of our tugs was sunk in Kerch. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.

Own Situation:

The minefields A 5 and A 6 were laid according to plan. Efforts to salvage the naval artillery lighter MAL "8" have been abandoned as being impossible.

During the night of 25 Sept. patrol vessels on duty north and south of the Taman peninsula came into contact with light enemy naval forces. No details are yet available.

During the night of 26 Sept. the 1st PT Boat Flotilla is to take up the patrol positions west of Utrich Point and the 11th PT Boat Flotilla the positions south of Banka - Mariya Magdalena.

Convoys through the Bosphorus and ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch were carried out according to plan and without enemy interference.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance.

The Russian Government has appointed a representative to the Allied Mediterranean Committee in Algiers which will start by dealing with the Italian question.

Observers in London declare that the unexpectedly hasty German retreat on the eastern front has upset the Allied invasion plans for northern Europe. It is assumed that they will now have to be speeded up.

The appointment of Stettinius as the successor of Sumner Welles has caused a sensation in the United States and in Great Britain.

British Government circles are disappointed in Argentina's foreign policy. It is, however, hoped that this country too will soon decide to break off relations with the Axis Powers.

According to the German News Agency, Reich Commissar Terboven stated that it was the Fuehrer's express wish that a "free, independent, national, and socialistic Norway" should arise out of this struggle for survival, which would only relinquish those functions indispensable to the preservation of European security for all time to the higher authority of a European Union, because only a union of this kind can and will be the authoritative supporter and guarantor of security.

Referring to Germany's strategy, Hoare Belisha declared that the latest developments in Italy have shown the Allied Supreme Command, in contrast to the German Supreme Command, incapable of rising to the need for swift decisions and adaptations. Hitler has succeeded in giving developments in Italy a sudden and dramatic turn in favor of Germany. He has filled his people and those fighting with them with renewed confidence, and he has proved himself to be an able leader who can master any situation.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Army Situation:

Withdrawals on the eastern front are proceeding according to plan. The general situation seems to be less tense.

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In Italy, the enemy brought up the 5th and 8th Armies and began simultaneously to launch attacks against the Naples and Foggia areas. New landings were carried out in the Gulf of Salerno.

In northern Italy Italian troops have joined the Communists, and this concentration of enemy forces is making itself strongly felt.

Our mopping-up operations in Istria are in progress.

Our attack on Split has forced the partisans to retreat to the mountains.

II. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported that Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command decided at the request of Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division that under normal conditions the responsibility for guard and security measures rests primarily with the security forces provided for such duties. Since conditions in the Italian area are, however, far from normal, and since the Army's forces are being strained to their utmost limits of endurance by combat operations of every kind, Armed Forces High Command considers it essential that the naval commands and forces stationed along the coast should take part in local defense measures as far as available personnel permits and even if training tasks have to be temporarily neglected.

Armed Forces High Command has therefore,
in practice, decided against the Navy.

III. The Naval Attaché reported that the Foreign Office is planning to send the Danish military attaches away from Berlin, provided the different branches of the Armed Forces agree, as they are no longer needed.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that the Foreign Office be informed that the Navy wishes to retain the Danish Naval Attaché in Berlin for the time being.

IV. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division drew attention in his report to the remarkable silence being kept by the Allies about the convoy battle in the North Atlantic and the midget submarine attack in Alta Fiord.

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Special Items.

- I. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff ordered that storing depots be designated in the Reich to receive and store the booty collected by authorized out-stations of the Army General Staff in the areas of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, Army Group B, and Commanding General, Armed Forces Southeast. The Army Ordnance Supply Depots at Metz and Mainz have been designated for the booty collected in the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.
- II. Naval Staff has informed Group South, Group West, German Naval Command, Italy, and Naval Command, North about the attack carried out by three British midget submarines in Kaa Fiord. For copy see Teletype 1700.
- III. The Reich Maritime Shipping Commissioner's deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean relinquished his claims to a number of Italian merchantmen in favor of the Navy so that they can be made available for escort duty and requested that in the interest of shipping they be manned and made ready for operations as soon as possible. Altogether 210 seamen will be required for these twelve ships, not counting the military requirements. The Reich Maritime Shipping Commissioner's deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean has furthermore announced that he plans to lay up those merchantmen at present in safe ports in the western Mediterranean area and to transfer their crews to the eastern Mediterranean. In this connection he stated that the shortage of seamen for which he had been blamed by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and German Naval Command, Italy was actually the fault of the Navy. He had therefore also sent copies of the above to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping and the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas, Armed Forces High Command. Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division considered that Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division should set this matter right.
- IV. The decree issued by Commander in Chief, Navy, Skl Qu A I/S 12005/43, Gkdos. on 27 Sept., supplemented the orders already given with the following instructions in connection with the co-ordination of the PT boat and submarine arms, namely that PT boats shall be accorded the same priority rights as the submarine arm with regard to expansion, personnel management, and matters pertaining to training and operations.
- V. The Main Committee for Submarine Construction is planning to try and build the type XXIII submarines in the

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areas where they are to operate. Commander in Chief, Navy thereupon decided that the series of 140 submarines of this type whose construction has been ordered is to be distributed as follows:

30 submarines against Britain,
60 submarines in the western Mediterranean,
15 submarines in the Adriatic Sea,
15 submarines in the Black Sea,
20 submarines in the Baltic for training purposes.

Situation 27 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokyo reported that the BRAKE put into Djakarta on 25 Sept. The ship supplied our submarines with 2,267 tons of oil and four and two-third sets of provisions.

Naval Staff suggested to the Naval Attaché in Tokyo that, since point "Antonio" has been compromised by the desertion of the ERITREA, point "Tannenwald", nearby, should be moved to 29° S, 66° E. The BOGOTA will be steered from 90° 0' onwards by Naval Staff, Operations Division.

Enemy situation report to all in foreign waters dispatched by Teletype 1832.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty-five planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay. One Allied vessel was located at 1850, 55 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal.

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At 1750 in CG 7649 (180 miles southwest of Cape St. Vincent) our air reconnaissance sighted a convoy of 61 merchantmen escorted by one cruiser and four destroyers on course 90°, at 1830 in CG 7973 (210 miles southwest of Cape St. Vincent) a convoy of 32 merchantmen with one cruiser, three destroyers, and four escort vessels on course 300°, and at 1935 in CG 5772 (150 miles southwest of Lisbon) five merchantmen and three escort vessels on course 160°.

Reuter reports that during the night of 26 Sept. Dutch PT boats in the Channel not far from the French coast, torpedoed and sank without loss one large heavily escorted German supply ship, and that they probably also scored a hit on an escort vessel.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The torpedo boats T "22", T "23", T "24", and T "25" put out from Brest and dropped anchor in Concarneau roads. Channel sweeps were carried out according to plan.

Channel Coast:

The convoy of the steamer MADALI was repeatedly attacked by enemy PT boats while on passage from Le Havre to Boulogne. The patrol vessel VP "1501" was torpedoed and sunk off Fécamp, and the MADALI (3,019 GRT) and the JUNGINGEN (800 GRT) presumably southwest of Berck sur Mer. The losses in personnel were considerable. The 15th Patrol Vessel Flotilla probably sank two motor gunboats and the other escort vessels and the artillery carrier group protecting the convoy definitely sank two PT boats. (Compare with "Enemy Situation"). For preliminary report of the 15th Patrol Vessel Flotilla see Teletype 1120, for preliminary report of the 18th Patrol Vessel Flotilla see Teletype 1345, for the short action report of the 2nd Defense Division see Teletype 1500, and for the action report of the 15th Patrol Vessel Flotilla see Teletype 1501.

Losses were naturally to be expected in moving such large vessels from the western area through the Channel.

At 0214 and at 0304 the Battery "Wissant" fired two salvos at targets located by radar.

The PT boats S "100", S "139", and S "141" moved from Boulogne to Cherbourg according to plan, as also the 5th PT Boat Flotilla from Cherbourg to Le Havre.

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Special Items.

Preparations for a blockade run will make it necessary to have four to seven ships laden with very valuable cargo lying in Bordeaux or the Gironde estuary from the middle of October until approximately the end of the year. This will lead to an intensification of enemy action in this area. Naval Staff will therefore make every endeavor to secure the reinforcements of the anti-aircraft defenses which were reduced some time ago. Chances of getting any are, however, considered slight, because Bordeaux, Brest, and Lorient are regarded as among the best defended harbors in the western area, and also because there is an acute shortage of anti-aircraft defense forces in France and notably in Toulon.

Quite apart from this it is essential to renew investigations into the effectiveness of all other instructions issued and measures taken for the protection of the blockade runners. Special attention must be paid to the possibilities of sabotage and midget submarine attacks.

Naval Staff has drawn the attention of Group West, Admiral, Atlantic Coast, and Foreign Section III, Armed Forces High Command to these requirements. Order as per 1/Skl I ga 2921/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in file 1/Skl I g - I op. 54.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Altogether four ground mines were swept near Scheveningen, Borkum and Spiekeroog.

It is now reported that ten planes were shot down by convoy "1177". For the short report of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North see Teletype 2210.

Enemy air forces attacked the 21st Minesweeper Flotilla near Vlielar, the Elbe-Ems traffic in the Hubertgat, and convoys between Wemeldinge and Zijpe and on the western Scheldt.

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Some of the escort vessels were slightly damaged. Losses in personnel were also suffered. A strong United States bomber formation of 200-300 four-engined Boeings with fighter escort penetrated the East Frisian area, crossing the Frisian Islands from 1037 onwards. Emden, Aurich, Esens and a number of other places were raided. About 300 bombs were dropped on Emden, but fell mostly outside the protected installations. The forge in the State Dockyard sustained a direct hit. For particulars of further damage and other details see Teletypes 1220 and 2005.

This is the first daylight attack carried out with fighter escort over Reich territory. Air Force Operations Staff reported that we put 388 fighters into operation which shot down 13 enemy planes.

2. Norway, Northern Waters.

Enemy Situation:

Twenty-five planes were detected on operations over the North Sea. Reconnaissance was mostly carried out over the central and western coasts of Norway. Reconnaissance planes spotted and reported group "Hermelin" at 0224, at 0810, and at 1900. The 30th MT Boat Flotilla showed lively radio activity.

In the forenoon our reconnaissance planes sighted a convoy of at least 15 merchantmen and an aircraft carrier on course 360° in AE 9910 southeast of the Faroes, which was seen to enter Thorshavn.

At 1530 on 25 Sept. Naval Signal Station Nurmansaetti sighted a Russian submarine a great distance away. On the same day and on 26 Sept. single planes dropped propaganda leaflets over the area of Banka and over Honningsvaag.

On 27 Sept. one of our Air Force radar stations located from 0220 onwards a shipping target eleven kilometers west of Sola on a northwesterly course and with a speed of 30 knots. During the afternoon of 26 Sept. and the forenoon of 27 Sept. single planes were reported over the islands off Bergen, Stavanger, and Stadlandet.

Own Situation:

Twenty-four ships were escorted north and 27 ships south in the area of Naval Command, Norway. Altogether

29 ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escort vessels and pilots.

The island of Itteroyen has been occupied by the Army and the radio station there has been put into operation.

Operation "Hansa - Hermelin" has been completed according to plan and without incident.

The weather ship COBURG reported that operation "Bassgeiger" cannot be carried out. The ship is drifting southwest in the ice about 19 miles off shore. It is planned to carry some high explosives there and to make an ice survey for a possible landing place for planes in order to rescue the ship's crew and the weather detachment.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

No marked changes were observed in the Gulf of Finland and Kronstadt Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

The sail training ship DEUTSCHLAND has been escorted to Liepaja. The operations of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic were partly hampered by weather conditions.

V. Submarine Warfare.

The patrol positions of group "Roszbach" have been moved 84 miles in the direction of 300° since it is assumed from radio intelligence that the expected ON "203" convoy is proceeding on a more northerly course.

Submarine Division has made an evaluation of the experiences gained in the first attack on a convoy with "Zaunkoenig" torpedoes. Copy as per 1/Skl 27196/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 211 planes on operations over the western area, 22 over the Atlantic, and 7 over the Mediterranean. For Atlantic reconnaissance evaluations see: "Enemy Situation West Area".

Ten Ju 88's and ten Me 410's started out on night operations over southeastern England. During the day enemy air forces attacked several airfields in the occupied western area and the railroad station of Rouen, and lost eleven planes. For details of air attacks in the Dutch coastal area and in East Frisia see: "Own Situation North Sea". During the night of 27 Sept. large enemy bomber formations raided Hannover and Brunswick. Two hundred and twenty-five of our fighters went up to intercept them. A report on the number of enemy planes has not yet been received. The Air Force reported that 15 of our planes mined the area off Kristiansand - Skagen - Anholt - Fyen.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported that its planes were on reconnaissance operations over the sea area of southern Italy. Planes of Air Force Command, Southeast attacked the enemy airfield at Anerara (Kos) and ship targets in Lagosta Bay. Reconnaissance operations over Cyprus were hampered by heavy anti-aircraft guns and fighter defense.

Seven Spitfires attacked Viterbo airfield. Owing to unfavorable weather conditions air activity over southern Italy was slight and there was no air activity over central and northern Italy.

3. Eastern Front:

The 5th Air Force reported 166 planes on operations, 150 of which provided a close escort for operation "Hansa - Hermelin". For air reconnaissance evaluations of the Faroes see: "Enemy Situation Norway, Northern Waters".

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

It is reported that 10 - 11 freighters, 1 tanker

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and 4 - 6 escort vessels put out from Gibraltar making for the west.

Photographic reconnaissance of Bizerta on 26 Sept. showed a marked decrease in the port occupation as compared with the previous day.

On 27 Sept. 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers were sighted in the port of Ajaccio. The auxiliary motor minesweepers dispatched to Pinos with an assault squad to search for the British pilots, said to have landed there, returned to Elba. A report of the outcome of this operation has not yet been received.

An Italian minesweeping group was located by radar in the Strait of Bonifacio.

Our air reconnaissance sighted heavy shipping and convoy traffic between Malta and the Apulian coast, which would indicate important changes in the occupation of Taranto and Brindisi.

A large convoy was sighted on 26 Sept. 60 miles off Cape Passero, presumably on return passage to Benghazi.

At 0920 submarine locations were reported 60 miles southeast of Toulon and at 1500 off Spezia.

Group West transmitted a reconnaissance report of the 3rd Air Force, according to which three cruisers and ten planes were sighted at 1055 in CJ 4235 (Ajaccio). In reply to an inquiry, Operations Division, Naval Staff stated that the 3rd Air Force need not submit reports of the Mediterranean air situation, as these reports reach Naval Staff both through the 2nd Air Force and German Naval Command, Italy.

There is nothing to report from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

There were no PT boat operations owing to stormy weather. The ferry traffic between Corsica and Leghorn had to be temporarily discontinued for the same reasons. The mine-laying operation of the POMMERN had to be postponed from 26 to 27 Sept. The freshwater supply of ships berthed in Leghorn cannot be assured at the moment, as the city water mains were destroyed in an air raid.

The steamer CHAMPAGNE was again torpedoed by an enemy submarine at 1805 in the anchorage off Bastia. The ship will have to be abandoned for the time being. Owing to the stranding of

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the UJ "2218", the last operational submarine chaser, off Leghorn in a thunderstorm, effective anti-submarine action is at present impossible in this area.

Enemy planes continuously attacked our ferry traffic on 27 Sept. Siebel ferries shot down two enemy planes.

With regard to the ground situation, German Naval Command, Italy reported that the new defense line extends from Lacedonia to about five kilometers south of Manfredonia.

The Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group B reported the quantity of booty in fuel, ammunition, equipment and clothing from naval stores and for naval use which has been secured by the Headquarters of the 2nd Mountain Army Corps in the areas of Spezia and Venice. For details see Teletype 1930. About 1,800 cubic meters of diesel oil were captured at Spezia.

Permission to attack hospital ships in the Gulf of Salerno requested by German Naval Command, Italy is dealt with in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Adriatic Sea:

The transfer of seven steamers from the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea has, despite considerable difficulties, been so far carried out more quickly than was expected. The passages of independently routed ships along the coast have up to now been proceeding without incident.

Aegean Sea:

Enemy planes attacked the harbor and radio station of Syra in the evening of 26 Sept. No damage has been reported.

The attack made on Porto Edda (east of Corfu) by the mountain infantrymen who were landed by two motor minesweepers, failed, owing to the strong resistance offered by Italians and partisans.

Mopping up operations on Corfu are continuing. The operation against Cerigo has been postponed for the moment. On 26 Sept. an Italian radio station, presumably on Naxos or Paros, communicated with Benghazi. According to a prisoner of war interrogation report, the garrison on Kos consists of one British regiment, on Leros of 300 - 500 Britishers, and on Samos there are said to be 5,000 Greeks.

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Group South subsequently provided further details to its report on the air raid on Leros on 26 Sept. Group South reports that one destroyer was sunk and another destroyer heavily damaged, while numerous near hits were scored on vessels and direct hits caused explosions to occur in fuel storage tanks, supply depots, and workshops on shore.

This Air Force success is valuable in so far as it will show the enemy that the Aegean will not fall into his hands without a fight.

It is therefore all the more regrettable that adequate defense forces are not available.

The torpedo boat TA "10" has been blown up. The BULGARIA minelaying operation has been postponed for 24 hours as no air escort is available.

At 1800 on 26 Sept. planes of Air Commander, Albania sighted one Italian torpedo boat and one steamer in the island area. Our planes have been given permission to attack.

According to an intelligence report, our Embassy in Ankara is said to have been informed that an attack on the Dodecanese and perhaps also on Crete is imminent.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, an enemy destroyer was standing off the coast of the central Caucasus at 1700. At 0730 air reconnaissance sighted both off and in Anapa nine motor minesweepers, two coastal vessels, eight landing craft, and three small armed vessels. It has been belatedly reported that during the night of 24 Sept. a plane was observed over the Beresanski Channel, probably on a minelaying operation.

Enemy air attacks on 26 and 27 Sept. were directed against naval landing craft in patrol positions north and south of the Taman peninsula and against the port and approaches to Taman. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. Our loading operations were delayed because some of the trucks were set on fire.

Own Situation:

At 2130 on 26 Sept. the patrol line off the south coast of the Taman peninsula had an encounter with two or three

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enemy motor minesweepers in the southern approach of the Strait of Kerch. One enemy ship has been probably destroyed. During the night of 26 Sept. the 11th PT Boat Flotilla had an encounter with enemy coastal motor boats or patrol vessels off the south coast of the Taman peninsula. Our torpedoes missed their targets.

During the night of 27 Sept. four ships of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla operated against enemy vessels in Anapa roads. According to preliminary reports received, some enemy vessels were sunk. Altogether four naval artillery lighters and seven naval landing craft are lying off the approaches to the Strait of Kerch, four motor minesweepers off Temryuk Bay, and two naval landing craft and two naval artillery lighters east of Genichesk.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

Items of Political Importance.

Swedish newspapers report from London that a big new campaign is being launched there for an early opening of a second front. The Press gives the following reasons why an offensive in the west should not be postponed any longer: the preparations are as good as completed; the entire coast line in the eastern part of the Channel has been air photographed; large depots have been set up in the ports of embarkation, and the so-called invasion dollars have been printed.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.I. Army Situation:

The evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead has been completed except for the rear guard of three and a half divisions. Russian air superiority is making itself strongly felt in the attacks made on the ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch. The Southern Army Group has abandoned its bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. Our forces are being evacuated from the eastern sector of Kiev. The enemy launched a large-scale offensive against the southern sector of the Southern Army Group, concentrating on Zaporozhe, which has on the whole been successfully repulsed. It is, however, expected that the offensive will be continued. The situation in the area where the Pripet joins the Dnieper is tense. The enemy is closely following on our withdrawal in the area of the Central Army Group.

Reinforcements must be and are being brought up there. Another danger point is the area north of Smolensk - Orsha, which could become the beginning of an enemy thrust towards Dvinsk. It is planned to withdraw the Northern Army Group to the East Wall positions in January, if at all. As a precautionary measure the withdrawal of heavy material will be started now.

In Italy the area round Foggia has been given up. Orders to hold the place were received too late.

In the Balkans it appears that partisans are being assembled in the Scutari - Montenegro area. Army General Staff believes that this area will be the beachhead for enemy landings from Italy. The 181st Infantry Division at present in Norway will be assigned to the Dalmatian area.

Chief, Naval Staff brought up the question of the effect enemy operations (in the Balkans and in the western area) would have on political relations within the enemy coalition. Although we, on our side, should under no circumstances draw strategic conclusions from the divergent tendencies showing themselves on the enemy side, developments in the political field are nevertheless to be expected which will undoubtedly influence strategic decisions. It is our duty to fight as energetically as possible. And the revival of tonnage warfare would be an especially important contribution towards these endeavors.

II. Before Captain Grossi reports to the Duce, personal discussions between Captain Grossi and Group West are to be held on the organization of an Italian Naval Detachment, followed by joint discussions in Berlin with Captain Sestini and Prince Borghese.

III. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported on the information received from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy on the attitude of Commander in Chief, Navy to the command boundary between German Naval Command, Italy and Group South.

Chief, Naval Staff stated in this connection that Armed Forces High Command considered it inopportune at the present time to detach the former Italian areas from the command of Army Group B, owing to political considerations and the present distribution of forces. The Navy has therefore no alternative but to agree to this for the present.

With regard to the withdrawal of three motor minesweepers, which can only be carried out at the expense of combat operations, from units belonging to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West for the training purposes of Commanding Admiral, Submarine Training, Chief, Naval Staff decided that Commanding Admiral, Submarines must have three ships, but whether motor minesweepers or suitable fishing smacks will have to be decided on with Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

IV. Operations Section, Naval Staff Operations Division: in connection with the positions for the minefields 4 c and 4 d (operations "Fafnir" and "Fasold" of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. See War Diary 19 Sept.) for the protection of our convoy routes to Holland against enemy PT boats and other light naval vessels, Group West has again pointed out

that it would be better to move the minefields closer to our own routes, possibly even within range of our coastal guns.

Naval Staff was, however, of the opinion that a wide sector off the coast should be kept clear of our mines so as to have several channels at our disposal which can be used alternately according to enemy ground mine operations. Regular sweeping operations by enemy forces 110 to 150 miles from their bases at Orfordness and the Humber are very unlikely. Conditions in the Channel Coast cannot in general be applied to the Dutch coast. Naval Staff therefore recommended that the minefield positions should be left unchanged and as agreed on between Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, Commander, PT Boats, and Naval Staff.

Chief, Naval Staff concurred. The relevant instructions have been sent to Group West; Naval Command, North; with copies to Group North/Fleet; Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, and Commander, PT boats.

V. Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reported on the progress made in the negotiations with the Spanish Navy for the release of Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi. Our endeavors have so far been unsuccessful, but they are being continued.

Furthermore Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff described the hopeless situation with regard to the recruiting of Danish volunteers for a river police force, as stated in the war Diary of the last few days.

Chief, Naval Staff suggested a circular exchange system by which Danish prisoners of war could be exchanged for other suitable German forces.

It would be advisable first to wait and see whether the new attitude adopted by Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark will induce Armed Forces High Command to alter the measures ordered so far.

Special Items.

Naval Intelligence Division gave a description of the Organization of Commander, British LCT's and its duties. This information is based on the captured British service

instructions: "Standing Orders for Tank Landing Craft", dated 1 July 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 29245/43 geh. in War Diary file: "Intelligence Evaluations - Foreign Navies 1943".

Situation 28 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships in foreign waters.

Foreign Section III, Armed Forces High Command advised that the changing of the flag on the Italian supply ships in Bordeaux would take place in a brief ceremony on 29 Sept. aboard the steamer PIETRO ORSEOLO, as arranged with Captain Grossi.

Operations Division, Naval Staff passed this information on to Submarine Division, as it is planned to take over the Italian submarines in the same way.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifteen planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines were swept off La Pallice, one off the Gironde, and one off Brest. Eight homeward-bound submarines were escorted and also one outward-bound one.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 27 Sept. ships of the 4th and 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotillas laid the second flanking minefield (OK4) north of Calais according to plan. A tug with a barge in tow was lost off Jersey harbor owing to sea damage.

The minelaying operation L 1 (southwest of Boulogne) which was to be carried out by the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla had to be postponed owing to the weather.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.1. North Sea:

Weather conditions made minesweeping operations impossible.

The patrol positions, however, were occupied.

Four planes were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the daylight attack on East Frisia. Another two planes were shot down over Emden by fighters and naval anti-aircraft guns. One plane was shot down over Langeoog, and two more over the Dutch coast by naval anti-aircraft guns.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:Enemy Situation:

Ten planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

The British Radio Station, Greenharbor on Spitsbergen has resumed normal radio communications with Murmansk again.

On 26 Sept. one of our reconnaissance planes was machinegunned and fired on by light anti-aircraft guns, apparently from a new position ten kilometers north-northwest of Barentsburg.

On 27 Sept. 60 enemy planes attacked Petsamo airfield. Five of our planes were damaged.

Twenty planes attacked a Norwegian cutter southwest of Kyberg and eight planes attacked our battery at Kyberg with bombs and machine guns. The shooting down of one plane was observed, and a second one was probably shot down.

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A reconnaissance plane was observed over the Banak and Alta areas both on 27 and 28 Sept. Further single reconnaissance planes were sighted over the areas of Bergen and Stavanger.

Own Situation:

At 1735 on 27 Sept. the patrol vessel VP "5705" exploded and sank in the entrance of West Fiord. Nineteen men are missing. The cause of the explosion has not yet been ascertained.

Forty-two ships were escorted north and 26 south in the area of Naval Command, Norway. A total of nineteen ships was delayed owing to a shortage of escort vessels.

The Task Force reported on the conditions of the engines on the TIRPITZ. According to this report, all her power stations and motor room II were still out of order on 27 Sept. and about 200 cubic meters of water were still in the ship. The entire hold, including the bunkers and compartments, has been repaired, some provisionally and some permanently. The examination of the starboard turbine will probably start on 28 Sept. The boilers and auxiliary engines are in working order, except for a few small defects. Steering gear station II is out of order and rudder II is damaged.

Group North/Fleet advised Naval Staff for information that orders have been sent to all concerned stating that contrary to present plans, the destroyer Z "27" will be withdrawn to home waters so that she can be subsequently transferred to the western area for operations there, and that the destroyer IHN will return alone to the northern area.

The destroyer IHN reported that she will be proceeding from Kristiansand South to Alta Fiord between 3 and 10 Oct. (See Teletype 1945).

Group North/Fleet reported that the weather operation "Kreuzritter" will probably start on the night of 30 Sept. The weather ship will be escorted by submarine U "355". Sailing order as per teletype 1/Skl 2950/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

Submarine Division advised Operations Division, Naval Staff for information, of the order that Commander in Chief, Navy sent to Commander, Submarines, Norway ordering nine boats out of the twenty-one now operating in Northern Waters to be withdrawn for operations in the Atlantic. This will leave only twelve boats at the disposal of Commander, Submarines, Norway. (See Teletype 1900).

The 5th Air Force carried out an air reconnaissance for the weather operation "Bassgeiger" and is holding planes in readiness to carry out a reconnaissance of the ships' berths in the Faroes, especially Thorshaven.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

There was lively artillery activity in Kronstadt Bay during the day and night of 28 Sept. The enemy air force was also very active. One plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns and one by the 509th Army Coastal Battery.

2. Own Situation:

During the night of 28 Sept. Group "Hermelin" passed through the Sound southward bound.

A mine exploded in the gear of a minesweeper north-northeast of Anholt.

Convoy and escort traffic was carried out according to plan throughout the Baltic.

The minelaying operations in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic were carried out according to plan.

Armed fishing vessels and naval landing craft were unable to carry out operations owing to the weather.

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries the "Prinz Heinrich" Battery bombarded Marti and Kronstadt dockyards between 1020 and 1315. Despite heavy smoke, large fires and wreckage being tossed into the air were observed at both targets. The enemy defenses were not very strong.

The 18th Army Corps considers that the Navy should carry out the following measures for the defense of Tyters:

1. Our naval forces must try to prevent enemy mine-sweeping operations by launching an offensive against his minesweeping forces.

2. The belt of minefields should immediately be reinforced or relaid by adequate naval forces.

3. The island garrison should be reinforced with arms and supplies as follows:

a. The anti-aircraft defenses reinforced by two medium-sized batteries.

b. Two-centimeter German guns substituted for all two-centimeters Oerlikons, as there is no armor-piercing anti-aircraft ammunition available for Oerlikons.

c. Supplies for six months brought to the island.

The Army Corps itself will exchange the 3.7-centimeter guns now on the island for medium-sized and heavy antitank guns and will improve the defenses and train the garrison troops in combat warfare by having infantry, engineer, and petty officers sent to the island.

To provide further infantry support it is planned to transfer the 18th Assault Battalion to the island if necessary. But a safe transfer will only be possible if adequate air and naval protection is provided. Otherwise the 18th Army Corps considers that the transportation of this battalion to the island would be too dangerous. Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries should therefore keep at least 9 naval barges constantly available, since it is too risky to rely on getting them on very short notice even. Commander, 18th Assault Battalion has been instructed to get in touch with Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries and to carry out embarkation practices. The 18th Army Corps emphasized that the island can only be held if their requests are fulfilled and air superiority assured.

Northern Army Group agreed with all the points made by the 18th Army Corps. The Army General Staff has requested its Liaison Officer to High Command, Navy to ascertain and report the Navy's views and plans on these matters to Chief, Army General Staff as soon as possible.

Naval Command, Baltic reported in this connection that it had always been of the same opinion as the 18th Army Corps and that it would be impossible to launch an offensive over our shallow minefields which have only just recently been reinforced.

Another modern minesweeper flotilla is now on the way there to reinforce our minefield patrol forces. The enemy has up to now only slowly moved forward against our minefields and no systematic sweeping operations have yet been noticed.

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High Command, Air Force has promised to dispatch additional fighter groups for the protection of our naval forces escorting the supply traffic to the island. High Command, Navy has been asked to supply twelve 3.7-centimeter anti-aircraft guns. It is, however, doubtful whether this request can be met in view of the shortage of men and material. For the same reasons it will be quite fruitless to make further requests exceeding these. Orders have been given to exchange the Oerlikons for German two-centimeter guns. Instructions have also been issued to ship a six months' supply to the island and to get naval landing craft ready. Embarkation practices will be given the utmost support.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Group "Rossbach" has so far been unable to contact the enemy convoy that is expected in the North Atlantic.

Otherwise nothing special to report from the Atlantic.

So far four submarines have put out for the Mediterranean to reinforce our submarines there. Another two submarines are to put out on 27 Sept.

On 26 Sept. the first four boats were reported to have reached grid squares CG 80, CG 50 and CG 20 respectively. Of these, submarine U "226" reported that between 24 and 26 Sept. she was repeatedly attacked by enemy planes and sustained some damage. She was attacked five times at close quarters at night without any previous radar location warning. No further reports have been received from this boat since she last signaled on the afternoon of 26 Sept. that she had again withstood two attacks.

These reports would suggest that the boat was located before the air attacks on frequencies that could not be detected by our Hagenuk set. Similar observations were already made by submarine U "617" east of Gibraltar. These locations are possibly being made on the nine centimeter band. Under present circumstances, therefore, a break through the Strait of Gibraltar, which in the last attempt cost us three out of the four participating boats, requires an exceptionally high number of boats, which cannot be justified, despite the present situation in the Mediterranean. Indeed, it could only be justified if it were thought that an increase in our Mediterranean submarine strength would have a decisive

influence on our position there. But as this will not be the case, Commander in Chief, Navy decided, very much against his will, to recommend that attempts to break through the strait be abandoned. Attempts at a break-through will be ordered anew during the next new moon period, by which time new radar sets will have been installed in the boats which will also be able to detect radar locations on the nine centimeter band.

Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command was informed of this decision in Submarine Division's "Situation Report No. 168".

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had seven planes on operations over the western area and three planes over the Mediterranean. Two enemy planes were shot down.

Twelve enemy planes carried out harassing raids over the Rhineland. Only a few planes and harassing raids with machine-gun attacks were reported from the coastal areas of Belgium, northern and western France.

No night activity was reported.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported 24 planes on reconnaissance and fighter operations as well as 19 transport planes engaged in the evacuation of Corsica.

Air Force Command, Southeast reported that 26 Ju 88's raided the airfield on Kos with good results.

Enemy planes attacked Verona at noon.

In the Aegean the island of Syros and the airfield on Argos were raided.

3. Eastern Front:

In the Black Sea four enemy transport planes were

shot down off Constanta. The 5th Air Force reported 33 planes on operations, but nothing special to report.

Nothing to report from the Army front lines.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A convoy of 22 freighters and three escort vessels put out from Gibraltar. In the afternoon a DIDO-class cruiser was lying out at sea, east of the port for several hours.

No reconnaissance reports are available from the eastern and western Mediterranean.

According to German Naval Command, Italy, it has been observed that the shipping traffic in the area between Salerno and Sicily only proceeds in open waters at night whereas during the day it keeps close in to the Sicilian coast or remains within the Gulf of Salerno. At 0030 two northbound and one southbound convoy consisting of 13 and 20 merchantmen respectively, were sighted 60 miles south of Salerno. At 0140 ostensibly one heavy cruiser and six destroyers were sighted 30 miles northwest of Palermo on a westerly course. At 0158 15 - 20 ships were located 30 miles northwest of Trapani; course and speed were not reported.

On 27 Sept. one destroyer, two torpedo boats, and two smaller naval vessels were sighted off Ajaccio. At 1000 our air reconnaissance reported three cruisers, one auxiliary vessel, one PT boat, and seven floatplanes in Ajaccio harbor. According to photographic reconnaissance on 24 Sept., Capri is being used by the enemy as a PT boat base. Thirty MGB's and PT boats were recognized. A submarine location was reported at 1725 70 miles southwest of Cape Spartivento.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

There were no PT boat operations owing to the weather. The minelayer POMMERN has carried out its minelaying operation according to plan.

Despite bad weather the ferry traffic between Corsica and the mainland was carried out almost according to plan.

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Port activity in Leghorn was hampered by constant air raid warnings.

The last remaining ships in Naples have been moved away. The harbor has been thoroughly demolished. The last remaining naval offices are now being moved to Gaeta.

On 27 Sept. two Italian pilots were taken prisoner on Pianosa. The airfield there has been put out of action. The planned surprise attack by two PT boats on the island of Trenuti, north-northwest of Manfredonia, was started but had to be abandoned as bad weather conditions made it impossible to land the assault detachment. These boats are now patrolling the ports north of Ancona. The minelayer CASPARI has been commissioned at Spezia as the F "8".

In view of the situation in Ajaccio, German Naval Command, Italy urgently requested that Operations Staff, High Command, Air Force should provide adequate bomber formations for operations against the enemy naval forces as they may seriously handicap our evacuation from Corsica. A similar request has been directly made to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and the 2nd Air Force.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported in connection with the ground situation that Foggia had had to be given up in face of strong enemy pressure. The 1st British Tank Division is probably employed there.

The Naval Attaché in Madrid submitted the original report made by an able seaman 2nd Class, who was on board the Italian torpedo boat ORSA during her passage from Spezia to Palma de Mallorca.

Although this report contained some interesting information, there was nothing especially new in it. Copy as per l/Skl 293/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. XI v.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Adriatic Sea:

From a radio message sent by Commanding Admiral, Adriatic to Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic intercepted here, it is taken that the Army plans to occupy the Dalmatian islands in the very near future. As such an operation can only be carried out with the assistance of the Navy, Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic should at once investigate how much suitable operational tonnage is available.

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Group South reported that according to information received from German Naval Command, Italy, three escort vessels were seized in Venice and four in Trieste.

Group South requested that these vessels be assigned to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic.

Aegean Sea:

At 0900 on 27 Sept. an enemy submarine was sighted and attacked northwest of Keos on a northerly course and again at 1115 west of Keos.

At 1300 on 28 Sept. a motor sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine north of Cerigo.

It is reported that no damage was sustained in the air raids on Syros, Castelli, and Candia in the evening of 27 Sept.

The Italian Commander of the island of Corfu has been taken prisoner and shot.

The removal of Italian prisoners of war is being prepared.

The operations on Andros have not yet been completed.

The steamer ELSI (1,430 GRT) sank on the afternoon of 27 Sept. four miles south of Cephalonia, probably by running into one of our minefields.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

One lighter laden with ammunition and a motor fishing vessel were sunk in the air attack on Kerch on the afternoon of 27 Sept. The northern jetty was damaged.

On 28 Sept. Constanta harbor was raided by six enemy planes that approached from the east. No damage was caused. Three of the attacking planes were shot down.

In a torpedo attack during the night of 27 Sept. our boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla sank two coastal vessels and three lighters of altogether 2,100 GRT. Two of the lighters

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were laden with ammunition. Our ships returned to port undamaged.

The same four ships will be on operations again during the night of 28 Sept.

There is otherwise nothing to report from the Black Sea.

VIII. Situation Far East.

The Allies report that Australian formations succeeded, after heavy fighting, in surrounding Finch harbor, the last Japanese base on New Guinea.

The Japanese reported that one of their submarines sank an enemy cruiser east of the New Hebrides during the night of 11 Sept.

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy.A. Organizational questions:

I. Chief, Quartermaster Division and Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau discussed the possibilities of training at sea that would remain open to cadets, should the PRINZ EUGEN, as proposed by Group North/Fleet, be assigned to the northern area again as a combat vessel. The decision on this proposal that has the support of Operations Division, Naval Staff depends on the finding of a satisfactory solution to the training problem. Ship "5" will be available for the training period beginning 1 May 1944. Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau considers the solution to be acceptable. For the training period beginning 1 Nov. 1943 it will only be possible to accommodate some of the executive officer and engineer officer aspirants on board small vessels, as accommodation on the larger ships has been completely filled with aspirants. Previous training experiences on smaller vessels were not satisfactory. A thorough general training is lacking and the greater practical experience undoubtedly gained on smaller vessels does not compensate for it. Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau can only consider this solution an acceptable one if there are strong strategic reasons for the recommissioning of the PRINZ EUGEN. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff pointed out that it was the present condition of the TIRPITZ which had brought the question of recommissioning to the forefront of discussions again. Our lack of battleships is a handicap not only in the northern but also in the Baltic area where we might be quite unexpectedly faced with the need to take strategic measures.

Chief, Naval Staff stressed that the training of replacements was of utmost importance in view of the fact that the brunt of naval warfare lies on the submarine arm. The relatively short length of service seen by the submarine commanders makes it imperative that all training possibilities be fully exploited. Basic training aboard is of the utmost importance and real experience can only be gained on larger ships where everything, including the duties, and the officers are directly coordinated to achieve this purpose. Despite these considerations, Chief, Naval Staff decided that the PRINZ EUGEN should immediately be withdrawn from training service and be reassigned

to active duty, and indeed not only to strengthen the task force in Northern waters but also in view of the situation in the Baltic Sea where even disturbances of a temporary nature would have far-reaching and irreparable consequences.

In answer to an inquiry made by Commander in Chief, Navy, Chief, Naval Personnel Department reported the standard of teachers both aboard and in the schools to be satisfactory. Chief, Training Unit, Fleet also had no complaints to make in this direction.

II. Chief, Quartermaster Division recommended that all affairs connected with the organization of naval shore commands should be handled by Quartermaster Division. Commander in Chief, Navy approved this recommendation in principle and stated in this connection that Fieldmarshal Rommel had expressed the wish to have Vice Admiral Ruge assigned to his command as advisor in all matters pertaining to coastal defense and shipping. Commander in Chief, Navy himself said that it would be out of the question to form a further naval command in the Italian area besides the already existing German Naval Command, Italy. As soon as Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and Army Group B have been merged, German Naval Command, Italy will in any case come under the command of Army Group B. Fieldmarshal Rommel's wish cannot therefore be fulfilled.

B. The General Situation:

I. Army Situation:

Enemy attacks are centered in three areas on the eastern front: namely Melitopol, Gomel, and Smolensk. The following details are also known: the air situation in the Kuban area is unsatisfactory. The 79th Infantry Division has been brought up to the Melitopol area from the Crimea. The enemy has succeeded in establishing altogether eleven bridgeheads across the middle Dnieper, which he is tenaciously defending. But all his attempts to extend the bridgeheads have failed. The eastern sector of the city of Kiev has been evacuated without enemy pressure. Where the Pripet joins the Dnieper, the situation has grown tenser. The situation round Gomel is critical at the moment owing to a major enemy break-through.

The situation in Italy and the Balkans remains more or less unchanged.

II. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported that the Torpedo School needed two more torpedo boats in order to bring the number of torpedo recovery vessels up to 13, so that each pupil

could fire 15 shots. The lacking boats could only be supplied at the expense of the western area. Chief, Naval Staff is of the opinion that 15 shots per pupil represent the bare necessary minimum and orders that the two torpedo boats be provided.

III. The Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission reported that it would be possible to raise the output of wooden PT boats to 25 boats per month and furthermore that the injudicious distribution of allotments by the Ministry of Armament and Production was endangering armament production. It is feared that weapon production will not be able to keep step with ship construction as envisaged under the 1943 Fleet Construction Program. The cuts now being made in allotments display a total disregard for naval requirements.

Rear Admiral Topp furthermore reported with reference to the Gauleiter Conference to be held at Posen on 6 Oct. that Director General Merker would also like to make a few remarks on naval warfare in general in the course of his speech on naval requirements. Commander in Chief, Navy said that as he would also be addressing the meeting, it would be unnecessary for Director General Merker to discuss naval warfare problems.

The British MT boat which was captured in the northern area will be handed over for a few weeks to the Shipbuilding Commission for trials.

With regard to Siebel ferry allotments, Rear Admiral Topp reported that an extremely favorable report on the performance of these ships had been received from an Army command, which stressed how much more useful than naval landing craft they were because of their exceptionally advantageous loading space. Minister Speer has therefore asked Commander in Chief, Navy to decide immediately whether 18,000 tons of the steel allotted to the Navy can be used for Siebel ferry construction.

Naval Staff is absolutely against this request which could only be fulfilled at the cost of the naval landing craft output. Chief, Naval Staff ordered that investigations should first of all be made as regards the Navy's actual requirements in naval landing craft as it might enable him to place the responsibility for obtaining the steel allotment for the construction of Siebel ferries requested by Reich Minister Speer, on the Army or the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

IV. Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reported that:

- a. Sweden had promised to prolong until 15 Oct. the

present order prohibiting Norwegian blockade runners to sail from Goeteborg until 15 Oct. The Foreign Office intends to put an embargo on the Goeteborg traffic again as soon as this period expires. Our own naval forces are most inadequate for the prevention of a break-through. Only three to five patrol vessels, five defense cutters, and an inadequate morning and evening reconnaissance are available.

b. According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Madrid, the Spanish Naval Offices in Las Palmas and Vigo have on instructions from their Foreign Office issued orders that the German ships lying there are to be moved into the inner harbor, that certain parts of their engines are to be removed, and that guards are to be stationed on board. Neither the Embassy nor the Naval Attaché were informed of this intention beforehand. A protest will be lodged against this step, which is quite clearly the result of having completely yielded to British pressure. (The Danish steamer SCHLESWIG has left Las Palmas). This measure is of little strategic importance in as much as these ships have not been used for the transportation of supplies for a long time now. In view of its political significance, however, countermeasures will be taken in consultation with the Foreign Office. It would be politic to support those elements of the Spanish Navy who are favorably disposed towards us. Reprisals are not, therefore, to be recommended. Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

V. Commanding General, Army Group E submitted his survey of the situation to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast. Group South has passed on this report together with its own comments to Naval Staff. Relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 2931/43 Gkdos., Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Special Items.

I. In order to strengthen the defenses of the ships' berths in Alta Fiord, Naval Command, Norway requested that a patrol vessel and submarine-chaser flotilla be allocated. Naval Command, Norway thinks that it would be impossible to withdraw the necessary number of ships required for this task from its own forces without so weakening the escort forces that even greater losses would have to be anticipated.

Group North/Fleet supports this request.

A further submarine chaser flotilla cannot be allocated to Naval Command, Norway, as three out of the four available submarine chaser flotillas are already stationed in the area of Naval Command, Norway. One flotilla (the 14th Submarine Chaser Flotilla) is operating in the western area off the Atlantic coast and must remain there.

Naval Command, Norway could only be assigned a patrol vessel flotilla by withdrawing one from another area. But the situation is extremely strained in all the other areas and the demand for modern minesweepers, large seagoing patrol vessels, and submarine chasers is most urgent.

Naval Command, Norway's request cannot, therefore, be granted.

Naval Command, Norway will therefore be informed that the following decision has been reached:

"The requested patrol vessel or submarine chaser flotilla could only be allocated at the expense of other areas where the situation is equally strained. Naval Command, Norway must therefore carry out the additional task of reinforcing the defenses of the ships' berths in Alta Fiord with its own forces."

Copy of teletype 1/Skl I op. 27109/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. d.

II. Naval Command, Baltic reported that:

"The Fuehrer issued the following orders:

1. The Reichsfuehrer SS has been granted permission to recruit volunteers from members of the Danish Armed Forces that are now to be released, and to send up to 4,000 men of the youngest age groups to SS camps in the Reich.

2. The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS, who will dispatch two police battalions to Denmark for this purpose.

3. Martial law is to remain in force at least until the operations mentioned under numbers 1. and 2. have been completed. Special orders will be issued when it is decided to lift it.

4. The Foreign Office has provided the Reich Plenipotentiary with the same information. It is pointed out

that recruiting for the minesweeping service must therefore be postponed until the above operations have been completed."

This is obviously an order issued by Armed Forces High Command which Naval Staff only heard of indirectly through its subordinate commands. Chief, Operations Division asked Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters once before to stop Armed Forces High Command from issuing orders in this way.

III. In accordance with the order issued by Chief, Naval Staff as a result of the request made by Fieldmarshal Rommel about Vice Admiral Ruge, Chief, German Naval Command, Italy, with copy to the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group B, has been informed that the developments of the situation in northern Italy will demand ever-increasing co-operation between German Naval Command, Italy and Army Group B, especially in coastal defense matters. Naval Staff assumes that German Naval Command, Italy will keep the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group B continuously informed of all matters pertaining to coastal defense (for instance the laying of minefields etc.).

IV. In Group West's War Diary the following entry is to be found on 13 Sept. on the effectiveness of the AA 1 firing unit:

"I expect to achieve the most effective results by using this new AA 1 firing unit as a defensive weapon both for the protection of our convoy routes and against enemy landings. I regret that the use of the AA 1 mine as an offensive weapon has had to be postponed for the time being, except for one experimental minelaying operation to be carried out by PT boats in connection with the minelaying offensive off the east coast of England. I hope that the mines with AA 1 firing units will be effective for at least a year. The restrictions imposed on our freedom of action by laying these mines, which cannot be swept, near our own channels can only be justified if the mines remain effective for a long time."

Operations Division, Naval Staff is forced to correct this view in so far as not too much should be expected from AA 1 minefields for the following reasons:

1. It is doubtful whether the AA 1 firing unit will react to small slow moving vessels, as the deep tone of their engine and screw noises is rather weak.
2. The mine remains active for 3/4 year, since it is dependent on the battery.

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V. Torpedo Branch, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament reported with reference to the information received from Group North/Fleet, on the introduction of a new Russian torpedo (see War Diary 22 Sept.), that the matter would be investigated as soon as the phonographic records have been received.

Situation 29 Sept.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

All in foreign waters have been informed by Radiogram 0831 concerning U.S. hospital ship ALGONQUIN (5,945 GRT)

According to a report received from our Naval Attaché in Tokyo, the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN will probably have completed her dockyard period by the end of September and not at the end of October or the beginning of November as previously expected. The supply ship's operations depend on how smoothly the schedule for the supplying of submarines runs, and also on the return trip schedule of Ship "28". For the relevant comments see the notes in 1/Sk1 2956/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

Foreign Section III, Armed Forces High Command has been requested to ask our Naval Attaché in Tokyo for information as to whether:

(1.) The BRAKE is fully operational for her further assignments.

(2.) The BOGOTA will be able as regards time and stores to:

(a.) supply the Aquila submarines,

(b.) carry out the supply operation as per Tokyo E 128 Gkdos. Chfs. simultaneously, or by installments, and whether two different kinds of fuel are required for operations
a. and b.

It has furthermore been requested that the Naval Attaché be informed that after the second "Monsoon" submarine supply operation in November, the BRAKE may have to carry out a third supply operation at the beginning of 1944, and furthermore that a decision on the future operations of the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN can only be made after his replies to (1.) and (2.) have been received and the return trip schedule of Ship "28" has been taken into consideration. The temporary use of the BRAKE for the relief of the transport traffic, probably from November onwards, can only be approved when all the scheduled supply operations have been carried out and on the understanding that her services can always be terminated at four weeks' notice.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Seventeen planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay.

At 1625 in CF 6689 our air reconnaissance sighted a northbound convoy of 31 merchantmen escorted by 1 anti-aircraft gun cruiser, 3 destroyers, and 2 escort vessels.

At 0129 radio intelligence located a British vessel in BF 4120.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two outward-bound and five homeward-bound submarines were escorted at Brest, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice. Altogether five ground mines were swept near Brest, off the Gironde and northwest of Bayonne.

The destroyer Z "37" has moved from Bordeaux to Royan. The torpedo boats T "22" and T "23" carried out gun practice at sea.

Channel Coast:

Stormy weather prevented convoy operations from being carried out even within the Channel Island traffic area. Throughout the day numerous detonations coming from the direction of Dover were heard at Cape Gris Nez and Blanc Nez.

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Their cause is unknown.

Five ships of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and six ships of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla put out from Le Havre at 2100 to carry out the minelaying operation L 1 (laying of a flanking minefield 15 miles southwest of Boulogne). The 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is carrying out the minelaying operation OK 5 (a third flanking minefield north of Dunkirk).

From 2249 onwards enemy targets were continuously located 6 - 10 miles off Cape De La Heve, Cape Antifer, Dieppe, Boulogne, Berk.Sur Mer, and Calais. A clash with the group of steamers with the 38th Minesweeper Flotilla on passage from Dieppe to Boulogne is therefore to be expected.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy No. "462" Elbe - Hook left at 1200 with three steamers. Channel sweeps were carried out according to plan. The patrol positions in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North were taken up. At 2120 bombs were dropped on patrol vessels north of Terschelling, but no damage was sustained.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Fourteen planes were detected on operations over the North Sea.

On 28 and 29 Sept. single planes carried out a reconnaissance over the areas of Petsamo, Alta, and Bergen.

On the east coast of Hopen Island one of our aircraft sighted two men near hut 2. A photographic reconnaissance of the Kola coast was carried out on 28 Sept. An evaluation report will follow. According to a sighting report received on 29 Sept., two submarines were sighted off the southern tip of Spitsbergen. The activity observed in Motka Bay was normal. Two PT boats were located in Pummanski Bay and a convoy of three merchantmen and two escort vessels was lying off the Yugor Strait.

Own Situation:

On 28 Sept. the Norwegian cruiser NK "15" belonging to the Inshore Defenses Unit of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast ran aground west of Mandal. Thirty-one ships were escorted north and twenty-one south. Ten ships were delayed owing to a shortage of escort vessels.

Admiral, Northern Waters reported that supplementary orders had been issued for weather operation "Kreuzritter", fixing the sailing from Narvik to Hammerfest for 2000 on 29 Sept. The ship will replenish her oil supplies at Hammerfest; she will proceed from there under escort of submarine U "355" to 79°45' N, 021° E via 76°35' N, 06°00' E and will proceed from there according to weather conditions.

Commander, Submarines, Norway recommended nine submarines suitable for transferring to operations in the Atlantic, and at the same time offered Submarine Division the choice of six more. (See Teletype 0216).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The enemy displayed lively air activity over Kronstadt Bay and Luga Bay. Two enemy planes were shot down and four more were probably damaged. A Finnish steamer was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy torpedo plane in Aaland Sea.

2. Own Situation:

Group "Hermelin" was off Ven Island at 0800. At 1711 the destroyer Z "27" reported from AO 4466 right, lower edge (east of Skagen) that continuous search gear locations and submarine noises were clearly heard in the multi-unit hydrophones. The 17th Patrol Vessel Flotilla and two Arado seaplanes were sent there for submarine chase.

It was calculated by dead reckoning that group "Hermelin" would be at point "Green 3" at 2000. From there on the LUETZOW will proceed to Gdynia alone and the destroyers STEINBRINCK and JACOBI will detach themselves and go to Kiel.

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Naval Command, Baltic submitted the following report from Commanding Admiral, Denmark:

"In accordance with the Fuehrer's decision, the members of the Danish Armed Forces are only to be disbanded after 4,000 men have been recruited as volunteers for the SS. As the SS are now also allowed to recruit members of the former Danish Navy, the following conclusions are to be drawn:

(1.) The hope of recruiting personnel for a civilian Danish minesweeper flotilla and for manning river police boats to control the Sound, will have to be abandoned for some time to come.

(2.) Previous incidents would point to the necessity for reconsidering the former plan that envisaged handing the minesweepers and river police boats back to the Danes at a later date, in view of the big temptation this would offer them of escaping with these vessels to Sweden.

Furthermore the vessels assigned to our naval formations in the Baltic and those that are to remain in Danish waters as badly needed reserves for the minesweeping service (1 mine-sweeper, 16 patrol vessels, 8 gunboats), are listed in this report. (Paragraphs (3) - (7)). Admiral, Denmark's report then continues as follows:

(8.) The Danish Navy will now be informed that all its vessels including fishing smacks are going to be taken over by Germany.

(9.) The arsenal material stored in Orlogs dockyard will now be disposed of since Armed Forces High Command has meanwhile, in conformity with the opinion held by High Command, Navy, decided that the weapons and other material seized are not to be regarded as booty but simply as equipment now at our disposal.

As the entire dockyard control organization has been reorganized, this command is no longer interested in Orlogs dockyard. I have informed the Shipbuilding Commission's representative for Denmark that in the future this dockyard is under his orders. It is expected that the present dockyard control staff (composed of Danish officers) will resign on 1 Oct.

(10.) It is felt that the following matters should be cleared up:

(a.) Can the Coastal Protection Flotilla, Great Belt be permanently manned by German personnel ?

(b.) Can German naval personnel be made available for manning the river police boats in the Sound ?

(c.) What is to be done about the other reserves mentioned in paragraph(7.) ? "

Convoy and escort operations were carried out without incident throughout the Baltic.

Nothing special to report from Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries.

V. Merchant Shipping.

Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Intelligence Division's short report No. 11/43 included amongst other things a report on the Spanish dockyards whose annual output is of 50,000 - 70,000 GRT so that there is very little hope of being able to increase it.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

As submarine group "Rossbach" failed to gain contact with the convoy that it was awaiting in the North Atlantic, it will now be moved on 1 Oct. to patrol positions from AD 8879 - AK 6363, where, according to available information on enemy routes used last year, the next slow-moving westbound convoy may be expected to pass.

Contacting enemy convoys is once again submarine warfare's main problem. The heavy losses suffered this summer are unfortunately still preventing us from operating again with as many submarine groups as are necessary, when we continue being unable to rely on the Air Force providing us with long-range air reconnaissance planes.

Submarine U "223" which was on passage to the Mediterranean had already passed through the Strait of Gibraltar unobserved when our signal cancelling previous orders was received (see War Diary 28 Sept.). A passage report has been received from this submarine.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reported 42 planes on operations over the western area and 3 planes over the Mediterranean.

Smaller enemy air formations penetrated into Holland and the Belgian and French coastal areas, and attacked, mostly with machine-guns, ships, traffic installations, and anti-aircraft gun positions. During the night of 29 Sept. 30 planes flew into the Baltic Sea area as far as Danzig Bay, ostensibly on minelaying operations.

A heavy enemy air raid was carried out on the Rhine - Westphalian industrial area; it was concentrated on Bochum, where very considerable damage was done to industrial and traffic installations. For further details see: "Daily Situation".

2. Mediterranean Theater:

British Isles and Vicinity:

The 2nd Air Force reported that no combat operations had been flown but only reconnaissance ones. No air activity whatsoever was reported during the night of 28 Sept.

Air Force Command, Southeast reported enemy reconnaissance activity over Crete and the Aegean Islands and enemy planes on supply operations to the insurgents.

3. Eastern Front:

Twenty-five enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines. We lost three planes. The 5th Air Force reported that 31 of our planes were on reconnaissance operations. For reconnaissance evaluations see: "Enemy Situation, Northern Waters".

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A convoy of two transports that seemed to be in ballast, and seven freighters put into Gibraltar from an unknown direction. A convoy of 21 freighters and 1 tanker passed through the Strait of Gibraltar westbound. This is presumably part of the convoy that was reported by Tres Forcas on 28 Sept.

A convoy of 40 ships proceeding towards the Mediterranean was sighted in the afternoon 30 miles off Cape Spartel.

The port occupation of Gibraltar remained more or less unchanged.

No reconnaissance evaluations were received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

The heavy cruiser was sighted again, this time north-northeast of Palermo. The battleships have not been relocated yet. A small eastbound convoy of seven ships was proceeding north of Palermo at noon. Fifteen medium-sized merchantmen, three destroyers, and numerous landing craft were sighted in the landing place in Salerno, and four transports that seemed to be disembarking troops were sighted in Salerno harbor.

According to radio intelligence, two groups of U.S. warships were at sea in the Palermo area and a third group in the Bizerta area.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

There were no PT boat operations owing to the weather. The minelayer POMMERN put into Toulon on 28 Sept. for reloading after having completed her minelaying operation.

Despite continuous enemy air attacks and bad weather, ferry traffic between Corsica and the mainland was carried out almost according to plan.

The small vessels and war transports sustained heavy sea damage and are now being repaired in nonstop day and night work.

The coastal defenses in the Genoa - Spezia sector have been considerably strengthened by the arrival of the 626th Naval

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Artillery Battalion. The rest of the 616th Naval Artillery Battalion has been stationed in the Leghorn - Piombino - Elba area. German Naval Command, Italy reported that the telephonic lines of communication with the ports are becoming more and more liable to 'breakdowns'. Teletype communications at present only exist with Berlin.

It is planned to use the former cruiser CATTARO, which is operationally ready, as a floating anti-aircraft battery in Pola. Investigations are at present being made as to whether the ship can be moved to Venice. Naval Port Commander, Pola reported the food situation to be critical and requested that the food supplies lying ready for shipment in Trieste be brought up by steamer.

German Naval Command, Italy proposed that appeals should be broadcast to the officers and men aboard Italian ships that were moved to enemy occupied ports, asking them to proceed with their ships to non-enemy occupied ports in northern Italy at the first opportunity, or at least, should this prove impossible, refuse to serve against their own fellow countrymen. Under-Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Legnani has been asked personally to make a similar appeal. The present broadcasts of the Italian radio station at Munich, attacking the Italian Navy and its officers, have aroused considerable indignation, especially amongst the Italian officers who are co-operating with us, all the more so because the Italian Navy achieved far more in the recent war than any other branch of the Italian Armed Forces.

In connection with the ground situation Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported on the evening of 28 Sept. that the evacuation of the main force from Corsica will be carried out on 6 Oct., and that the remaining troops will have been evacuated by 9 Oct.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

A convoy of five steamers put into Trieste from Durazzo on 26 Sept. The PILIS which was one of the two torpedo boats escorting this convoy escaped during the night of 27 Sept., as already reported. The crew of the MISSOURI has been interned in an Italian naval barrack. The convoy was shelled by shore batteries on the island of Meleda. The ships have been put at the disposal of the Mediterranean Shipping Company in Trieste.

Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic reported that two companies of the 611th Naval Artillery Battalion as well as the 623rd Naval Artillery Battalion with four light batteries and four anti-aircraft batteries, and the 612th Naval Artillery Battalion with three light batteries but without guns arrived in Trieste. The 621st Naval Artillery Battalion has not arrived yet. The 612th and 623rd Naval Artillery Battalions are to be assigned to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic.

As a result of the repeated bombardments of our vessels by Army coastal batteries on the Dalmatian coast, Commanding Admiral, Adriatic has given strict orders to Naval Shore Commander, North Adriatic to keep the Army well informed of all ship movements.

According to information received from the Naval Liaison Officer to Army Group E, the Air Force has received permission to attack enemy merchantmen northwest of the line Cape Gargone - Pelagosa - Lagosta - western tip of Corcula Island, but only if they have been definitely recognized as being enemy vessels.

Group South has again requested that the three vessels seized in Venice and the four seized in Trieste which are very suitable for escort operations, be allotted to them. Group South requested that the Italian warships captured in Pola ready to put out be assigned to Commanding Admiral, Adriatic. For copy of teletype, justifying these requests, see 1/Skl 27352/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. d. A decision on the matter is now being discussed by Operations Division in conjunction with Quartermaster Division.

b. Aegean Sea:

A Greek motor-sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine in the harbor of Velanidia (southeastern tip of the Peloponnesos) at noon on 28 Sept. The enemy air raids on Syra on 28 Sept. heavily damaged the town but not the harbor. The runway at Argos airfield near Nauplia was hit by bombs. The steamer ARDENNA (1,092 GRT) struck a mine and sank at 1630 on 28 Sept. after having put out from Argostoli. It is now being investigated whether this ship was lost either by having run into an enemy minefield or into one of our own. Her mast tops and superstructure are still showing above the water. Sweeping operations on the enemy minefield off Trikkeri have been started.

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A convoy of transports with about 1,000 German soldiers aboard left Piraeus for Suda at noon on 29 Sept., escorted by two submarine chasers and three naval landing craft.

c. Black Sea:

Our air reconnaissance on the morning of 29 Sept. in the eastern part of the Sea of Azov and off the northeastern Caucasian coast was without tactical result.

During the day the town and harbor of Genichesk were raided three times by about nine enemy bombers. A harbor defense vessel was set on fire and became a total loss. Five other harbor defense vessels, one naval landing craft and the naval artillery lighter MAL "4" were heavily damaged. The losses suffered in personnel were slight.

In the course of an air raid on Constanta on 28 Sept., four out of the six attacking planes were shot down.

The operation of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in conjunction with night reconnaissance planes off Anapa during the night of 28 Sept. was without result. The use of flares enabled us to obtain a perfect view of the harbor and the inshore coastal waters.

At 2015 on 28 Sept. naval landing craft in patrol positions off the south coast of the Taman peninsula had a brief encounter with light enemy naval forces which were thus prevented from approaching our coast line.

The patrol positions north and south of the Taman peninsula were again occupied during the night of 29 Sept. Our patrol vessels once again had an encounter with the enemy off the south coast. Further details have not, however, been received yet.

In answer to an inquiry from Operations Division, Naval Staff, Admiral, Black Sea stated that:

"The evacuation of the Kuban bridgehead has so far been carried out more or less according to plan. After the Anapa - Kerch and Temryuk - Kerch traffic was suspended the day before we withdrew from the ports, the evacuation has been exclusively taking place from the loading points of the fish-salting plant at Senaya Taman to Kerch, and from the embarkation point at

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Chushka Spit mostly to Yenikale. Most of the large stores of supplies (especially ammunition and provisions) are being removed in naval landing craft and lighters, whereas troops and vehicles are being mostly evacuated on combined-operations boats and ferries, especially on the short route from Tuzla Spit to Yenikale. As soon as the enemy recognized the nature of this operation, he concentrated his air force on the transports and the points of disembarkation. We lost a few lighters, tugs, naval landing craft and minesweepers as a result. Direct hits on the loading jetties and railroad tracks interrupted loading work several times. Sufficient shipping space is available. A shortage of boxcars and trucks caused a bottleneck in the outgoing traffic from Kerch. From the beginning of the operation on 7 Sept. up to 26 Sept. the following had been evacuated:

(1.) By the Navy and the Engineers, on all routes, in all: 30,547 tons of Army supplies, 132,600 German and Axis soldiers and volunteers, 13,818 wounded, 22,843 civilians, 11,687 motor vehicles, 16,641 horse drawn vehicles, 796 guns, 43,774 horses, 4,796 head of cattle.

(2.) Of which the Navy transported: 69,296 tons of Army supplies, 5,000 soldiers, 11,615 wounded, 12,383 civilians, 171 motor vehicles, 647 horse drawn vehicles, 72 guns, 918 horses and 2,096 head of cattle.

The figures given above for the Navy (paragraph (2)) include the large quantities transported over the Anapa - Kerch and Temryuk - Kerch routes, which were particularly open to enemy attack. These sea transports which were carried out by naval landing craft from ports near the front line relieved the loading points on the eastern side of the Strait of Kerch, considerably shortened the overland transportation to the loading points, and generally achieved an appreciable saving in trucks and fuel.

IX. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

Views on Political Negotiations.

Relations with Russia are still very widely discussed in the British and American press. "The Manchester Guardian" warns against allowing Russia to withdraw into isolation again, or in other words to lose interest in western European affairs, and therefore welcomes Russia's participation in the Mediterranean Commission. Logically speaking, a three-power conference should be the next step. In this connection it is noteworthy that Roosevelt should have stated that no decision had yet been reached on the possibility of Hull's visiting Moscow and that the question as to whether the American Ambassador will return to Moscow is still under consideration. The American periodical "News Week" writes:

"When the Russians speak of a Second Front they mean western Europe, not Italy, and least of all the Balkans. The latter area is not officially mentioned in Moscow, but it is said to be quite clear that an invasion of the Balkans by the Western Powers would not be welcomed by Russia."

The British periodical "The New Statesman and Nation", doubts whether there exists an agreement even of the most general kind amongst the Allies on the major postwar problems. The situation is being rendered all the more difficult at the moment by the coming presidential elections in the United States, which are for the time being preventing the formulation of any clear cut policy.

According to a report from Argentina British circles in Washington are said to be concerned over the tendency of the United States Senate not to bind itself to any fixed foreign policy.

This makes it impossible to oppose Russian aims with a well defined, joint Anglo-American foreign policy. The question that the Allies have to decide for themselves is quite clearly this: either to carry out the Atlantic Charter or else to comply with the Russian demand for a strategic zone - and thereby communistic sphere of influence - in Europe. It should be borne in mind that Russia is now in a position to come to terms with Germany.

According to a Swiss report, Turkey is said to have tightened up her control of vessels of belligerent nations passing through the straits.

With the approval of the German Commander of the city of Rome, Mussolini's Defense Minister, Marshal Graziani, announced

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over the radio that the appeal published in the press asking Italian officers to join the German Armed Forces has been withdrawn.

According to a Swedish report, the present seat of the Italian Government is at Bari where the King and the Badoglio Cabinet are staying. A Spanish press agency report says that Anglo-American negotiations are being conducted with the King with the specific aim of re-shuffling the Badoglio Cabinet and of pressing for an Italian declaration of war on Germany.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

I. Army Situation:

Heavy fighting has again set in on the eastern front now that weather conditions have improved. In particular, enemy successes are reported north and south of Zaporozhye. Our bridgehead at Kremenchug has been evacuated. Heavy fighting is in progress north of Kiev. The enemy crossed the Dnieper at three more points. In the Smolensk area Rudnya had to be given up. The enemy offensive there is aiming at Orsha.

In Italy serious riots are reported from Naples caused by the demolition of the harbor. Our troops will evacuate the city to-night.

There are still about 6,800 men left on Corsica for the removal of the rest of the material.

The situation in Istria is unsatisfactory; most of the insurgents have been able to escape to the mountains.

II. In order to forestall a new Swedish press campaign, Naval Staff has recommended that a note be sent to the Swedish Government in connection with the spotting of submarine locations in the Skagerrak, advising that enemy submarines are in their territorial waters. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. Chief, Quartermaster Division reported that:

a. With regard to the reorganization of Italian naval personnel in our sphere of influence, a new situation has arisen with the appointment of Admiral Legnani as Secretary of the Navy, for it would appear that the re-establishment of the Italian Navy is being planned. Further details will have to be awaited.

b. From 1200 on 1 Oct. onwards, the command area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic will extend as far as Memel. All the Coastal Protection Flotillas and Harbor Defense Flotillas of the Naval Shore Commanders will come under the command of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic on the same date. Naval Command, Baltic feels that the placing of the entire southern and central Baltic under one naval shore commander will prove too unwieldy and has therefore recommended that this area be divided into two naval shore commands. Quartermaster Division supports this recommendation with which Chief, Naval Staff concurred.

c. Four more of the 21-centimeter guns that were placed at our disposal by the Army are now ready in Vienna for shipment to the Dalmatian coast.

IV. In compliance with the order of Chief, Naval Staff, on 29 Sept., Operations Division, Naval Staff submitted a statement showing the tasks for which the Navy required landing craft in the various areas. The number available is shown in comparison with the requirements. This statement shows that a constant monthly output of 45 naval landing craft, or 135 per quarter, must be constructed if all the requirements are to be met to a reasonably satisfactory degree. The monthly minimum has been set at 30 naval landing craft, and under no circumstances must production be allowed to drop below this figure.

Copy of this statement as per 1/Skl I op 27335/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

The Chairman of the Shipbuilding Commission declared that in view of this statement it would be impossible to allocate material from naval allotments for the construction of Siebel ferries as requested by Reich Minister Speer.

Furthermore he reported that the Head Committee had redrafted the 1943 Fleet Building Program, considerably curtailing it except for submarine and PT boat construction. As Rear Admiral Topp already stated, Commander in Chief, Navy will under no circumstances agree to these measures or accept them as an accomplished fact. The Head Committee is not authorized to make such curtailments. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament will be ordered to explain to Reich Minister Speer in writing that the Fleet Building Program constitutes an organic whole, and that Commander in Chief, Navy must reserve himself the right to make changes in the program should it actually prove impossible to obtain the full allocation of raw materials promised.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Operations Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reported on Fuehrer Directive No. 50, giving instructions for the preparation of the retransfer of the 20th Mountain Army Corps to northern Finland and northern Norway. The directive is based on the assumption that the situation in the Northern Army Group is maintaining its stability and that it is not planned to withdraw the front lines. Certain instructions have nevertheless been given in the event of unfavorable developments, particularly in Finland. A second line of defense is at present being built west of Lake Peipus and the river Narva. Should Finland withdraw from the war or collapse, it will then be the duty of the 20th Mountain Army Corps to hold the northern area which is economically vital to our warfare as long as possible, and the exceedingly important nickel mines in the Petsamo area must be given special protection. It is impossible to judge at present how long this area can be held. The directive then deals with the preparations which must be started now because of the considerable difficulties that this operation will present, for it must also be borne in mind that an evacuation from Finnish ports by sea will be impossible to any appreciable extent. Copy of directive as per 1/Skl 2964/43 Gkdos. Chers. in file I op "Fuehrer Directives".

With reference to the advance measures that are to be taken for the withdrawal of the present front line positions of the Northern Army Group to the East Wall positions, Naval Command, Baltic reported that a special staff has been set up in the area of Naval Shore Commander, Tallinn and that in agreement with the Army, the naval batteries are being withdrawn and replaced by Army batteries one by one. The Battery "Prinz Heinrich" will be withdrawn without being replaced. Copy of relevant teletype as per 1/Skl 2912/43 Gkdos. Chers. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

VI. Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reported that the Spanish Secretary of the Navy admitted to our Naval Attache that the measures taken against our ships in Vigo and Las Palmas were the result of British pressure. Great Britain is said to have handed the Spanish Government a list of alleged Spanish neutrality infringements with regard to the supplying of submarines. The release of Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi depends on the decision of General Orgaz, who is expected to return to Madrid in a few days' time. For further details see: War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items.

A compilation of enemy messages intercepted by our radio decyphering and radio intelligence services between 20 and 26 Sept. is contained in Radio Monitoring Report 39/43. There are no comments to be made.

Situation 30 Sept.I. War in Foreign Waters.1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships in foreign waters.

An enemy situation report was dispatched to all in foreign waters by Teletype 1350.

II. Situation West Area.1. Enemy Situation:

Eight enemy planes were detected on operations over the Bay of Biscay.

At 1310 in CE 6339 our reconnaissance planes sighted a convoy of 60 merchantmen with ten escort vessels and one plane on a northerly course.

One British vessel was located at 0203 in BF 4450.

Between 1115 and 1400 radio intelligence detected radio traffic between six group leaders and several other ships in the Portsmouth area. This traffic resembles that of 28 Sept. and is presumably connected with the training practices being held in the area east of the Isle of Wight.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Three homeward-bound and one outward-bound submarine were escorted from the Atlantic ports. The torpedo boats T "22" and T "25" carried out firing practices in Concarneau roads. The destroyer Z "24" moved from Bordeaux to Royan. The steamer SCHARLACHBERGER (2,900 GRT) put out from Royan for Bilbao escorted by two minesweepers.

Channel Coast:

The minelaying operations L 1 and OK 5 were carried out during the night of 29 Sept. according to plan. During the night of 30 Sept. three ships of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla will move from Le Havre to Cherbourg. The torpedo boat T "19" that is to transfer to home waters during the first half of October is awaiting the convoy of the steamer LIVADIA in Le Havre.

While on her way to carry out the minelaying operation L 1 the GREIF was damaged by a mine that exploded 20 meters abeam.

The boat has carried the operation out according to plan and is remaining in Le Havre for repairs.

At 0438 the group of steamers with the 38th Minesweeper Flotilla had an encounter with six enemy PT boats ten miles southwest of Boulogne. One of the enemy ships was set on fire. We suffered losses in personnel. The motor minesweepers RA "2" and RA "6" were damaged.

The minesweeper M "4616" ran aground and sank on the evening of 29 Sept. while putting out from Abrevach in heavy fog. Her crew has been rescued and her weapons and secret papers taken off.

Convoy operations were only carried out in the Channel Island traffic area.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.1. North Sea:

Convoy "462" Elbe - Hook was carried out according

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to plan. Nine ground mines in all were swept off the Frisian Islands. Minesweeping operations had to be discontinued off the Dutch coast owing to the weather. As a result the patrol positions in this area remained unoccupied. In connection with the attack of eight enemy planes on the Maas Flotilla during the afternoon of 29 Sept. it has now additionally been reported that a gunboat had to be beached, a tug was set on fire, and several vessels were damaged. Two of the attacking planes were probably shot down. In the same area a boat of the Rhine Flotilla was forced onto the coast and burned out as a result of an air attack. One of the attacking planes was probably also shot down there. During the evening of 29 Sept. lively air activity was reported over Heligoland Bight. Eighty-four of our night fighters went up to intercept them.

A schooner struck a mine and sank off Neuwerk.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Lively air reconnaissance activity was observed off the Norwegian coast and submarine hunting in the area between Iceland and the Faroes. On 29 Sept. single reconnaissance planes were reported over the areas of Petsamo, Vardoe and Bergen.

Own Situation:

At 2200 on 29 Sept. the steamer SANTOS (5,700 GRT) ran aground off Molde. Salvage operations have been started. The loss of the patrol vessel VP "5705" in West Fiord was probably due to a boiler explosion. Nineteen members of her crew are missing.

Twenty-two ships were escorted north and twenty-eight south. Eleven ships were delayed in the polar coastal area owing to a shortage of escort vessels.

In view of the urgent need for defense measures to be taken in Alta Fiord, Group North/Fleet has again asked whether a few armed fishing vessels could not be made available, as increased escort duties make it impossible for such defense vessels to be withdrawn from other areas of Naval Command, Norway.

Group North/Fleet informed Operations Division, Naval Staff that it had sent a request to Submarine Division asking that due consideration be taken of the present unsatisfactory operational condition of the submarines stationed in Northern Waters, and that the execution of the most important tasks in the northern area be assured before any submarines are withdrawn. Group North/Fleet stated that in order to carry these tasks out three boats were needed for the Bear Island positions, one for Ice Fiord, and two for weather and minelaying operations. (See Teletype 0726). Commander, Submarines, Norway reported in this connection that the recommendation for the withdrawal of the submarines had been made on the assumption that all the boats of the 13th Submarine Flotilla would be remaining in Northern Waters. At the time when the names of six further submarines recommended for withdrawal were submitted, it had been planned to keep all the minelaying boats of the 13th Submarine Flotilla in Northern Waters. (See Teletype 2110).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During the day, several planes were reported to have penetrated into Kronstadt Bay where bomb and machine-gun attacks were carried out. One enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns. The port occupation of Lavansaari, Seiskari and Battaranaya Bay remained in general unchanged.

2. Own Situation:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic reported that the submarine chase in the area east of Skagen was discontinued at 1100 as no results had been obtained until then. One ground mine was swept northeast of Schultz Ground. One mine was swept between Hela and Gdynia, and one off Pillau. The anchorages of the 27th Submarine Flotilla at Bornholm, Allinge, and Hammerhus were declared unsafe because mines are suspected.

Naval Command, Baltic has ordered the WETZOW to proceed, keeping to deep water because of the mine situation. At 0700 the ship was in or near AO 9544 and dropped anchor in Danzig Bay at 1000. She will probably not be allowed to enter Gdynia before the afternoon of 1 Oct. as a thorough

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sweep of the approach channel has been considered necessary. Having consulted Naval Command, Baltic, Group North/Fleet recommended that the training group be temporarily transferred to Memel and Liepaja.

Fishermen reported that the steamer ZUELLICHOW (600 GRT), which was on passage from Riga to Stettin, was apparently sunk by a torpedo plane west-southwest of Windau. As soon as the 25th Minesweeper Flotilla has arrived in Kotka, Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic is planning to station four heavy artillery carriers of the 24th Landing Craft Flotilla in the sea area between Kolkas and Liepaja to protect steamers sailing under relay escort. The 1st Air Force has promised to provide air cover in the same area at dawn.

The armed fishing vessels in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic were prevented from occupying their patrol positions owing to the weather. The 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was forced to discontinue its minesweeping operations.

Nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries.

V. Submarine Warfare.

According to radio intelligence, an enemy signal was intercepted ordering the stragglers of convoy ON "204" to keep to navigation-al points in grid squares AL 2456 and AD 8924, presumably because a Mitchel plane reported having sighted a submarine in AK 6169. As it is presumed that the ONS and ON convoys will also be proceeding on a more northerly route, our patrol positions have been moved further north. From 1200 on 1 Oct. the new positions will be between AD 8815 and AK 0339.

Submarine U "279" reported that during the night of 30 Sept. in AK 2278 she had beaten off an attacking Hudson plane that approached without having been previously located.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

No important combats have been reported. Activity

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was small on both sides.

Only eight planes were shot down in the air raid on Bochum during the night of 29 Sept. We lost four planes. Fog handicapped our fighters, of which 284 went into action.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 2nd Air Force reported that two direct hits were scored on a destroyer and two on an LST in a raid carried out by our bombers on the port of Ajaccio. Three enemy planes were shot down at the same time.

Air Force Command, Southeast reported that our bombers carried out operations against insurgents in the southwestern part of Crete.

Strong enemy formations attacked our Army positions at Pontecorvo. In the Aegean eight enemy planes were reported over Crete, six over Milos, and six over the mainland which flew in as far as 100 kilometers west of Bucharest.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty-three enemy planes were shot down over the Army front lines on 29 Sept. We lost four planes.

The 5th Air Force reported 28 planes on operations, of which seven were on reconnaissance operations against the blockade runners in the Skagerrak.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Ten freighters and one tanker belonging to the convoy which was sighted on 29 Sept. from Cape Spartel put into Gibraltar. The remainder of this convoy was joined by five freighters, one U.S. salvage ship, two tugs, and five escort vessels from this port.

On the morning of 30 Sept. ten transports, one freighter, and one auxiliary cruiser passed through the Strait of Gibraltar from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic; this convoy was

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joined by one transport, two freighters, three auxiliary aircraft carriers, the seaplane tender ALBATROS, and two destroyers from Gibraltar. Later on a DIDO-class cruiser followed on from Gibraltar. Three transports put into Gibraltar from the east, one of which put out again at noon making for the west.

No reconnaissance reports have been received from the western and eastern Mediterranean.

On 29 Sept. eight medium-sized merchantmen put into Ajaccio. This is presumably the convoy with French troops from Oran aboard of which we had been informed by an agent. At 1007 on 30 Sept. one destroyer and one LST were located 35 miles southwest of Ajaccio on a northeasterly course.

According to photographic evaluations, there were 4 merchantmen, 1 hospital ship, 3 landing craft, 35 small harbor vessels, and 1 PT boat in Maddalena harbor. Porto Vecchio harbor was unoccupied.

There were 11 warships, 12 landing craft, 3 tankers, and 17 freighters in the harbor and roads of Palermo.

The supply traffic in the Tyrrhenian Sea showed normal activity.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The minelayer POMMERN put out from Toulon in the morning making for the east. Ferry traffic from Corsica was carried out according to plan despite unfavorable weather conditions. All naval formations have been withdrawn from Naples except for the coastal guns. Owing to the riots staged by the population, the final evacuation of our forces from this city has been planned for the night of 30 Sept.

3. Area Naval Group South:

a. Adriatic Sea:

Three steamers left Pola for Cattaro on 29 Sept. Three steamers put into Trieste from the south. One steamer is on passage from Trieste to Zara. Otherwise nothing to report.

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b. Aegean Sea:

According to photographic evaluations, the port occupation in Parteni on Leros increased by one destroyer and three steamers. The occupation of Porto Laki was unchanged. Bombs were reported to have been dropped on the southern part of Rhodes at 2300 on 29 Sept.

On Corfu in all about 600 Italians were shot or taken prisoner. About 10,000 unarmed Italians surrendered, most of them in closed formations. The officers will be dealt with in accordance with the Fuehrer directive. The following material was captured: eight batteries, the arms and equipment of eight infantry battalions, one trench mortar battalion, and one anti-aircraft defense company; moreover stores and munitions. Our casualties were: seven killed, including two naval ratings, and 45 injured. Investigations as to the whereabouts of the former German island garrison have not yet been completed. (The naval and air force personnel is said to have been taken to Brindisi by the Italians).

The inquiry made into the loss of the steamers ELSI and ARDENA, lost as a result of mines off Cephalonia, has shown that the ELSI ran into one of our minefields despite previous warning.

The ARDENA was most probably sunk by an IM mine. An Army post on the coast subsequently reported that during the night of 27 Sept. several enemy planes which penetrated the coastal area jettisoned their bombs at sea when taken under machine-gun fire. The planes flew very low. The bombs did not explode. They were therefore probably not bombs but IM mines being dropped in our barrage gaps. Twenty-eight members of the ARDENA's crew have been rescued, 32 of her anti-aircraft gun crew and 120 out of the 840 Italian prisoners aboard.

This is obviously a very clever tactical enemy move to close our barrage gaps, which he knows to be in shallow waters close inshore, with IM mines as soon as we have occupied the port - and all at a time when we have no gear or vessels for minesweeping operations ready yet. The enemy air force will most probably try to prevent us from bringing up minesweepers. The success of this operation must be ascribed to the close co-operation between the enemy's naval and air forces. Operations Division, Naval Staff has informed Commander in Chief,

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Air Force, Operations Staff with copies to German Naval Command, Italy; Group South; Commanding Admirals, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Sea; Group North/Fleet; Group West; Naval Commands, North, Baltic and Norway; as well as Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, Navy of the experience gained from this enemy operation and enquired whether it might not be possible for our Air Force to carry out similar operations. The decision as to where and when such operations are to be carried out would naturally have to be left to the naval commanders, and their success could only be ensured if the required air force assistance is immediately forthcoming.

Fourteen mines were swept in the enemy minefield off Trikkeri channel.

A transport carrying approximately 1,000 German soldiers put into Suda from Piraeus.

On 28 Sept. Group South submitted a demand for the immediate assignment of a naval assault detachment of at least 1,000 men to Naval Shore Commander, Peloponnesos because the Army is withdrawing its infantry, which so far covered our 609th Naval Artillery Battalion, to an inland defense position.

Naval Staff decided as follows:

"1. It is absolutely impossible to provide about 1,000 men for the formation of a naval assault detachment for the Peloponnesos.

2. The increasing demand for infantry protection against insurgents and enemy landings must be met by the Army and must also include the naval coastal batteries. If the Army withdraws all its forces from the coastal areas, then the Navy cannot remain there all alone but will also have to withdraw its batteries from the coast.

3. Army Group E should be approached and asked to provide adequate infantry protection for the naval coastal batteries. This demand should be based on the general opinion held by the Navy as stated in paragraph 2. "

c. Black Sea:

On the evening of 29 Sept. four ships of the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla that were proceeding to their

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patrol positions south of the Strait of Kerch had a brief encounter with two enemy PT boats, which withdrew when our ships fired two torpedoes and opened fire.

The fairway between Tuzla Spit and Cape Tuzla in the Strait of Kerch is blocked by a lighter that has been scuttled there.

Submarine U "24" put out from Constanta for its operational area. A low-flying enemy plane that was machine-gunning Constanta was shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation Far East.

Nothing to report.

(Bremen)

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